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This thesis contributes to recent discussions about criminology’s public role 
through an empirical case study analysis of the dominant discourse of ‘public 
confidence in the criminal justice system’ in England and Wales. The thesis begins 
by arguing that the recent literature reflecting on criminology’s public role has 
failed to adequately deal with the tensions created by the plural, value-dependent 
and contested character of criminological knowledge. 
Then, drawing on primary data from newspaper archives, parliamentary debates, 
research reports, academic books and papers, policy documents and focus group 
and interview transcripts, the thesis provides a multi-faceted analysis of the public 
confidence agenda. It argues that the dominant discourse of public confidence 
takes up a politically prominent ‘lay concept’ and, without clarifying what it means, 
discursively constructs it as a ‘real’ object which is both measurable and caused.  
This understanding of confidence reflects contingent historical conditions 
(including the ‘modernist’ criminological outlook), and is premised on an 
(unacknowledged) value-based decision about how to do research on how the 
public think and feel about the criminal justice system. The public confidence 
agenda in research and policy is a governmental project encompassing a double-
epistemic aspiration: (i) to be epistemic (by providing scientific knowledge which 
shapes policy); and (ii) to promote a particular conception of criminological 
expertise (as episteme - objective, context-independent, scientific knowledge). As 
such it provides an excellent case study for reflecting on recent discussions of 
criminology’s public role.   
The thesis concludes that the starting point for any discussion of criminology’s 
public role in a democratic society should be an explicit acknowledgment of the 
value-based decisions which are implicit in every criminological project. Such 
acknowledgment provides a route to a more fruitful method for negotiating the 
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Dr Ruth Graham (Co-Investigator) and Dr Andy Dale (Non-academic Research 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Point of departure 
How do, and how should, social scientific endeavours in the broad and contested 
field of criminology relate to the public sphere and the actions of government? 
These questions are at the core of recent discussions about ‘public criminology’. In 
this thesis I attempt to propose some answers by drawing on an empirical 
exploration of the emergence and effects of a body of knowledge on ‘public 
confidence in the criminal justice system’1.   
Concentrating on this body of knowledge was, initially, a matter of opportunity: the 
thesis began its development whilst I was working on a funded research project 
which sought to contribute to the production of an alternative body of knowledge 
about public confidence in the criminal justice system in England and Wales2. 
Whilst working on this project, I experienced a growing awareness of the tensions 
inherent in using social research to understand the way people think and feel in 
order that such thinking and feeling can be, in effect, manipulated by political and 
administrative elites. My imagination was captured by the way in which these 
elites, and the researchers who worked with and for them, conceptualised (and 
justified) their use of research ‘products’ in the service of measuring the way the 
public perceived them and their activities.  
                                                        
1 I use inverted commas around ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ here to indicate 
that this is a concept which has, as will become clear, become reified as an object for research and 
policy. In the interests of readability I will not use inverted commas throughout. However, where 
the phrase public confidence in the criminal justice system is used, it should be taken to mean the 
reified object.   
2 Henceforth I will refer to this project as simply ‘the project’. For more details about the project see 




I became interested in the assumptions underpinning the idea of public 
confidence: about where members of the public and criminologists stand in 
relation to the criminal justice system and how and why non-offending members of 
the public can and should become the objects of criminological research. I started 
to consider how ‘expert’ knowledge generated by professional researchers both in 
and outside of academia might support and sustain these assumptions. I became 
convinced that a better understanding of the ‘formation and… effects’ (Lee, 2007: 
1) of the public confidence agenda3 would yield insights which could be brought to 
bear on the public criminology debate (see below).  
Through my investigations I found that the public confidence research agenda 
could be understood as both research which aimed to have a public role (by 
providing advice to policymakers and practitioners) and research which promoted 
a particular understanding of the appropriate public role of expertise (as the 
provider of value-free ‘facts’ which, by implication, should structure and inform 
opinion formation amongst members of the public). This dual role makes the 
public confidence agenda a particularly interesting case study for thinking about 
criminology’s public role. 
But before my thesis started to take this kind of coherent shape I had only a set of 
rather vaguely linked observations. Firstly, I noted that the concept of public 
confidence had become increasingly central to criminal justice policy in England 
and Wales, despite being only rather vaguely defined in the research and policy 
literature. Secondly, I noted that some criminologists utilised the concept in their 
own work without explicitly clarifying its definition or meaning. Thirdly, I noted 
that, from about the mid-1990s onwards, criminologists had become increasingly 
interested in an apparent shift to a more ‘punitive’ attitude towards criminals 
which was frequently attributed to the increasing concern of politicians to be seen 
to be reflecting the opinions of the public on crime and justice, rather than 
deferring to the knowledge produced by ‘experts’. 
                                                        
3 For the sake of brevity, throughout this thesis I use the term public confidence agenda to refer to 
the sustained and deliberate focus on public confidence as an object of research and policy and the 
network of linked research and policy developments which have sprung up in response. 
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From these initial observations sprang a number of questions: Why is a concept as 
poorly defined as public confidence apparently so central to criminal justice and 
penal policy? Why are some criminologists engaging with the concept of public 
confidence (and similar concepts) in a relatively uncritical fashion? What are the 
linkages between the increasing prominence of the notion of ‘public confidence’ 
and apparent increases in punitiveness? What does all this mean for criminology, 
criminal justice and confidence? These questions reflect my desire to understand 
more about why a situation which I find troubling exists and this thesis is the 
product of my attempts to address these questions.  
1.2 Setting the scene  
1.2.1 Public confidence at the heart of criminal justice 
Maintaining and increasing ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ has 
been a stated strategic priority for criminal justice agencies in England and Wales4 
since at least as far back as the early 1980s. The 1984 Criminal Justice Working 
Paper quoted the Home Secretary as saying: ‘No one can afford to disregard the 
need to sustain full public confidence in our criminal justice system’ (Cited in 
Home Office, 1984: para 1), whilst the report on the second British Crime Survey 
(BCS) noted that:  
‘Public opinion has over the last five years become more central to the concerns 
of criminal justice policy. Greater recognition has been given to the principle 
that the criminal justice system should command public confidence… One 
obvious consequence…is a greater need for information on public attitudes … to 
gauge public confidence’ (Hough and Mayhew, 1985: 43). 
                                                        
4 This thesis focuses primarily on England and Wales. Reference is made to research from other 
jurisdictions on public confidence in aspects of criminal justice where that research has been 
influential in the English (meaning English and Welsh) context (this is primarily work from North 
America). The recent English preoccupation with monitoring public confidence in the criminal 
justice system has only recently been emulated in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The earliest 
reference to the measurement of public confidence in the criminal justice system made in reports of 
the Scottish Crime Survey is in the report for 2008/9. In Northern Ireland meanwhile, although 
reference is made to the Northern Ireland Crime Survey measuring public confidence in 2003/4, 
the measurements obtained do not feature prominently until the report on the 2006/7 survey. In 
both Scotland and Northern Ireland the measures of confidence used and types of analysis 
conducted mirror those used in the British Crime Survey (which only covers England and Wales). 
As such the public confidence agenda in research and policy, which this thesis takes as its analytical 
focal point, has been primarily an English affair.  
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The authors here advocate using data collected through mechanisms like the BCS 
to monitor public confidence in support of the government’s priority of 
maintaining public confidence. After some delay this vision was finally realized in 
the 1990s. A suite of questions for measuring public confidence that the criminal 
justice system is ‘fair and effective’ were trialled in the 1996 BCS, and subsequently 
approved to provide performance data in support of the Labour government’s 
regime of ‘Public Service Agreements’ (PSAs)5.  
Under the PSA regime, criminal justice agencies were required to work together to 
increase public confidence as measured by the BCS. In 2003  joint working was 
further institutionalised with the establishment of the 42 ‘Local Criminal Justice 
Boards’ (LCJBs) which brought together the most senior representatives from the 
criminal justice agencies (Police, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), Magistrates 
and Crown Courts, Prison Service, Probation Service and Youth Offending Teams) 
in each of the police force areas in England and Wales6.  
The PSA relevant to the public confidence agenda was PSA 24, Indicator 2: 
‘Increase public confidence in the fairness and effectiveness of the CJS’7. The 
confidence target was (until the 2010 general election brought about significant 
and ongoing reorganization of government departments and performance 
monitoring8) owned by the Office for Criminal Justice Reform (OCJR), the central 
                                                        
5 Following the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review, in an attempt to provide a structure for 
ensuring that public money was being deployed effectively by evaluating ‘performance’ against 
measurable objectives, the government introduced a complex system of performance targets, 
organized into Public Service Agreements.   
6 There are 43 police force areas in England and Wales but representatives from both City of 
London Police and the Metropolitan Police sit on the London Criminal Justice Board.  
7 The initial ‘headline’ confidence measure was based on responses to the question: ‘how confident 
are you that the criminal justice system as a whole is effective at bringing offenders to justice?’. This 
was subsequently amended to: ‘how confident are you that the criminal justice system as a whole is 
effective?’ The available response options were: ‘very confident’, ‘fairly confident’, ‘not very 
confident’, ‘not at all confident’. Very and fairly confident responses were subsequently aggregated 
to identify the proportion of ‘confident’ individuals.  
8 The formation of the coalition government has brought considerable change and uncertainty for 
criminal justice agencies. At the point of writing the previous target regime of PSAs has been 
scrapped and it is unclear how or if it will be replaced. Nonetheless criminal justice agencies remain 
concerned about public confidence in the services they provide and the BCS remains one of the 
main sources of data in this regard.  
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department responsible for monitoring LCJBs. The OCJR required LCJBs to produce 
strategies and action plans demonstrating that they were taking positive steps to 
help meet the target.  
In support of their work to improve confidence LCJBs were provided with 
research-based guidance which had been produced based on analysis of the BCS 
and other commissioned Home Office studies. Additionally, many LCJBs also 
carried out their own research into what were commonly referred to as the 
‘drivers of confidence’. Under the Labour government, then, ‘public confidence’ 
moved into a position very much at the heart of the criminal justice system. 
1.2.2 Punitiveness, populism and public criminology 
Recent decades have seen criminologists analysing what many regard as 
perturbing trends in criminal justice policy in Anglophone jurisdictions (see inter 
alia Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001; O’Malley, 1999; Ryan, 1999; Hallsworth, 2000; 
Rose, 2000; Freiberg, 2001; Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur and Hough, 2003; 
Grimshaw, 2004; Hutton, 2005; Wacquant, 2009; Loader, 2010). Characterizations 
and explanations of the current state of the criminal justice landscape are myriad, 
and often conflicting, but the idea that there has been a punitive shift has gained 
general acceptance as an analytical focal point for contemporary criminology, 
despite some prominent notes of dissension (for example see Matthews, 2005).   
Most aspects of the increasingly punitive action against offenders are regarded as 
incompatible with criminological evidence, and thus also irrational. Some 
criminologists fear that a wholesale cultural shift has deemphasized the 
importance of the goal of rehabilitating offenders, substituting a ‘New Penology’ 
(Feeley and Simon, 1992); a ‘post-correction’ age (Bauman, 2000: 212); an 
increase in ‘confinement without the aspiration of reformation’ (Rose, 2000: 334); 
or a ‘Culture of Control’ (Garland, 2001). All of these characterizations of 
contemporary trends in criminal justice are difficult to reconcile with the 
traditional aims and content of criminological knowledge.  
Whether criminologists and other experts are being marginalized altogether in the 
criminal justice policymaking process, or whether understandings of expertise are 
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simply diversifying, is a matter of some debate. However, it is generally accepted 
that, over the last three decades, as political debates about crime and justice have 
become more heated, politicians have paid increasing attention to representations 
of the views of ordinary members of the public. The terms ‘populist punitiveness’ 
(Bottoms, 1995) and ‘penal populism’ (Roberts et al, 2003) have been used to 
describe an apparent tendency for some politicians to cynically seek political 
advantage in this way.  
There is disagreement about whether increasing public influence over the criminal 
justice arena should be regarded in an entirely negative light. Some criminologists 
(e.g. Ryan, 1999; 2003) point to the positive democratic aspects of politicians 
responding to public sentiment, however others have warned that, due to the 
distorted media coverage of crime and criminal justice, the public are woefully 
misinformed about the facts of crime and justice (e.g. see Roberts et al, 2003). Still 
others have argued that policymakers are relying on inadequate methods for 
understanding how the public think and feel about their criminal justice system 
(e.g. see Green, 2006). 
Against this backdrop a body of work has recently emerged which purports to 
engage with the issue of criminology’s public role. This work has been primarily of 
either North American or British extraction and has, to an extent, piggy-backed on 
the debates taking place about ‘public sociology’ (see Burawoy, 2005). Nonetheless 
the content of the ‘public criminology’ literature is (for better or worse) 
distinctively concerned with the public role of criminology. In the British context 
the discussion has recently been much animated by the publication of a book 
entitled Public Criminology? (Loader and Sparks, 2010a).  
1.2.3 Public confidence research: a part of the problem or the solution? 
Much of what has been said and written in the literature tracing recent trends in 
criminal justice policy seems to be lacking in reflexivity about the legitimate role of 
‘expertise’ as opposed to lay ‘opinion’ in the policy-making process of a democracy 
(although the recent emergence of work on public criminology, most notably 
Loader and Sparks (2010a), has gone some way towards starting to address this 
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deficit). There has been a tendency to understand the problems associated with 
‘populist punitiveness’ as being external to the criminological field (the existence 
and value of which is taken for granted). Often the problem is traced back to a 
failure by members of the public to understand properly the evidence about ‘what 
works’ and by politicians to appreciate that the (implicitly) ignorant public are 
mistaken.  
Understood in this way, the populist punitive turn appears to require a response 
from criminologists not unlike that which the advocates of the public confidence 
agenda have offered: a robust method for measuring levels of public confidence 
and understanding the factors that drive it. In this way the problems faced by the 
criminological field can simply be brought within the scope of its established 
methods for solving problems. This may explain why the public confidence agenda 
has, thus far, received little effective critique, even by those criminologists who 
appear to be most concerned about recent developments in criminal justice policy.  
1.3 Thesis overview 
In this thesis I address the gap identified above by presenting a thorough critique 
of the public confidence agenda. I then use this critique to contribute to the 
contemporary debate about criminology’s public role. The thesis is structured as 
follows: Chapter Two provides a review of the literature which attempts to 
describe and explain the characteristics of contemporary criminal justice policy, 
and to explore the public role of criminology; Chapter Three describes the methods 
which I have applied to critique the public confidence agenda, and details the 
theoretical perspective underpinning these methods; Chapter Four provides a 
chronological overview of the development of public confidence research, followed 
by a deconstruction of the dominant discourse of public confidence; Chapter Five 
traces the emergence of the public confidence agenda, identifying its historical 
conditions of existence and exploring the particular social and political context 
against which it emerged in its dominant contemporary form; Chapter Six presents 
an analysis of qualitative data gathered as part of the funded research on public 
confidence; Chapter Seven applies the analysis of the public confidence agenda to a 
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discussion of criminology’s public role, in order to draw some conclusions about 
potentially fruitful future directions for this body of work.   
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Chapter 2. The public role of criminology: A review of recent 
debates 
 
‘Crime and punishment are topics on which everyone is entitled to have a view, 
and it is the concentration and diffusion of these views which goes to make up 
public opinion. ... Although it is vain to expect that penal matters can be wholly 
divorced from these emotional attitudes, who can deny that the more they are 
restrained and informed by a body of factual knowledge, the more effective and 
enlightened our system of criminal justice will be?’ (Radzinowicz, 1961: 180)  
‘I was determined that there should be a long-term plan: a course of action that 
would lay a path for an enlightened penal policy. In particular I believed that 
changes should not be based on swings in emotions and opinion, prone as they 
are to the influence of dramatic events and bizarre cases, but upon reliable 
information about the phenomenon of crime, its social and personal roots and 




In recent years, government activity in the area of criminal justice policy has 
inspired a growing body of scholarship attempting to describe and account for 
apparent changes to the criminal justice policy ‘landscape’9 (for example see 
Feeley and Simon, 1992; Bottoms, 1995; Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001; O’Malley, 
1999; Ryan, 1999; Hallsworth, 2000; Rose, 2000; Freiberg, 2001; Roberts et al, 
2003; Grimshaw, 2004; Hutton, 2005; Loader, 2010). Broadly speaking, this 
                                                        
9 I borrow the term ‘landscape’ from David Garland’s usage in The Culture of Control. Garland 
suggests that recent changes to criminal justice system policy ‘would surprise (and perhaps even 
shock) a historical observer viewing this landscape from the vantage point of the recent past’ 
(Garland, 2001: 1). It is this idea of the variable terrain of criminal justice which I wish to evoke by 
borrowing Garland’s term. This borrowing of vocabulary should be taken as an indication that, at 
this stage, I find the topographical metaphor usefully evocative, rather than as an endorsement of 
Garland’s thesis or theoretical perspective. In the interests of expressive parsimony I will therefore 
use the term ‘landscape literature’ throughout this thesis to denote that body of work which is 
concerned with describing and accounting for the nature of criminal justice system policy. Whilst 
this body of literature is most commonly associated with the discipline of criminology it also 
represents an enterprise in policy analysis and, more specifically, analysis of policy. That is to say it 
is concerned with the content (‘origin, intentions and operation’ (Gordon, Lewis and Young, 1993: 
7)) and determinants (‘inputs and transformational processes’ (Ibid: 6)) of criminal justice policy. 
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‘landscape’ literature can be seen as the attempt to identify which approaches to 
dealing with crime receive political support and become policy, and to understand 
why this is so. What binds this body of work together is an underlying and often 
implicit concern with the part which criminologists play, and should play, in 
moulding the criminal justice landscape.  
This body of work could be regarded as criminology being ‘drawn into questions of 
crime control and criminal justice policy’ (Loader and Sparks, 2004: 26, my 
emphasis). The turn of phrase used here implies that these topics might be 
considered by some (although not, it should be noted, by Loader and Sparks) to be 
peripheral to the normal business of criminologists; an area of enquiry into which 
they are mysteriously ‘drawn’ rather than venturing voluntarily. According to this 
view, then, the ‘landscape literature’ would exist at the edges of the criminological 
discipline, rather than being a central concern.  
Yet most criminologists are likely to have at least some interest in the terrain into 
which their empirical evidence is released, the obstacles which it must navigate if 
it is to have any kind of influence in ‘the real world’, and thus to a large extent the 
landscape literature transcends the internal divisions of the criminological field: its 
central themes are of interest to criminologists regardless of political hue, 
theoretical perspective, topic area, or method of choice. Indeed, Young (1996) has 
argued that, since the 1940s, a gradual ‘collapse and confusion of criminology and 
criminal law’ has been occurring, such that it is more apt to refer to a ‘crimino-legal 
complex’ which comprises:  
‘the knowledges, discourses and practices that are deemed to fall under the 
rubric of criminology, criminal justice and criminal law [and] to convey the 
sense that “crime” has become (been made?) a potent sign which can be 
exchanged among criminal justice personnel, criminologists, politicians, 
journalists, film-makers and, importantly (mythical) ordinary individuals’ 
(Young, 1996: 2)   
I concur with Young’s description of the crimino-legal complex, and approve of the 
way it captures the blurring of the boundaries between ostensibly separate 
endeavours. However the term crimino-legal complex is perhaps a little 
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cumbersome and for this reason I have retained and used (for good or for ill) the 
terms criminology, criminal justice policy, penal policy and so forth10.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, at the current time, the issues which the 
landscape literature deals with are particularly topical, as criminologists, and 
indeed social scientists more generally, are increasingly reflecting upon the public 
significance of their intellectual endeavours. In many ways, then, the landscape 
literature can be seen as having laid some of the foundations for the recent 
preoccupation with proposing and describing a ‘public criminology’. By identifying 
some worrying trends in the criminal justice policy arena, and attempting to 
provide accounts of how and why these trends have emerged, the landscape 
literature has stimulated criminologists’ concerns about the prospects for their 
field, and has played a part in framing debates about how criminologists should 
interact with wider publics.  
In this chapter I review literature which deals with the public role of criminology. 
In the first part of the chapter I consider the reasons why this public role has been 
increasingly subject to attention. I explore what I consider to be the four most 
salient features of the ‘landscape literature’: (i) the claim that criminal justice 
policy has become more punitive; (ii) concern about the changing role of 
criminological ‘experts’ in shaping that policy; (iii) the allegedly increasing 
influence of ordinary members of the public on policy; and (iv) the claim that the 
public are ignorant of ‘the facts’ about crime and justice due, at least in part, to the 
inadequate media coverage of the topic.  In the second part of the chapter I deal 
with the proposed tasks and objectives of a ‘public criminology’. I provide a critical 
over view of the work which has proposed ‘public criminology’ and the related 
notion ‘newsmaking criminology’ and I focus at some length on the recent book 
Public Criminology? (Loader and Sparks, 2010a) which has proposed an alternative 
                                                        
10 Whilst policy pertaining to how convicted offenders are dealt with by criminal justice systems is 
the main focus of much of the discussion here, and is commonly referred to as ‘penal policy’, I 
prefer to use the broader term ‘criminal justice policy’ to describe my focus. This is because 
referring only to ‘penal policy’ would exclude some important changes to criminal justice systems, 
including changes in policing. For this reason I use the phrase ‘criminal justice policy’ throughout to 
encompass all aspects of criminal justice system business, whilst the specific term ‘penal policy’ is 
used to refer to the sentencing and treatment of convicted offenders. 
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notion – ‘democratic underlabouring’. I conclude that none of these approaches 
contain adequate approaches to the issue of plurality and conflict within the 
criminological knowledge-base.    
2.2 ‘[S]pitting in the wind’? The challenging terrain of the contemporary 
criminal justice landscape 
2.2.1 The ‘punitive turn’11 
In recent decades it has often been suggested that criminal justice policy and 
practice in Anglophone jurisdictions has been becoming more ‘punitive’(e.g. see 
inter alia Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001; O’Malley, 1999; Ryan, 1999; Hallsworth, 
2000; Rose, 2000; Freiberg, 2001; Roberts et al, 2003; Grimshaw, 2004; Hutton, 
2005; Wacquant, 2009; Loader, 2010). This suggestion is often supported through 
reference to the growth in prison populations (e.g. see Ryan, 1999; Hallsworth, 
2000; Freiberg, 2001; Garland, 2001; Grimshaw, 2004; Hutton, 2005; Wacquant, 
2009) which is alleged to have occurred despite the lack of a parallel escalation in 
the number of offenders convicted and the seriousness of their offences12. 
Furthermore, an increasing range of community penalties are said to have taken 
on a ‘more punitive edge’ (Ryan, 1999: 8) and to have expanded the state’s power 
and influence over the lives of individual offenders (Garland, 1996: 454; Matthews, 
2005: 179). 
Whether or not the manifest material changes on the criminal justice landscape 
ought properly to be regarded as indicating that criminal justice systems have 
become more ‘punitive’ is a matter of dispute. Though the notion of increasing 
punitiveness may be a thread which unites analyses of the criminal justice 
landscape most of these analyses also remark upon the diverse and contradictory 
nature of that landscape (e.g. see O’Malley, 1999: 175-6; Garland, 1996: 445; Young 
                                                        
11 Hutton, 2005: 243 
12 In England and Wales, on first inspection, this allegation certainly appears substantiated:  
according to the British Crime Survey, crime has been falling since 1995, however the average 
prison population increased by 85% between 1993 and 2009. Ministry of Justice projections for the 
number of prisoners in 2015 suggest this will be somewhere between 83,400 and 95,800 (Ministry 
of Justice, 2009). 
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and Matthews, 2003: 12; Newburn and Reiner, 2007: 324 and Tonry, 2004: 1), 
arguing that its contours cannot be explained through reference to any single 
explanation (e.g. see Feeley and Simon, 1992: 449). Of course, criminal justice is 
not the only area of public policy to be riven with apparent contradictions, and 
many would argue that this is a constant feature of most policy fields. 
Furthermore, it is frequently the case that the rhetorical representation of issues 
by politicians appears to be at odds with the policies which they ultimately enact 
(e.g. see Roberts et al, 2003). Nonetheless, the common thread running through 
many of these accounts is the sense that western criminal justice systems have 
become increasingly ‘punitive’ in word and deed, although more ‘punitive’ action 
against offenders has been punctuated by occasional, and apparently incongruent, 
‘progressive’ moves (e.g. see Ryan, 1999: 11; Rose, 2000: 334).  
Whilst acknowledging the diversity within the literature, which in truth does much 
more than merely argue that criminal justice policy has become more punitive, the 
idea of increasing punitiveness is the aspect of the literature which has proven 
most influential, and which has gained acceptance as a key issue of concern for 
contemporary criminology. However, it has been suggested that different authors 
may be subsuming related but conceptually distinct shifts in penal policy under the 
word ‘punitive’, and associated ‘codewords’ (Grimshaw, 2004: 2), and that there 
has been a tendency to treat the concept of punitiveness as relatively 
unproblematic, to the extent that the descriptor ‘punitive’ has become accepted 
shorthand for any ‘increase in the range and intensity of formal interventions’ 
(Matthews, 2005: 179). This overuse of the word, Matthews suggests, has led to it 
being reified as a social fact (Ibid: 192), serving to obscure ‘the diverse, uneven and 
contradictory nature of penal processes’ (Ibid: 179).  
The descriptor ‘punitive’ can be used to denote both the effects of the actions 
described and the intentions13. What is more, one may also distinguish between the 
                                                        
13  ‘Punitive’ is defined in the dictionary as meaning ‘inflicting or intended to inflict punishment’, 




retributive imposition of suffering14, intended to produce no result other than the 
administration of ‘deserved’ suffering, and the use of suffering, or the threat of 
suffering, to produce a deterrent effect. Walker and Hough (1988: 6) have argued 
that we ought to observe the distinction between the ‘colloquial’ use of the word 
‘punitive’, as causing suffering, and the way in which penologists use it, which is to 
mean ‘endorsing retributive aims’. If we adopt this quite specific understanding of 
what it means to be ‘punitive’ then we might be less willing to accept the much 
broader and vaguer sense in which the notion of punitiveness has been invoked in 
recent years as we note that the increasingly severe outcomes faced by offenders 
have not always emerged from more punitive intentions towards them.  
One alternative explanation which has been offered for the increase in the number 
of offenders either being held in prison, or subjected to high levels of intervention 
in and surveillance of their lives is that there is ‘a new strategic formulation in the 
penal field’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992: 449). This ‘strategic formulation’ takes the 
form of an ‘actuarial criminology’, applying risk management techniques to 
criminal justice practice in order to control and manage offenders rather than to 
punish them. According to this view, the fact that offenders are subject to more 
intrusive and restrictive controls, which may be experienced as ‘punitive’, is 
merely an unintended consequence of a crime control strategy which has ‘neither a 
punitive nor a rehabilitative logic’ (O’Malley, 1999: 177)15.  
Another explanation, proposed by Bauman (2000), is that rising prison 
populations have been brought about both by the intention to remove offenders to 
a place where they cannot harm the public (to manage the risk they pose) and by 
the intention to inflict suffering on offenders. Bauman sees these two rationales as 
closely entwined, and as representing the state’s desire to be seen to ‘do 
                                                        
14 I use the idea of ‘suffering’ here to describe the experience of the offender. At the core of the idea 
of punitiveness is the notion of suffering. 
15 O’Malley suggests that this approach is underpinned by a number of somewhat controversial 
claims, including that rehabilitation has been an ‘expensive failure’ (Cohen, 1985 cited by O’Malley, 
1999: 178), that law-abiding citizens deserve protection from offenders (Ibid: 178), and, perhaps 
most controversially, that it is cheaper than leaving prisoners free and offers the public greater 
protection (Zedlewski, 1985 cited by O’Malley, 1999: 178).  
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something’ which will ensure people’s safety (Ibid: 214). The increasing use of 
prison is thus, according to Bauman, deliberately and punitively exclusionary, 
offering to physically deliver on the promise to keep people safe (by removing 
threatening elements into a place of ‘immobilization’) and, simultaneously, to 
punish those threatening individuals through the very act of immobilizing them 
(Ibid: 217).  
For Bauman, then, it is neither helpful nor necessary to disentangle incapacitative 
from punitive intentions: the two are so closely associated in the public mind, and 
in the minds of politicians who wish to be seen to meet public demands, that any 
attempt to separate them would be merely academic. Similarly, Nils Christie 
observed in 1981 that Scandinavian research had suggested that attempts to 
impose indeterminate ‘treatment’, rather than determinate punishment, on 
criminals were ‘obviously experienced as considerably more painful than old-
fashioned pain’ (Christie, 1981: 25). This again highlights the difficulty posed by 
insisting that punitiveness is a matter of intent, rather than outcome. 
It seems, then, as several writers have remarked, that the idea of increasing 
‘punitiveness’ or a ‘punitive turn’ may apply an inappropriately broad brush to the 
task of painting the outline of recent policy and practice. Certainly the terminology 
appears rather imprecise in light of more nuanced accounts of change, some of 
which I have referred to above. Nonetheless, as already noted above, the idea that 
there has been a ‘punitive turn’ does appear to have captured the attention of 
criminologists and other observers of criminal justice policy, and to have been set 
down as a way-marker for navigating the criminal justice landscape.  
2.2.2 Marginalisation or multiplication of experts? 
Criminologists concerned about the increasingly punitive treatment of offenders 
have tended to ground their resistance to this trend in the claimed ineffectiveness 
of increasing the severity of sanctions (e.g. see Garland, 1996; Hallsworth, 2000; 
Rose, 2000; Roberts et al, 2003; Young, 2003). The claim that policy has shifted in a 
punitive (and therefore implicitly ineffective) direction usually rests upon a linked 
claim that criminologists, as the ‘experts’ on what is effective in dealing with crime, 
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have suffered a loss of status in the criminal justice policymaking process (e.g. see 
Brereton, 1996; Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001; Roberts et al, 2003; Young and 
Matthews, 2003; Young, 2003; Grimshaw, 2004; Tonry, 2004; Loader, 2006, 2010).  
The argument is that, despite the expansion in the criminological enterprise and 
the availability of rigorous research, ‘key areas of crime and justice policy continue 
to be developed with little apparent reference to … research’ (Brereton, 1996: 83). 
The so-called ‘punitive turn’ is thus described as ‘irrational since it is inconsistent 
with the results of criminological research’ (Roberts et al, 2003: 160) and ‘driven 
much more by ideology, exaggerated fears, and political opportunism than by 
rational analysis of options and reasoned discussion’ (Tonry, 1999b: 1789); whilst 
penal regimes including chain gangs, curfews and boot camps are said to have 
been instituted in Western criminal justice regimes in opposition to available 
evidence about their likely effectiveness (Hallsworth, 2000: 155). The perceived 
loss of status suffered by criminologists is said to be observable in a ‘recurring gap 
between research-based policy advice and the political action which ensues’ 
(Garland, 1996: 462) and ‘[g]overnment policies [which] fly directly in the face of 
research evidence, and would seem to almost wilfully ignore expert opinion’ 
(Young, 2003: 36)16.  
Commentators who bemoan the diminishing effectiveness of criminal justice 
policies often seem to presuppose the existence of instrumental objectives for 
                                                        
16 Before examining this line of argument more closely it is important to note that it is usually 
acknowledged within the literature that there never was a ‘golden age’ when evidence from 
scientifically rigorous criminological research formed the exclusive basis for criminal justice policy. 
In an often-cited article on this topic, Loader (2006) has argued that the attitude of ‘liberal elitism’ 
in penal policy-making (which he suggests existed in England from the post-world war two period 
up until the 1980s), was not rooted primarily in extensive in-depth social research. Rather policy 
was formulated by the ‘platonic guardians’, a small elite of ‘politicians, senior administrators, penal 
reformers and academic criminologists wedded to the belief that government ought to respond to 
crime…in ways that, above all, seek to preserve “civilised values”’ (Loader, 2006: 563). Liberal 
elitism was less about methodical research into the causes of crime, and more about fostering a 
body of ‘informed opinions’ (Ibid: 568).  
Even during the era of ‘liberal elitism’ Ryan (1999: 15) argues that ‘[p]ractice often belied expert 
theory’ (Ryan, 1999: 15).  He recounts how public opinion played an important role in inhibiting 
reform in relation to the death penalty, suggesting that governments and civil servants were 'wary' 
of instituting reform which 'ran directly contrary to public opinion' (Ibid: 3). As Matthews (2005) 
has noted, somewhat sardonically, ‘[t]ry as they might, elites do not always have things their own 
way. Now and again the public is determined to intrude’ (Matthews, 2005: 3). 
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penal policy (including crime reduction and offender rehabilitation), and 
widespread agreement that these objectives are appropriate. According to this 
instrumentalist understanding of penal policy, criminologists provide knowledge 
about how policy can best achieve its goals. If the pursuit of instrumental goals, 
including crime reduction and offender rehabilitation, is the purpose of penal 
policy then failing to consult the criminological evidence-base may be, as Roberts 
et al (2003) have observed ‘irrational’.  
A further concern expressed within the literature is that, in some cases, 
policymakers have either redefined effectiveness, or (worse) have deemphasized 
effectiveness altogether (Hallsworth, 2000: 155). According to this view, shifts in 
criminal justice policy may not be merely a matter of criminological evidence being 
overlooked or ignored, rather they may reflect shifts in policymaker 
understandings of the nature of ‘success’ in the criminal justice arena. For example, 
the intention simultaneously to punish and incapacitate offenders, through 
incarceration, identified by Bauman (2000: 212) has, he suggests, produced a 
tendency for the prison (at least in the United States context) to become a ‘factory 
of exclusion’ in a ‘post-correction’ age (Bauman, 2000: 212). This shift has been 
described by Rose (2000: 334) as an increase in ‘confinement without the 
aspiration of reformation’. However, Tonry and Green (2003) point out that a lack 
of instrumental (i.e. crime reducing) impact achieved by certain initiatives may not 
devalue those initiatives if policymakers also see them as important for achieving 
‘latent goals’, such as symbolising to the public that offenders are being punished, 
or expressing societal abhorrence for certain acts.   
Garland (1996: 458) suggests that criminal justice agencies have attempted to 
manage public expectations by reducing them: ‘redefining their aims, and seeking 
to change the criteria by which failure and success are judged’, agencies now seek 
to be judged against internal referents, rather than against a much broader notion 
of social purpose. And Feeley and Simon (1992) note that ‘[b]y emphasizing 
correctional programs in terms of aggregate control and system management 
rather than individual success and failure, the new penology lowers one’s 
expectations about the criminal sanction’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992: 455). Such 
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changes might be seen as directly undermining the need for certain kinds of 
‘expert’ criminological knowledge, however they can also be seen as premised 
upon, and making space, for certain other forms of expertise. 
It is worth recalling that data collated by ‘experts’ informed the claim that ‘nothing 
works’, as ‘experts’ practising scientific monitoring of correctional and treatment 
approaches to dealing with criminals demonstrated an apparent lack of success in 
the war on crime (Christie, 1981: 25; Ryan, 1999: 7). Although Martinson’s famous 
1974 analysis of the impact of correctionalism is far from uncontroversial (e.g. see 
Matthews, 2009: 357), Garland (1996: 447) has noted that: 
 'Official reports from the 1960s onwards began to register doubts about the 
efficacy of criminal justice institutions. ... limitations ... were increasingly 
exposed - not least by the Home Office's own criminological research - until the 
whole penal welfare strategy began to unravel in the face of the scientific 
monitoring which it had done so much to promote' (Garland, 1996: 447) 
Additionally, it was advances in statistical methods and risk analysis by another 
kind of ‘expert’ which enabled the shift towards the ‘New Penology’ (Feeley and 
Simon, 1992: 466), and new ideas about how best to manage public services led to 
increasing opportunities in the public management field for ‘experts’ from 
accounting and management backgrounds (Feeley and Simon, 1992: 455-6; 
Bottoms, 1995; Garland, 1996; Grimshaw, 2004: 5-6).  
Furthermore, it is clear that there are examples of areas of work where 
criminologists have been instrumental in informing the development of responses 
to crime, for example those approaches which Garland (1996) has named 
‘adaptive’; the growth in community penalties as an alternative to custody 
(Bottoms, 1995: 34-6); the expansion of ‘community policing’ (O’Malley, 1999: 
183) and the theory of ‘Just Deserts’ in sentencing (Bottoms, 1995: 19-21), to name 
just a few. Meanwhile, New Labour’s crime policies were said to have been 
influenced by individuals holding academic credentials which, whatever one thinks 
about the content of their researches, could be seen to legitimate their claims to 
expertise (including Charles Murray, John DiIulio and James Q Wilson) (Young, 
2003: 39).  
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More money was spent on crime reduction research in the 1990s than ever before 
(Garland and Sparks, 2000: 5), and Tonry and Green (2003: 495) have argued that 
at local and agency level researchers have been able to exert their influence and 
that the importance of their role has been recognised through government 
investment in research. Furthermore, whilst it might be tempting to conclude that 
this influence only extends to criminologists of a certain theoretical bent, it has 
also been suggested that several official reports published in the UK in recent 
times ‘could have been drafted by 1980s radical or critical criminologists – and 
some have’ (Matthews, 2005: 190). 
Perhaps, then, as Melossi would have it, criminologists have not lost any power: 
their ‘representations of the criminal’ still have the power to orient ‘the activities 
of the many social institutions that frame the question of “crime” and 
“punishment”’ (Melossi, 2000: 314). Or, as Tonry and Green (2003: 507) suggest: 
‘the cumulative effects of of numerous studies ... gradually influence emerging 
conventional wisdom and widely shared understandings, and as a result shape 
policy’. In other words criminologists may still have the power to shape how 
criminals are viewed and dealt with. Although criminologists are themselves, in 
Melossi’s account, profoundly influenced by the prevailing economic fortunes of 
their society (Melossi, 2008: 7-8).  
Perhaps the issue, then, is more about a shift in criminology’s internal balance of 
power. Of the current moment, Matthews (2005) has argued: 
‘The suggestion that there has been a decline in professional experts shaping 
and implementing penal policy is mistaken. There may be changes in the 
composition of elites and those who formulate penal policy, but this role 
remains largely in the hands of professionals and experts … What is clear is that 
within a continually expanding criminal justice system we have seen a 
proliferation of all kinds of experts … These include not only the established 
experts such as psychologists, sex therapists, drugs counsellors and 
educationalists, but specialists who are preoccupied with much wider 
considerations related to different aspects of lifestyle … The fact that many of 
these experts wear jeans and trainers instead of suits and ties does not make them 
any less expert or any less influential.’ (Matthews, 2005: 189, emphasis added) 
Ericson (2003: 32) has suggested that when criminological research is taken up 
and used by those operating in the practical policy sphere criminologists 
experience a ‘loss of autonomy’ which leads them to claim that their research is 
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unsuccessful at influencing policy. This view, he suggests, is pervasive in 
contemporary criminological research culture (particularly amongst those 
criminologists who started their careers during the era of the strong welfare state) 
and reflects not a complete loss of influence, but rather a shift of policymaker 
attention onto different forms of criminological knowledge, meaning that certain 
criminologists are losing ground in a competitive knowledge market place. 
 It appears, then, that it might be more accurate to refer not to the marginalisation 
of experts, but rather to a change in the types of experts who are influential: a 
‘multiplication of expertise’ (Rose, 2000: 329) in an arena characterized by 
‘competing discourses’ (Freiberg , 2001: 272). To argue then that ‘experts’ have 
been side-lined altogether is to ignore extant facts about the ideas which have 
shaped some recent policy developments, and to neglect the permanently 
contested nature of what counts as an ‘expert’. The status of who is an ‘expert’ and 
what counts as ‘expertise’ is of course contingent and changing. Expert knowledge 
is not developed in a hermetically sealed realm, but is (as noted by Melossi, see 
above) responsive to the social, cultural and political environment within which it 
is developed. Whilst it might be true to argue that evidence derived from certain 
kinds of activities falling under the label ‘criminology’ has been de-emphasised by 
policymakers, it is far from being the case that ‘experts’, of any kind, no longer 
influence the policymaking process.  
The concern which can be identified from the literature, then, is not that ‘experts’ 
per se are being excluded, but rather that some criminologists fear that the ‘wrong 
kind’ of experts are being included, often for the wrong kinds of reasons, and in the 
wrong kind of way. For example: Matthews has described risk analysis expertise as 
‘pseudo-scientific’ and as masking ‘a thinly veiled moralism and subjectivism, 
while providing an extremely limited contribution to the enhancement of public 
safety’ (Matthews, 2005: 187); Young (2003: 41) has argued that the American 
criminological ideas imported to England by New Labour have noticeably been 
what he refers to as the ‘contested’ ideas of the right, rather than those of ‘liberal 
criminology’, and that they have been ‘filtered through the lenses of policy advisers 
and speech-writers’; whilst Wacquant (2009) has argued that the diffusion of US-
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style punitive penal policies around the globe has been achieved through the 
aggressive tactics of partisan Think Tanks with dubious scholarly credentials and 
questionable moral commitments. Meanwhile, the (implicitly ‘bad’) research of the 
International Crime and Victimization Survey is apparently ‘greeted annually with 
dismay and a general gnashing of teeth by the worldwide criminological 
community’ but is widely reported in the press despite generating results which 
are ‘almost the exact opposite of reality’ (Young, 2003: 36). The findings are then 
(mis)used by the media to suggest that Britain is a violent, out of control society 
(Young, 2003: 37).  
However, it is clear that even though on many occasions respected researchers are 
being commissioned by government, suggesting that their knowledge is sought 
after and valued and that academics are able to influence policy, it seems that they 
are rarely (if ever) able to exert influence over the way in which their research is 
framed. As Tonry and Green (2003: 449) observe: 
‘the fundamental questions of policy – severity of penalties, choices between 
repressive and preventive crime and drug control policies, relative law 
enforcement emphases on street crime and white collar crime, and investment 
in social programmes aimed at the root causes of crime. On these big questions 
most elected officials, and probably most citizens, believe they know what 
needs to be known, and see little reason to defer to any asserted expert 
knowledge of criminologists.’ (Tonry and Green, 2003: 499)   
As frustrating as an apparent lack of influence might be for some criminologists 
they are not peculiar to criminal justice policymaking. The formation of policy is 
seen in most analyses as taking place against a backdrop of competing interests, 
values or ideologies, with research findings usually taking a secondary position in 
most theories of how policy is made (cf. Sebba, 2001: 34). For example, in the case 
of the relationship between research into victims’ needs and the development of 
victim-oriented policy, Sebba (2001: 36) suggests that ‘[a]s compared with the role 
of ideologies and interest-groups, the influence of empirical research upon policy 
development in this area was clearly marginal’.  
Tonry and Green (2003: 486) are blunt: ‘Few people outside elementary school 
imagine that research findings translate directly into policy’. They go on to argue 
that ‘influence is often indirect and partial’ (Ibid: 489) but that the findings of 
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‘knowledge utilization research’ suggest that social scientists in general, and 
criminologists in particular, may have ‘more influence than they realize’ (Ibid: 
502). Drawing on the work of Weiss (1986), they suggest that drastic policy change 
is most likely to occur in a ‘window of opportunity’ (Tonry and Green, 2003: 505) 
created by ‘exceptional, high-profile cases’ and in the absence of ‘boundedness’ 
(that is to say significant organizational, political and cultural limits which restrict 
decision-makers’ room to manoeuvre): ‘When windows of opportunity are 
circumscribed by boundedness in a particular place at a given time, policy 
prescriptions that fail to take account of that – those that attempt to push social 
learning beyond its boundaries – will not be taken seriously’ (Tonry and Green, 
2003: 506).  
However, despite the varied notes of dissension to the argument that ‘expert’ 
influence on the policymaking process has diminished and that this is to the 
detriment of the policy enacted, the notion of criminological exclusion from 
policymaking has joined the idea of the ‘punitive turn’ as a defining feature of the 
challenging terrain of the contemporary criminal justice landscape. On the flip side 
of this sense that experts are having less influence on policy is the belief that 
ordinary members of the public are having more influence.  
2.2.3 ‘Penal populism’ or ‘up-grading…the public voice’17?  
A frequently cited explanation for the alleged shift in policymaker attention away 
from ‘experts’ and research evidence about ‘what works’, is the increasing 
attention which is being paid to the perceived desires, expectations and opinions of 
ordinary members of the public (Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001; Roberts et al, 2003; 
Young and Matthews, 2003; Young, 2003; Grimshaw, 2004; Tonry, 2004; Loader, 
2006, 2010). This trend is said to reflect an increase in the extent to which criminal 
justice has become an arena for political conflict (Downes and Morgan, 1997; 
Roberts et al, 2003; Young, 2003). 
In England and Wales, it is generally recognised that a more heated political debate 
around issues of law and order has emerged over the last four decades. This 
                                                        
17 Blumler and Gurevitch, 1996: 129 cited in Ryan, 2003: 15 
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emergence has been traced through the content of election manifestos and 
campaigning materials since the Second World War (Downes and Morgan, 1997), 
analysis of which reveals that the issue of criminal justice did not emerge as an 
arena of political contest until the 1960s, and only really came to the fore at the 
1979 general election18. Political competition appeared to be further intensified 
after 1993, the year which saw both the infamous murder of toddler Jamie Bulger 
by two ten year old boys, and Michael Howard’s assertion that ‘prison works’ 
(Downes and Morgan, 1997: 118; Newburn and Reiner, 2007).  
Young and Matthews (2003) suggest that the heightened level of political tension 
around crime and criminal justice issues in the New Labour era has influenced a 
cohort of politicians with ‘a social-democratic impulse heavily patinated with 
caution, hesitation and conservatism [caused by] the government’s pursuit of the 
central ground of voters’ (2003: 22). A leaked memo from Tony Blair in 2000 
revealed his concern that his government still needed to be perceived as ‘tough’ on 
crime, in order to maintain ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ 
(Roberts et al, 2003: 52-3).  
The evidence supporting the claim that criminal justice has increasingly become a 
key political battleground, and that this development has accelerated since the 
1980s, does appear to be sound and is widely accepted. As to why this has 
happened there does appear to be a consensus that the process was precipitated 
by a combination of social and political conditions and the political strategising of 
both a Labour party which came to perceive crime policy as an area in which it 
could not afford to be seen as weak, and a Conservative party which did not wish 
to lose its own mantle as the party of law and order. Additionally, behind the party 
political rhetoric on crime and criminal justice there have been changes in the way 
                                                        
18 The relatively recent emergence of a heated political contest around crime is well-illustrated by 
the suggestion made by Paul Rock in 1979, that, at that time, crime was not seen by Home 
Secretaries and Prime Ministers as an important part of their role, within ‘a political environment 
which ascribes little importance to criminal law-making’ (Rock, 1979: 192). Rock’s pronouncement 
that ‘British elections are not concerned with crime control problems’ (Ibid: 199) may sound 
absurd now, but it offers significant contemporaneous support to the periodisation of change 




in which the delivery of public services is organized and assessed which may have 
contributed towards an increase in the extent to which policy is influenced by the 
views (variously captured and articulated) of ordinary members of the public.  
Claims that the role of the public in shaping criminal justice policy in many 
Western jurisdictions has expanded over the last 10 to 15 years are widespread in 
the literature (e.g. see inter alia Bauman, 2000; Roberts et al, 2003; Young, 2003; 
Hutton, 2005; Green, 2006; Pratt, 2007; Newburn and Reiner, 2007; Loader, 2010). 
However, the nature and significance of this expanded role are conceptualised 
quite differently by different authors. Politicians have been described as having a 
range of quite different motives and intentions, including, inter alia, exploiting, 
responding to, engaging with or reflecting the views of the public in their policy 
pronouncements. 
Perhaps the first point to deal with is whether in fact the growing role played by 
the public is something new to criminal justice policy, or whether the change has 
been exaggerated. Ryan (2003) suggests that public opinion played a key part in 
prolonging the struggle over abolition of the death penalty: ‘[t]his halting process 
of reform was a direct consequence of the wariness of successive governments 
(and their civil servants) to legislate for something that ran directly contrary to 
public opinion’ (Ryan, 1999: 3), and that public views were also invoked in 
repeated attempts to reintroduce corporal punishment (Ibid: 4). However these 
examples do not exactly debunk the notion that the public now have greater 
influence over policymaking than previously, rather they temper any sense that 
the public previously had no influence whatsoever.   
The most common claim in the literature is that the ‘intrusion’ (Matthews, 2005: 3) 
by the public has become markedly more pronounced in recent years. The 
question is, as I have noted above, what form does that intrusion take? For some 
writers the increasing role played by the public is indicative of a growing 
sensitivity to public opinion by politicians and sentencers, something which is not 
necessarily a negative development. For example, Downes and Morgan (1997) 
have highlighted the positive aspects of the public outcry generated by scandalous 
incidents, citing the 1982 exposure of how Thames Valley Police dealt with 
 25 
 
allegations of rape, and the pressure for change that this outcry generated (1997: 
126), and Matthews (2005) has suggested that public opinion played a critical role 
in ‘confronting injustice’ (2005: 189)19.  
Meanwhile Ryan (1999) has argued that, far from being cynically populist, the 
Labour government from 1997 engaged in a genuine and necessary attempt to 
reengage the public as ‘active citizens’, with the objective of ‘mobilising consent’ 
(Ryan, 1999: 17). Ryan (2003) makes a distinction between the New Labour 
approach of ‘up-grading…the public voice’ (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1996: 129 cited 
in Ryan, 2003: 133)20 and the kind of populism which, he suggests, was adopted by 
the Conservative party in their ‘cynical manipulation’ of the public during an 
‘authoritarian moment’ (Ryan, 2003: 8; cf. Hall et al, 1978; Hall, 1980). The 
difference between the Conservatives and New Labour on this matter is, he 
suggests, a matter of ‘process’ (Ryan, 1999: 11)21.  
However, despite Ryan’s optimism about the Labour government’s intentions, 
positive interpretations of the increasing prominence of the public in the criminal 
justice arena appear outgunned by more sceptical interpretations. According to the 
sceptics the public ‘intrusion’ into issues of crime and criminal justice has inspired 
(or been inspired by22) punitive political rhetoric (Newburn and Reiner, 2007: 
                                                        
19 He gives the examples of the Stephen Lawrence and Rodney King cases, which exposed racial 
discrimination by police forces in the UK and the US respectively. 
20 Ryan concedes that during the 1970s an opportunity did arise to produce a progressive solution 
to the breakdown of the post-war consensus on penal policy but the opportunity was missed due to 
the rapid emergence of ‘authoritarian populism’ (Hall et al, 1978 cited by Ryan, 1999), which 
accompanied the dismantling of the social democratic consensus and the arrival of the political 
trend known as ‘New Right’: ‘penal strategy was manipulated under the broad rubric of “law and 
order” politics to secure wider political objectives during a time of economic crisis’ (Ryan, 1999: 7). 
Notably in Ryan’s version of events at this point in time it is not a power-to-the-people moment, but 
a manipulation from above, stretching from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s (Ryan, 1999: 8). 
21 It is not entirely clear on what basis Ryan claims to be able to distinguish the intentions 
underpinning Labour’s responsiveness, from those motivating the Conservative’s ‘manipulation’. 
He appears to assume that populism is a kind of opportunistic strategising which politicians resort 
to only under certain adverse political conditions. Thus, he argues, New Labour’s populism, at least 
in the earlier stages of its power, was not ‘simply opportunistic’ because Labour did not need to be 
opportunistic - it had the largest electoral majority of the century (Ryan, 1999: 14). 
22 Exploring explanations for the US’s exceptionally high rate of imprisonment Tonry (1999a: 425) 
has suggested that one plausible explanation is that ‘it is not public opinion per se that leads to 
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334) and leads to expert-produced evidence being disregarded by policymakers 
(Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001; Hallsworth, 2000; Young, 2003). It is also suggested 
that the kinds of harsh and exclusionary penal measures and rhetoric subsequently 
adopted fail to comply with democratic ideals (Lacey, 2008). The key objection to 
increasing public influence, however, appears to be that it interferes with progress 
towards utilitarian policy goals, encouraging the construction of new ‘irrational’ 
penal regimes in opposition to available evidence (cf. Hallsworth, 2000: 155; 
Roberts et al, 2003: 160).  
For those who are the most critical of the increasing role played by the public, 
what the politicians have been doing is not responding to the views of the public, 
rather they have been exploiting them. One of the most widely cited accounts of the 
factors shaping penal policy is the 1995 paper by Anthony Bottoms, in which he 
coined the term ‘populist punitiveness’: 
‘populist punitiveness' occurs when politicians 'believe that the adoption of a 
"populist punitive" stance will satisfy a particular electoral constituency … the 
term "populist punitiveness" is intended to convey the notion of politicians 
tapping into, and using for their own purposes, what they believe to be the 
public's generally punitive stance' (Bottoms, 1995: 39-40)  
Roberts et al (2003) adapted Bottoms’ term and described what they call ‘penal 
populism’, a political approach which, unconcerned with the wisdom of slavishly 
following public preferences, ‘involves the exploitation of misinformed opinion in 
the pursuit of electoral advantage’ (Roberts et al, 2003: 7). Roberts et al (2003) 
suggest that the emergence of full-blown penal populism in England and Wales can 
be traced back to Michael Howard’s term as Home Secretary, specifically his 
assertion that ‘Prison Works’. It is suggested that this was something of a turning 
point as Howard, and the conservative party, ‘successfully23 mined a broad seam of 
public opinion that supported harsher sentencing’ (Ibid: 46) and ‘[f]or the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
harsher policies, but politicians’ proposals and posturing that lead to changes in public opinion’, 
suggesting that politicians have been leaders rather than followers of public opinion. 
23 The use of the word ‘successfully’ here seems somewhat misleading. Howard and the 
conservatives certainly attempted to use tough rhetoric on criminal justice to win political 
advantage, however they still lost the 1997 election by a landslide. 
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remainder of the Conservative administration, public opinion was as central in the 
formation of penal policy as it had previously been marginal’ (Ibid: 47).  
This populism, it is argued, continued under New Labour after 1997. Interestingly, 
they suggest that evidence of New Labour’s populism can be seen in their concern 
with ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ and being seen to be ‘tough’ 
on crime (Roberts et al, 2003: 52-3).  Similarly, Downes and Morgan (1997) 
suggested that Labour's talking 'tough' on law and order meant that by 1997 their 
party attracted greater 'public confidence' on this issue than the conservatives 
(1997: 129). Populism is here specifically linked to attempting to gain the 
‘confidence’ of the public on the issue of law and order, with ‘confidence’ indicated 
through opinion poll ratings. It is claimed that Labour boosted their opinion poll 
ratings on the issue of crime during the 1990s by emphasising their ‘tough’ 
criminal justice credentials. 
As already noted above, what gets said by politicians can often differ somewhat 
from the policy which is eventually enacted. However, the literature explores the 
importance of political rhetoric as well as policy. In a robust assessment of the 
habits of politicians, Garland (1996) suggests that '[s]ometimes the punitive 
pronouncements of government ministers are barely considered attempts to 
express popular feelings of rage and frustration in the wake of particularly 
disturbing crimes' (Garland, 1996: 460) and that punitive 'law and order' policy 
announcements 'frequently involve a knowing and cynical manipulation of the 
symbols of state power and of the emotions of fear and insecurity which give these 
symbols their potency' (Ibid: 460). Pratt (2007: 15-18) argues that populist 
politicians explicitly place their trust in the public rather than ‘experts’, and 
publicly denigrate expert-produced knowledge forms such as statistics where they 
appear to conflict with commonsense, or ‘what we all know’.  
There is, then, a clear sense within the literature that shifts in the political rhetoric 
herald ‘a new political consensus under which governments seek to give voice and 
effect to, rather than temper, the impassioned demands of citizens’ (Loader, 2010: 
1). Furthermore, the rhetoric may also reflect the dominant ideas about the 
necessary political action; for example, Bauman suggested that government had 
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presumed that there was a growing need to discipline certain segments of the 
population and that this view was shared by public opinion (Bauman, 2000: 212-
213), to such an extent that ‘the sole publicly displayed concern of [political 
parties] is to convince the electorate that it will be “tough on crime” and more 
determined and merciless in pursuing the imprisonment of criminals than its 
political adversaries have been or are likely to be’ (Bauman, 2000: 213).  
On first reading, the literature can leave one with the impression that ‘political 
surrender to a punitively inclined public has become commonplace’ (Hallsworth, 
2000: 150). However upon closer examination it is clear that the processes and 
motivations implied by the notion of populism require careful delineation. Green 
(2008: 20-21) has suggested that a distinction should be made between ‘populist 
punitiveness’ and ‘penal populism’ on the basis that Bottoms’ populist 
punitiveness is ‘less accusatory’ (Ibid: 21), than penal populism’s implication of 
‘wilful cynicism’ (Ibid: 21) on the part of politicians. Green’s key objection to these 
two terms being treated as synonymous is that the severity of the implied criticism 
of politicians’ conduct differs in each account, with severity being a function of the 
degree of deliberately self-interested (‘wilful’) manipulation of the public ascribed 
to politicians when they adopt populist punitive measures.  
The account of ‘populist punitiveness’ outlined by Bottoms, Green suggests, 
permits politicians to be guilty of mere naivety, whilst penal populism suggests 
more self-interested intent on the part of elected officials. It is not initially clear 
that Bottoms’ ‘populist punitiveness’ is, as Green suggests, ‘less accusatory’ than 
Roberts et al’s ‘penal populism’: Bottoms’ suggestion that politicians are placing 
‘their own purposes’ above some more selfless notion of the public good, would 
appear to be pretty accusatory. However, the key difference for Green is that 
Bottoms imputes good faith to the politicians who seek to respond to ‘what they 
believe to be the public’s generally punitive stance’ (Bottoms, 1995: 40 quoted by 
Green, 2008: 20), whereas Roberts et al (2003) accuse politicians of deliberately, 
and apparently without regret, exploiting public ‘concern and lack of knowledge’ 
(Roberts et al, 2003: 65 quoted by Green, 2008: 20). 
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A problem with Green’s observation of the differences between ‘populist 
punitiveness’ and ‘penal populism’ is that, as I have argued above with reference to 
Ryan’s claims, whilst it would certainly be desirable to be able to distinguish 
between politicians motivated purely by self-interest and those motivated by a 
naïve desire to please the public, it is unclear how it is suggested that we should 
determine politicians’ ‘true’ intent. Furthermore, one might argue (and both Green 
and Ryan acknowledge this) that we should be able to expect politicians not to be 
naïve, and to be ever vigilant to the possible long-term outcomes of the decisions 
that they make. In line with this way of thinking ill-considered populism, even 
naively executed, would be seen to fall below the standards of competence and 
conduct that (it is implied) politicians should meet. Whatever its merits in terms of 
conceptual clarity, Green’s distinction is not commonly made within the literature, 
where authors tend to use ‘populist punitiveness’ and ‘penal populism’ 
interchangeably, and liberally. 
It is conceivable though that, because of its intuitive appeal for criminologists, the 
currency of penal populism as an explanation of recent developments may have 
been over-inflated. Indeed, Matthews (2005) has suggested that the penal 
populism thesis had come to exercise an unhealthy level of dominance over 
criminology, to the detriment of more accurate and nuanced explanations of 
criminal justice and penal policy development. And perhaps this is the biggest 
problem with the idea of ‘penal populism’: as an explanation of the state of the 
contemporary criminal justice landscape it raises as many questions as it provides 
answers. Whilst it might initially appear to be a straightforward matter of 
politicians’ actions being led more by public opinion than by the views of ‘experts’ 
there are many areas of ambiguity. 
In a slightly different context, Garland (2001) has noted that ‘criminological ideas 
… are adopted and … succeed because they characterize problems and identify 
solutions in ways that fit with the dominant culture, and the power structure upon 
which it rests’ (Garland, 2001: 26). One cannot ignore the fact that the idea of penal 
populism has instant intuitive appeal, not only for criminologists who may fear 
that their influence on policymakers is waning, and that their expertise has been 
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devalued, but also for other interest groups concerned about changes to the 
criminal justice landscape (Matthews, 2005: 196). The term ‘populism’ has an 
ominous ring for those who consider themselves ‘experts’ in any field, for it 
indicates an approach to political decision-making which does not privilege 
expertise. To accuse politicians of penal populism is, then, also to accuse them of 
failing to value the type of expertise which is the criminologist’s life work; it is also 
a way of casting politicians’ approach to policy formulation in a negative light.     
Some accounts of the contemporary criminal justice landscape offer more subtle 
and carefully drawn accounts of the current situation. Within these accounts 
populism is just one periodically occurring facet of the relationship between the 
public, policymakers and experts. In other words populism is clearly delineated as 
an episodic phenomenon, rather than a constant state. So, for example, Young 
(2003) argues that, ‘at times’ in criminal justice policymaking, ‘there is a simple 
populism at work – a notion of giving the public what they want’ (Young, 2003: 
36). Ryan (1999: 10), meanwhile, argues that there are dangers in seeing all 
populist responses as serving ‘the same generalised purpose at different historical 
moments’, a tendency which he suggests is present in Garland’s work. Although 
Ryan does not deny that work of this type has generated useful insights, it may, he 
suggests, also serve to disguise the fact that each episode of populism is different 
and may serve a very different purpose. Populist responses thus need to be 
analysed separately to avoid the risk that ‘the discourse in which we have become 
accustomed to decode them is possibly obscuring a more complex agenda…to see 
them only as opportunistic, manipulative and cynical is arguably questionable, or 
at best tells us only half of the story’ (Ryan, 1999: 10). In a similar vein, Matthews 
(2005: 189) suggests that the role of populism should not be overstated as the 
process of policy formation is complex and ‘[t]he general demands that members 
of the public may express from time to time are filtered, shaped and moderated 
before they are translated into penal policy’ (Matthews, 2005: 189). 
Tonry (1999a: 432-433) prefers Musto’s (1987) notion of policies being enacted in 
cycles which are responsive to material conditions, but on a time-lagged basis, 
which makes them appear to be out of step with societal needs. In this way harsh 
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anti-drug laws are not enacted until after a change in public sensibilities has 
already started to noticeably reduce drug use, but these changed sensibilities also 
mean that there is less resistance towards a harsh turn in sentencing for drug-
related offences. So: ‘in periods just after crime rates have peaked and begun 
falling, many more people come to believe that harsh measures are called for and 
will be effective, even if a few years earlier, their beliefs were very different’ 
(Tonry, 1999a: 433). Furthermore, if new harsher laws are enacted just as crime 
rates start to fall then it can seem to people that the tougher approach ‘worked’ 
(something which Tonry suggests applied in relation to New York’s zero tolerance 
policing, California’s three-strikes rule, and truth-in-sentencing legislation across 
many states).     
On the other hand, Roberts et al (2003) portray populism as the default position of 
many politicians, a position which determines how they respond to specific events 
so that, when a high-profile tragedy occurs, ‘populist politicians tend to exploit 
these incidents by advocating ever harsher responses to crime and raising the 
possibility that the tragedy could have been prevented, had the government 
adopted such measures in the first place’ (2003: 59-60). They argue that populist 
penal policies result from one or more of: ‘an excessive concern with the 
attractiveness of policies to the electorate’; ‘an intentional or negligent disregard 
for evidence of the effects of various criminal justice policies’; ‘a tendency to make 
simplistic assumptions about the nature of public opinion, based upon 
inappropriate methods’ (Roberts et al, 2003: 8). Crucial to the oft-cited arguments 
advanced by Roberts et al are the findings from empirical studies which suggest 
that most ordinary members of the public hold inaccurate views on the reality of 
crime and criminal justice practice, and that this reflects the paucity of information 
available to them through the media. 
2.2.4 The ‘misinformed’ public and the ‘distorting’ media  
Research demonstrating that the public generally do not have an ‘accurate’ notion 
of either the volume and distribution of crime, or the nature of the state response, 
has been a staple of the criminological knowledge base since at least the 1980s. 
Research carried out in the 1960s first assembled empirical data on this issue in 
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England and Wales (Banks, Maloney and Willock, 1975) and during the 1980s a 
growing body of research established the idea of the ‘misinformed public’ as an 
extant social fact (albeit one which many criminal justice professionals and 
criminologists had long suspected). Data collected and analysed during this decade 
was said to have revealed that ‘most people overestimate the leniency of the 
courts’ (Hough and Moxon, 1985: 164); that the public had a ‘distorted view of the 
sort of offender filling up our prisons’ (Shaw, 1982: 13); and, in the Canadian 
context, that ‘the Canadian public’s view of crime in 1982 did not correspond with 
our best estimate of what crime looks like’ (Doob and Roberts, 1984: 272).  
More recently, Hough and Roberts (1998: 27) have suggested that ‘public 
dissatisfaction [with the criminal justice system] stems from public ignorance of 
the system’; Chapman, Mirrlees-Black and Brawn (2002: 9) found that 
‘[k]nowledge of crime trends and current sentencing practice is particularly poor, 
with only about one in ten people being reasonably well-informed in these areas’; 
and Roberts et al (2003: 23-4) have highlighted data from several countries, 
including England and Wales, showing that large proportions of the public 
overestimate the amount of crime and underestimate the severity of sentences 
passed. Accepting and confirming the idea that the public are ignorant of ‘the facts’ 
about crime and justice, Green (2006: 131) suggests that ‘public preferences have 
acquired a level of influence and deference that many might find difficult to justify’. 
As these illustrative examples suggest, the idea that members of the general public 
often lack an accurate appreciation of the ‘reality’ of crime and justice as 
represented by ‘experts’ is, then, widely noted and accepted in the literature. 
The effect that the media have on people’s understanding of the scale and nature of 
the crime problem, and what should be done about it, has also been much 
discussed in the literature. It has been argued that crime reporting approaches 
crime from a very personalized perspective, focusing on the persona of the victim 
to the detriment of the provision of balanced information about the wider context 
within which crimes take place, including crime statistics (Pratt, 2007; Roberts et 
al, 2003, Roberts and Hough, 2002; Allen, 2004). It has also been noted that there 
has been a quantitative increase in the volume of crime stories in the media (Pratt, 
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2007: 69) and that this has been accompanied by a qualitative shift in the focus of 
such stories, with an increasing focus on violent and sexual crimes (Pratt, 2007: 
69). As a result, the media are held responsible by many criminal justice 
professionals and commentators for, amongst other things, increasing the fear of 
crime, distorting people’s perceptions of the prevalence of all types of crime (but 
particularly of violent and sexual crime), and damaging public understandings of 
sentencing by focusing disproportionately on atypical cases (Pratt, 2007; Roberts 
et al, 2003; Hough, 2003; Allen, 2004; Roberts and Hough, 2002).   
Roberts et al (2003: 92) in particular portray the media as highly culpable in 
encouraging the pursuit of ineffective punitive policy by systematically distorting 
the reality of crime, playing on and feeding public emotions and promoting a 
simplistic criminal justice agenda. They refer to its ‘dynamic and powerfully 
conditioning force’ which frames ‘not only reality to feed late modern anxieties but 
also tell[s] stories about how to think about the remedies to these anxieties and 
what political actors are doing or failing to do in “making things better”’ (Roberts 
et al, 2003: 73). Green (2008: 217-2) has been similarly scathing, suggesting that 
the press ‘routinely fail to present readers with sufficient contextual information 
even to begin to formulate informed views’. In this kind of media environment, 
Downes and Morgan (1997) suggest that politicians can be caught off-balance and 
'utterly outpaced by events which explode in such a way that unusual responses 
are called for by "public opinion" - a phenomenon for which media attention is 
often taken to be the proxy' (1997: 121).  
The media are viewed as culpable in two ways. Firstly, they are charged with 
failing to provide the public with objective, balanced and complete accounts of 
criminality (e.g. see Green, 2008; Roberts et al, 2003; Downes and Morgan, 1997; 
Young, 2003; Tonry, 1999). Secondly, it is suggested that they falsely represent 
themselves as the public’s mouthpiece, thus distorting politicians’ and 
policymakers’ understandings of the direction of public opinion (see Downes and 
Morgan, 1997; Roberts et al, 2003; Green, 2008). The situation is summarised by 
Green (2008: 272) as one where ‘the government routinely takes into account the 
convictions of an unrepresentative press that stands as an inaccurate barometer of 
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the public will and that has failed to provide a forum for the public to process fully 
the issues it raises in its name’.  
Green’s objection to this situation is that it creates an environment which is hostile 
to the formulation of ‘informed opinion’ amongst members of the public which, in a 
society where opinion polls on political subjects are ubiquitous and influential, 
leads to ‘low quality public opinion’ being granted an inappropriate level of 
deference by politicians (Green, 2008: 270-286). Similarly, Young (2003) has 
argued that:  
‘spokespeople for New Labour will turn to their focus groups and to opinion 
polls and argue that they merely do what the people want. But is it really 
surprising, given the direction of political leadership and the prevalent mass 
media coverage of crime, that public opinion is pushed in a pessimistic and 
vindictive direction?’ (Young, 2003: 41) 
However, it has also been noted that determining just how the media portrayal is 
assimilated into the public’s points of view is a demanding task, especially when 
most people are at some point exposed to the same material (Skogan and Maxfield, 
1981 cited by Ditton et al, 2004: 599). Nonetheless, there does appear to be 
general acceptance of the proposition that, as a rule, media coverage of crime and 
criminal justice is not conducive to informed and rational debate of the issues, and 
does not, on its own, enable the public to gain an accurate sense of how much 
crime is being committed, how prevalent different types of offences are, who is 
committing these offences, and what sanctions are imposed upon them. 
However, others have proposed that public opinions and preferences on crime and 
justice have much more deep-seated sources of inspiration. Garland notes that the 
new law and order policies are reliant on ‘the pre-existence of certain wide-spread 
social routines and cultural sensibilities’ (Garland, 2000: 347), and that '[o]ne 
might say that we are developing an official criminology that fits our social and 
cultural configuration - one in which amorality, generalized insecurity and 
enforced exclusion are coming to prevail over the traditions of welfarism and 
social citizenship' (Garland, 1996: 462). He describes the ‘crime complex’ which is 
characteristic of the culture of high crime societies: a ‘formation’ which exists 
within ‘attitudes, beliefs and assumptions’ about crime. A key attitude is that ‘the 
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criminal justice state is viewed as inadequate or ineffective’ (Ibid: 367). These 
kinds of attitudes are not easily or quickly dislodged because they have a basis 
deep within our ‘commonsense’ in the ways in which we are accustomed to 
thinking and talking about crime, our ‘widespread habits of thought, routines of 
action, and structures of feeling’ (Ibid: 369). Such deep-rooted aspects of our being 
cannot, Garland suggests, be adequately understood as merely the product of 
punitive discourses peddled by opportunistic politicians or profit-oriented media. 
Tonry (2001), meanwhile, suggested that public ‘sensibilities’ were the key to 
understanding oscillating penal fashions. He proposed that, although other 
explanations for the rise in US prison population (e.g. rising crime, a hardening of 
public attitudes, politicians’ opportunistic use of crime issue) may have some 
plausibility, that ‘a deeper explanation is required for why those forces operated so 
powerfully in our time and not in others’ (Tonry, 2001: 168). Tonry suggested that 
unfair, cruel and repressive punishments are imposed ‘because many or most 
people in an era come to share perceptions and beliefs that justify them, unmindful 
that their perceptions and beliefs may be wrong and that they themselves in a few 
years may see them to have been wrong’ (Tonry, 2001: 169). This can happen 
despite the fact that most people at the times in question are capable of 
understanding principled and practical arguments about the rights and wrongs of 
different approaches.  
Girling, Loader and Sparks (2000: 163) have suggested that there is a ‘theoretical 
deficit’ within the research dealing with public responses to crime. They suggest 
that this deficit ‘arises from the way in which this literature views – or, perhaps 
one should say, disregards – “lay” responses to crime’ (Ibid: 163). They argue that 
the literature has tended to view public responses as homogeneously punitive, has 
failed to consider the background conditions which might contribute to the 
articulation of demands for order, and has not closely examined the way in which 
criminal justice agencies themselves may contribute to ‘cultural mentalities and 




2.2.5 Towards a public criminology 
So far this chapter has described how, in recent years, criminologists have 
expressed their concerns about four features of the criminal justice landscape: (i) 
the increasingly ‘punitive’ character of criminal justice policy, which has been 
widely interpreted as signalling (ii) policymakers’ disregard of evidence produced 
by criminologists in favour of pursuing popularity amongst the wider public, who 
are seen as (iii) having a poor level of knowledge and understanding of the ‘facts’ 
of crime and justice, a shortcoming, which is seen as at least partially attributable 
to (iv) the impoverished media discourse on crime and justice.  
Recognition of some or all of these four features of the criminal justice ‘landscape’ 
has encouraged some criminologists to reflect more explicitly upon the nature and 
achievements of their field, and to consider why their efforts often appear to have 
‘amounted to nothing more than spitting in the wind’ (Austin, 2003: 557). But to 
understand the criminal justice landscape in these terms - that is to say as punitive, 
ineffective, irrational, populist, and be-devilled by public ignorance of the ‘truth’ 
about crime and justice born of an impoverished media discourse on the subject - 
is already to imply a particular sense of what criminology’s public role should or 
could be. We might summarise this role as: (i) informing policy so that irrational, 
ineffective, punitive policies are not enacted; and (ii) educating the public so that 
policymakers are able to enact humane and evidence-based policy without fear of 
public opprobrium. In other words the seeds of the call for ‘public criminology’ 
were already sown in the way in which some criminologists conceptualised, 
interpreted and described the criminal justice landscape over the last 20 or so 
years.   
In fact, all four of the key features of the ‘landscape’ identified above have featured 
in arguments about the need for a ‘public criminology’. For example: Carrabine, 
Lee and South (2000) preface their call for a ‘public criminology’ with the 
argument that increasingly punitive criminal justice policies should be resisted; 
Currie (2007), Chancer and McLaughlin (2007) and Feilzer (2009) have all 
advocated ‘public criminology’ as a response to the marginalization of 
criminologists from the criminal justice policymaking process;  Carrabine et al 
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(2000), Feilzer (2009) and Uggen and Inderbitzen (2010) have proposed ‘public 
criminology’ as a solution to inadequate levels of public knowledge about the 
realities of crime and justice; and Feilzer (2009) and Groombridge (2007) have 
linked ‘public criminology’ to the improvement of media discourse on crime and 
justice. In the next part of this chapter I will explore this literature in more depth.  
2.3 ‘Scholarship versus nonsense’? Recent reflections on ‘public 
criminology’ 
2.3.1 An American gimmick? 
As outlined above, in recent years, criminologists have become more concerned 
about their public role for a number of reasons. Research has repeatedly claimed 
to have revealed that the public are ignorant of basic facts about crime and justice, 
and that extant public and media discourses of crime focus on the most serious 
crimes and encourage punitive attitudes towards offenders. Furthermore, trends 
in criminal justice and penal policy have caused consternation and have been seen 
by some as indicating that criminologists’ work is not valued by policymakers, who 
are much more interested in the opinions of the apparently ignorant public. 
Meanwhile, social scientists generally seem to have been becoming more conscious 
of, and concerned about, the public reception and political influence of their 
work24. 
In light of these developments it is, perhaps, unsurprising that a small 
criminological sub-field has emerged, under the banner of ‘public criminology’, to 
discuss the issue of criminology’s public role, and its relationship to the public 
sphere. Michael Burawoy’s (2005) high profile exposition on ‘public sociology’25 
                                                        
24 Loader and Sparks (2011) bring a brief discussion of the public understanding of science (PUS) 
literature to their discussion of public sociology and public criminology. They use this discussion to 
suggest that the literature on public sociology is ‘rather thin’ (Loader and Sparks, 2011: 56). Their 
brief excursion into the more established PUS literature is a welcome attempt to bring a sense of 
perspective to what can sometimes seem a rather insular debate. The focus of this chapter is on 
recent discussions of criminology’s public role, and to this end I have not included a review of the 
PUS literature here. However, it is clear that this literature has relevance to some of the wider 
themes of this thesis, and as such I refer to it again in my conclusion.   
25 In 2005, the then President of the American Sociological Association Michael Burawoy proposed 
a fourfold division of sociological labour. This entailed the established traditions in professional, 
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inspired a flurry of interest in this idea in the USA, and some of the advocates for 
‘public criminology’ whose work is discussed below are based on the other side of 
the Atlantic (see Currie, 2007; Uggen and Inderbitzen, 2010). However, the term 
‘public criminology’ seems to have first been used in an English publication which 
predated Burawoy’s address (Carrabine et al, 2000), whilst Burawoy’s framework, 
along with aspects of Carrabine et al (2000), was used by Cardiff-based 
criminologist Gordon Hughes (2007) in a chapter entitled ‘Futures of Criminology: 
Going Public?’. These domestic discussions of ‘public criminology’, along with 
longstanding concerns amongst English criminologists about punitive trends in 
criminal justice policy and the apparently impoverished state of public knowledge 
about crime and criminal justice, indicate that the body of work on public 
criminology is more than just an American peculiarity26.  
Nonetheless, the very existence of the idea of ‘public criminology’ as an extant (if 
ambiguous) criminological term in this society (England and Wales), at this time, 
invites investigation. A superficial reading of the ‘public criminology’ literature 
                                                                                                                                                                  
critical and policy sociology making room for a fourth sociological modus operandi: ‘public 
sociology’. Burawoy’s typology of sociological work has stimulated fierce debate amongst 
sociologists and he has been accused, inter alia of maintaining the status quo of ‘intellectual 
insularity’ and internal disciplinary hierarchies by making ‘public sociology’ a mere compartment 
within the larger discipline, thus cementing its ‘second class status’ (Hays, 2007: 80); and of basing 
his argument on the inadequate ‘straw-man’ of a ‘hermetically-sealed’ sociology bent only on the 
pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake (Smith-Lovin, 2007). 
26 In his incisive review of Loader and Sparks’s (2010) recent book Public Criminology?, Loïc 
Wacquant (2011: 441) questions why Loader and Sparks even bring up the matter of ‘public 
criminology’. He suggests that debates in social science around the ‘ “public” tag’ have tended to be 
an American ‘sideshow’ and a ‘hindrance’ to understanding the relationship between criminological 
knowledge and criminal justice policymaking in the European context. He draws the rather 
accusatory conclusion that the reason for using the term is likely to be commercial as the recent 
tendency towards outbreaks of ‘public-itis’ have made ‘public’ into a buzzword almost guaranteed 
to seduce canny academic publishers.  We cannot know the accuracy or otherwise of Wacquant’s 
uncharitable ‘hunch’ about Loader and Sparks’s choice of book title (indeed, in a response to 
Wacquant, Loader and Sparks (2011) diplomatically refuse to be drawn into a refutation), however 
we can dispute Wacquant’s claim that the use of the ‘public’ tag is a predominantly American 
phenomenon emerging only since Burawoy’s infamous ASA address. It is true, as has been noted by 
Christie (2011) and Walters (2011) that these debates do appear to be more relevant to the 
situation of criminology in some societies than others. For example, Christie (2011) notes that in 
his small society (Norway), whether or not criminologists and other social scientists would 
participate in public life was not a choice but a necessity and thus to talk of a separate notion of 
‘public criminology’ is to make ‘artificial what was experienced as natural’ (Christie, 2011: 707). 
However, the context in England and Wales, as described above, is such that discussion of 




suggests that its proponents anticipate (or hope) that through its practise two 
linked outcomes will emerge: (i) a change in the way that the public thinks and 
talks about crime and justice, which is often seen as a necessary precursor to (ii) a 
change in the direction and nature of criminal justice policy. Communicating 
criminological knowledge (including recommendations for policy) widely, clearly 
and effectively, and ‘engaging’ directly with a range of publics, are generally 
regarded as key tasks in achieving these objectives.  
This very brief précis of objectives and tasks makes the idea of ‘public criminology’ 
sound profoundly unremarkable and uncontroversial: a benign and well-
intentioned attempt to propose various solutions to the challenges which 
criminologists perceive to be facing the criminological endeavour. However, it is 
plausible that use of the term ‘public criminology’ is also, at least partly, a strategic 
move by some criminologists to be seen to be opening up, or at least engaging with, 
a novel and potentially lucrative area of criminological work, in which case ‘public 
criminology’ starts to appear gimmicky, self-interested and contrived. But, even if 
that were so, the question would still remain: are the ideas underpinning calls for 
public criminology (and related notions which will be discussed below such as 
‘newsmaking criminology’, and ‘democratic underlabouring’) adequate as 
responses to the challenges which criminologists on both sides of the Atlantic 
currently perceive themselves to be facing?  
In this part of the chapter I attempt to answer this question by reviewing the 
different ways in which the objectives and tasks of ‘public criminology’ (and 
related enterprises) have been described, and identifying the key concepts and 
assumptions upon which it has, in its various guises, been premised. I begin from 
the observation that the slippery notion of criminological ‘truth’ occupies a central, 
yet also ambivalent role within the public criminology discourse. 
2.3.2 Fighting for ‘truth’   
In his call to criminologists to resist ‘marginality’, Currie suggests that 
contemporary conditions represent a serious ‘threat to truth’. He argues that ‘truth 
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can easily be overwhelmed in the real world by calculated untruth’ (Currie, 2007: 
188) and criminologists have to be prepared to ‘fight’ for ‘truth’: 
‘… Truth doesn’t thrive unless it is assertively promoted and nurtured … If we 
do not want to see our work – and the values that sustain it – slowly but 
steadily chipped away, or neutered, we will have to fight for it.’ (Currie, 2007: 
188-9). 
Fighting for truth, as Currie describes it, means energetically opposing the 
interpretations of reality presented by those with ‘a certain ideological axe to 
grind’ which are ‘probably a lot less honest’ than those offered by ‘people like us’ 
(Currie, 2007: 183). Public criminology means working on the ‘public mind’, as 
Currie suggests that:  
‘most Americans remain in the dark about much of what is important about 
crime and justice … they are easily swayed to support policies we know have 
failed and will fail again; to buy into beliefs about crime and punishment that 
criminologists shattered long ago; and to reject most of the strategies that 
might be both more humane and more effective’ (Currie, 2007: 179)  
Criminologists, then, are understood as being in possession of a ‘truth’27 which is 
not being heard by the wider public. In its absence, less ‘honest’ accounts of reality 
are encouraging members of the public to support policies which are both 
ineffective and inhumane. If criminologists want (as Currie clearly does) to alter 
recent trends in policy, it is not enough to do research which identifies truth, 
rather truth must also be ‘assertively promoted and nurtured’ in opposition to 
‘calculated untruth’. This promotional work, it is suggested, is the task of the public 
criminologist, who must confront the fact that, as Cullen has observed (2005: 2), 
‘most criminological research is ignored’. 
In a similar vein, Uggen and Inderbitzen (2010) argue that ‘public criminology’ is a 
mechanism to ‘narrow the yawning gap between public perceptions and the best 
available scientific evidence on issues of public concern’ (Uggen and Inderbitzen, 
2010: 726, emphasis added). They suggest that: 
‘Public criminologists, armed with peer-reviewed evidence, clear points, and 
plain language, have an important role to play as experts in the realm of crime 
                                                        
27 In this chapter I use the word ‘truth’ in the everyday sense which it is used by Currie (2007), 
which is to mean accurate representations which correspond to reality. In the next chapter I 
provide some theoretical reflections on the nature and possibility of this kind of truth. 
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and justice, giving voice to the accumulated and emerging knowledge in the 
field’ (Uggen and Inderbitzen, 2007: 730, emphasis added). 
Uggen and Inderbitzen, then, refer to criminologists as producing ‘evidence’ and 
‘knowledge’. These are somewhat more contingent and less categorical notions 
than Currie’s rather bombastic assertion of ‘truth’ but, nonetheless, Uggen and 
Inderbitzen clearly share Currie’s view that criminology does have some valuable 
‘products’ to offer in this respect. Public criminology, they argue, should aim to 
impact on both policy and the wider public ‘by building a solid evidentiary base 
that can be applied to problems that hold public interest’ (Uggen and Inderbitzen, 
2010: 738). To be effective it ‘demands trust in the knowledge that we produce and 
absorb, trust in the media’s ability to convey it, and trust in the public’s capacity to 
grasp its nuances’ (Uggen and Inderbitzen, 2010: 734).  
This perspective on what it means to do ‘public criminology’ also appears to be 
reflected in Feilzer’s (2009) ‘Experiment in Public Criminology’. The ‘experiment’ 
involved the researcher writing a regular newspaper column to communicate 
‘factual information on crime and justice issues’ (Feilzer, 2009: 475, emphasis 
added), in what she describes as ‘an information-based strategy to public 
education’ (Ibid: 477).  
In a slightly different take on this issue Carrabine et al (2000: 206) envisage public 
criminology as being ‘about taking information and evidence, power and action, 
“back to the people”’. They argue that  
‘the populism of punitive and exclusionary social policy is largely legitimized by 
the distorted version of evidence (or its suppression or denial) presented to the 
public by government and sympathetic media. Popularization of critical 
evidence about the realities of imprisonment, policing, racism, poverty and the 
denial of justice is a key goal for public criminology.’ (Ibid: 206, emphasis added)  
This strategy is seen as a principled response to the deliberate drowning out or 
sidelining of inconvenient criminological evidence by government, a matter which 
has attracted the attention of a number of authors in recent years (e.g. see Walters, 
2003, 2008; Hope, 2004, 2008; Morgan, 2000).  
Hope (2008: 39) uses Mathiesen’s (2004) term ‘silent silencing’ to describe the 
way in which the Home Office recently drowned out critical voices by amplifying 
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the findings produced by ‘compliant’ experts, where both were involved in 
evaluating New Labour’s ‘Reducing Burglary Initiative’. Of the same government, 
Reece Walters wrote: ‘This is not a government that openly conveys and debates 
the truth. It is a government that conceals, manipulates and suppresses truth.’ 
(Walters, 2004: 8-9). The suppression of truth happens in a number of ways, as 
Walters goes on to explain: 
‘The Home Office remains silent on all those topics that have the potential to 
reflect poorly on government. As a result, it is not an institution that represents 
the British public – it is an organization that exists to protect the reputation of 
government ... through its biased and skewed research agenda [it] presents the 
British public with an erroneous and partial view of crime in British society ... 
In effect, the Home Office both perpetuates and superficially describes media 
stereotypes of crime and criminality that continue to be used by politicians for 
grandstanding and electioneering purposes.’ (Walters, 2004: 14) 
In the face of a variety of ‘threats to truth’, then, ‘public criminology’ proposes that 
criminologists get better at communicating the ‘truth’, or the ‘facts’, or ‘evidence’, 
‘knowledge’, or ‘information’ on or about ‘reality’ in order to overcome falsehoods 
circulating in the public sphere.  
This understanding of public criminology is reflected in the conceptual oppositions 
which appear to define the modus operandi of the public criminologist: ‘accuracy of 
information’, ‘new evidence’, ‘factual information’ and ‘complete information’ are 
contrasted with ‘false statements’, ‘shoddy evidence’, ‘harmful myths’, ‘scare 
tactics’, ‘overblown claims’ and ‘politically motivated views’ (see Carrabine et al, 
2000; Currie, 2007; Feilzer, 2009 and Uggen and Inderbitzen, 2010). The 
oppositions deployed here allude to, but do not make explicit, the existence of 
some agreed upon criteria for determining what counts as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
evidence (Carrabine et al, 2000: 205) which can then be legitimately deployed to 
‘debate controversial issues’ (Uggen and Inderbitzen, 2010: 743). 
This notion of criminologists fighting for ‘truth’, arming themselves for combat 
with their ‘peer-reviewed evidence’, and becoming ‘louder, more effective, more 
consistent and more visible advocates for scholarship versus nonsense in the 
shaping of social policy’ (Currie, 2007: 189) raises a number of quite profound 
problems: Does such a thing as a criminological truth exist? What counts as a 
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criminological truth?  Who decides? How can truth overcome the obstacles it 
faces?  
2.3.3 Criminology as bad science 
Some have argued that criminology’s marginality is the result of the generally poor 
quality of the evidence it provides, suggesting that ‘criminologists have very little 
“good” science to offer policy makers’ (Austin, 2003: 558). Failures identified in the 
criminological knowledge-base include the decline of ‘scientific’ methods (Austin, 
2003); the failure of programmes of research to be designed around proposing 
constructive actionable proposals (Brereton, 1996); a lack of definitive knowledge 
about why crime is committed and what can be done about it (Tonry and Green, 
2003: 521); the inappropriateness of methods for demonstrating conclusively 
‘what works’ (a point advanced some time ago by Clarke and Cornish (1980) and 
made more recently by Wiles (2002) and Sherman (2005)); and criminology’s 
failure to produce positive ‘galvanizing’ statements of truth, as opposed to negative 
or highly qualified positive statements (Tonry and Green, 2003).  
A key problem which cross-cuts with all of these issues is the sheer diversity of 
criminological theories, methods and findings which means, as Austin observes in 
a tone of exasperation, that: ‘even today there are so-called “credible” studies that 
reach diametrically opposite conclusions on whether increasing the nation’s prison 
population by over a million persons in less than three decades has been a good or 
bad policy’ (Austin, 2003: 558). The contradictory nature of research findings can 
lead to what Weiss (1986 cited in Tonry and Green, 2003: 522) has called 
‘endarkenment’ – the production of confusion rather than enlightenment and the 
opening up of an opportunity for poor quality research to be accepted as adequate 
knowledge because it happens to chime with preconceived ideas. Policymakers 
then ‘satisfice’ (cf. Simon, 1947) by making the best possible decision in limited 
circumstances (Weiss, 1986: 220 cited by Tonry and Green, 2003: 522). But when 
policymakers get into the habit of adopting ineffective measures in order to relieve 
the political pressures upon them they may ‘further undercut public confidence in 
justice system institutions’ and simply create more demand for action (Tonry and 
 44 
 
Green, 2003: 522). ‘[W]eak empirical information’ thus leaves criminal justice 
policymaking at risk of political exploitation, and poor policy. 
According to those who press this sceptical perspective on the quality of 
criminological knowledge the standard of ‘truth’ on offer in much criminological 
research is inadequate (perhaps dangerously so) for policymakers’ purposes 
(either because it is not conclusive enough, or because it is not useful enough) and 
criminology has not produced enough knowledge to allow policymakers to 
confidently target their efforts in initiatives to address the roots of crime (Tonry 
and Green, 2003). It has also been suggested that the impact of these shortcomings 
has been exacerbated by criminology’s track record of ideological disputatiousness 
(Tonry and Green, 2003: 520) and by the tendency of some criminologists to 
oversell what data they do have, thus further undermining trust in criminological 
knowledge (Tittle, 2004).  The sceptics suggest that in order to have more 
influence on policy criminologists need to produce research which is more 
scientific, more relevant and more usable, and that in the meantime they should 
have more humility about the value of their findings.  
The inadequacy of criminological knowledge in England and Wales has been 
attributed to weaknesses in the funding framework for criminological work 
whereby increased government funding has reduced the availability of funding 
from private foundations (Tonry and Green, 2003: 511). This, it is suggested, has 
shifted the centre of gravity towards problems defined by Home Office 
administrators, which fit with the short-term, applied interests of government. 
This leaves ‘gaping holes’ in the availability of funding for ‘social and behavioural 
science research on crime and criminal justice’, making it difficult to get funding 
for: ‘longer-term, more basic, and less partisan’ research; any research which 
investigates subjects not regarded as being of relevance to contemporary policy 
concerns; and research which uses the kind of ‘experimental designs and multi-
year follow-ups’ which are most likely to produce valid findings from which 
generalization is appropriate (Ibid: 512). Meanwhile, Matthews (2009: 343) argues 
that, somewhat ironically, the ‘administrative criminology’ fostered by the 
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narrowness of the government’s sponsored research agenda has produced a body 
of criminological research which is of very limited policy relevance. 
Calls for reforms to the institutional arrangements within which criminologists 
must operate often seem to boil down to two things in the literature: (i) the need 
to ensure that institutional arrangements allow criminological knowledge to take 
its proper position in the policymaking process, for example through the 
periodically invoked notion of an ‘independent research institute’ (see Tonry and 
Green, 2003: 513); and (ii) the need to ensure appropriate levels of investment in 
research: governments ‘should’ spend more money on better research, and they 
‘need’ to invest in work to ‘distil strong findings from mountains of research and 
provide authoritative statements of what we know’ (see Tonry and Green, 2003: 
525). 
The need for internal reform in order to improve the quality of the criminological 
knowledge-base is acknowledged by Currie (2007). He observes that the particular 
demands of academic careers and the types of activities valued by those who 
recruit and promote academics have played a part in causing academic 
criminology to become inward-looking, and to produce work which is often highly 
abstract, utilises complex techniques, and excludes the non-expert. This is likely to 
have led to criminology’s marginalisation from criminal justice policymaking 
(Currie, 2007: 179-182).  
This notion that a better organized and funded criminological field will be able to 
produce more definitive criminological truths (‘systematic knowledge that is 
sound, generalizable, and replicable’ (Tonry and Green, 2003: 510) and 
scientifically verifiable through ‘experimental designs and multi-year follow-ups’ 
(Ibid: 512, see also Sherman, 2005)), chimes harmoniously with the general tenor 
of the literature which is sceptical about criminology’s adequacy and usefulness. 
The primary concern in this literature is that criminological work is, too often, ‘bad 
science’, and that too many criminologists are engaged in ideological disputes and 
politically partisan projects, producing findings which are contradictory, 
controversial and out of touch with the needs of policymakers.   As a result 
criminologists are seen by policymakers as having ‘axes to grind’, rather than as 
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the producers of ‘non-partisan, even-handed scientific research’ which Tonry and 
Green (2003) think they should be. As such they are (deservedly) unable to exert 
much influence on policy.  
An alternative perspective argues that advocates of a more ‘scientific’ criminology, 
who denounce what they see as the ‘intellectual lawlessness’ (Hayward and Young, 
2004: 269) of their more critically-inclined colleagues, are themselves responsible 
for the impoverishment of the criminological knowledge-base. Hayward and Young 
describe the situation created by the over-representation of a-theoretical 
quantitative research thus: 
‘Data that is in fact technically weak ... and, by its very nature, contested, 
blurred, ambiguous, and unsuited for quantification, is mindlessly churned 
through personal computers. The journals and the articles become myriad yet 
their conclusions and pontifications become more and more obscure – lost in a 
mess of figures, techno-speak and methodological obfuscation.’ (Hayward and 
Young, 2004: 262)  
For some critics of quantitatively-inclined ‘scientific’ criminology the 
criminological knowledge-base is seen as compromised by the failure to close the 
gap between research which is theoretically reflexive and research which has 
‘empirical bite and strategic relevance’ (Garland and Sparks, 2000: 4).   
2.3.4 Maintaining a competitive edge in the ‘marketplace of ideas’  
In his 2009 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology, Todd 
Clear called for criminal justice policy to become more ‘criminologically justifiable’ 
(Clear, 2010: 14), emphasising the need for criminologists to build a strong 
evidential base grounded in basic research. In his view: 
‘what we really seek is not merely evidence, in the sense of something that has 
been proven to be true. Instead, we seek action-relevant evidence—knowledge 
that is the foundation for criminological action. Much action-relevant 
criminological knowledge comes from “basic” research. It is basic in the most 
profound meaning of the term because it tells us about the world of crime and 
justice in ways that enable us to imagine new and potent strategies for 
improving justice and public safety.’ (Clear, 2010: 14) 
However, Clear argued that there is rarely, if ever, total agreement about the 
nature of evidence, and suggested that ‘a certain disarray in the marketplace of 
ideas’ must be tolerated lest any attempt to define what can count as evidence be 
too narrowly drawn. ‘Disarray’ is precisely what the advocates of criminology as ‘ 
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“good” science’ find so objectionable, believing that it undermines the legitimacy of 
criminologists’ claims to truth, and demands for influence, claims and demands 
which, it is suggested, are already tenuous given the impoverished state of the 
criminological knowledge base.  
Most proponents of ‘public criminology’ (and perhaps most criminologists) would 
naturally tend to dispute the sceptical perspective on the quality, reliability and 
utility of existing criminological knowledge. Indeed, Currie expresses the firm 
belief that, over successive generations, criminology has amassed ‘a formidable 
body of evidence that could make a strong case for or against certain kinds of 
action or intervention’ (Currie, 2007: 177). A positive take on the knowledge base 
is generally evident in work where reference is made to anything like ‘public 
criminology’ or to the need to strengthen the influence of criminology on policy. So, 
for example, Carrabine et al (2000) refer to the capacity of criminological evidence 
to show that punitive measures are ineffective and Feilzer (2009: 482) expresses 
her belief that public criminology can ‘enable and support evidence-based policy’.  
Meanwhile Uggen and Inderbitzen refer to the pedagogical aspect of academic 
work, arguing that:  
‘Public criminologists who take teaching seriously hope that their students 
enter their chosen professions and indeed the larger responsibilities of 
citizenship with a more accurate picture and understanding of the causes of 
crime and the workings of the criminal justice system’ (Uggen and Inderbitzen, 
2010: 741, emphasis added) 
Implicitly, then, in all of these accounts (as well as in those accounts which I 
referenced in the first part of this chapter) criminology has some kind of ‘accurate’ 
knowledge to offer up to those who care to receive it. Yet throughout the literature 
there is often a striking silence on the criteria which criminologists must satisfy in 
order to be able to make claims to have truth or worthwhile evidence in their 
possession.  
The argument that criminology’s influence has been limited because of short-
comings in the evidential base is dismissed by Chancer and McLaughlin (2007: 
160) as ‘tending to presume agreed on definitions on what constitutes reliable and 
usable social science data’. However, this criticism might also be applied to some of 
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the statements which are made about public criminology being a matter of 
communicating ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘evidence’. Formulations of public 
criminology which fail to reflect on what can count as knowledge seem to 
deemphasise and downplay the diversity of criminological perspectives and the 
intensely contested nature of the field. The unqualified use of terms such as truth, 
evidence, reality and knowledge, by the advocates of ‘public criminology’ may also 
reflect a strategic reticence about publicly acknowledging the fragility of truth.  
Ericson (2003) argues that criminologists are ‘part of a system of academic 
disciplines, professions, and institutions in which they compete for jurisdiction over 
problems of crime and security’ (Ericson, 2003: 78, emphasis added). Tonry and 
Green (2003: 519, emphasis added) point out that ‘policy will be made with or 
without expert knowledge... Criminological knowledge must compete with other 
forms of information and other pressures for change’. Currie (2007: 188) 
meanwhile suggests that ‘definitions of social reality are always the object of 
struggle and contest.’ The ongoing sense of being in competition with others may 
mean, as Ericson (1996: 19) has argued, that it is very difficult for criminologists to 
publicly acknowledge that their work is non-scientific, and that the criminological 
field is ‘highly relative and biased institutionally’. Such an admission may 
‘antagonise potential institutional audiences and sponsors, and undermine the 
persuasive force of “academic” and “scientific” accounts’ (Ericson, 1996: 19)28. 
Similarly, Smart (1990: 75) argues that sociologists, including criminologists, have 
struggled with the implications of postmodernist thought because they fear that to 
say they ‘do not know (in the modernist sense)’ would simply allow their kind of 
knowledge to be dismissed, particularly by forces on the right who have always 
been scathing about the quality and utility of sociological knowledge.   
For some criminologists, then, ‘truth’ is the product which they have to offer, and 
they must get better at ‘conveying the details of criminological knowledge to 
external audiences’ (Carrabine et al, 2009: 454). Others argue that researchers will 
                                                        
28 Smith-Lovin (2007) makes a similar argument with respect to public sociology, suggesting that, 
in order to retain resources and legitimacy, the discipline must remain wedded to the generation of 
knowledge. However, she also acknowledges that sociology is not able to present a united front as it 
lacks a homogeneous view on the constitution of valid sociological knowledge. 
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have to be more strategic than this, building bridges with policymakers by 
becoming more sensitive to the pressures which they face in designing and 
selecting policy, by writing more accessible reports, and by thinking much more 
carefully about how their studies might be applied in the ‘real world’ (Tonry and 
Green, 2003: 524). This may include inquiring further into why some research is 
influential at some points and other research is not (Ibid: 525). However, for 
others ‘truth’ seems like just one kind of device in the criminologist’s toolbox. To 
increase their influence criminologists should seek to ‘devise better policy 
rhetorics and policing initiatives that will more clearly demonstrate their value. … 
using figurative language that is more carefully chosen, for example with regard to 
words and numbers that have greater symbolic power’ (Ericson, 2003: 78).  
In the highly contested ‘marketplace of ideas’, then, ‘truth’ appears to be a sought 
after commodity, and some criminologists seem to feel that in order to attract 
potential consumers to make use of its wares the criminological field as a whole 
should not draw attention its internal ‘disarray’. If this argument is correct, this 
would appear to subordinate any intrinsic value which ‘truth’ may possess to the 
value which it has as a strategic rhetorical resource.  
There are criminologists who have advocated a strategic approach to influencing 
public discourses of crime and justice in the direction which they favour, without 
relying on the notion that there are criminological ‘facts’ or ‘truths’ which exist 
somehow above or outside of the general melee of public communication.  A 
noteworthy example of this is Barak’s (1988) call for a ‘newsmaking criminology’: 
a consciously strategic endeavour which involves building up networks with 
journalistic sources and understanding the motivations of journalists, who are 
seen as potential allies for criminologists due to their commitment to ‘post-
bourgeois values’. Such an approach requires knowledge of media and culture and 
applying this ‘to help shape the “progressive” discourse, language and 
representation of crime and justice, and ultimately the policies that are adopted 
and acquiesced to by societies in their “fights” against crime and injustice’ (Barak, 
2007: 205).  
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Unlike the more neutral stance implied by those who see ‘public criminology’ as 
primarily about educating an ill-informed public, Barak describes ‘newsmaking 
criminology’ as ‘a “call for action”, which asks criminologists to eschew notions of 
alleged value neutrality and “objectivity”’ (Barak, 2007: 193). Rather than merely 
seeking to disseminate truth or evidence, then, Barak wants criminologists to 
adopt a radical stance, ‘taking sides’ and providing an oppositional discourse: ‘it is 
important that, as criminologists, our voices be heard among all the other sounds 
and images associated with crime and justice, especially if those voices are 
resonating alternative rather than conventional themes’ (Barak, 2007: 201).  
A strategic approach is also proposed by Groombridge (2007: 466), whose analysis 
of media coverage of criminology evokes a contested media discourse in which the 
already limited space available for academic criminologists to put across their 
perspectives is occupied by the contributions provided by ‘journalists … politicians 
and pressure groups’ and where more measured or liberal contributions are often 
swamped by ‘ideologically privileged voices’, in particular by comment provided 
by police sources who have come to be seen as  ‘the experts on law and order’ 
(Ibid: 473).  Overall, he concluded, ‘criminologists don’t get to say much’ (Ibid: 
466).  
The solution proposed by Groombridge is for criminologists to ‘become 
journalistic’, adopting the skills and tools of the journalistic trade, capitalising on 
the opportunities afforded by new media formats such as blogs and podcasts, and 
cultivating better relationships with media workers (Ibid: 472). This call for 
criminologists to become more skilled in techniques of mass communication 
echoes Barak’s work on newsmaking criminology produced a decade earlier (see 
Barak, 1988: 566).   However, despite their shared acknowledgment of the need to 
adopt a strategic approach in order to enable criminological discourses to compete 
in the media, Barak’s approach is clearly more consciously and deliberately 
partisan than Groombridge’s.  
Barak directed his work towards criminologists of a ‘critical or progressive’ 
persuasion and, although newsmaking criminology does call on criminologists to 
‘share their knowledge with the general public’ (Barak, 1988: 566, emphasis 
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added), knowledge is not deployed here in the narrow sense to mean ‘facts’ or 
‘truth’. Rather the primary focus of newsmaking criminology is on using the media 
to increase the public’s exposure to neglected crime topics and alternative 
perspectives on existing problems, affecting ‘public attitudes, thoughts, and 
discourses about crime and justice’ in order to influence the shape of public policy 
interventions (Ibid: 566). This is to be achieved by ‘locating the mass-media 
portrayals of incidences of “serious” crimes in the context of all illegal and harmful 
activities’ in order to disrupt the processes through which mass-media 
communications on crime and justice reinforce bourgeois capitalist hegemony 
(Ibid: 566).    
Despite their differences, Barak and Groombridge both resist an understanding of 
public criminology as purely about ensuring that ‘the facts’ are heard. Instead they 
envisage criminology’s public role as that of providing discourses which can 
compete with established ways of representing crime and justice: ‘if criminologists 
don’t do criminology in public – which means the media now – then the media will 
do it for them’ (Groombridge, 2007: 473). 
At this juncture it seems prudent to look more closely at the work in which the 
term ‘public criminology’ appears to have made its first appearance: Carrabine et 
al (2000) first proposed the term ‘public criminology’ to describe a form of 
criminology which would put ‘empowerment’ at the centre of its work. 
Empowerment, it was argued: 
‘means working for the ordinary public rather than for narrow political 
interests, and emphasizing social justice and human rights. An empowerment-
orientated public criminology prioritizes the interests of the public person/s 
(individuals/communities) over interest groups that disempower people and 
cause and create conditions resulting in crime or other social injuries and 
hazards to health or the environment’ (Carrabine et al, 2000: 206)     
Carrabine et al’s version of public criminology, then, appears to require that 
criminologists ‘take sides’ with ‘the ordinary public’ by emphasising ‘social justice 
and human rights’. The work of public criminologists should, Carrabine et al (2000: 
205) argued, ‘seek to make a difference and bring about change’ and also to ‘break[ 
] boundaries and mak[e ] positive connections with other arenas of social action’. 
This version of public criminology is orientated towards action and eschews 
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isolationism. Crime and justice are to be dealt with in relation to wider social 
contexts and issues.   
When, in 2009, Carrabine et al reprised and updated the idea of ‘public 
criminology’ they quoted Currie (2007) at some length, suggesting that he ‘agrees 
and expands on’ their argument (Carrabine et al, 2009: 454). In fact, Currie does 
not explicitly cite their earlier work, and one might also say that rather than 
expanding on the agenda set out in Carrabine et al (2000) Currie rather contracts 
the issue by focusing primarily on the defence of criminological ‘truth’ rather than 
the defence of the ‘values’ (which he refers to as sustaining criminologists’ work, 
but refrains from discussing). I will explain what I mean.  
In their original article on ‘public criminology’, Carrabine et al (2000) argued that: 
‘projects of managing poverty are no longer based on political and policy 
appeals to the public in the name of care and assistance, but are rooted in the 
discourses of ambivalence and condemnation. Similarly, the penal doctrine of 
incapacitation is devoid of any moral commitment to restoring the offender to 
citizenship: it is a strategy of containment and a discourse of denunciation.’ 
(Carrabine et al, 2000: 204)    
In their later work they suggested that ‘a public criminology must engage with 
general ignorance around crime issues, moral indifference and uncivilized 
intolerance … the tendency is towards a negative evaluation of [offender’s] worth 
and contribution (or lack of it) to society, and of their low social status’(Carrabine 
et al, 2009: 452-453). They contrast this negative evaluation of some offenders 
with the way in which corporate offenders are able to ‘profit from activities that 
damage the quality of life of others and from economic crimes that pass losses onto 
consumers via higher prices, workers losing pensions or jobs, and compromised 
health and safety programmes leading to accidents and manslaughter deaths of 
employees’ (Carrabine et al, 2009: 453).  
In these extracts, although they may not explicitly acknowledge it, Carrabine et al 
exhibit forms of criminological interrogation which rely not merely on some 
objective notion of ‘truth’ or ‘evidence’, but also on the authors’ own values. There 
is no objective ‘evidence’ which tells us that it is correct to think of people living in 
poverty in terms of ‘care and assistance’, or to reject a ‘negative evaluation of 
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[offender’s] worth’, or to explore corporate offending in the same terms as 
burglary, but the authors would like us to do so. In other words they favour the 
adoption of certain values as a route to new ways of knowing, and indeed to new 
knowledge, about crime and justice. In this sense the ‘public criminology’ proposed 
by Carrabine et al (2000; 2009) is also about offering an alternative set of values 
on which to build a knowledge discourse on crime and justice29.   
The political values of those advocating some form of ‘public criminology’ are quite 
often clear in some aspects of their work. For example Currie (2007: 189) decries 
the ‘neglectful social policies’ and ‘costly and brutal penal policy’ adopted by US 
governments and Chancer and McLaughlin (2007: 156), argue that public 
criminologies should place ‘explicit value … on moving policies in more 
progressive directions’ (although they fail to provide a definition of what they 
would regard as ‘progressive’). However, these and other writers repeatedly fight 
shy of explicitly addressing the role played by values in the knowledge production 
process, seemingly preferring to fall back on the legitimising veneer of objectivity 
implied by deploying notions such as ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘evidence’ (and all 
their associated rhetorical kudos). Ultimately, they seem to say, it is not values, but 
the ‘facts’ of ‘reality’ which should win the contest in the marketplace of ideas.  
2.3.5 Against ‘public criminology’? ‘Democratic underlabouring’ 
Recently, Loader and Sparks (2010a) have rejected the ‘evangelism’ of those 
wanting to ‘inform others what public criminology is … advise them how to be a 
public criminologist, or – worse still – to tell them they must become one’ (Ibid: 
115). It is important to note that the differences between the various articulations 
                                                        
29 Latour (2004) argues that the conceptual border between facts and values is indistinct and 
porous (Ibid: 98-99) to the extent that the attempt to disentangle them implies an ‘impossible 
purification’ (Ibid: 167). Due to its inadequacies, he suggests, the fact-value distinction has 
‘paralyzed’ debates about the relationship between science and politics (Ibid: 108-9). Whilst I am 
sympathetic to Latour’s argument (so far as I am able to understand it), for the purposes of this 
thesis I will retain and use the familiar distinction between the concept of a ‘fact’ (a claim about 
what is) and ‘values’ (beliefs about what should be) in all its instability and inadequacy. I have 
reached this decision because the fact-value distinction is routinely employed, either explicitly or 
implicitly, within the criminological field, including in discussions about criminology’s public role. It 




of ‘public criminology’ and Loader and Sparks’s ‘democratic underlabouring’ are 
perhaps not as significant as their initial rejection of public criminology’s tendency 
to ‘evangelism’ appears to suggest. The main areas of tension appear to be around 
whether criminologists should feel entitled to wield influence in the public sphere 
and whether they should feel obliged to engage with it. But, as I will discuss below, 
despite producing a much more detailed and nuanced account of what 
criminology’s public role has been, might be and should be there is a crucial aspect 
in which they fall short of transcending the existing offerings from the public 
criminology advocates. 
Loader and Sparks explicitly state that they did not set out to ‘try to own or 
champion something called “public criminology” or to participate in the for-it-or-
against-it knockabout that the use of this term tends to encourage’ (Ibid: 115), 
rather they were concerned with ‘how criminology … can today best understand 
and give coherence to its role in public debates and controversies about its subject 
matter’ (Ibid: 116). They propose:  
‘a sensibility or disposition, a way of being in and relating to public life … 
criminology’s public role is most coherently and convincingly described as that 
of contributing to a better politics of crime and its regulation – or what we shall 
call democratic underlabouring’ (Ibid: 116-117) 
Crucially, they wish to avoid appearing ‘ill at ease with democracy’ (Ibid: 118), 
proposing instead that criminologists must be more ‘humble’ in the face of 
democratic politics, as well as being more understanding of the circumstances for 
political decision making; more accepting of the fact that criminological evidence 
cannot settle questions of values; and more aware of the ‘hard truths’ of 
contemporary politics (Ibid: 119).  
In particular, they propose that criminologists would be better off making their 
claims ‘in ways that explicitly seek to understand and improve politics rather than 
replace it with expert-led calculation’ (Ibid: 122). The fight for ‘truth’, then, is more 
appropriately and productively carried out with respect to the rules of 
‘democracy’: 
‘In a democratic polity, politics (rather than markets, or bureaucratic authority, 
or the judgement of the wisest, or force of the strongest) is the arena for 
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deciding between competing resource claims and distributing basic social 
goods (and bads). It also a space for mediating claims for recognition, for 
determining who belongs, who “we” are and the terms we set for our 
coexistence. Politics, in a democracy, is where we reconcile competing values 
and interests and determine the public good, a means of arriving at – and 
recursively revising – collective self-understanding of the question “how do we 
want to live together”’ (Ibid: 122) 
Criminologists, then, must accept that in a democracy criminological knowledge 
should and must compete with other discourses on crime and justice – it does not 
have any automatic right to guide or influence policy, and it cannot settle questions 
of values. 
Loader and Sparks are far from unique in noting that criminologists must show 
humility in the face of democracy.30 It has been argued that criminologists who 
become particularly frustrated with their apparent lack of influence may have an 
unrealistically rigid and naïve set of assumptions about how knowledge can and 
should influence policy (Laub, 2004: 18), as the receptiveness of policymakers to 
such evidence is constrained by prevailing ‘paradigms’ of punishment, prevailing 
ideology, and short-term political and bureaucratic considerations (Tonry and 
Green, 2003). Maybe, then, as Brereton has argued: 
‘The best we can hope is to make the system somewhat more informed and 
reflective than it is at present, and to reduce the probability of governments 
adopting seriously harmful and/or counter-productive policies in the area of 
crime and justice’ (Brereton, 1996: 88) 
As described by Loader and Sparks, democratic underlabouring tends towards this 
more modest objective, producing criminological knowledge (in all its diverse 
forms), whilst being orientated towards supporting a ‘better politics’ of crime and 
justice. This vision has been criticized for relying on a consensual theory of politics 
which is out of step with a current reality where democratic principles are 
subverted and social inequalities are obscured and mystified, whilst the rich and 
powerful casually and unapologetically break the law, often without fear of coming 
                                                        
30 See, for example, Leon Radzinowicz (cited by Hood, 1974: xiv): ‘criminologists must be aware 
that the specific solution of many legal and penal problems cannot be determined exclusively, or 
even predominantly by the factual criminological evidence which they can provide’; Tonry and 
Green (2003): ‘neither politically nor normatively is there any good reason why criminologists’ 
opinions should count more than anyone else’s’ (Tonry and Green, 2003: 492-493); and Laub 




under scrutiny (see Currie, 2011: 712; Sim, 2011: 725, also see Wacquant (1999) 
for a particularly forceful account of how neoliberalism has distorted the politics of 
penality).  
Other critics have observed that Loader and Sparks fail to provide a clear 
definition of what they mean by a ‘better politics’ (see Christie, 2011; Tombs, 
2011), leading to a sense that democratic underlabouring (which does indeed 
appear as a rather comfortable prescription for those currently engaged in the 
field)  means just ‘business as usual’ (Currie, 2011). It is certainly true that, rather 
than being a programme for action which requires criminologists to reconsider 
and reconfigure existing roles and ways of working, ‘democratic underlabouring’ 
asks of individual criminologists only three things: that they retain their ‘academic 
“formative intention” … to produce knowledge’ (Loader and Sparks, 2010a: 129)31; 
that where they critique existing arrangements they are also prepared to propose 
constructive alternatives (Ibid: 131); and that they respect and engage with the 
diversity of approaches to being a criminologist, each of which adds value to the 
field.   
Suggesting that criminology should have ‘a generous account of what can count as 
a criminological claim’ (Ibid: 130) and that it ‘can and should bring to public 
discussion of its subject matter a scepticism that refuses to treat at face value the 
categories, assumptions and self-understandings that make up “common sense” 
about crime and its control’ (Ibid: 130), Loader and Sparks propose three modes of 
criminological knowledge production. ‘Primary’ criminology is described as 
‘committed…to the generation of knowledge [on] crime causes, patterns and 
trends, offender motivations and behaviour, the social distribution and impact of 
victimization, and the effects of programmes that aim to reduce crime and make 
neighbourhoods or societies safer’ (Ibid: 125). ‘Institutional-critical’ criminology is 
concerned with the social constitution of crime and the selection of crime 
                                                        
31 They argue that: ‘when criminology intervenes in public life, it needs to do so in ways that remain 
embedded in academic formative intentions and processes, and retain an overriding interest in the 
production of knowledge. Once severed from these intentions, and the limits they place on what can 
be said and done, criminology loses what is legitimate and valuable about its contribution to a 
better politics’ (Loader and Sparks, 2010: 130) 
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problems, media representations of crime, the functioning of criminal justice 
organizations, placing crime and penality in the wider socio-cultural and economic 
setting. ‘Normative’ criminology reflects on the meanings of ideas such as justice, 
proportionality, and due process, and attempts to deal with conflicts in values 
(Ibid: 126-127).  
It is emphasised that individual criminologists are not expected to do all three of 
these, although it is explicitly stated that criminologists doing primary work ought 
to retain:  
‘a critical sensibility – the inclination to question the terms in which the social 
world is conventionally apprehended – ought to be part of what it means to be 
a criminologist – or any kind of social scientist. Why should those who don’t 
self-identify with critical criminology so easily be exempted from this basic 
professional obligation?’ (Ibid: 140-141)32 
What is of vital importance to Loader and Sparks’s argument is the idea that the 
‘collective organization of the field’ (which should accommodate all three genres of 
criminological activity in a non-hierarchical way) is more important than 
individual criminologists being well-versed in each of the primary, critical and 
normative aspects of the field (Ibid: 127-128)33. But, this rather tolerant and 
accommodating proposal does not appear to have any way of dealing with the 
inherent conflict which exists between different modes of criminological 
knowledge production (Sim, 2011), and fails to offer any suggestions as to how 
disagreement between diverse criminological knowledges (each, in their own way, 
seeking to contribute to a ‘better politics’ of crime) can and should be settled: 
‘Are we to understand that all these academic “criminologies” are capable of 
contributing to a “better politics of crime and its regulation”? If so, what weight 
                                                        
32 This expectation chimes with Ericson’s assertion that ‘being critical is a core element of 
professionalism’ (Ericson, 2005: 366), and is also reflected in Wacquant’s claim that ‘reflexivity is 
not a decorative device, a luxury, or an option … it is an indispensable ingredient of rigorous 
investigation and lucid action’ (Wacquant, 2011: 439). 
33 This resonates with Bottoms (1987), who wrote that criminologists were: ‘privileged to be at the 
centre of contemporary debates about the basis of the legal and social order at the end of the 
twentieth century, though any criminologist who is honest must admit his or her inadequacy to face 
the full implications of those debates, partly because of the patchy state of criminological 
knowledge, partly because of the poor state of collaboration between criminology and social and 
political philosophy, and partly because of the impossibility, for any single criminologist, of 
mastering all the disciplines which rightly require attention if criminological questions are to be 
adequately confronted’ (Bottoms, 1987: 263) 
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is to be given to each of their contributions? Who will decide what that should 
be?’ (Tombs, 2011: 728) 
Loader and Sparks have very little to say about who decides what is to count as 
adequate knowledge. Responding to reaction to Public Criminology?, they have 
attempted to clarify the sense in which they use the term ‘formative intentions’, 
writing that:  
‘the special contribution that the under-labourer as a social scientist can make 
to democracy presupposes a commitment to the values of clarity, coherence, 
non-contradiction, evidence, and so on, that define her activities as academic 
ones. She holds, that is to say, that when sociology, criminology, and other 
disciplines intervene in public life, they need to do so in ways that remain 
embedded in academic formative intentions and processes, and retain an 
overriding interest in the production of knowledge.’ (Loader and Sparks, 
2010b: 406, emphasis added) 
Here the first three ‘values’ listed - clarity, coherence, non-contradiction - are 
perhaps more accurately understood as attributes, which is to say as (hoped for or 
aspired to) positive features, of academic work. The fourth ‘value’ – evidence – is, I 
suggest, more helpfully understood as the raw material which criminologists and 
other social scientists use to produce knowledge. The focused, sustained and 
systematic assembly of evidence, understood as ‘ground for belief; testimony or 
facts tending to prove or disprove any conclusion’ (Oxford English Dictionary), is 
what most social scientists spend their time doing in order to produce the 
knowledge which they claim to possess. But the question still remains: who 
decides which types of raw material should count as admissible evidence in the 
production of knowledge?   
In attempting to be diplomatic rather than didactic34 Loader and Sparks 
congratulate the adherents of forms of criminological knowing which are not 
renowned for their critical reflexivity. The crime science advocate, for example, is 
praised: ‘our field – thanks to your efforts – does know things about what works, 
what doesn’t work and what is promising in crime reduction’ (Loader and Sparks, 
2010a: 135).  
                                                        
34 An effort which, although in some ways laudable, means that Loader and Sparks lean towards 
what Walters (2011: 734) bluntly describes as ‘too much sitting on the fence’. 
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What appears to be neglected by accounts of ‘public criminology’ and ‘democratic 
underlabouring’ is consideration of how, when one truth is threatened, it is often 
another form of truth which threatens it. In this way certain ways of knowing, 
certain forms of knowledge, and certain knowledge workers can come to 
dominate, or to crowd out the virtually infinite variety of possible perspectives 
which can be assumed towards a given topic35. Inconvenient truths can be 
smothered with the truths provided by more ‘compliant’ experts (Hope, 2008); the 
‘skewed research agenda’ of the Home Office can produce truths which drown out 
other truths (Walters, 2004); and two very narrow criminological ‘genres’ - 
administrative criminology and crime science – can dominate and squeeze out 
other ways of knowing from the competitive criminological ‘marketplace’ (Walters, 
2003: 162; Hughes, 2007: 200).  
Yet, in an earlier piece Loader (1998) acknowledged the dangers of certain forms 
of knowledge coming to dominate. Drawing on Habermas, Loader noted that the 
‘actually existing public sphere’ is far from an ideal environment for knowledge 
and discourse, and is ‘dominated by powerful commercial interests and the 
unaccountable expert cultures of remote public bureaucracies, both of which share 
an instrumental rather than a discursive orientation to the social world’ (Loader, 
1998: 191). Under these conditions, he argued, a kind of ‘jobbing criminology’ may 
come to dominate, making it likely that crucial and highly contested issues 
concerning the maintenance of social order in liberal democratic societies will be 
‘reduced to questions of efficient management and administration’ in such a way as 
to leech vitality from the democratic public sphere (Ibid: 199). 
Yet, in 2010, by expressing approval of the work of those criminologists who focus 
on primary work unfettered by critical or normative considerations (which surely 
are the stuff of reflexivity), Loader and Sparks (2010a) seem to license individual 
                                                        
35 In all of the reviews of Loader and Sparks (2010a) which I have encountered in only one has the 
writer explicitly stated their own position as acceptance that engaging in criminological knowledge 
production cannot provide ‘ “scientific” knowledge that might or should privilege whatever 
contribution I might make to public debates about crime and criminal justice’ (Morgan, 2011: 717). 
The same author wrote ‘in my reading of the criminological literature, I did not encounter 
propositions or findings that suggested policies about which there were not several, conflicting, 
perfectly reasonable viewpoints’ (Op cit.)    
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criminologists to be one-dimensional, relying on a belief that the ‘collective 
organization of the field’ will supply the second and third dimensions. They readily 
admit that they do not explore the circumstances of reception of criminological 
work. But it is precisely these circumstances which are likely to mean that the end-
users, whether they are policymakers, journalists, or indeed members of the 
public, are likely to receive isolated excerpts of the criminological whole, thus 
seeing only one face of the criminological polygon. If the face which they see is 
blue, then it can appear as if the whole thing is blue. The diverse truths which the 
criminological enterprise is capable of producing are thus effectively obscured.  
In response to their critics, Loader and Sparks (2011) have attempted to clarify 
their argument in a number of ways, including: (i) explicitly defining a ‘better 
politics’ as one which embraces a deliberative approach to democracy; (ii) 
countering the idea that they are committed to a consensus view of politics with 
the claim that they have rather made ‘an argument in favour of argument’; and (iii) 
refuting the notion that they are naive about the reality of contemporary politics 
and claiming that Public Criminology? was rather an attempt to work out how 
criminologists might negotiate this political sphere. However, these responses still 
leave us wondering how it is that criminologists might help to support the 
fashioning of a more deliberative form of democracy in the context of current 
social and political circumstances; and how more radical and critical knowledges 
can play any kind of role on an unequal playing field dominated by research which 
is far more congenial to our elected representatives.   
2.3.6 Different kinds of truth: criminological pluralism and the role of 
values 
Whether or not criminologists will produce certain kinds of knowledge depends 
upon the choices which they make about what to include and to exclude, and about 
whether to regard their subjects of inquiry with, for example, compassion and 
understanding, or fear and disgust. These are in very large part choices based upon 
values. As noted above, in the earliest call for a ‘public criminology’, Carrabine et al 
(2000) obliquely referred to the role played by value-based considerations in the 
construction of criminological knowledge, and they hinted at the way in which the 
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nature of criminological knowledge can be contingent upon either the discourse 
within which its objects are located, or upon the conscious contextualization of 
crimes against a wider backdrop of harmful actions.  
The kinds of criminological truth which come to dominate in the public arena may 
not be (and often are not) false, or ‘untrue’, according to the rules of method 
applied in each case. Rather they are one-dimensional: they come at their topic 
from a certain angle, with a certain set of objectives, informed by certain prior 
assumptions and values.   Unfortunately, later incarnations of ‘public criminology’, 
as well as Loader and Sparks’s notion of ‘democratic underlabouring’ have tended 
to neglect the value-laden nature of criminological knowledge and have thus 
omitted what is surely a crucial element in any debate about criminology’s public 
role.  
However, and as noted above, there may be good reasons why criminologists do 
not wish to become embroiled in a discussion about values: they fear that any such 
discussion may undermine the legitimacy of criminological knowledge in the eyes 
of potential consumers, revealing some very deep divisions within the field, 
divisions which threaten its very existence as a distinctive genre of intellectual 
inquiry. For one further thing which the proponents of public criminology, and of 
criminology as ‘democratic underlabouring’ have in common with each other, and 
also often with their critics, is an implicit sense that criminology is and should be a 
distinctive field.  
Loader and Sparks (2010a) argue in their conclusion that the direction in which 
criminologists should be travelling is: ‘to work in and seek to extend institutional 
spaces that can engage affected citizens, practitioners, political actors, and 
researchers in raising, investigating and fashioning solutions to the question of 
how we regulate and live comfortably with crime risk’ (Loader and Sparks, 2010: 
147). Their vision for democratic underlabouring, then, though enthusiastic about 
fostering deliberation about what should be done about the risk of crime, appears 
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to place the concept of crime, and thus the existence of criminology, prior to, or 
outside the realm of deliberation36.   
2.4 Conclusion 
In recent years, criminologists have identified various ways in which the ‘truth’ 
which they produce is threatened. Key ‘threats to truth’ identified include: the 
tendency of the media coverage of crime to be quantitatively biased towards 
atypical cases, specifically offences of a violent or sexual nature, where the victim 
is particularly vulnerable or where a sentence which appears particularly lenient 
has been passed; the prevalence in media and political discourses of pessimistic 
and punitive ‘cultural scripts’ on crime and justice; the side-lining of good 
criminological research and evidence in the policymaking process; the failure to 
adequately organize and fund the criminological field such that high quality 
‘scientific’ truths can be produced; the existence of diverse approaches to knowing 
about crime and justice, some of which are considered less adequate than others; 
and the deliberate misrepresentation or suppression of specific evidence or facts 
about crime or criminal justice interventions.  
These ‘threats to truth’ operate in some fundamentally different ways. At the 
simplest and most brutal end of the spectrum there is the systematic and 
deliberate burying of evidence already at large, which is inconvenient or 
embarrassing to some powerful institution, usually the government of the day. 
There is also the disinclination to fund or otherwise support the initiation of 
inquiries which are perceived as having the potential to produce knowledge which 
does not match with the government’s own agenda, and which could develop into 
the types of inconvenient or embarrassing truths which will need to be 
                                                        
36 In his review of Loader and Sparks (2010a), Wacquant (2011) is fiercely critical of what he sees 
as the tendency of criminologists, including Loader and Sparks, to isolate crime from the wider 
social, political and cultural context within which it is located and thus to ‘underestimate the extra-
penological significance of crime and the extra-criminological functions of punishment’ (Ibid: 447). 
Arguing that criminal justice is used as a way to ‘manage urban marginality, stage political 
sovereignty and achieve legitimacy in the eyes of citizens’ (Ibid: 447), rather than as a way of 
reducing crime he suggests that an adequate analysis of criminal justice is beyond the traditional 
domain of criminology. In order to achieve Loader and Sparks’s vision of a ‘better politics of crime 
and justice’, criminology ought to be dissolved into the ‘sociology of penality’ (Ibid: 447). 
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suppressed. More subtly, the dominance of certain ‘cultural scripts’, some of which 
are produced and reproduced by certain kinds of criminological work, can make it 
difficult to frame, initiate, get funds for, and subsequently communicate the 
findings of research which reflects ideas or values falling outwith the dominant 
ideology of the day. 
Not all criminologists are equally concerned (or indeed at all concerned) about all 
of these types of threats to truth. The most commonly voiced concern, as discussed 
in the first part of this chapter, is the general sense that truth, in the form of ‘the 
facts’ about crime and criminality (as produced by criminologists), is not taking its 
rightful place at the policymaking table. This exclusion of criminological ‘experts’ is 
often understood as being caused by the increased influence of the general public 
on politicians. Public influence is not necessarily regarded as always and 
everywhere a bad thing. In fact it is widely acknowledged that, in a democracy, 
experts should not feel entitled to have the final say on the policies adopted. 
Nonetheless, a number of measures to regulate the manner in which the public are 
able to influence politicians have been proposed. Proposals include requiring 
politicians to behave in a more principled fashion by not resorting to crude and 
manipulative populism, and introducing ‘cooling devices’ to manage and temper 
the implicitly dangerous and inappropriate outpourings of raw public emotion. 
Metaphorically speaking, some criminologists want politicians to be more inclined 
to ‘sit down and count to ten’ (Tonry, 1999b: 1791) before deciding how to 
address problems of crime and justice.   
It has also been suggested that criminologists need to do better at communicating 
their findings to both politicians and the public, in order to educate them about 
‘the facts’ of crime and justice. But here there is a problem which neither the 
advocates of ‘public criminology’ nor Loader and Sparks (2010a) with their notion 
of ‘democratic underlabouring’ have resolved: the sheer diversity of criminological 
knowledge. The objective of better communicating the facts about crime and 
justice rests upon the assumption that criminologists can and do produce truth in 
an unproblematic, consensual way. Invoking the notion of an unproblematic truth 
tends to neglect the diversity of the criminological endeavour; and to ignore the 
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unequal playing field faced by critical and radical strands of criminological 
knowledge. These must battle to be heard in a political sphere which is far more 
hospitable to the less challenging fare proffered by administrative criminology and 
crime science. In particular, what appears to be missing is any resolve to face up to 
the role played by values in the selection of topics for investigation, concepts to 
apply, and methods to use.     
The recent literature on criminology’s public role tends to deal with the inherently 
value-dependent and contested character of criminological knowledge in one of 
three ways: (i) it deplores such diversity as being brought about by rogue 
criminologists who dilute the scientific purity of the subject with their unscientific 
qualitative or critical approaches; (ii) it downplays or entirely ignores the 
diversity; or (iii) it acknowledges diversity and then leaves it to one side. However, 
if criminologists are serious about reflecting on the appropriate public role for 
their work then they must find some way of broaching the question of values. To 
rely on the legitimising aura of a value-free criminological truth is unlikely to 
provide satisfactory technical attire for traversing the challenging terrain faced by 
contemporary criminologists.  
In the rest of this thesis I will attempt to make a novel and useful contribution to 
these recent discussions about criminology’s public role through an empirical case 
study analysis of the recent research and policy agenda which has been established 
in England and Wales around the idea of public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. In the next chapter I elaborate on the methods which I have used to 
explore ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ as a case study in pursuit 
of this more ambitious objective. I also explain in more depth the theoretical 
reflections which have led me to approach this particular topic, and to approach it 





Chapter 3. Theory and methods of inquiry: ‘a certain ethos of 
investigation’ 
 
‘I wouldn’t want what I have said or written to be seen as laying any claims to 
totality. I don’t try to universalize what I say; conversely, what I don’t say isn’t 
meant to be thereby disqualified as being of no importance. My work takes 
place between unfinished abutments and anticipatory strings of dots. I like to 
open up a space of research, try it out, and then if it doesn’t work, try again 
somewhere else. … What I say ought to be taken as “propositions”, “game 
openings” where those who may be interested are invited to join in; they are 
not meant as dogmatic assertions that have to be taken or left en bloc.’ 
(Foucault, 1991a: 73-4). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As explained in chapter one, this thesis developed in a close (one might say 
parasitic) relationship with a funded research project which attempted to 
contribute to the production of an alternative, but also practically usable, body of 
knowledge about something called public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. I commenced work on that project as a novice social researcher, and the 
experience of working on the project from start to finish (a period of some three 
years) provided the context against which the ideas for this thesis took shape.  
Working as a researcher on an ‘applied’ project brought me into regular contact 
with practitioners who expected the research to produce knowledge which they 
could use to design concrete programmes of action, an expectation I was keen to 
fulfil. But at the same time I was entertaining grave doubts about the ontological, 
epistemological, methodological and ethical status of the object at the centre of the 
project. In order to try to resolve the tension between my two roles – applied social 
researcher and critical doctoral student – I began to think about what the effects of 
doing public confidence research might be, as well as the reasons why research on 
public confidence had been commissioned in the first place. My research interest 
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thus began to lean towards being an exercise in ‘objectify[ing] the act of 
objectification’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 59). 
In this chapter I give an account of how I set about trying to propose some answers 
to the questions which my dual role provoked: the data which I used, the methods 
for selecting and analysing that data, and the theoretical perspectives which 
animated and oriented my work. The main body of this chapter provides a 
predominantly descriptive account of how I approached data collection and 
analysis. This is divided into three parts. Firstly I explain how I approached the 
deconstruction of the dominant discourse of public confidence in the criminal 
justice system, including how I identified the sources which constituted that 
discourse and the concepts and procedures which I applied to their analysis. 
Secondly I discuss the way in which I approached the task of carrying out a 
Foucauldian-style genealogy of the idea of public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. Thirdly I describe how I reanalysed a body of interview and focus group 
data collected as part of the funded research project on which I was employed. 
Finally, in the concluding section of the chapter, I reflect on the appropriateness of 
a method which brings these different analytical approaches together, and explore 
the theoretical and practical implications of adopting this eclectic approach.  
3.2 Analysing the public confidence discourse 
One of my first tasks whilst working on the funded research project which inspired 
this thesis was to identify and review existing research on public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. In the process of doing this review I noticed three things: 
(i) that the central concept ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ was 
rarely explicitly defined; (ii) that research into public confidence all tended to be 
conducted according to a similar pattern, and (iii) that the findings of many of the 
pieces of research seemed rather repetitive and unremarkable37. Based on my 
                                                        
37 At the time that I did the review I proposed the idea that a dominant discourse of public 
confidence, prevalent in policy documents, suggested a basic model for confidence research and 
strategy formation which had shaped the way confidence was researched, and could be 
summarised as follows: (i) Identify the issues of importance to the public in relation to the CJS 
(their expectations or what they need to believe or have confidence in); (ii) Understand how 
opinions are formed on these issues (how they come to know about the CJS in order to be able to 
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initial review it seemed to me that the parameters of confidence research were set 
in such a way that identifying the ‘drivers’ of confidence, in a style akin to market-
research, was regarded by many researchers as the basic ‘problem’ for confidence 
research. The ‘solution’ to the problem was to use knowledge of the drivers to 
correct public perceptions (implicitly constructed as emotional and/or inaccurate) 
or to alter criminal justice policy in order to meet public expectations38. I found 
these initial observations on the public confidence research agenda troubling and 
resolved to analyse them in more detail. 
3.2.1 A governmentality perspective on public confidence 
Foucault proposed the notion of governmentality to describe a new rationality of 
government whereby ‘[t]o govern … it was necessary to know that which was to be 
governed, and to govern in the light of that knowledge’ (Rose, O’Malley and 
Valverde, 2006: 87). One of Foucault’s major preoccupations was ‘how men govern 
(themselves and others) by the production of truth (…the establishment of 
domains in which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and 
pertinent)’ (Foucault, 1981: 9 cited in Smart, 2002: 59). From a governmentality 
perspective, then, power is understood as exercised and expressed through ‘ways 
of thinking (rationalities) and ways of acting (technologies) as well as ways of 
subjectifying populations to be governed’ (Lee, 2007: 11). Influenced by this 
Foucauldian perspective, I started to see the public confidence research literature 
as more than an attempt to uncover some ‘truth’ about public confidence, and 
began to regard it as also a ‘practice for the conduct of conduct’ (Rose et al, 2006: 
101), that is to say as a governmental project.  
Thinking along these lines I started to see that the quest to improve public 
confidence in the criminal justice system (what we might call the public confidence 
agenda), and the whole gamut of investigations, recommendations, strategies and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
believe or not believe, that is their evidence); (iii) Apply knowledge of the above to ‘correct’ 
opinions (by providing evidence that the CJS is meeting their expectations) (see Turner, 2008). 
38 Hammersley (1995) has identified what he calls the ‘Engineering Model’ of social research, which 
sees the end product of research as modifying policy and society and which means that ‘[t]he 
parameters of the inquiry process are set narrowly: the aim is to solve the problem, and both the 
problem and what constitutes a solution are defined by practitioners’ (Hammersley, 1995: 126). 
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tactics that sprang up to serve this cause, collectively constituted what Foucault 
would term  a ‘regime of practices’. Which is to say that they can be understood as 
‘programmes of conduct which have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to 
be done (effects of “jurisdiction”), and codifying effects regarding what is to be 
known (effects of “veridiction”)’ (Foucault, 1991: 75).  In Foucauldian thought, 
regimes of practices are not understood as more or less ‘rational’, rather ‘forms of 
rationality’ are seen as inscribed within ‘practices or systems of practices’ as 
‘“practices” don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality’ (Foucault, 1991: 79). 
The analysis of regimes of practices, then, seeks to identify two things: (1) the 
ensemble of rules and procedures which they contain, and (2) how they set up a 
‘domain of objects about which it is possible to articulate true or false 
propositions’ (Foucault, 1991: 79).  
The first part of the analysis presented in this thesis, then, is an exercise in 
expanding and deepening my initial review of the public confidence research 
literature. When working on the funded project the literature on public confidence 
was treated primarily as a resource: a body of knowledge which was used to 
orientate a new empirical inquiry39. However, for the purposes of researching and 
writing this thesis I chose to use the literature as data, or more specifically as a 
‘discourse’, the analysis of which I would approach from a Foucauldian 
governmentality perspective.  
3.2.2 Doing a Foucauldian discourse analysis 
The term ‘discourse analysis’ has been applied to a diverse range of practices 
across a range of disciplines (Taylor, 2001a: 5; Phillips and Jørgenson, 2002: 1). In 
fact, Phillips and Jørgenson (2002: 1) observe that since the term ‘discourse’ came 
into vogue in the early 1990s a tendency has developed to use it ‘indiscriminately’, 
often without an accompanying definition, with the result that ‘[t]he concept has 
become vague…there is no clear consensus as to what discourses are or how to 
analyse them’. However, Taylor (2001a: 5-6) suggests that the range of practices 
                                                        
39 This is not to detract from the fact that the funded research project approached the existing body 
of knowledge critically and, in its final report (see Turner et al, 2009), offered an alternative 
epistemological framework for understanding public confidence. 
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associated with a discourse analytic methodology are united by a concern with 
‘language in use’. Although Taylor’s simple formulation here implies that discourse 
is only a linguistic phenomenon (whereas some analysts conceptualise discourse 
as including the extra-linguistic), the notion of ‘language in use’ is a useful starting 
point for considering the theoretical context within which discourse analysis is 
situated.  
When doing discourse analysis, ‘language is not treated as information about 
something else but is ... problematized’ (Taylor, 2001a: 15). Doing discourse 
analysis, then, always reflects a sense that it is ‘untenable to retain conceptions of 
language as a merely neutral medium for the transmission of information, values 
and beliefs about the world “out there”’ (Wooffitt, 2001: 326), and also that ‘reality 
can never be reached outside of discourses’ (Phillips and Jørgenson, 2002: 21). As 
such, the discourse analytic approach has frequently been linked (either implicitly 
or explicitly) to the epistemological position of constructionism (e.g. see Burr, 
1995; Potter, 1996; Willig, 1999; Phillips and Jørgenson, 2002), and it has been 
suggested that discourse analysts must accept the basic theoretical premises of 
that perspective (Phillips and Jørgenson, 2002: 4). However, as both 
constructionism and subjectivism (as defined by Crotty, 1998: 8-9) accept that 
language itself (as the vehicle through which individuals organise and express 
their conscious thoughts) is implicated in the constitution of meaningful reality, I 
would argue that either of these epistemological positions might feasibly underpin 
a discourse analytic approach. Moreover, both constructionism and subjectivism 
sit in sharp contrast to the position of epistemological objectivism, which sees 
language as able to unproblematically represent reality, in which case discourse 
analysis is pointless (Phillips and Jørgenson, 2002: 20).  
The idea of social constructionism has been taken by some to refer to the idea that 
it is only social objects that are socially constructed. However, Crotty (1998: 55) 
maintains that it refers to the idea that ‘all meaningful reality, precisely as 
meaningful reality, is socially constructed’. The word ‘social’, then, is used to 
indicate that the work of meaning construction happens in the context of social 
interactions, which usually take place through the medium of language. A social 
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constructionist stance, then, accepts the basic premise that ‘language is 
constitutive: it is the site where meanings are created and changed’ (Taylor, 2001a: 
6).  
Social constructionism is not opposed to the ontological position of realism (which 
holds that a real world exists independently of our understandings of it), rather 
social constructionists hold that descriptions of reality can never objectively 
represent reality. Discourse analysis, then, is an approach to research which is 
centrally concerned with the discursive construction and maintenance of 
meaningful reality. It rejects objectivism in favour of the relativist epistemological 
positions of either constructionism or subjectivism (which both recognise that the 
sense we make of objects is relative to our own subjective positions (Burr, 1995: 6; 
Crotty, 1998: 64-66)) 40. 
Foucault’s work has been an important reference point for many discourse 
analysts (Phillips and Jørgenson, 2002: 12), although the way he used the term 
discourse in his own writing was varied, and in his later work it was rarely 
mentioned (O’Farrall, 2005: 78-81). However, O’Farrall suggests that generally 
Foucault used the term in the sense of ‘a “certain way of speaking”’ (Foucault, 
1977a: 107-8, cited by O’Farrall, 2005: 78), whilst Carrabine (2001: 273-4) 
suggests that a Foucauldian understanding of discourses would see them as 
‘variable ways of “speaking of” an issue’. However, Foucault also saw discourses as 
being more than language (Taylor, 2001b: 317).  
Crucially, at the core of Foucault’s understanding of discourse is its ‘productive’ 
potential, as it constructs the objects of which it speaks. It is not merely that the 
discourse shapes the way that people think about and understand issues, then, but 
rather that the discourse produces them as subjects, thus having effects 
(Carrabine, 2001: 273). The Foucauldian notion of a ‘discursive formation’ 
represents the inseparability of ideas and language (Hughes and Sharrock, 2007: 
                                                        
40 There are some important caveats to this as regards the knowledge claims made by discourse 
analysts. There is significant scope for discourse analysts to find themselves in the apparently 
hypocritical position of denying that reality can be objectively accessed outside of language whilst 
effectively objectifying language or discourse in their analysis. I will discuss how I deal with this 
issue in the last part of this chapter. 
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330). A Foucauldian discourse analysis proceeds from an understanding of 
discourse as productive, that is to say as capable of constituting its own objects and 
of having power effects as it produces a ‘truth’. 
To identify the sample for my discourse analysis I compiled a spreadsheet of 
articles, reports and policy documents which referred directly to either public 
confidence in the criminal justice system, or public confidence in policing41. I then 
examined the references cited in each of these documents in order to identify any 
other sources which were referenced by more than one of the pieces on 
confidence. The criteria I used to select the documents which would be included in 
my sample was that at least one of the following should apply: (i) the document 
had been referenced 3 or more times in other documents dealing with public 
confidence; (ii) the document was produced by authors who had been referenced 3 
or more times in other documents dealing with public confidence; or (iii) that, 
despite not having been referenced 3 or more times, they were clearly positioned 
within the policy agenda as influential texts (this latter applied mainly to the most 
recent examples of confidence research and policy documents). These criteria 
were intended to help me to identify the texts within the discourse which might be 
considered to be ‘programmatic’ (Foucault cited in O’Farrall, 2005: 77). 
The initial stages in the process of doing a discourse analysis, from whatever 
theoretical perspective, have many similarities with other forms of qualitative 
analysis. The analyst must consider the key categories and themes in their data, 
and the terms used within the discourse, and they will code and recode, consider 
how meanings and images are used, how associations or contrasts are set up, how 
different subjects are positioned by the text, consider the repeated use of ideas and 
representations around particular themes, identify apparent inconsistencies 
within the discourse, and also look for the silences (Tonkiss, 2004: 378-9). That is 
to say the analyst will focus on the ‘internal relations’ (Fairclough, 2003: 37) of the 
                                                        
41 I included the literature on public confidence in policing as I very quickly noticed that there were 
no clear dividing lines in discussions of public confidence between those studies which focused on 
the police, and those studies focused on the criminal justice system as a whole. The research on 
those topics used similar methods and approaches, suggesting that both were shaped by similar 
rationalities.   
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texts. In my case, then, this was a concern with the details of how public confidence 
was being constructed through the relationships which the texts set up between 
words, expressions and ideas. However, my analysis also concentrated on 
identifying which sources referenced which earlier works and how these linked 
together in referential chains, with each instance of referencing legitimising and 
solidifying the place of each text within the discourse. I focused on the ‘ “movement 
of meaning” ...  from one event to another, from one text to another’ (Silverstone, 
1999 cited by Fairclough, 2003: 30).  
To begin my analysis, in the first instance I read and reread the selected documents 
in chronological order to get a feel for what they were saying, how they were 
saying it and how this changed over time. During this preliminary analysis I 
identified four categories of interest:  Role (what role was implicitly or explicitly 
assigned to the public in influencing policy?); Significance (what were seen as the 
significant public interventions thus far?); Subjective capacity (how was the 
content of the subjective categorized?); Malleability (how malleable were the 
public as subjects implied to be?). I used these four categories to code each of the 
‘programmatic’ texts, and to identify extracts for more detailed analysis. This 
approach was sufficient to enable me to give a descriptive account of the 
development of the discourse from 1984 to the present day. In the next phase I 
employed a more detailed analysis of the discourse, drawing on a number of 
conceptual resources which can be used to facilitate discourse analysis. In the next 
two sections I outline these. 
3.2.3 Subjective, subjectivities, subject 
I have thought very carefully about how to use these three words in such a way as 
to minimise vagueness and maximise the opportunity for readers to apprehend my 
meaning. The way I use these words also reflects the theoretical position that 
underpins my work, something which I believe should be transparent. To this end I 
now briefly explain my approach. 
In colloquial usage to say that something is ‘subjective’ is to say that it is a matter 
of individual taste or perspective. In this way the word can be used to defend the 
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existence of apparent differences between individuals in matters of preference or 
judgment. To say ‘well it’s all subjective’ can signal acceptance of or resignation to 
difference. However to say that something is ‘subjective’ is also to say that it is not 
‘objective’, a discursive manoeuvre which can be used to denigrate individual 
judgments, as in ‘that’s just your subjective view’. In this latter instance the 
personal view, opinion, belief, whatever, is implicitly, and unfavourably, contrasted 
with an objective external reality, that is to say with ‘the way things really are’.  
The notion of the subjective (and also of subjectivity), then, implies something 
personal, something interior, something which carries more than a whiff of a 
suspicion that it is likely to imperfectly reflect the exterior world of objective 
reality. I use the idea of ‘the subjective’ to refer to that portion of the individual 
which is regarded as being internal, as belonging to them alone, and, unless they 
choose to articulate it, as remaining, if not invisible (for clearly what is interior can 
always ‘leak out’), then inaccessible to other individuals.  
I use the word ‘subjectivities’ to denote the array of concepts which are deployed 
to categorize the ‘content’ of the subjective, for example, broadly, emotions, 
cognitions and connations and, more specifically, things like happiness, anger, 
sadness, fear, confidence, beliefs, perceptions, opinions, intentions. Subjectivities, 
then, are not the actual interiority of the individual, they are the concepts we use 
to describe what is ‘inside’ them. The way in which we use these concepts and the 
relationships which we posit between them shape our understandings of ourselves 
and others.  
It is difficult (although perhaps not impossible) to communicate our interiority to 
others and to ourselves without making use of the shared stock of ideas which we 
have in common to describe our interiority. Subjectivities, then, obtain their 
meaning intersubjectively, although some individuals and institutions, for example, 
those who produce and disseminate knowledge about the content and workings of 
human interiority (the producers of ‘psy knowledges’ (Lawler, 2008: 64)), may be 
particularly influential in this process as concepts ‘ “escape” from their specialist 
enclaves to inform the workings of other types of professionals … self-help 
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literature … And … are reiterated in the minutiae of daily life … and inform the 
relationship of the self to itself’ (Lawler, 2008: 64).   
Subjectivities thus contribute to forming our identities as we use them as a way of 
thinking about, and even of being, ‘ourselves’ and ‘constantly act upon ourselves to 
be a certain type of subject’ (Lawler, 2008: 62). I use the word ‘subject’ then in this 
sense: to mean what becomes of the individual after what Foucault refers to as a 
process of ‘subjectivation’, that is to say the individual who has been ‘subject-ed  to 
the rules and norms engendered by a set of knowledges’ (Lawler, 2008: 62) and 
‘formed within the apparatuses of power/knowledge’ (Blackman et al, 2008: 6). 
Subjectivities are implicated within the knowledge discourse around individual 
personhood and, as we use them to understand ourselves, they are thus both the 
tools of our subjectivation, and the building blocks of subjecthood.  
So the subjective is that portion of the individual regarded as internal and 
personal, subjectivities are the concepts used to categorize the content of that 
interiority, and the subject is the individual subject-ed to the knowledge discourses 
available for thinking about their selfhood (including subjectivities). Thus, 
individuals ‘take up subject-positions – specific ways of being – available within 
discourse, understanding themselves according to a set of criteria provided by the 
experts whose authority derives from rationality and “reason”’ (Lawler, 2008: 62). 
These ideas are of relevance to my thesis because I am concerned with the way in 
which knowledge about a subjectivity called ‘confidence’ is produced, as well as 
with the effects of that knowledge. The knowledge discourse around confidence 
not only contributes to the wider knowledge discourse on subjectivities and 
personhood, but, in the course of its production, it offers individuals opportunities 
to give expression to their interiority. Different mechanisms for collecting data on 
confidence and other types of subjectivities (e.g. opinions) offer different 
opportunities for individuals to be subject-ed whilst, in making subjectivities into 
‘categories of enumeration’, the research gives them the form of concrete/real 
‘objects’, or Durkheimian ‘social facts’. My contention, then, is that confidence 
research does not uncover the truth about confidence, rather it makes that truth.   
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3.2.4 Other conceptual resources  
‘Grids of specification’ 
Foucault argued that the statements of which discourses are comprised are always 
about objects: ‘things presented to thought … the occasion or the matter on which 
thought is exercised’ (O’Farrall, 2005: 79). Statements within discursive 
formations place objects in specific positions in relation to one another in what 
Foucault called a ‘grid of specification’ (Hughes and Sharrock, 2007: 331). A 
Foucauldian discourse analysis seeks to identify the objects presented to thought 
and the inter-relations implied in their positioning within discourse in order to 
map the ‘grid of specification’ at work, and understand ‘the systematic ways that 
phenomena are rendered accessible to us’ (Kendall and Whickham, 1999: 28) 
including any hierarchical relationships implied between the objects which the 
grid contains. This task was the first step in my in-depth analysis of the public 
confidence discourse. 
‘Regimes of truth’  
Foucauldian analysis pays particular attention to the discursive construction of the 
distinction between what is true, and what is false, that is to say ‘regimes of truth’: 
‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and 
specific effects of power attached to the true’ (Foucault, 2000 [1977]: 132 cited in 
O’Farrall, 2005: 65). In social research literature the construction of this 
distinction is usually discussed in terms of the adequacy of the method used to 
access and represent reality, and the epistemology (way of knowing) upon which it 
rests. However, from a social constructionist perspective all meaningful reality is 
socially constructed, thus the activities of social researchers themselves are 
implicated in the construction of meaningful reality. Taking this perspective 
towards my data I analysed how discussions of methodological and 
epistemological adequacy (‘regimes of truth’) have been used in the public 
confidence discourse in preference to discussions of ontology (which would focus 
on how researchers themselves construct meaningful reality), and how this neglect 
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of their own ontological productivity serves to obscure the value-laden nature of 
decisions about how (and indeed if) public confidence should be represented. 
‘Procedures of intervention’ 
The Foucauldian notion of ‘procedures of intervention’ describes the regulation of 
processes for introducing new statements into a discursive field, something which 
often happens when statements are translated from one discursive context into 
another (Hughes and Sharrock, 2007: 331). For example, inquiries into ‘what the 
public think’, whether they are via crude single-item opinion polls or sophisticated 
multi-item questionnaires, transpose ‘statements’ from one register (e.g. everyday 
talk about crime and justice) into another (e.g. responses elicited by a 
questionnaire) and then into another (e.g. reports of stable public beliefs or extant 
public demands). In this way, ‘[k]nowledge can only be a violation of the things to 
be known, and not a perception, a recognition, an identification of or with those 
things’ (Foucault, 2000 [1974]: 9 cited in O’Farrall, 2005: 67). As Rock has argued, 
established conventions for research into public opinion about crime and justice 
lead to complex and fluid everyday thought being given ‘alien meaning’ (Rock, 
1979: 163) as it is pressed into the mould of ‘organizational instruments which 
emphasise logicality and lucidity’ (Rock, 1979: 166). I use the idea of ‘procedures 
of intervention’ to examine the ways in which public confidence discourse 
appropriates and transforms what the public are saying, and indeed doing,  when 
they take part in public confidence research.  
‘Reality effects’  
As should by now be clear, I envisage the way in which social research constructs 
reality as more than  simply producing unpredictable consequences through ‘the 
reentry of social scientific discourse into the contexts it analyses [and] the chronic 
revision of social practices in the light of knowledge about those practices’ 
(Giddens, 1990:  40). This perspective on how research can change reality is not 
incompatible with an objectivist world view (a view which I have rejected). Instead 
I propose that research has the potential to produce something which Osborne and 
Rose (1999) have termed ‘reality effects’ whereby ‘the version of the world that 
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could be produced under this description...become[s] true’ (Osborne and Rose, 
1999: 382).  
Reality effects emerge when practices of research and representation call upon 
individuals to behave in certain ways, for example in the case of ‘public opinion’ 
research Osborne and Rose have argued that: ‘people learn to have opinions; they 
become “opinioned”…people come to “fit” the demands of the research; they 
become, so to speak, persons that are by nature “researchable” from that 
perspective’ (Osborne and Rose, 1999: 392). It is not, then, merely that people are 
altered (in unpredictable ways) by their experiences of being the objects of 
research, and reading about such research carried out on others (which is a 
somewhat obvious point). It is rather that the research produces subjects and 
objects; it calls upon individuals to constitute themselves as subjects in certain 
ways, and it fashions them into research objects in the light of their subjectivation.  
Social science is at its most ‘productive’ (in terms of constructing reality and 
subjectivating individuals) when its concepts, ideas and modes of explanation 
move beyond the rarefied discourses of the academy and into the more accessible 
realms of public, political or policy discourse. The productivity of social science is 
also in evidence when concepts and ideas from these discourses are taken up and 
used within social scientific work and then re-enter public discourse infused with 
supplementary meaning by virtue of their status within research. Such is the case 
for research into the idea of public confidence, which has taken on a prominent 
position in recent criminal justice policy in England and Wales.  
I draw upon the idea of ‘reality effects’ to examine how the public confidence 
discourses frequently (albeit often implicitly) categorize and order affectivities, 
cognitions, conations, and actions (subjectivities or the ‘stuff’ of the subjective), in 
such a way as to create the subjects which they purport to represent42 whilst, at 
the same time, interpellating individuals in various subject positions in relation to 
                                                        
42 I have expanded here Campbell’s (2010) notion of ‘taxonomies of affect’. I am also thinking of 
Bourdieu’s ‘practical taxonomies’ which he says guide our perceptions of the social world, offering 




crime, criminology and the criminal justice system. These features of the discourse 
indicate that the public confidence research and policy arena is infused with 
theories of the subject which, even if they are not explicitly acknowledged, play an 
important part in producing the ‘reality’ of public confidence (as Lawler notes with 
respect to ‘psy knowledges’: ‘The knowledges generated by psy are not normally 
represented as theories, open to contestation, but as truths about “human nature”’ 
(Lawler, 2008: 64)). 
3.2.5 Summary 
In this section I have described how I went about identifying and analysing the 
dominant discourse of public confidence in the criminal justice system. During the 
next stage in my analysis I became interested in how it was possible for this 
dominant discourse to exist in its contemporary form. In the next part of this 
chapter I describe how I analysed the ‘conditions of emergence’ for the idea of 
public confidence in the criminal justice system.  
3.3 A Foucauldian genealogical analsyis of the emergence of the dominant 
discourse 
3.3.1 Archaeology: identifying ‘surfaces of emergence’ 
‘I begin with the assumption that the phenomenon to be explained is a present 
day phenomenon … and … my task is to trace its historical conditions of 
emergence … and give account of its formation and development’ (Lee, 2007: 9) 
In his 2007 book Inventing Fear of Crime: Criminology and the Politics of Anxiety, 
Lee provided a thorough and thought-provoking Foucauldian genealogy of the 
much-analysed concept of ‘fear of crime’. He argued that the will to knowledge, and 
more specifically the will to ‘enumerate’ (Ibid: 203), had contributed to the 
production of a concept which had in turn developed ‘its own productive capacities 
and effects’ (Ibid: 134). He described the process of production thus: 
‘…contingent factors have informed the entire conceptualisation of the fear of 
crime as an object that might be rendered intelligible through empirical 
enquiry. ... Fear of crime became an object of governance not because it was 
“out there”, “waiting to be discovered”, but because of a number of accidental or 
contingent discursive alignments or conditions of emergence’ (Lee, 2007: 133)  
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Lee’s account of the emergence of the idea of fear of crime offers many illuminating 
parallels with the story of how public confidence has become a prominent object 
for research and policy, but, more importantly for my purposes, his approach to his 
subject matter provided inspiration for my own inquiry, as it fired my interest in 
tracing the historical contingencies which allowed the idea of public confidence in 
the criminal justice system to emerge.  
Foucauldian genealogical inquiries proceed from the belief that there is ‘no 
necessity at work in history’ (Smart, 2002: 58), and to do genealogy is to seek to 
understand how an idea (e.g. public confidence) comes to be seen as self-evident 
and necessary (Smart, 2002: 59). Knowledges are seen as requiring particular 
material conditions in order to operate, and also as having consequences for that 
materiality (Kendall and Whickham, 1999: 45). Thus, as Garland has argued with 
reference to the categorizations utilised within discourses on crime and criminals, 
these categorizations function as ‘effective, truth-producing categories that 
provide the discursive conditions for real social practices. These categories are 
themselves a product (and a functioning aspect) of the same cultures and social 
structures that produce the criminal behaviours and individuals to which they 
refer’ (Garland, 2001: 25).  
The investigative method applied in genealogy is what Foucault described as 
‘archaeology’ (Kendall and Whickham, 1999: 31-34), a method which entails 
analysing and describing:  
‘the domain of existence and functioning of a discursive … to discover that 
whole domain of institutions, economic processes, and social relations on 
which a discursive formation can be articulated … to uncover … the particular 
level in which history can give place to definite types of discourse, which have 
their own types of historicity, and which are related to a whole set of various 
historicities’ (Foucault, 1977a: 164-5 cited in Smart, 2002: 50) 
Archaeology thus aims to uncover the traces of past knowledges and practices 
which can be identified in contemporary orders of knowledge, and which provide 
that knowledge with its ‘conditions of possibility’ (O’Farrall, 2005: 63). Foucault’s 
archaeology, then, pivots on the notion that ideas which commonsense might be 
inclined to treat as timeless in fact have a historicity, and that our perspective on 
these ideas is rooted in the time and place from which we view them (Smart, 2002: 
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58). Indeed, Foucault regarded historical inquiry as the best method for 
understanding and challenging contemporary regimes of truth (O’Farrall, 2005: 
54). His analytical focus eschewed the identification of underlying causes of history 
and instead aimed at uncovering the material conditions which permit certain 
objects to be thought, and thus to be known (Kendall and Whickham, 1999: 35).  
Archaeology was intended to provide liberating knowledge by offering ‘a model of 
what has happened that will allow us to free ourselves from what has happened’ 
(Foucault, 1974: 644 cited in O’Farrall, 2005: 64). Foucault later introduced the 
idea of ‘genealogy’: a way of applying archaeology to answer present problems by 
incorporating, along with the historical analysis, an understanding of power: ‘there 
is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, 
nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations’ (Foucault, 1977a: 27 cited by Smart, 2002: 64). For Foucauldian 
thought then, truth is shaped and organised by power. Doing a Foucauldian 
genealogy of public confidence in the criminal justice system, then, means, in the 
first instance, applying an archaeological method to uncover how the idea of public 
confidence (in its dominant contemporary form) became thinkable, that is to say 
how it was able to emerge as an ‘object’ for thought, its ‘conditions of emergence’. 
My archaeological inquiry was concerned with how the contemporary notion of 
public confidence in the criminal justice system became a recognised object of 
governance (Lee, 2007: 10). I was concerned to identify its ‘surfaces of emergence’, 
defined by Kendall and Whickham (1999: 6) as ‘places within which objects are 
designated and acted upon’. In pursuit of this objective I primarily used secondary 
historical sources as a resource for understanding material conditions, that is to 
say they were used as a way of getting at what was happening at certain points in 
history. My approach to these sources could therefore be described as objectivist, 
as the sources in question were utilised as adequate discursive representations of 
an extant reality. Such an approach could be seen as inconsistent with the 
Foucauldian ideas outlined above however, despite recognising the notion of 
universal truth as a historically contingent category, Foucault still strived to ensure 
that his analyses were firmly and accurately rooted in concrete material 
 81 
 
experiences (O’Farrall, 2005: 86) and this too is my concern in utilising these 
secondary sources.  
It is of course also plausible to analyse secondary sources from a social 
constructionist perspective, and to consider how they construct the truth they 
purport to represent, however the productive work done by these accounts is not 
the concern of this thesis. It would also of course be possible to engage in my own 
search of the entire historical archive bypassing secondary accounts altogether, 
however such a project is beyond the practical scope of this project. For good 
practical reasons, then, I have approached these secondary sources from an 
objectivist perspective, using them to help me to understand (as best as possible 
from my vantage point in the present) material conditions at different points in 
history.  
As my concern was with what happened, rather than with why it happened I did 
not need to adjudicate between competing explanations as to how historical events 
came to pass. However, using secondary historical sources in this way still requires 
that careful consideration be given to their validity, reliability and clarity as 
historical records. Methods which can be applied to this task are also applicable to 
any literature review and include triangulation (consulting multiple sources to 
ensure that their accounts of historical facts are aligned) and close analysis of the 
arguments presented to ensure that claims are supported by appropriate evidence 
rather than being unsupported assertions or suppositions. To identify appropriate 
historical resources for my purposes I used the same procedures as I would use to 
identify sources for a literature review, consulting the bibliographies of the texts of 
which I was already aware in this area, searching library catalogues and databases, 
and spending time in the library getting to know the available literature. 
3.3.2 Genealogy: Power/knowledge 
In the first part of my analysis of the emergence of the contemporary discourse of 
public confidence I explored its historical ‘surfaces of emergence’, relying 
predominantly on secondary historical sources, and utilising primary sources for 
illustrative purposes. In the second part of my genealogical analysis I sought to 
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analyse in detail how, in the past 40 or so years, the idea of public confidence in the 
criminal justice system has been able to ‘“hook” into normative ideas and common-
sense notions’ (Carrabine, 2001: 269) within discourses on crime and criminal 
justice in England and Wales. I thus treated the public confidence agenda as a 
discursive formation containing statements (including claims to knowledge) about 
the object public confidence which could be analysed in order to identify the 
characteristics of the dominant discourse of public confidence.  
Accepting the Foucauldian perspective that there can be no form of knowledge 
without networks of power (O’Farrall, 2005: 101), and that power is productive, 
generating ‘particular types of knowledge and cultural order’ (Ibid: 100), I was 
concerned to trace the relationship between knowledge and power in the 
emergence of the public confidence agenda. Foucault argued that ‘there is no 
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations’ (Foucault, 1977a: 27 cited in Smart, 2002: 64). I chose to approach this 
task through an analysis of the publicly available records of the utterances of 
politicians and people working in the criminal justice field as reported in media 
discourses, and in the contents of parliamentary debates, policy documents, 
commissioned inquiries and research reports. In dealing with this kind of data my 
concern was not with the factual accuracy of utterances and reports, but with how, 
when and where the idea of public confidence entered into the discourse.  
 My approach to the primary sources used for this part of the analysis was social 
constructionist in perspective, and I regarded the texts as ‘ “social facts”: produced, 
shared and used in socially organized ways’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997: 47 cited 
by Gidley 2004: 254). I was interested in the material events and conditions 
against which the idea of public confidence was deployed; and secondly I was 
concerned to trace the intertextual relationships at work, not just between the 
newspaper articles, but also between the newspaper articles and other textual 
genres, including political statements and debates and the content of policy and 
research documents. My focus then was on how texts related to external social 
events (Fairclough, 2003: 37). The purpose here was ‘to identify the details and 
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accidents that accompany beginnings, the small deviations, the errors, the 
complete reversals, “the false appraisals and faulty calculations” that produced 
things, knowledges, and “truths” that continue to have value in contemporary 
settings’ (Lee, 2007: 10). The Foucauldian genealogical method is focused, then, on 
contingencies, not causes (Kendall and Whickham, 1999: 6). 
To kick start the analytical process I reviewed every newspaper article since 1982 
which contained the phrase ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’. I 
coded these according to how and why confidence had been invoked in each of 
these articles (the material events and conditions it referred to), and any links 
which the article made to other texts (its intertextual relations). After this point, 
the selection and analysis of further texts was a perambulatory process: as I 
identified events and texts of interest so I used these to search for other texts, all 
the time building up a sense of the points at which confidence entered into (or did 
not enter into) and was transmitted through the discourse. The purpose of this 
journey through linked events and texts (a journey into the discourse) was to 
apply the Foucauldian strategy of ‘eventalization’:  
‘...making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a 
historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness 
which imposes itself uniformly on all. To show that things “weren’t as 
necessary as all that”;  
...  
eventalization means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, 
blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment 
establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and 
necessary.’ (Foucault, 1991a: 73) 
This is a key part of any genealogical analysis, an approach to analysis which  
‘seeks to identify the details and accidents that accompany beginnings, the small 
deviations, the errors and complete reversals’ that produce knowledges and 
‘truths’, and ultimately the ‘things’ of which discourse purports to ‘speak’ (Lee, 




However, before I got to this part of my analysis there were important choices to 
be made about which sources should fall into my sample for analysis. In the 
following sections I give an overview of how this selection was made. 
3.3.3 Identifying, accessing and using primary historical sources 
In searching for appropriate primary sources it was necessary to consider the 
practical constraints upon what was and was not plausible. As the genealogical 
aspect of the research constituted just one chapter in my three part analysis I 
decided to rely primarily on digital resources. The advent of large-scale digitization 
has made newspaper content a more accessible source for historical research as it 
no longer requires the previously prohibitive major investment of time and 
resources to trawl through physical archives (Bingham, 2010: 226). Using 
newspaper content in order to understand the politics, culture and society of an 
era has become a widely accepted historical technique (Ibid: 225) and enables 
researchers to identify when subjects were first discussed in the press, when a 
particular term or idea was first invoked and historical variations in its usage. 
Digital archives make this type of analysis much more feasible over large time 
periods with high volumes of newspaper print (Ibid: 228). However, there are 
some limitations to utilising digital archives. The easier availability of the archived 
content of particular titles (for example, The Times) has led some scholars to use 
this title as if it were ‘representative of “press opinion”’ without justifying this 
decision (Ibid: 229). I have tried to avoid falling into this trap by explicitly 
triangulating between the different archival resources which I used.  
Bingham (2010: 230) further notes that the search engines of digital archives treat 
historical newspaper content as if it consisted of discrete articles, and argues that 
there is a danger that by utilising keyword searches to ‘home in’ on the articles 
containing their search terms researchers will neglect to consider the physical 
location and presentation of the article, failing to see the newspaper as a whole 
document. The practical limitations of the digital archive made it difficult to avoid 
the kind of neglect described by Bingham. This is particularly the case when using 
the Lexis Nexis archive which contains only the words featured in the articles, and 
an indication of the page upon which they featured, rather than a scanned image of 
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the article’s place within the page and the paper as a whole. This should therefore 
be regarded as a potential limitation of my analysis. 
 Following a preliminary investigation of available, accessible and appropriate 
archival sources I selected the following digital repositories as useful starting 
points for my research: the Times Digital Archive; Lexis Nexis Newspaper 
database; the National Archive (includes House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers) and the British Library Digital Newspaper Archive. I started my 
exploratory analysis with the Times Digital Archive and Lexis Newspaper 
database. The Times Digital archive covers the full text of the Times Newspaper 
from 1785 to 1985, containing almost 8 million articles from this time period. 
Lexis Nexis contains full text coverage of the contents of both local and national 
British newspapers, although the time span of the coverage varies by publication. 
The two publications for which Lexis Nexis offers the longest period of coverage 
are The Times/Sunday Times (from 1st July 1985) and the Guardian (from 14th July 
1984), so initially I limited my searches to these two national broadsheet 
newspapers as I was interested in gaining the longest possible historical 
perspective. Later, once I had identified events and dates of interest, I was able to 
expand my analysis to include content from other newspapers included in the 
archive. 
The British Library Digital Newspaper Archive contains a fascinating range of 
newspaper and pamphlet content from 1600 to 1900. As at December 2010 the 
database contained 16,646,238 articles, on 2.2 million pages from 48 different 
publications. It is important to note that only a small fraction of the Library’s 
physical newspaper collection (1%) have thus far been digitised, however the 
composition of the database was carefully thought out and designed by a panel of 
academic advisors, and designed in such a way as to provide researchers with an 
indication of prevalent media discourses from earlier eras43.   
                                                        
43 The academic panel made their selection using the following eligibility criteria: to ensure that 
complete runs of newspapers are scanned; to have the most complete date range covered by the 
titles selected; to have the greatest UK-wide coverage as possible; to include the specialist area of 
Chartism (many of which are short runs); to consider the coverage of the title: e.g., the London area; 
a large urban area (e.g., Birmingham); a larger regional/rural area; to consider the numbers printed 
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In order to familiarise myself with the primary data for my genealogical analysis I 
used the quantitative technique of content analysis. Content analysis has the 
potential to have high validity and reliability via precise sampling as its focus is the 
objectively observable features of discourse, that is the words and phrases used, 
and the frequency with which they occur. The procedure of counting the 
occurrence of key words and phrases minimises the potential for researcher-bias 
as the object of inquiry is the manifest content of the texts and the procedures used 
should be replicable by any individual doing the same search in that search engine. 
By careful, defensible and explicit definition of the population, sample, sampling 
frame, text selection and search criteria, content analysts can evidence the valid 
and reliable nature of their findings (Tonkiss, 2004: 368-370). However, clearly 
quantifying content is limited in terms of the depth of insight which it can offer. It 
is entirely atheoretical, and can be subject to bias introduced by the way in which 
article content has been coded. For this reason I used it as a prelude to analysis, 
rather than as analysis itself, and report my findings here as a justification of my 
method, rather than in the substantive analysis chapters.  
3.3.4 Quantitative pre-analysis  
Using the search engines of the Times Digital Archive and the Lexis Nexis digital 
archive of the Guardian and the Times/Sunday Times I carried out a quantitative 
content analysis in order to gain an initial overview of the prevalence and 
historical distribution of the term ‘public confidence’ used in relation to criminal 
justice matters within the print media.  Initially I searched just on the term ‘public 
confidence’. This enabled me to identify whether this term had become more or 
less prevalent over time so that I could ensure that any variation in the use of 
‘public confidence’ in relation to my other search terms was not attributable to a 
general increase in the use of the term ‘public confidence’.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
- a large circulation; the paper was successful in its time via its sales; to consider the different 
editions for dailies and weeklies and their importance for article inclusion or exclusion; to consider 
special content, e.g., the newspaper espoused a certain political viewpoint (radical/conservative); 




As illustrated in Figure 1 (below) I found that the term public confidence occurred 
much more frequently in the last quarter of the 20th century than at any time prior 
to this. During this time period there was also an increase in the size of the 
newspaper, which may partially explain this upward trend. Figure 2 (below) 
however, shows that mentions of ‘public confidence’ in parliamentary debates also 
showed a definite upwards trend in the last two decades of the 20th century, 
suggesting that at least some of the increase in the newspapers may reflect the 
increasing political salience of the term.  
Figure 1: Mentions of 'public confidence' in the Times and Sunday Times 1905 -200444 
 
Figure 3 (below) uses Lexis Nexis data for the last quarter of the 20th century to 
show that in both the Times and the Guardian Newspapers there was a generally 
upward trend in use of the term ‘public confidence’ in each five year period from 
1985-2004. This reinforces the impression gained from Figures 1 and 2 that the 
use of the term ‘public confidence’ was on the increase, although the differences 
between the figures for the two newspapers remind us of the dangers of seeing the 
Times as representative of newspapers generally. 
 
 
                                                        
44 Figures up until 1984 obtained through the Times Digital Archive. Figures from 1985 onwards 
from Lexis Nexis. 
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Figure 2: Mentions of ‘public confidence’ in parliamentary debates 1810 -2000 
 
 
Figure 3: Mentions of 'public confidence’ in broadsheet newspapers 1984-2009 
 
Next I searched to see how many times the term ‘public confidence’ occurred along 
with either ‘police’ or ‘justice’. Here I encountered a problem: the search engine for 
the Times archive worked slightly differently to that of Lexis Nexis. This meant that 
I was unable to directly compare searches on text produced up until the end of 
1984 and searches on text produced thereafter. This problem was compounded by 
the tendency of the Times archive to throw up false positives for the earlier time 
periods, where ‘public confidence’ occurred in close proximity to either ‘police’ or 
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‘justice’ but in a completely different article or context45. Therefore, in order to get 
a rough idea of trends over time in the use of ‘public confidence’ in relation to 
issues of justice and policing I searched for all articles using the term ‘public 
confidence’ where one of the article keywords was either ‘justice’ or ‘police’. This 
seemed to produce more reliably relevant ‘hits’. The results of this search for each 
50 year period from 1785 to 1984 are displayed in Table 1, below.  
Table 1: Frequency of use of 'public confidence' in relation to justice/police in the Times 
1785-1984 
 1785-1834 1835-1884 1885-1934 1935-1984 
Justice 1 (<1%) 3 (<1%) 8 (<1%) 19 (<1%) 
Police 0 (0%) 7 (<1%) 21 (1%) 105 (5%) 
 
Percentages displayed correspond to frequency expressed as a percentage of all mentions of ‘public confidence’ 
 
These figures suggest that the notion of public confidence in justice had virtually 
no presence in the content of the Times newspaper prior to 1985, whilst the notion 
of public confidence in police had a limited presence from the late 19th century 
onwards, and became more frequently used during the 20th century. I triangulated 
these findings by searching the British Library database of British Newspapers 
1600-1900. The search on ‘public confidence justice’ (which would identify all 
articles where these words occurred in close proximity to one another) yielded 
just 4 hits, whilst a search on ‘public confidence police’ yielded 3 hits, supporting 
the inference suggested by the Times archive search. 
Table 2 (below) displays usage of ‘public confidence’ in the same sentence as the 
words ‘police’ or ‘justice’ in the Times/Sunday Times and The Guardian 
newspapers since 1984. These figures were obtained from the Lexis Nexis search 
engine. As can be seen, both in crude volume terms and in proportion to other uses 
of the term ‘public confidence’, there was a spike in the use of ‘public confidence’ in 
the same sentence as ‘justice’ and ‘police’ between 1989 and 1994. Analysing each 
                                                        
45 For example the search engine identified a long article from Friday 2nd February 1821 recounting 
parliamentary business, where the word ‘justice’, used in relation to the presumption of innocence 
which should follow a person’s acquittal for an offence, was followed by the use of the term ‘public 
confidence’ in an entirely separate debate about the reporting of government income. 
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of these years individually I found that during that five year period the prevalence 
(numerical and proportional) of the term ‘public confidence’ used in the same 
sentence as the word police was at its peak in both newspapers in 1989 and 1990, 
but declined thereafter, whereas the prevalence (numerical and proportional) of 
the term ‘public confidence’ used in the same sentence as the word justice was 
highest between 1991 and 1993. In the Guardian in 1993, 21% of uses of the term 
‘public confidence’ came in the same sentence as the word justice (18 articles in 
all). See Figure 4 (below) which displays this graphically. 
Table 2: Frequency of occurrence of 'public confidence' in same sentence as justice/police 
1984-2009 
  1984-1989 1989-1994 1994-1999 1999-2004 2004-2009 
Justice Times 25 (5%) 64 (10%) 57 (8%) 83 (10%) 102 (11%) 
 Guardian 26 (8%) 57 (14%) 37 (6%) 37 (6%) 40 (7%) 
Police Times 22 (5%) 86 (14%) 33 (5%) 46 (6%) 55 (6%) 
 Guardian 42 (13%) 55 (13%) 45 (8%) 24 (4%) 42 (7%) 
       
Percentages displayed correspond to frequency expressed as a percentage of all mentions of ‘public confidence’ 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of uses of 'public confidence' where justice or police in same sentence 
(Guardian newspaper 1989-1994) 
 
3.3.5 Pinpointing entry into the discourse 
My interest, of course, lay in the specific idea of ‘public confidence in the criminal 
justice system’. Using the Lexis Nexis database I counted how many articles from 
the Times/Sunday Times and the Guardian contained the phrase ‘public 
confidence in the criminal justice system’ in each year from 1985 to 2009. The 
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results are displayed in Figure 5 (below). The results indicate that the phrase only 
came into common usage from 1992 onwards. However it seems that during 
earlier periods the term ‘public confidence in the administration of justice’ was 
preferred, reflecting the fact that the term ‘criminal justice system’ was not widely 
used in relation to England and Wales prior to the 1970s46.  
Figure 5: Number of uses of phrase 'public confidence in the criminal justice system' in the 
Guardian and Times newspapers 1984-2009 
 
A search on the term ‘criminal justice system’ revealed that, in the British Library 
database of British Newspapers 1600-1900, the phrase did not occur at all, whilst 
in the Times newspaper, the term was not used in relation to Britain until 1973. 
Uses of the term during the 1970s were sparsely distributed and tended to be with 
reference to the US context (particularly the Watergate affair) or appeared to be 
prompted by, and often directly quoting from, academic or other research reports, 
or the words of the researchers themselves. It was not until 1981 that the term 
‘public confidence’ appeared in the same article as the term ‘criminal justice 
                                                        
46 The idea of criminal justice operating as a system, and thus the application of the term ‘criminal 
justice system’ began to become more prominent during the 1980s (See Bottoms, 1995: 24). Feeney 
(1985) has argued that the application of a systems approach to criminal justice from the 1960s 
onwards ‘bore almost immediate fruit’ (Ibid: 8) due to the multiple points of interdependence 
between agencies trying to operate effectively and efficiently. However, writing in the same edited 
collection, Mair (1985) argued that the term ‘system’ was misleading implying ‘notions of smooth-
running, interdependence, feedback and structured interaction’ (Ibid: 197) which were unlikely to 
result from the activities of agencies and professional groups with starkly different working 
cultures and objectives. Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of the term ‘system’ used in 
the criminal justice context it has, apparently at the behest of ministers seeking to exercise tighter 
control over the performance of public sector work, become the dominant term used to describe 
the collected and interacting activities of criminal justice agencies. 
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system’, however here the limitations of the Times archive search engine became 
clear as, although the two terms were used in the same article, they were not used 
in close association with each other. In an article the following year however, the 
two terms were brought together as the Times reported a speech in the House of 
Commons by the then Home Secretary William Whitelaw.  
Using the archive Historical Hansard (1803-2005) I was able to trace the exact 
emergence and prevalence of the phrase ‘public confidence in the criminal justice 
system’ in parliamentary debates. I found that the term was not used in 
parliamentary debate prior to 1981, when Ivan Lawrence MP referred to it in 
relation to proposals by the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981) to 
establish an independent prosecution service. Figure 6 (below) indicates that 
during the 1990s the term ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ came 
to be preferred to the term ‘public confidence in the administration of justice’ in 
parliamentary debates. 
Figure 6: 'Public confidence in the administration of justice' vs. 'Public confidence in the 
criminal justice system'. Number of uses in parliamentary debates 1810 -2000. 
 
Figure 7 (below) shows the prevalence of the term ‘public confidence in the 
criminal justice system’ in debates between its emergence in 1981, and 2005 when 
the archive terminates47. As it demonstrates, usage of the term was sparse in the 
                                                        




1980s, became much more prevalent in the mid-1990s, and had a significant spike 
in 2003/2004. Furthermore, the figures showed that the term was used much 
more frequently within parliamentary debates than it was in the content of the 
Times and Guardian newspapers.  
Figure 7: Number of uses of the phrase ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ in 
parliamentary debates 1981-2005 
 
Using various digitised archival sources then, I was able to note that the use of the 
term ‘public confidence’ in relation to the issue of justice was virtually non-existent 
in Times newspaper content prior to the early 1980s. I was also able to identify 
1981 as the first year in which the phrase ‘public confidence in the criminal justice 
system’ was used in a parliamentary debate, and 1982 as the first time that a 
discourse of ‘public confidence’ came together with that of the ‘criminal justice 
system’ in Times newspaper content.  Using Lexis Nexis I was able to identify 
1989-1994 as the period during which the use of the term ‘public confidence’ in 
the same sentence as justice or police became more frequent in newspaper 
content, and I identified a spike in the use of the term ‘public confidence’ in 
relation to police in 1989 and 1990, and a spike in the use of the term ‘public 
confidence’ in relation to justice from 1991-1993. The phrase ‘public confidence in 
the criminal justice system’ was most prevalent in newspaper content in 1992-
1994, 1996-1997, 2000, 2003 and 2007. In parliamentary debates this exact 
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phrase became more frequent between 1994 and 1997, in 2000 and between 2002 
and 2004.  
Gaining this quantitative overview of the historical content of the Times and The 
Guardian newspapers and parliamentary debates enabled me to familiarise myself 
with the data, to identify the newspaper articles and political debates which would 
form my sample for more detailed qualitative analysis, and to identify key points in 
time in the history of ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’.   
3.3.6 Summary 
In this section I have described the methods which I used to carry out a 
genealogical analysis of the emergence of the dominant discourse of public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. In the next section I describe the 
approach I used to reanalyse interview and focus group data collected as part of a 
funded research project on public confidence. 
3.4 Reanalysing interview and focus group data from a funded research 
project 
The data used for the final part of my analysis was collected as part of a funded 
research study on public confidence in the criminal justice system. The study 
employed three phases of empirical data collection: (i) a small-scale series of 
exploratory interviews and focus groups (September – October, 2007); (ii) a 
random-sample mail survey (April – June, 2008); (iii) an in-depth qualitative phase 
based on focus-group and semi-structured interviews (August – September, 2008). 
In my third analysis chapter I reused the data collected during the third phase of 
this process. This part of my methods chapter describes the way I used that data 
and the theoretical stance which I adopted towards it. 
The value of using interviews and focus groups in social research, the relative 
merits of these approaches to qualitative data collection, and the appropriate 
methods and procedures for doing interview/focus group research have been 
discussed in a vast wealth of methods literature (see for example Bloor et al, 2001; 
Bryman, 1998; Crabtree and Miller, 1999; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Mason, 2002; 
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Morgan, 1997; Silverman, 2001; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). My analysis takes it for 
granted that interviews and focus groups are relatively uncontroversial and widely 
used techniques in qualitative research; that it was valid and indeed conventional 
to use them in the funded project; and that they were conducted in a manner 
compatible with good research practice. Therefore it is not my purpose in this part 
of my methods chapter to dwell upon the debates about why, how, and when to 
use interviews and focus groups, and about the adequacy of the procedures 
actually adopted in the funded research project (although for the sake of 
transparency I do describe these). Rather I am concerned to elaborate on how and 
why I found it useful to re-visit this data for the purposes of developing my PhD 
thesis, and how in re-visiting the data I approached it from a very different 
perspective than that adopted during the funded research project. As a prelude to 
addressing this topic, the section below describes how the data was collected. 
3.4.1 Description of data collection48 
Respondents to the mail survey (n=1300) carried out during phase two of the data 
collection of the project were asked to indicate whether they would be willing to 
take part in a follow-up qualitative study. In total 420 people (32% of the sample) 
offered to take part in either an interview or a focus group and a contacts database 
of those respondents was compiled. The database included information (based on 
their responses to the mail survey) about respondents’ levels of confidence in the 
criminal justice system, their willingness to engage with the criminal justice 
system and where they lived. This information was used to enable purposive 
sampling for phase three to ensure that, as far as possible, a demographically and 
attitudinally diverse range of participants took part.  
During the recruitment phase attempts were made to contact respondents by 
telephone at different times of the day and on different days of the week, including 
evenings and weekends. Ninety three (22%) of those who offered to participate 
were successfully contacted. No incentives were offered to respondents to take 
                                                        
48 This section (3.4.1) is closely based on the description of data collection contained in Turner, 
Campbell, Dale and Graham (2009).  
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part, however refreshments were offered when they attended venues external to 
their own homes, and they were able to claim back travel expenses. Eighteen 
(19%) of those contacted declined to take part. Twenty one (23%) could not 
attend at a suitable time. Eleven (12%) agreed to take part but did not attend. 
Forty three (46%) took part in either an interview or focus group.  
In total I conducted five focus groups and 14 one-to-one interviews for the project 
during August and September 2008. Of the 43 participants, 25 were female and 18 
were male. The ages of the participants ranged from 27 to 93 years. Four 
participants were from a black or other minority ethnic background. 18 (42%) of 
the participants had said in the survey that they were fairly or very confident that 
the criminal justice system is effective, the remaining 25 (58%) had indicated that 
they were not very or not at all confident. The proportion of participants in the 
interviews and focus groups who were fairly or very confident corresponds closely 
to the proportion of confident individuals found in the population as a whole, 
through the random sample survey. See Table 3 (below) for details of the 
participants.    
Focus groups were carried out in three different locations: at the University 
campus, in a community centre in Riverton49 and at the council chambers in 
Lightly. Three interviews were carried out at the University, the remaining 11 
interviews were carried out at locations which were convenient for the participant, 
including (where appropriate) participants’ own homes, workplaces and 
convenient cafes. The focus groups each lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, and at 
each one I was assisted by a co-facilitator who took notes on the discussion and 
also on non-verbal interaction, and who later transcribed the discussion verbatim, 
including notes about the non-verbal interactions. The interviews each lasted 
between 30 and 60 minutes. I transcribed six of these interviews myself, and the 
                                                        




remaining eight interviews were transcribed verbatim by an external organisation 
and checked for accuracy by me50.    
Table 3: Focus group and interview participants  
 Alias Sex Age Confident? Ethnicity 
IV1 Fred M 93  White - British 
IV2 Elsie F 77  White - British 
IV3 Harriet F 63  White - British 
IV4 Gavin M 28  White - British 
IV5 Angie F 43  White - British 
IV6 Niall M 28  White - Irish 
IV7 Lorna F 39  White - British 
IV8 June F 61  White - British 
IV9 Brenda F 64  White - British 
IV10 Abida F 27  Asian - Pakistani 
IV11 Vivien F 68  White - British 
IV12 Karen F 58  White - British 
IV13 Margaret F 72  White - British 
IV14 Bert M 65  White - British 
FG1 Hamid M 31  Asian - Pakistani 
Mavis F 57  White - British 
Robin M 60  White - British 
Veronica F 49  White - British 
Julian M 56  White - British 
FG2 Rosemary F 56  White - British 
Eric M 61  White - British 
Malcolm M 51  White - British 
FG3 Ursula F 54  White - British 
Henry M 54  White - British 
Pam F 44  White - British 
Geoff M 63  White - British 
FG4 Sandra F 42  White - British 
Violet F 55  White - British 
Lawrence M 47  White - British 
Ted M 56  White - British 
Ernest M 77  White - British 
Jack M 65  White - British 
FG5 Judy F 57  White - British 
Steve M 52  White - British 
Bill M 55  White - British 
Maureen F 59  White - British 
Sandy F 46  White - British 
Tara F 54  White - British 
Andy M 35  White - British 
Priya F 50  Asian - Indian 
Anne F 49  White - British 
Laura F 45  White - British 
Glenys F 86  White - British 
 
                                                        
50 To satisfy ethical and data security obligations, transcripts of the discussions were stored on a 
secure password-protected database only accessible to the University-based members of the 
research team. Transcripts were anonymised for identity and place and participants were identified 
only by their questionnaire URN and an allocated pseudonym. 
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At the beginning of every focus group and interview the purpose of the research 
was explained (including the link to my PhD work) and the source of the funding 
made explicit. Participants were assured that their confidentiality and anonymity 
were guaranteed by the research team unless they said something which made the 
team concerned that someone might be at risk of serious harm. Participants were 
also advised that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw 
from the discussion at any time. Promotional materials for victim support were 
made available at each interview and focus group and participants’ attention was 
drawn to these. Participants were asked whether they would like to receive a copy 
of the final report and a note was made of those who expressed interest in order to 
share the published findings. 
The semi-structured interview and focus group schedules were designed to 
address four key themes: participants’ normative expectations of the CJS (what did 
they think it should be doing?); the conditions under which participants formed 
their views of the CJS (what information did they say they used?); the impact of 
confidence (what did respondents say about their willingness to engage with the 
criminal justice system in certain scenarios?); whether respondents felt that their 
views were listened to by the criminal justice system. The interview and focus 
group schedules were laid out in a grid formation so that themes would not be 
addressed in a linear fashion but could be addressed at points which seemed 
appropriate during the discussion. The intention was to allow the conversations to 
be as free-flowing as possible whilst ensuring that the core themes were 
addressed51.  
At the time that I carried out the interviews and focus groups for the funded 
research project I had only a rather vague sense of how I would use this data in my 
PhD thesis. However I knew that I was interested in the perspectives which 
members of the public had on whether or not the criminal justice system listened 
to their views, and whether they thought it should listen to their views, or to the 
                                                        
51 See Appendices 1 and 2 for the final versions of the focus group and interview schedules. 
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views of any other groups. For this reason I included a specific section in the 
interview and focus group schedules about ‘being listened to’.  
In the interviews, this section started from the question ‘do you think that your 
views about the CJS are typical?’, and included the following prompting questions: 
‘What gives you that impression? What other points of view are you aware of? Do 
you think the CJS listens to views like yours? Who does the system listen to? Who 
should the system listen to? How can the system listen better?’ In the focus groups 
this section started from the question ‘Do you think that the criminal justice 
system listens to views like yours?’ and prompting questions were: ‘What gives 
you that impression? Who does the system listen to? Who should the system listen 
to? How can the system listen better? Do you think your views are typical? What 
other points of view are you aware of?’ This was the only part of the schedules 
which was not designed to address public confidence directly. In writing up my 
analysis I have tried to make it clear when data have emerged ‘naturally’ in 
response to questions about public confidence in the criminal justice system, and 
when they have emerged as a direct consequence of this additional PhD-focused 
section of the schedule.  
3.4.2 Redefining the data: interview/focus group research as a technique 
of power 
Interviewing has been described by Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 188) as ‘an 
interactional format in which the researcher plays a key role through the questions 
he or she asks, however non-directive the interview is. In interviews the very 
structure of the interaction forces participants to be aware of the ethnographer as 
audience. Their conceptions of the nature and purposes of social research, and of 
the particular research project, may, therefore, act as a strong influence on what 
they say.’ They go on to caution researchers about the possible impact of a 
‘sophisticated’ interviewee who moves more towards giving analysis rather than 
description of the events or experiences he or she is asked about: ‘however 
interesting or fruitful the theoretical ideas are, the data base has been eroded’ 
(1983: 189), and argue that researchers must be aware of the differences between 
solicited and unsolicited statements in the evidence, as well as the potential impact 
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of ‘impression management’ by participants (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 
190). However they stress that despite the need to be vigilant on these issues 
‘participants’ responses to ethnographers may nevertheless may be an important 
source of information. Data in themselves cannot be valid or invalid; what is at 
issue are the inferences drawn from them’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 191).  
In reanalysing the data collected from a funded research project I did not simply 
plan to identify themes which were not spotted, or at least not explored, in the 
original analysis. Instead I started from a position of redefining the ontological 
status of the data. Instead of treating what people said in the interviews and focus 
groups as providing insight into the authentic and pre-existing content of some 
personal interior life, I interpreted their utterances as indicating their 
understanding of what can be said in the scenario which has been constructed for 
them by the researcher.   
I saw the interview/focus group as a scenario constructed specifically for research 
and, although to some extent ‘artificial’ (in that it is a mechanism constructed to 
access the ‘real’), it is also in itself ‘real’. The ‘real’ status of the interview/focus 
group scenario is confirmed by the fact that once it is brought into existence it 
begins to have ‘effects’ on the participants, the researchers, and ultimately on 
wider audiences exposed to the research findings which the interview/focus group 
scenario has helped to produce, and therefore subject to the version of reality 
which such research helps to construct and maintain. I regard the interview/focus 
group scenario, that is the scenario in which some people are being ‘researched’ by 
being asked to talk about their views on or experiences of a particular subject, as 
never being merely a method for finding things out about those taking part, but 
also as a technique of power, the ‘correct’ or ‘approved’ application of which 
permits certain knowledge discourses to gain legitimacy as accurate 
representations of the reality of ‘what the public think’.  
So, in re-using the data collected in interviews and focus groups for a funded 
research project I redefine that data as discourse generated by the artificial, but 
also real, situations constructed by researchers doing empirical research on public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. I regard the content of that discourse as 
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providing an indication of how individuals go about accomplishing meaning in the 
artificial/real interview/focus group scenario. Thus the accomplishment of 
meaning, and the discursive manoeuvres used by participants to legitimate the 
views which they express, are regarded as an indication of participants’ 
understanding of the rules of the game as regards being allowed to express a belief 
or opinion in an interview/focus group scenario.  
Bourdieu argued that data collected from in-depth interviews is likely to produce 
‘official accounts’ which are artefacts of the research relationship, and of the 
objectivist approach to research (see Jenkins, 1992: 53-54). In carrying out 
analysis for this thesis I take the view that the research is the relationship, and that 
the artefactual is thus also the real. So my perspective was that 
‘interviews…demonstrate a relationship between position and utterances via 
which people routinely act and interpret events and relationships’ (May, 2001: 
141) when called upon to do so in the researched situation. Recalling the quotation 
which I used above: ‘Data in themselves cannot be valid or invalid; what is at issue 
are the inferences drawn from them’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 191). 
Interview and focus group data are therefore interpreted in my third analysis 
chapter as precisely that: ‘data’, entirely produced by the research and indicating 
only what people do in the researched situation, not something more ‘real’ or 
‘authentic’ than that52. 
3.4.3 Analytical approach 
The purpose of my re-analysis of the data was to consider the kinds of ‘official 
accounts’ which the public confidence research scenario encouraged and the way 
in which statements of opinion were achieved by participants. That is to say I 
wanted to consider the question ‘how did the participants in these interviews and 
focus groups take part in the research scenarios?’, in the light of my assumption 
                                                        
52 It is important to note that the interviews and focus groups which I conducted could never 
exactly replicate the research environments created in other pieces of confidence research, my 
interviewing technique and my persona will necessarily be different to those present in other 
pieces of research. So, whilst the general situation - an interview or a discussion with criminal 
justice as its focus, and the presence of a professional social researcher – is the same, I cannot, and 
nor do I, claim that one can generalise from my interviews and focus groups to interviews and focus 
groups more generally. 
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that the interview/focus group scenario is used to make claims to truth, and that it 
subjectivates the individual participants to its own logic.  
My re-analysis of the discourse generated by the interviews and focus groups 
commenced from an observation which I made during the initial analysis, carried 
out for the funded research project. The project analysis had reconfirmed the 
common theme within the dominant discourse of public confidence that the public 
have a sense that the criminal justice system should be (but too often is not) ‘in 
touch’ with their experiences, views and preferences. I started my analysis, then, 
with a close consideration of how this idea of being ‘in’ or ‘out of’ ‘touch’ was 
achieved, or given meaning, in research participants’ utterances.  
My approach to the analysis, then, reflected a symbolic interactionist orientation 
towards the data. Symbolic interactionism holds that shared symbols for 
communication enable the interaction which constitutes the social world. The self 
is seen as constituted internally through the experience of externally occurring 
symbolic interactions. The self thus changes with experience as individuals take on 
new roles and are exposed to new symbols and meanings. To effectively 
investigate human action, symbolic interactionists hold that one should study 
interaction naturalistically. However, as I had repositioned my data as being real, 
as well as artificial, there was no methodological discrepancy involved in analysing 
interview/focus group data in this way (see Filmer et al, 2004: 38; Crotty, 1998: 
72-78).  
I approached the analysis by asking myself what kind of (implicitly) 
intersubjectively shared symbolic resources participants used when invoking the 
idea that the criminal justice system is in/out of touch. In identifying the symbolic 
resources used by participants to give their utterances (about being in/out of 
touch) meaning, I was also interested to make connections between these symbolic 
resources and social structure. That is to say I regarded the resources as not only 
resources, but also as indications of the methods used by participants to make 
sense of their own social reality. I was not merely looking to provide an objectivist 
description of the symbols utilised, then, rather I was also trying to enable the 
participants to ‘speak’, by creating ‘theory out of data’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 
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56). My assumption was that there is something important to consider in the fact 
that participants are achieving meaning in this way (rather than that), and I wanted 
to explore this within the context of what I had already found about the public 
confidence agenda. 
In addition to approaching the data as described above I also became interested in 
the different ways in which participants did not create meaning, or the ways in 
which they muddied the waters of meaning, and thus failed to provide 
unambiguous ‘data’ about their beliefs, preferences and opinions, as well as when 
they indicated their awareness that for the criminal justice system to be ‘in touch’ 
was not straightforward due to the diversity of public views. I mean by this the 
various expressive tics present in participants’ speech - the slips and self-betrayals 
which indicate uncertainty, the self-conscious rowing back from a previously 
staunchly expressed position, the subsequent moderating of language used - which 
make it difficult (if not impossible) for the researcher to really claim to have got at 
some authentic expression of what the participant thinks, or feels, or wants. As 
Girling et al (2000) observed in their excellent study: 
‘people’s talk about crime (their discourse) is dense and digressive. It slips from 
topic to topic, changes gear and direction. It talks in stories, instances and 
anecdotes but then moves to speculations, conjectures, theories. It roams from 
the present, to the remembered past to possible wished-for or threatening 
futures. It is heavy with experience and skips between abstractions. It makes 
sense of troubling and alarming events but also expresses confusion and 
uncertainty. It effects connections between people but also draws boundaries 
and distinctions and crystallizes hostilities, suspicions and conflicts. It invokes 
authority and demands order, yet voices criticism and mistrust of authorities 
and orders.’ (Girling et al, 2000: 5-6) 
The analysis, then, proceeded from an initial focus on the idea of being in/out of 
touch, and considered how this idea was given meaning in participants’ utterances. 
An initial reading of the transcripts revealed that the idea was alluded to in 
reference to two different groupings (‘us’ and ‘them’), and in relation to the 
different ways of knowing about crime and justice (and different motives for 
knowing) attributed to these different groups. Subsequent coding sought to 
explore the themes associated with these ideas, and to extract key illustrative 
quotes. In relation to the indications of self-doubt, self-contradiction and 
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awareness of diverse views on crime and justice, again the transcripts were coded 
for these themes, and key illustrative quotations were identified.   
It is important to note that the analysis which has emerged from this process of 
coding is offered here quite tentatively, as just one of many possible 
interpretations. In the next and final section of this chapter I address the 
theoretical perspective on doing research which has informed and disciplined my 
approach. 
3.5 Theoretical reflections on an eclectic method  
In this final part of my methods chapter I reflect on the theoretical implications of 
the practical solutions which I arrived at in the course of doing my research, in an 
attempt to locate some kind of (retrospective) order in the process. I begin by 
considering the tension between a social constructionist theoretical perspective, 
and the progressive political objectives of the critical social researcher. What then 
follows is an attempt to propose an ethically and practically grounded way of 
resolving this tension. I return to this reflection in the final chapter of this thesis to 
tidy up some of the ‘loose ends’ which I have not been able to resolve here, as well 
as to identify the aspects of my theoretical reflection which, with hindsight, have 
turned out to be as much products of my research as they are tools used to 
facilitate the completion of this thesis.   
3.5.1 Social constructionism: ‘promise’ or ‘paralysis’? 
As described above, I began my analysis with a Foucauldian discourse analysis, 
followed by a genealogy of the public confidence agenda. These analytical 
approaches rested on the following linked assumptions: (i) reality exists but 
cannot be known outside of discourse; (ii) discourses are productive of reality. The 
first of these assumptions is the standard fare of the social constructionist 
theoretical perspective. The second is what we might call ‘hard’ social 
constructionism, and corresponds to what Osborne and Rose (1999) have termed 
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‘reality effects’53, and what Foucault saw as discourse’s productive power. 
Epistemologically speaking social constructionism opposes the objectivist 
assumption that a reality which is ‘out there’ can ever be accurately known and 
represented outside of the socially available, inter-subjectively constructed 
resources for knowing about and representing it. It is a relativist epistemological 
position. 
The charge which may be levelled at research which takes a social constructionist 
perspective is that it offers only deconstruction, and cannot propose constructive 
alternatives. Foucault received heavy criticism for this tendency in his work (Burr, 
1998: 17). Consider the closing prescription in Lee’s thought-provoking 
Foucauldian genealogy of the concept of fear of crime:  
‘[a]s researchers we should…always seek to problematise the notion of fear of 
crime; render it contingent. Likewise we must abandon positivistic notions that 
fear of crime is a stable object of knowledge that can be attributed specific 
causality’ (Lee, 2007: 204)  
Lee’s conclusion offers only a deconstructive course of action, failing to offer a 
reconstructive alternative way of thinking. At worst his failure to offer a 
constructive alternative could be seen as denying the painful reality in the lived 
experiences of some people of something which can be adequately (if imperfectly) 
labelled ‘fear’.  
It is extremely unlikely that issuing such a denial of human suffering was Lee’s 
intention, however as Stan Cohen has so eloquently argued, certain theoretical 
positions may, albeit unintentionally, ‘supplement the inventory of denials 
available to the powerful’ (Cohen, 2001: 280). Fully accepting Lee’s concluding 
position appears to involve, if not rejecting, then at least failing to deal with the 
reality of human experiences of suffering associated with regularly feeling 
threatened with impending victimisation, or with feeling, even occasionally, 
intensely vulnerable. Such is the problem which social constructionism poses: in 
the absence of objective knowledge, how does one act, or indeed legitimately 
exhort others to act, in pursuit of political goals?  
                                                        
53 ‘the version of the world that could be produced under this description...become[s] true’ 
(Osborne and Rose, 1999: 382).   
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‘Critical’ social research, meanwhile, has been characterized in terms of its political 
objectives, its methodological approach and its epistemological assumptions. 
Politically, being critical can mean seeking to challenge and change things, rather 
than simply understanding them as they are (Crotty, 1998: 113); it can also mean a 
commitment to a particular kind of ‘progressive’ political agenda (Fairclough, 
2001: 230). Methodologically, a key difference between critical and non-critical 
research can be seen as the difference ‘between a research that reads the situation 
in terms of interaction and community and a research that reads it in terms of 
conflict and oppression’ (Crotty, 1998: 113). On the epistemological level, critical 
research has been described as ‘concerned with revealing underlying social 
relations and showing how structural and ideological forms bear on them. Critical 
social research, then, is interested in substantive issues and wants to show what is 
really going on at a societal level’ (Harvey, 1990: 20, emphasis added). 
The last of these aspects of being ‘critical’ implies a commitment to identifying 
objective social realities. This aim appears incompatible with the relativist 
epistemology of social constructionism for, if descriptions of reality can never be 
straightforward representations of reality and instead merely indicate how the 
researcher has made sense of reality (Crotty, 1998: 64), then the researcher can 
surely never claim to know ‘what is really going on’. 
Yet, whilst noting this problem, I also know that in many ways the social 
constructionist perspective on reality is as much a habit as a conscious choice and, 
in my own experience, I can no more switch it off than I can glance at a page of text 
in the English language and fail to decipher the clusters of symbols before me as 
words. That said I was always concerned about where social constructionism 
might lead me.  As Burr has observed, the apparent ‘liberatory promise of [social 
constructionism’s] anti-essentialism’ (Burr, 1998: 13) brings with it the fear of 
‘social and personal paralysis’ (Ibid: 14).  Intent on a career in social research, I 
wondered what was the point in it all if concepts had no meaning and knowledge 
was simply a product of its social context? There must be some firm ground on 
which to stand to generate knowledge which could be useful, empowering and 
socially beneficial. The dilemma for me, then, was not whether or not to be a social 
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constructionist, but how to reconcile the fact that I was one with my personal 
political objectives. 
Of course, many others have walked this path before me. Edwards, Ashmore and 
Potter (1995 cited in Burr, 1998: 15) have argued that the way in which many 
researchers have coped with constructionism is not by making an either/or choice, 
instead there is a ‘continuum of acceptance of social constructionist and relativist 
ideas’, with researchers choosing to get off the ‘constructionist wagon’ at the point 
where they fear losing their ability to be critical. But can we really make a decision 
about epistemological possibilities based on political expediency? Can we really 
say that this can be known because it is politically important to know it? Surely in 
such a situation the decision is no longer epistemological?  
Others have argued that relativism is a strength: it enables researchers to show 
that ‘things could be different’, and indeed places a responsibility upon them to 
reconstruct that which they have deconstructed in ways which are more conducive 
to the type of society which they favour (Willig, 1999). However, as the example 
from Lee (2007) above demonstrates, many authors fight shy of this reconstructive 
effort for fear of reifying any new construction (Burr, 1998: 25). 
In what follows I hope to provide some indication of how my approach to this 
thesis has attempted to weave together relativism and relevance with a view to 
saying something interesting and constructive about my topic. As a starting point I 
think it is important to clarify that social constructionism is a double-edged sword: 
on the one side it is a powerful weapon for critiquing discourse, yet the other blade 
always appears to skewer those who wield it by limiting the epistemological status 
of the critiques which they produce. I want to start with the strong edge of social 
constructionism here, before proceeding to consider some ways out of the trap 
which that strong edge sets.   
3.5.2 What must the world be like to make this reality possible? 
As described above, the starting point for my analysis of the public confidence 
agenda was that empirical research on public confidence does not and cannot 
merely represent a public response to crime and criminal justice which pre-exists 
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the research process. Rather, as data is collected, research findings disseminated 
and guidance for policy and practice produced, the public confidence agenda 
brings into being not only the types of public responses which it purports to 
represent, but also the public themselves, both as subjects, and as objects for 
criminological research. If reality cannot be accessed outside of discourse, then the 
discursive resources available to us and their ‘intersubjectively shared meanings’ 
constitute ‘the experiences which comprise social reality’, and provide the ‘rules, 
models and indeed versions’ according to which people live their lives (Williams, 
1998: 20). Social reality can never consist of anything other than social 
constructions, but these constructions ‘take on a reality to those who experience 
their effects’ (Williams, 1998: 19). 
 The experience of social reality is thus always subject to ‘conceptuality’ - the 
concept-dependence of our social structures (Bhaskar, 1986) - and our ‘categories 
of classification’ are, therefore, always also ‘social structures’. Rather than 
representing events these categories constrain the way in which events can be 
represented and, as they are used to represent events, these structures are 
strengthened, so that ‘[t]he use of particular ways of talking... both reflects, 
continuously constitutes and reconstitutes narratives that provide the continuity 
to reproduce social structures’ (Henry and Milanovic, 1994: 113).   
Drawing on this attitude towards knowledge-seeking and generation, in this thesis 
I am concerned with what the ‘representationalism’ which is implicit in applied 
research on public confidence does: what are the ‘reality effects’ which it produces? 
What is important to me, then, is not critiquing public confidence research and 
policy in terms of whether or not it is based on an ‘accurate representation’ of the 
putative phenomenon of public confidence. Rather I am concerned with the effects 
of the pursuit of objective knowledge about public confidence: what is it that 
different accounts of the ‘reality’ of public confidence, and how to represent it, do 
for, and to, us?  
Burchell has argued that by using Foucauldian methods to identify ‘the historically 
contingent limits of present thought and action, attention is drawn to what might 
be called the costs of these limits: what does it cost existence for its truth to be 
 109 
 
produced and affirmed in this way’ (Burchell, 1996: 33). Through my analysis I 
started to feel that the public confidence agenda was not without its ‘costs to 
existence’ and that we should therefore consider: 
 ‘What sort of relationships with ourselves, others and the world does this way 
of speaking the truth presuppose, make possible and exclude? What other 
possibilities of existence are necessarily excluded, condemned, constrained?' 
(Burchell, 1996: 34) 
This is the strong critical edge which a ‘hard’ social constructionism can use to cut 
through and into the social conditions and events which it analyses. Instead of 
taking the structure of our language as an objectively given and morally neutral 
thing, it considers what that language (and the discourses within which it is 
deployed), makes possible and impossible in different places and at different 
points in time. That is to say it considers what discourses do to, and for, both the 
individuals who are subject-ed by them, and the larger social structures within 
which these individuals exist. 
But how can one identify these ‘costs to existence’? In my analysis I have drawn 
upon (although perhaps not entirely in the way he intended) the critical realism of 
Roy Bhaskar. Bhaskar takes a novel, and useful, approach to considering the 
possibility of social science. He begins by considering what makes science possible, 
starting from a position where ‘one assumes at the outset the intelligibility of 
science (or rather of a few generally recognized scientific activities) and asks 
explicitly what the world must be like for those activities to be possible’ (Bhaskar, 
1979: 10-11). This is an interesting sort of inverted approach to ontology whereby 
what exists is whatever makes scientific activity possible, rather than science being 
deemed possible only if it investigates what exists. In fact, for Bhaskar, scientific 
activity rightly produces the reality it studies: ‘the objects of scientific inquiry are 
neither empirically given nor even actually determinate chunks of the world. 
Rather, they are real structures, whose actual presence and appropriate concept 
have to be produced by the experimental and theoretical work of science’ (Bhaskar, 
1979: 17, emphasis added).  
Bhaskar’s theory suggests that to answer ontological questions (which is to say 
questions about what kind of things can exist) we should start by asking how 
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something is brought into being (see Harré, 1998). If we apply this approach to the 
public confidence agenda, which implicitly assumes that some ‘real’ thing called 
public confidence in the criminal justice system can exist and be accurately 
represented in research, then we would ask ourselves: what must the world be like 
to make this reality possible, to bring this reality into being? How is research on 
public confidence possible? By asking these questions we can concentrate our 
focus not on the accuracy of any representation (as we assume all representations 
to be inherently imperfect), but on the ethical implications, the ‘costs to existence’ 
of representing (and therefore producing) reality in this way.     
When Osborne and Rose (1999) describe ‘reality effects’ their critique does not 
allude to the presence of creative agents in the process of constructing reality; it is 
the social sciences rather than social scientists which create phenomena. Their 
account thus lacks an ethical consideration of the responsibilities incumbent on 
social scientists who, after all, they argue, have the power to alter the ‘subjective 
attributes of persons themselves: the kinds of persons they take themselves to be 
and the forms of life which they inhabit and construct’ (Osborne and Rose, 1999: 
392). They observe that the ‘success’ of the social sciences at creating phenomena 
(and thus impacting on humanity) may only be visible with the benefit of 
hindsight. However, their association of ‘success’ with creativity betrays no sense 
that ‘success’ at altering the human experience, may have deleterious 
consequences.  
Foucauldian thought also sees the production of discourses as ‘a subjectless 
process - … the rules of the production of statements are not centred on human 
intervention or action’ (Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 43). In conducting my 
analysis of research on public confidence I have taken a slightly different 
perspective, assuming that we might reasonably expect social scientists to at least 
try to take responsibility for the effects of their representations. Couched in 
normative terms my view is that those who make a claim to a particular expertise 
at representation ought to consider the kind of reality they are producing.  
So, a social constructionist perspective engages critically with what it means to 
represent reality in this way or that, and researchers should take responsibility for 
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the ontological ripples which they create. But what about the trap which is now 
clearly set and baited for the social constructionist researcher to fall into? If reality 
cannot be represented, what status do the claims of a social constructionist have? 
Or, as I put it above: in the absence of objective knowledge, how does one act, or 
indeed legitimately exhort others to act, in pursuit of political goals?  
3.5.3 Critical anti-representationalism: refusing the epistemological bait 
What I want to argue here is that the bait in the trap which has been laid for the 
social constructionist is the idea of epistemology itself, and the steel teeth which 
line the jaws of the trap are ‘the discursive conventions of our ways of talking and 
writing [which] create the ontological illusions that beset our efforts to make sense 
of the world’ (Harré, 1998: 38). In support of my argument I draw on the work of 
the philosopher Richard Rorty.   
Rorty challenged the aspiration to provide ‘accurate representation’ of the world 
around us. Drawing on the work of Gadamer he argued that ‘getting the facts 
right…is merely propaedeutic to finding a new and more interesting way of 
expressing ourselves, and thus of coping with the world’(Rorty, 1979: 358). 
Seeking to obtain ‘correspondence’ between reality and representation, between 
phenomenon and concept, was, in Rorty’s view, worse than irrelevant it was to 
engage in a ‘self-deceptive effort to eternalize the normal discourse of the day’ 
(Ibid: 11). He argued that ‘[w]e have to see the term “corresponds to the way 
things are” as an automatic compliment paid to successful normal discourse rather 
than as a relation to be studied and aspired to throughout the rest of discourse’ 
(Ibid: 372).  
Rorty took a pragmatist philosophical stance towards knowledge. Pragmatism has 
been described as the view that ‘[n]o single set of answers are imposed on us by 
reality, but there are better and worse answers, more and less rational ones given 
our aims’ (Cormier, 2006: 113). Following Dewey, Rorty proposed that knowledge 
is ‘what we are justified in believing ... a social phenomenon rather than a 
transaction between the “knowing subject” and “reality”’ (Rorty, 1979: 9). 
Therefore, we should not be concerned with establishing what is objectively ‘true’, 
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rather we should focus on ‘the project of finding new, better, more interesting, 
more fruitful ways of speaking’ (Ibid: 360) what he calls, borrowing from Gadamer, 
‘edification’. The search for objective knowledge, whilst not necessarily destined to 
fail, offers, a ‘temptation to self-deception’ which may ‘hinder the process of 
edification’ (Rorty, 1979: 361)54.  
Rorty was particularly scathing about the discipline of epistemology which he 
described as: 
‘the attempt to see the patterns of justification within normal discourse as more 
than just such patterns. It is the attempt to see them as hooked on to something 
which demands moral commitment – Reality, Truth, Objectivity, Reason.’ 
(Rorty, 1979: 385)  
In place of this approach to epistemology Rorty proposed a ‘behaviourist’ 
approach which would 
‘look at the normal scientific discourse of our day bifocally, both as patterns 
adopted for various historical reasons and as the achievement of objective 
truth, where “objective truth” is no more and no less than the best idea we 
currently have about how to explain what is going on’ (Ibid: 385) 
According to this view ‘practices of justification’ are ‘just the facts about what a 
given society, or profession, or other group, takes to be good ground for assertions 
of a certain sort’ (Rorty, 1979: 385) and these grounds always have alternatives.  
The parallels with Foucault should be clear. Whereas Rorty offers a philosophical 
demolition of epistemology, Foucault has proposed the empirical investigation of 
its historical conditions of existence, the mechanisms through which it operates 
and their effects. Foucault’s perspective, as Flyvbjerg (2001: 101) writes, was that: 
‘[w]here universals are said to exist, or where people tacitly assume they exist, 
universals must be questioned’.  My contention is that the very existence of the 
idea of epistemology means that all our carefully observed descriptions of how 
reality appears to us are implicitly understood as claims to accurate 
representation. In fact they need be no such thing.  
                                                        
54 This aspiration to provide ‘edifying knowledge’ is echoed in Bauman and May’s (2001) 
description of sociology as ‘central to the endeavour of coming to understand ourselves in better 
ways’ (Bauman and May, 2001: 180). 
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In Rortean terminology, our ‘normal discourse’ is oriented to notions of ‘truth’, and 
‘representation’. It struggles to accommodate the notion that our saying something 
about something might be anything other than a claim to represent that thing 
accurately, to speak the truth about it. As Harré has observed: ‘the discursive 
conventions of our ways of talking and writing create the ontological illusions that 
beset our efforts to make sense of the world’ (Harré, 1998: 38).  In the social 
sciences these ‘discursive conventions’ betray the epistemic aspirations which 
encourage researchers to ally themselves to a narrow scientism55.   
So what is my point? I was trying to deal with the problem of being a social 
constructionist and also having critical political aims. The two are often seen as in 
conflict because social constructionism deconstructs but has no ground to 
reconstruct and thus induces paralysis. My argument is that paralysis is present 
only if we allow ourselves to be fixed within a normal discourse which makes an 
objectivist epistemology the primary condition for having anything useful or 
constructive or valuable to say. But why should epistemology, which purports to 
provide a theory of what can be known, be the prime consideration?  
C. Wright Mills argued that ‘by their work all students of man and society assume 
and imply moral and political decisions’ (Mills, 2000 [1959]: 76), and that the 
applied sociologist working as ‘the research technician available for hire’ does not 
escape from the moral and political decisions, but allows these questions to be 
answered by others. When epistemological adequacy is adjudged to be the most 
important consideration in the status of what social scientists can say, then what 
becomes of moral and ethical considerations?    
I proposed a solution to this problem above, when I argued that we should take an 
ethical attitude towards the ‘ontological illusions’ which we cannot help but 
perpetuate. We should recognise that our representations are always imperfect, 
contingent and also always (potentially) productive, and we should ask ourselves: 
what must the world be like to make this reality possible? This approach, a sort of 
                                                        
55 ‘science’s belief in itself: that is the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one 
form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science’ (Habermas, 1987: 4) 
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critical anti-representationalist response to social constructionism, is both a 
methodology (which can be applied to the reality constructed in other people’s 
research), and an ethical stance to be applied to oneself. It is also a refusal to take 
the epistemological ‘bait’. 
A critical anti-representationalist approach to doing social research makes the first 
thing researchers ask of themselves when they look at the different varieties of 
criminological and other social research  (including their own) not ‘how accurate is 
this representation of reality?’ but rather ‘what must the world be like to make this 
reality possible?’. This means, in other words, asking ‘what does knowing the 
world in this way say about and do to the way we relate to our participants, as well 
as to the public more generally, and the way they relate to themselves, to each 
other and to the social and political structures which help to shape their daily 
lives?’. It also means asking ‘by reporting these kinds of facts what other facts are 
omitted or might be obscured?’ These questions direct the analytical gaze not 
towards the accuracy of any representation (as we assume all representations to 
be inherently imperfect), but rather towards the ethical implications, the ‘costs to 
existence’ of representing (and therefore producing) reality in this way. 
This approach is congruent with proposals advanced by Bent Flyvbjerg (2001)56. 
Flyvbjerg draws on Aristotle’s account of the three intellectual virtues: phronesis 
(ethical judgment), episteme (scientific knowledge) and techne (craft) to argue that 
many social scientific activities which represent themselves as episteme, which is 
to say as identifying context-independent scientific facts, are more properly 
                                                        
56 Flyvbjerg draws on both Foucault and Rorty in outlining his method, and is particularly 
influenced by Foucault’s rejection of both foundationalism and relativism in favour of contextually 
grounded ethics and the constant challenging of domination. Describing Foucault’s method as 
centred on ‘making that which appears invariable variable’, Flyvbjerg adds that phronesis means 
deliberating the variable (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 112). The synergy with Rortean pragmatism is also 
clear. Rorty argues that pragmatists do not debate the accuracy of objective representations; rather 
they debate the utility of inevitably socially constructed objects. The claims of the pragmatist, then, 
are ‘practical recommendations on what to talk about, suggestions about the terms in which 
controversy on moral questions is best conducted’ (Rorty, 1999: 85). The emphasis within 
pragmatism on contextually grounded debate about the utility of concepts is clearly paralleled in 
Flyvbjerg’s suggestion that we should deliberate the variable, only Flyvbjerg’s concern is not with 
utility (means) but with values (ends). This variation on pragmatism is also reflected in my own 
concern for ‘costs to existence’, which emphasises the importance of applying a reflection on values 
to the construction of research problems and methods. 
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understood as either phronesis or techne (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 60). Techne is described 
as ‘Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented towards production. Based on 
practical instrumental rationality governed by a conscious goal’ (Ibid: 57). It 
literally means ‘craft’ or ‘art’ and, as practised by social scientists, can mean an 
activity capable of grappling with key ‘social, cultural, demographic and 
administrative problems’ (Ibid: 62). The activities which constitute social science 
as techne thus can ‘play an emancipatory role; or they may act as controlling, 
repressive, and legitimating’ (Ibid: 62, emphasis added).  
Flyvbjerg suggests that social science as phronesis will contribute to ‘society’s 
practical rationality in elucidating where we are, where we want to go, and what is 
desirable according to diverse sets of values and interests … contributing to 
society’s capacity for value-rational deliberation’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 167). Phronesis, 
then, is about considering one’s own relationship to society and analysing and 
interpreting the role played by values, and by different interests and mechanisms 
of power, in constructing the social as we know it (Ibid: 60). Doing social science as 
phronesis means asking: Where are we going? Is this desirable? Why/why not? 
Who gains and who loses? By which mechanisms of power? These questions have 
also shaped my inquiry into both the public confidence agenda and the public 
criminology debate.  
3.5.4 ‘Do any or all of these things…’ 
A critical anti-representationalist approach deliberately injects a normative 
dimension into social constructionist critique by proposing that social scientists 
have an ethical responsibility to consider the consequences of their conceptual 
creativity. In other words reflexivity must extend to a consideration of what 
different types of factual claims, and the values and assumptions underpinning the 
investigations which allow these claims to be made, imply about, and may do to, 
the nature of social reality.  Phronesis in social science must extend to value-
rational deliberation about the production of social scientific knowledge. 
In order to critically appraise a particular piece of social scientific inquiry, then, we 
must consider something more than how well the researcher has applied the rules 
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of method which she has relied upon to legitimise her knowledge claims (which is 
just a matter of the researcher’s work having internal coherence with respect to 
accepted ways of knowing within the field or discipline or tradition with which she 
is aligned: one cannot say just anything and expect others to go along with it). 
From a critical social constructionist perspective we should also be concerned with 
whether in this specific case the application of these rules is acceptable. I don’t 
mean acceptable in the sense that the rules are seen as a scientifically valid way of 
grasping the truth about reality. Rather this is where we ask the question: ‘what 
must the world be like to make this reality (the reality implied by the rules) 
possible?’ We then consider whether this reality is both ontologically plausible and 
ethically agreeable. The epistemological question ‘can this be known?’ is replaced 
with the more interpretive question ‘what if this is knowable?’. In light of what we 
find we can begin to approach the phronetic question: ‘should this be known?’ 
Now this may give rise to the question of what criteria (indeed what rules) we use 
to interrogate the acceptability of the rules used in each case. Infinite regress and 
her bedfellow nihilism rear their ugly heads. What needs to be accepted at this 
point is that we do possess some intersubjectively shared resources which are 
adequate to the task of sensibly and usefully (but never definitively) interrogating 
the rules by which we and others attempt to know reality. Because these 
intersubjectively shared resources are, like all representations, also inherently 
unstable social constructions, we must be prepared to propose our reading of the 
rules as just that: one possible reading, and to welcome alternative readings and 
challenges. The important thing is that we have stepped back from the outer layers 
of knowledge production: the knowledge itself and the rules of method, to ask 
questions, both metaphysical and ethical, about the conditions of possibility for 
that knowledge. Taking such a step is anti-representationalist (it renders the notion 
of the possibility of accurate representation permanently unstable and open to 
critique), and it can also be critical (if it approaches that critique from the position 
of commitment to progressive objectives and bringing about social change). As C. 
Wright Mills argued, all researchers have their biases:  
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‘Let those who do not care for mine use their rejections of them to make their 
own as explicit and as acknowledged as I am going to try to make mine!’ (Mills, 
2000 [1959]: 21) 
So what are my own biases? Well, as I admit above, I do assume one thing: that I 
have in common with my contemporaries an adequate stock of intersubjectively 
shared resources to offer a sensible and useful representation of some aspects of 
recent historical events and of our current reality. I should state that this is 
emphatically not merely the point at which I get off the social constructionist bus 
(see above). It is an ontological conviction about what exists in the world based on 
my own experience of being in the world. However, I do not claim that these 
intersubjectively shared resources are objectively the same as the things they are 
used to describe, only that, in many cases, they are good enough to facilitate 
reasonably clear communication. In recognition of the fact that they can never 
objectively represent the things they are used to describe, in offering my 
representations I endeavour to make my analytical procedures as transparent as 
possible, and in my analytical chapters I attempt to keep a clear distinction 
between describing the visible surfaces of things (the number of articles, the words 
used, the links made between concepts), and interpreting their meaning (an 
activity which is much more perilous, being prone to the introduction of one’s own 
values). By maintaining this distinction I intend to leave open to my reader the 
possibility to visit these things for him or herself in order to adjudge, firstly, the 
reasonableness of my assumption that adequate representations can be sensibly 
and usefully made, and, secondly, my interpretations of the meaning of these 
objects.  
In terms of the values which shape my work I can declare an interest, as I stated in 
my introduction, in the desire to see movement towards ‘progressive’ political 
objectives. For me this means moving towards more equal opportunities and 
outcomes for individuals and the communities of which they are a part, the 
strengthening of tendencies towards compassion and cooperation between people 
(as opposed to suspicion and competition), and working towards meeting our 
material needs in an environmentally sustainable and non-exploitative manner. If 
anyone would like to take me to task for this bias I suppose they might suggest that 
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I allow my values to distort the way I represent reality, but as I contend that all 
representations are made possible by rules based on values and underlying 
assumptions I would gladly accept this accusation. Invoking C. Wright Mills again, I 
am committed to making my values and biases explicit and I would invite my 
critics to explore their own values. If, on the other hand, they would like to 
challenge the worth of my stated values then I would be interested to hear what 
type of society, that is what ends, they themselves would have us pursue.   
The critical anti-representationalist approach I have outlined here need not be tied 
to any particular method, and instead follows Harvey’s advice: ‘Do any or all of 
these things as appropriate to advancing the enquiry.’(Harvey, 1990: 210) As I 
stated in the first part of this chapter, the analysis which provides the backbone for 
this thesis grew out of seeing the public confidence research agenda not as merely 
an attempt to gain greater knowledge about a phenomenon already existing ‘out 
there’ but as a governmental project for regulating the ‘conduct of conduct’. With 
reference to governmentality studies, Rose et al (2006: 101, emphasis added) have 
argued that: ‘[w]e should not seek to extract a method from the multiple studies of 
governing, but rather to identify a certain ethos of investigation, a way of asking 
questions, a focus not upon why certain things happened, but how they happened 
and the difference that has made in relation to what has gone before’.  
In this chapter I have reflected on my own ‘ethos of investigation’ and I have 
hopefully provided an insight into how I have found it possible to ‘say something’ 
about the data which confronted me. There are however, as I indicated at the start 
of this section, some ‘loose ends’ which have not been fully resolved here. In the 
following three chapters I present the findings generated by my eclectic method. 
These findings, and the discussion of these findings in light of my review of the 
literature on criminology’s public role, provide further food for theoretical 









In this chapter I present a detailed examination of the dominant discourse of public 
confidence in the criminal justice system. By a ‘discourse’ I mean a set of linked 
ideas and assumptions about public confidence, which are represented and 
reproduced in the texts reviewed, and which have consequences for the way public 
confidence is thought about, researched and addressed through policy and 
practice. This confidence-specific discourse has emerged from a more general body 
of research which has sought to explore and examine the nature and significance of 
public attitudes more generally towards crime and criminal justice.  
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part of the chapter I provide a 
chronological overview of the development of the knowledge discourse. In the 
second part of the chapter I deconstruct the dominant discourse focussing on the 
way it places objects into a hierarchical ‘grid of specification’, how it disguises 
judgements based on values as ontologically-mandated, and the ‘costs to existence’ 
of the agenda as it constructs and transforms what people say and do through the 
‘procedures of intervention’ applied in order to represent reality. In the final 
section I draw together the analysis to identify the ‘conditions of existence’ upon 
which the dominant discourse of public confidence appears to be premised.  
4.2 Chronology of a research agenda 
4.2.1 1970s and 1980s: Methodological scepticism 
Over the last 30 years public opinion about the criminal justice system in England 
and Wales, particularly opinion about punishment and sentencing, has been the 
topic of a growing body of research. Research into general attitudes in this area 
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predated and influenced the development of the more specific public confidence 
agenda. In the early 1980s, the first British Crime Survey provided a vehicle for 
researchers in England and Wales to measure attitudes towards the criminal 
justice system of a substantial sample of members of the public. The approach 
adopted was reflective of a number of pieces of previous work which sought to 
compare public perceptions of crime and criminal justice with ‘reality’. The 
adoption of this approach has had important ramifications for the public 
confidence agenda, however things could have been otherwise. 
In the late 1970s a number of presenters at the Council of Europe Thirteenth 
Criminological Research Conference: Public Opinion on Crime and Criminal Justice 
expressed concern about research purporting to ‘capture’ public opinion. It was 
observed that claims made about public opinion were ‘frequently ill-founded; 
badly conducted surveys merely lend these assertions a pseudo-scientific 
colouring, reinforcing their apparent plausibility, and, in some cases, even help to 
fabricate the “facts” which they claim to reveal’ (Robert, 1979: 45). Warnings were 
also sounded about the worrying tendency to treat public opinion as a single 
unified phenomenon rather than as a varied, pluralistic one (Robert, 1979: 55; 
Schneider, 1979: 121-2) and it was suggested that ‘[w]e should, as scholars, keep 
in mind that there is more in public opinion than what the scarcity and simplicity 
of our present empirical research methods and results can produce’ (Schneider, 
1979: 122). Meanwhile, the only UK-based criminologist represented amongst the 
presenters argued that the phenomenon of ‘public opinion’ was anyway entirely 
socially constructed through a process whereby complex and fluid everyday 
thought was pressed into the mould of ‘organizational instruments which 
emphasise logicality and lucidity’ (Rock, 1979: 166) giving everyday ideas ‘alien 
meaning’ (Ibid: 163).  
These warnings about the inherent deficiencies of research on public opinion 
about crime and criminal justice proved to have less influence on the public 
confidence agenda than the recommendations made at the same conference by Van 
Dijk (1979). In the report on the first British Crime Survey (Hough and Mayhew, 
1983) Van Dijk’s conference paper was referenced, and he also received an 
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expression of gratitude from the authors in their acknowledgements. Van Dijk’s 
paper suggested that media outlets should be supplied with ‘objective information’ 
about crime, including contextual information about the prevalence and ‘social 
correlates’ of different types of criminal behaviour, and ‘actual victimisation risk’. 
He argued in favour of governments taking a much more active role in ‘publicising 
the data on the actual crime situation’ using the vehicle of crime prevention 
advertising campaigns (Van Dijk, 1979: 9).  Van Dijk’s focus, then, was very much 
on deficiencies in public knowledge about crime and criminal justice which were 
detrimental to their levels of fear and their attitudes towards the criminal justice 
system. 
In support of his argument, Van Dijk cited findings from a public survey carried out 
in England in 1966 as part of the aborted Royal Commission on the Penal System57. 
This survey found that most members of the public did not have an accurate 
appreciation of the relative and total incidence of different types of crime recorded 
each year and that they had very limited levels of knowledge about court 
procedures and the experience of prison inmates (Banks et al, 1975: 230-235). 
During the 1980s a growing body of research took up this mode of enquiry and 
established the paucity of public knowledge about crime and criminal justice as an 
extant social fact (albeit one which many criminal justice professionals and 
criminologists had long suspected). Data from the British Crime Survey was said to 
have revealed that ‘most people overestimate the leniency of the courts’ (Hough 
and Moxon, 1985: 164) whilst research carried out for the Prison Reform Trust 
suggested that members of the public were often ignorant of basic facts about the 
                                                        
57 The Royal Commission was appointed by the Prime Minister in April 1964. Its terms of reference 
stated that its purpose was 'in the light of modern knowledge of crime, and its causes, and of 
modern penal practice here and abroad, to re-examine the concepts and purposes which should 
underlie the punishment and treatment of offenders in England and Wales; to report how far they 
are realised by the penalties and methods of treatment available to the courts, and whether any 
changes in these, or in the arrangements and responsibility for selecting the sentences to be 
imposed on particular offenders, are desirable; to review the work of the services and institutions 
dealing with offenders, and the responsibility for their administration: and to make 
recommendations'. No report was produced and the Royal Commission was decommissioned in 
May 1966 upon the appointment by the Home Secretary of a standing Advisory Council on the 
Penal System.               (See http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ for more information) 
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criminal justice system and had a ‘distorted view of the sort of offender filling up 
our prisons’ (Shaw, 1982: 13).  
In Canada a similar strand of research was developed (see Doob and Roberts, 
1984; 1988 and Roberts and Doob, 1989). This research (emerging apparently 
independently of the European studies referred to above) concluded that ‘the 
Canadian public’s view of crime in 1982 did not correspond with our best estimate 
of what crime looks like’ (Doob and Roberts, 1984: 272) and that ‘the view that 
Canadians have of crime is distorted’ (Doob and Roberts: 1988: 116). The 
conclusions were based on findings that Canadians overestimated both the 
proportion of crimes that were violent and recidivism rates, believed that the 
murder rate had increased since the abolition of the death penalty, and that they 
lacked accurate knowledge about sentencing policy (statutory minimums and 
maximums) and about the ‘actual levels of penalties imposed by the court’ (Doob 
and Roberts: 1988: 115-116)58.  
Doob and Roberts (1984) also experimented with providing respondents with 
different levels of information about cases. Some respondents were shown media 
coverage of the case, whilst others received the information available to the courts. 
They found that ‘the same sentence was evaluated differently according to the 
actual account that was read’ (Doob and Roberts, 1984: 276). It was therefore 
concluded that:  
‘public attitudes to sentencing are shaped not by the reality which takes place 
in courts, but by the news media. … This suggests that policy makers should not 
interpret the public’s apparent desire for harsher penalties at face value; they 
should understand this widespread perception of leniency is founded upon 
incomplete and frequently inaccurate news accounts’ (Ibid, 1984: 277) 
The Canadian research merits mention here because it has, latterly, been 
influential in the development of the public confidence agenda in England and 
Wales as one of the key protagonists in the Canadian work, Julian Roberts, went on 
to collaborate with one of the key confidence researchers in England, Mike Hough. 
This partnership seems to have been made more likely by the preparation of a 
                                                        
58 Although, interestingly, the authors of this study acknowledged that data on ‘actual penalties 
imposed’ was extremely difficult to find as good records were not held.  
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book (Public Attitudes to Sentencing: Surveys from Five Countries edited by Hough 
and Walker (1988)) in which Doob and Roberts reported findings from their 
Canadian research.   
The 1980s were formative years for the public confidence agenda. The more 
critical and reflexive points raised at the Council of Europe council were largely 
ignored by the mainstream of researchers who assembled a growing body of data 
about both public opinions and public knowledge about crime and criminal justice. 
It is crucial to note that at this stage the perceived inadequacies of public 
knowledge were regarded by some researchers as undermining the value of 
measuring general public opinion of the criminal justice system: ‘[q]uestions 
designed to find out whether offenders are generally thought to get their just 
deserts can only be sensibly asked if people hold accurate beliefs about current 
practice’ (Hough and Moxon, 1985: 162).  Policymakers were therefore enjoined to 
treat with care findings from opinion polls which indicated that ‘people generally 
favour a tougher approach’ (Hough and Mayhew, 1985: 43).  
Critics of general questions suggested that researchers should provide specific 
hypothetical cases in order to elicit respondents’ actual sentencing preferences. 
This approach would avoid eliciting opinions based on public misperceptions. 
Adopting this approach, Hough and Moxon (1985) suggested that their analysis of 
the data from the first British Crime Survey offered ‘a corrective to widely held 
misconceptions about popular attitudes to punishment’ (Hough and Moxon, 1985: 
171) because it suggested ‘that sentencing practice is broadly in step with public 
opinion’ (Hough and Moxon, 1985: 167). They made this claim on the back of their 
critique of general opinion poll style questions which they described as 
‘insufficiently precise to answer whether sentencing is in line with public opinion – 
that is, whether people would see court sentences as fair’ (Hough and Moxon, 
1985: 162, emphasis added). They argued that the only way to find out if practice 
was ‘in line’ with public opinion was to ask the public to ‘“pass sentence” on a 
selection of hypothetical cases’ (Hough and Moxon, 1985: 162, emphasis added).   
Meanwhile, in Canada, Roberts and Doob (1989) argued that ‘interpreting opinion 
polls to mean that the public are greatly dissatisfied with the severity of current 
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sentencing practice is, in Shakespeare’s words, to take “false shadows for true 
substances”’ (Roberts and Doob, 1989: 515). The ‘false shadows’ referred to are 
the data gathered via indicators of public opinion which, due to their alleged 
methodological shortcomings, have ‘overstated’ the ‘public desire for greater 
punitiveness’ (Roberts and Doob, 1989: 515).   
However, the 1980s also saw the expression of an alternative perspective on the 
value of general opinion measures. This was articulated by Walker and Hough in 
their introduction to their 1988 edited volume of international studies of public 
attitudes to sentencing. They argued that:  
 ‘Specificity is important ... if people’s views are to be elicited about the 
appropriateness of sentences; but this does not entitle us to ignore the results 
of unspecific questions about sentencing policy. They may be measuring 
something which specific questions do not: a generalized satisfaction or – more 
often – dissatisfaction with what respondents vaguely believe to be official 
sentencing policy’ (Walker and Hough, 1988: 8, emphasis added). 
This comment suggests that the distinction between the specific and general 
indicators of opinion is not a matter of them being ‘true’ and ‘false’, or more and 
less methodologically adequate, but rather it is that they capture distinctive, but, 
crucially, equally valuable, phenomena. This view can be seen to justify the 
continued use of general measures of opinion (such as that used to measure ‘public 
confidence’) despite their much discussed methodological limitations. 
4.2.2 1990s: Establishing the blueprint 
Research of the kind described above appears to have petered out for a while in 
the early 1990s, but similar themes rose to prominence once again in England and 
Wales in the late 1990s. Hough and Roberts (1998) positioned their analysis of the 
1996 BCS (which had included a new suite of questions on public attitudes and 
knowledge) as an opportunity to bring the research from the 1980s up to date. 
Their report precipitated two subtle but important shifts in the way in which 
research into public opinion on issues of crime and justice was framed. Firstly it 
specifically linked public attitudes on sentencing to the ‘need to sustain public 
confidence’, thus tying together empirical research and the idea of public 
confidence in the criminal justice system which, as will be discussed in the next 
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chapter, had become politically prominent during the 1980s and 1990s. Secondly, 
it positioned public confidence, public attitudes and public knowledge within a 
causal schema, setting down a blueprint upon which most subsequent public 
confidence research was based.      
In their report, Hough and Roberts referred directly to the work done in the 1980s 
which, they said, ‘indicated that the public were less punitive than was generally 
supposed’ (Ibid: 2). They also repeated the argument that low levels of public 
knowledge about crime and criminal justice necessitated a sophisticated 
methodological approach in order to be able to access ‘true’ preferences: 
‘...it would be inappropriate for sentencers to respond to public dissatisfaction 
by toughening up sentencing policy. At least in part, public dissatisfaction stems 
from public ignorance of the system. In a sentencing climate in which public 
misperceptions about crime and sentencing are pervasive, the only safe way of 
assessing the acceptability of current practice is to elicit people’s sentencing 
preferences for particular categories of crime, and to compare their preferences 
to practice.’ (Ibid: 27, emphasis added).  
Their analytical approach and conclusions were very similar to the studies from 
the 1980s. For example, analysing the data from a question which asked about 
people’s sentencing preferences in a case of burglary they found that the responses 
were generally more lenient than magistrates’ guidelines. They also found that 
respondents tended to think that the case they had been given to ‘sentence’ was a 
fairly low-level scenario. They suggested that this latter finding:  
‘underscores how useless for policy it is to provide survey findings pitched at a 
general level. If the general public overestimates the seriousness of the average 
burglary, as appears to be the case here, those responsible for sentencing policy 
can derive little of value from the finding that, on average, people think that 80 
per cent of burglars should be locked up’ (Ibid: 28, emphasis added)  
However, this aspect of their analysis (which reiterates the cautionary tale found 
in much 1980s research on public attitudes) is somewhat drowned out by claims 
which they make very early on in the report:  
‘The 1996 BCS suggests that there is a crisis of confidence in sentencers which 
needs tackling with some urgency ... People think that sentencers are out of 
touch, and that their sentences are too soft. 
... 
Correcting public misperceptions about sentencing trends in this country should 
promote greater public confidence in judges and magistrates. And since the 
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judiciary occupy such a critical place in the criminal justice system, increasing 
confidence in the courts should promote confidence in the administration of 
justice.’ (Ibid: x, emphasis added)  
They go on to state: 
‘...the public are dissatisfied with sentencing practice, or what they perceive 
sentencing practice to be. What is responsible for this dissatisfaction? One 
explanation is that people simply do not have an accurate perception of the 
sentencing process. Recent qualitative work employing focus groups (Hough, 
1996) has uncovered systematic ignorance of current sentencing patterns, and 
has demonstrated that this is a factor fuelling public dissatisfaction with the 
courts.’ (Ibid: 2, emphasis added) 
I have added emphasis to the above quotations in order to identify the two points 
from this report which have been most influential. Firstly there is the identification 
of a ‘crisis of confidence’, and secondly the clear identification of a plausible 
solution: ‘correcting public misperceptions’. The authors not only raise the alarm 
about the approaching iceberg, they also inflate the life rafts. They provide 
reassurance to policymakers by offering ‘to chart opinion in an authoritative way 
and to explore the factors which shape this opinion’ (Ibid: 3). Rather than being a 
reason for policymakers to treat general measures of dissatisfaction with care, 
poor public knowledge is repositioned as a causal factor in public dissatisfaction 
with sentencing, and thus with low levels of public confidence in the criminal 
justice system as a whole.   
In their characterization of the problem at hand Hough and Roberts were highly 
sympathetic to extant causes of frustration for policymakers: the multiple 
manifestations of public opinion they were exposed to which were of varying 
reliability and contaminated by the influence of the media, particularly the 
tabloids. In response to these frustrations Hough and Roberts positioned 
researchers like themselves as being on hand to offer a solution, claiming that 
‘these conduits of public opinion can provide a distorted image of public views. The 
only truly valid measure of opinion is a representative survey.’ (Ibid: 1, emphasis 
added). However, they cautioned, survey questions must be carefully designed to 
be ‘adequate to capture the complexities of the sentencing process.  … simply 
asking the public whether they think sentences are too harsh or too lenient is an 
inadequate and indeed misleading way of measuring public opinion.’ (Ibid: 1).  
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Hough and Roberts must have appeared to offer an appealingly logical response to 
the ‘crisis of confidence’. By cross-tabulating ‘beliefs about leniency’ with 
‘estimated use of imprisonment’ they were able to show that ‘people who are 
dissatisfied with the severity of sentences are also those who are particularly 
inaccurate’ (Ibid: 21). This, they claimed, ‘suggests that ignorance about current 
practice is one source of public dissatisfaction with sentencing’ (Ibid: 21). 
Furthermore, they found that ‘[p]eople who thought that crime was steeply on the 
increase were more likely than others to think that sentences were too lenient’ 
(Ibid: 21).  
In their conclusion Hough and Roberts argue that it is ‘important to educate the 
public about trends in crime and the proportion of crime that involves violence’ 
(Ibid: 43)59. This manner of response to ‘crisis’ was likely to appeal to 
criminologists and penal experts, as well as civil servants and politicians, 
concerned with halting the apparent trend towards ‘populist punitiveness’ 
(Bottoms, 1995).  The techniques which Hough and Roberts proposed should be 
used for such public education were also likely to have appeared reassuringly 
compatible with established political practices following Labour’s landslide return 
to power which had been achieved on the back of a ruthless campaign of re-
branding and tactically targeted communications. Hough and Roberts proposed 
exploiting ‘the communication techniques of the late twentieth century’ to ensure 
that people were made aware of key facts. This would entail ‘identify[ing] key 
audiences ... and convey[ing] in media appropriate to each audience an accurate 
portrayal of current sentencing practice.’ (Ibid:  45).  
                                                        
59 In many ways the public confidence issue closely parallels the debates around how to measure 
and address fear of crime. Traditionally, administrative criminologists and some CJS practitioners 
saw the ‘problem’ of fear of crime as a situation where lay people failed to rationalistically process 
the available data on their probability of becoming a victim (Lupton and Tulloch, 1999: 508). The 
media were held responsible by many criminal justice professionals and commentators for, 
amongst other things, increasing the fear of crime, distorting people’s perceptions of the prevalence 
of all types of crime, but particularly of violent and sexual crime, and damaging public 
understandings of sentencing by focusing disproportionately on atypical cases (Pratt, 2007; 
Roberts et al, 2003; Hough, 2003; Allen, 2004).  There was thus a tendency to see the public 
expression of an inappropriate level of fear (or confidence) as a ‘dysfunction’ of the public (Lupton 
and Tulloch, 1999: 508) stemming from their propensity to hold inaccurate beliefs about the 
incidence of crime. 
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Hough and Roberts’ report functioned in many ways as the blueprint for the 
subsequent development of research and policy in the area of public confidence in 
the criminal justice system. Its enduring contribution has been to cement an 
understanding amongst policymakers and criminal justice practitioners of 
confidence as something which is real, measurable, caused by other factors and 
thus amenable to correction. Although the report did repeat the earlier warnings 
about the perils of reading too much into general measures of public opinion, this 
aspect was not picked up and emphasised in subsequent public confidence 
research.  
4.2.3 2000s: Expansion  
In a clear indication that the understanding of confidence outlined in Hough and 
Roberts (1998) (as real, measurable and caused by other factors) was accepted 
within government, the late 1990s saw it adopt the objective of promoting public 
confidence in the criminal justice system and set quantitative performance targets 
to be measured through the BCS (see Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black, 2000: 47-48). 
The adoption of improving public confidence in the criminal justice system as a 
target against which CJS performance would be judged heralded an expansion in 
the amount of attention which the specific concept of ‘public confidence in the 
criminal justice system’ received from researchers. There was a substantial 
increase in the volume of available analysis, emanating both from the BCS and 
from commissioned research studies with confidence as their focus.  From 1998 
onwards analysis of public confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole 
became a routine component of the BCS work programme and was conducted very 
much along the lines of the blueprint set out by Hough and Roberts (1998).  
Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black (2000) drew their readers’ attention to the fact that 
Hough and Robert’s (1998) report had ‘led to increasing awareness of the 
importance of educating the public about crime and criminal justice’ (Mattinson 
and Mirrlees-Black, 2000: 2), and noted that the Home Office had subsequently 
engaged in discussions with criminal justice partners about suitable initiatives to 
achieve this aim. Comparing the figures from the 1998 BCS to those from 1996 
Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black suggested that ‘[t]here was some evidence that the 
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message of falling crime was getting across to the public’ as the percentage of 
respondents believing that crime was rising fell from 75% in 1996 to 59% (Ibid: 3, 
emphasis added), nonetheless the public still ‘overestimate the crime problem’ 
(Ibid: 4). 
A new set of questions on perceptions of juvenile offending included in the 1998 
BCS identified what Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black referred to as a ‘great disparity 
between perceptions and the statistics’ most likely caused by ‘[m]edia portrayals 
of persistent juvenile offenders and the continuing influence of the James Bulger 
murder on the public psyche’ (Ibid: 14, emphasis added). Using logistic regression 
they confirmed the existence of ‘a relationship between low levels of knowledge 
and negative assessments of juvenile justice ... independently of other factors such 
as age, sex and victimisation, poor knowledge is predictive of a low opinion of the 
youth courts. Of greater predictiveness, however, is believing that the police and 
courts are too lenient in the way they deal with young offenders’ (Ibid: 22). They 
also argued that ‘[t]o target strategies to tackle misperceptions about juvenile 
crime effectively, it is necessary to identify those with the poorest knowledge’ 
(Ibid: 15).  
Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black explicitly positioned their analysis and report as 
‘updating’ the work done by Hough and Roberts (1998) and were careful to note 
the continuity between their work (on knowledge of juvenile offending and justice) 
and the work undertaken by Hough and Roberts (which focused on adult 
offending). They said they had identified ‘a similar pattern’ in terms of the 
relationship between knowledge and opinion:  
‘Consistent with Hough and Roberts, those with the poorest levels of knowledge 
also have the most negative opinions. From this we can only draw the same 
conclusion as Hough and Roberts – correcting public misperceptions of juvenile 
crime should promote greater public confidence in juvenile courts’ (Mattinson 
and Mirrlees-Black, 2000: 45). 
The emphasis placed on continuity indicates the influence that Hough and Roberts 
had on subsequent research, as well as the general importance given to developing 
a continuous, cumulative body of knowledge within the confidence discourse. 
However this surface appearance of continuity conceals a tendency to mis- or 
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over-interpret the significance of earlier studies. For example Mattinson and 
Mirrlees-Black suggested that Hough and Roberts (1998) had argued that ‘there 
was a public crisis of confidence in the criminal justice system (CJS)’ and that ‘very 
low opinions of the courts and sentencers ... were undermining public confidence 
in the criminal justice system’ (Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black, 2000: 47). These 
statements go beyond the claims made by Hough and Roberts, which were that 
there was a ‘crisis of confidence in sentencers’ and that, due to their centrality 
within the criminal justice system increasing  confidence in the judiciary and the 
courts ‘should promote confidence in the administration of justice’ (Hough and 
Roberts, 1998: x).   
These minor over-interpretations of Hough and Roberts make their conclusions 
appear significantly more categorical than they probably intended. Through such 
episodes of subtle mis- or over-interpretation, over time knowledge about public 
confidence has been discursively constructed as an altogether more concrete and 
certain affair than was indicated in some of the earlier texts.  
That the relationship between knowledge and confidence is causal (the central 
theme from Hough and Roberts (1998)) has underpinned successive analyses of 
the BCS since 1998, and indeed each successive ‘sweep’ of analysis tends to 
reference (if not reproduce verbatim) excerpts from previous years, so, for 
example:  
‘Giving people access to accurate information about crime and the criminal 
justice system is essential to securing confidence in the system. Previous 
sweeps of the BCS (Hough and Roberts, 1998; Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black, 
2000) have shown that …’ (Mirrlees-Black, 2001: 5)  
‘Giving people access to accurate information about crime and the criminal 
justice system is essential to securing confidence in the system. Previous 
sweeps of the BCS (Hough and Roberts, 1998; Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black, 
2000 and Mirrlees-Black, 2001) have shown that …’ (Whitehead and Taylor, 
2003: 124)   
‘There is evidence from previous years of the BCS which suggests that people 
who are better informed about crime and the criminal justice system tend to 
rate the system more highly (Mattinson and Mirrlees-Black, 2000 and Mirrlees-
Black, 2001).’ (Allen, El Komy, Lovbakke and Roy, 2005: 7)  
Furthermore, the key protagonists in the establishment of the public confidence 
research blueprint (Hough and Roberts) authored, co-authored or edited a number 
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of academic publications during the early 2000s, which referred readers between 
their different publications creating the sense of a mutually re-inforcing 
knowledge-base with considerable intellectual weight behind it (see Roberts and 
Hough, 2002; Hough, 2003; Roberts et al, 2003; Roberts and Hough, 2005a; 2005b 
and 2005c).   
In addition to the analysis of BCS data and the situating of public confidence in 
relation to a wider academically-rooted oeuvre, further research into public 
confidence was commissioned and carried out on both a local and a national basis 
during the mid-2000s. At the national level, in 2003 two different pieces of 
research were commissioned by the Home Office from commercial research 
organizations. MORI carried out research in which ‘[t]he public’s attitudes and 
perceptions of the system and its constituent agencies ... were measured to identify 
the factors relating to levels of confidence and satisfaction’ (Page, Wake and Ames, 
2004: 1). The research was published as part of the Home Office’s ‘Findings’ series 
of papers, and subsequently cited in two Ministry of Justice studies (Smith, 2007 
and Singer and Cooper, 2008).  
NOP World in partnership with Phillip Gould Associates (PGA)60 were 
commissioned to carry out qualitative research to ‘uncover what drives confidence 
in the CJS as a whole, and in its separate agencies and to help the Home Office 
develop strategies to harness these drivers’ (NOP World, 2003). The research has 
not been externally published by the Home Office, however it has subsequently 
been cited in one of their own research reports (Rix, Joshua, Maguire and Morton, 
2009), suggesting that it had some internal influence. Both of these studies have 
significant limitations.  
                                                        
60 It is interesting to note that Phillip Gould of Phillip Gould Associates, a leading figure in the 
emergence of New Labour, played a key role in designing communications and marketing strategies 
for Labour in elections from 1987 through to 2003, and was appointed as a life peer in 2004. His 
involvement in the NOP World research, as well as the general style of that research, indicate the 
extent to which the public confidence agenda has, at times, blurred the boundaries between 
governmental and party political research and policy. This is certainly a matter deserving of more 
research attention than I am able to give it here. 
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The MORI study positioned itself as making a further contribution to the body of 
knowledge on public confidence in the CJS, and this is the context in which it has 
been subsequently cited. It had a robust data collection mechanism, using a 
random-sample telephone survey. The analysis managed to be both self-confident: 
‘confidence in the system overall ... would increase’ (Page et al, 2004: 6, emphasis 
added); and yet also vague and obvious: ‘creating a society where people feel safe 
and dealing effectively with violent crime’ (Page et al, 2004: 6). It used a different 
measure of confidence from that used within the BCS61, and approached the matter 
of public knowledge differently62.  
Some of the conclusions in the MORI study appear to have been drawn on the basis 
of rather opaque and questionable analytical manoeuvres. For example, data on 
confidence and knowledge were aggregated to analyse the relationship between 
these two variables on an agency by agency basis: the average score which 
respondents gave to their ‘familiarity’ with each agency, was plotted against the 
average score which they gave each agency for its ‘effect on crime’. These points 
were found to make a reasonably clear diagonal line on a graph but no indication 
of the statistical significance of the relationship was given. It is not clear why the 
researchers chose to plot aggregated data on this graph, rather than plotting data 
points for each individual respondent and calculating the correlation coefficient for 
the relationship between perceived importance and perceived effectiveness of the 
different functions.  
The report also includes a graph which plots the proportion of respondents seeing 
certain functions of the CJS as ‘absolutely essential’ against the proportion who 
have confidence that they are being delivered. The authors highlighted five 
functions of the CJS which, they said, were seen by a majority of respondents as 
being ‘absolutely essential’ and in which a relatively low proportion of 
                                                        
61 The MORI study focused on how confident respondents were ‘about the way that crime is dealt 
with’ at the local and national level (Page et al, 2004: 2). 
62 The study asked respondents how much they felt they knew about the different agencies and 
then what effect they thought each agency had on crime in their area. 
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respondents said they had confidence63. These points were ringed on the graph to 
provide visual emphasis of their importance (Page et al, 2004: 3). They were also 
referred to again in the conclusion, which stated that these issues should ‘be 
regarded as public priorities for addressing confidence in the criminal justice 
system’ (Page et al, 2004: 6). The basis upon which this prescription is made is 
tenuous to say the least, as a number of other functions were on the periphery of 
the seemingly arbitrarily drawn circle on the graph (one of these issues was 
‘tackling the causes of crime’). Bearing these points in mind the selection of the key 
issues to be addressed has more than a suspicion of arbitrariness, if not bias. 
The NOP World/PGA study used a qualitative approach with a relatively small 
sample of approximately 50 respondents which was, by their own admission, not 
representative, and which they regarded as a pilot study (NOP World, 2003: 7). 
Despite these limitations the final presentation of their findings ran to 108 
powerpoint slides and adopted a confident and authoritative tone throughout. Its 
recommendations included ensuring that legislation put victims before criminals, 
and ‘breaking through media distortion’ by communicating to the public that 
sentences are ‘longer, tougher, more consistent’ (NOP World, 2003: 107). 
During the mid-2000s, in addition to these nationally-commissioned studies, a 
number of studies were carried out at the local level, usually by or on behalf of 
Local Criminal Justice Boards seeking support for their efforts to meet the centrally 
imposed confidence targets (see Addison, 2006; Dodgson, 2006; Dodgson, 
Dodgson and O’Donnell, 2006; Holme, 2006; Greater Manchester Police, 2005; 
Beaufort Research, 2004; Devon and Cornwall Police, 2006; Opinion Leader 
Research, 2005). The influence of local research on the dominant knowledge 
discourse of confidence appears to have been limited as most of it was reported 
locally, but not subsequently cited elsewhere. Furthermore, this research has 
tended to be carried out in a way which replicates the approaches used in the 
                                                        
63 These were: creating a society where people feel safe; reducing the level of crime; stopping 
offenders from committing more crime; dealing effectively with street robbery (including 
mugging); bringing people who commit crimes to justice. 
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national-level research, rediscovering on a ‘local’ basis knowledge about 
confidence that is already in circulation.  
Two features of public confidence research during the early to mid-2000s stand 
out. Firstly, the analytical focus of many of the studies (for example on ‘key 
audiences’) appears to reflect pre-existing beliefs about the most appropriate 
tactics to ‘tackle’ the problem of low confidence, namely factual education via 
targeted marketing64. Secondly, the methods used in the studies, particularly the 
focus on quantitative analysis using cross-tabulation and regression, determine the 
type of knowledge which can be generated (essentially ‘predictive’ knowledge 
which is implicitly causal). Knowledge of this kind can only reinforce an 
understanding of confidence as a measurable natural phenomenon which is caused 
by other phenomena. 
These features are manifested in broad conformity to an established way of doing 
confidence research which can be summarised as follows: (1) Identify the issues of 
importance to the public in relation to the CJS (their expectations or what they 
need to believe or have confidence in); (2) Understand how opinions are formed 
on these issues (how they come to know about the CJS in order to be able to 
believe or not believe, that is their evidence); (3) Apply knowledge of the above to 
‘correct’ opinions (by providing evidence that the CJS is meeting their 
expectations)65. Thus, the parameters66 of confidence research are set in such a 
way that identifying the ‘drivers’ of confidence, in a style similar to market-
research, seems to be regarded by many researchers as the basic task of 
confidence research. 
 
                                                        
64 Perhaps a good example of what Matthews (2009: 343) has called ‘policy driven evidence rather 
than evidence driven policy’ 
65  For a more detailed discussion see Turner (2008). 
66 Hammersley (1995) has noted that the dominant model for Western governments’ social 
research, the ‘Engineering Model’, sees the end product of research as modifying policy and society. 
He argues that this means that ‘[t]he parameters of the inquiry process are set narrowly: the aim is 
to solve the problem, and both the problem and what constitutes a solution are defined by 
practitioners’ (1995: 126).  
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4.2.4 2000s: Experimentation 
The ‘problem’ for confidence research, then, has been understood by many 
researchers as that of identifying the ‘drivers’ of confidence and using that 
knowledge to correct public perceptions (which are implicitly emotional and/or 
inaccurate). This model of what confidence research should be about was taken to 
its logical extreme in several pieces of ‘experimental’ research commissioned to 
investigate the relative effectiveness (in terms of increasing confidence) of 
different techniques for informing the public (Chapman et al, 2002; Salisbury, 
2004; Singer and Cooper, 2008).  
The first such study (Chapman et al, 2002) was initiated in response to the 
concerns which arose as a result of a review of the sentencing framework during 
2000/2001. Doubts were expressed about using public opinion to inform the 
review in light of knowledge about the extent of public ‘misperceptions’ about 
crime and justice67. In response, an investigation was commissioned to explore 
whether such misperceptions could be corrected by improving knowledge, and 
whether improved knowledge would impact upon views.  It was felt that such an 
investigation could also be of value in helping with progress towards the newly 
imposed target of increasing public confidence in the criminal justice system:  
‘In theory... improving public knowledge about crime, sentencing and the CJS 
might be expected to result in more positive attitudes towards the CJS. 
Improvements in ratings of the system should be achievable where current 
opinion is based on overly negative beliefs.’ (Chapman et al, 2002: 2-3) 
Chapman et al found that ‘[k]nowledge of crime trends and current sentencing 
practice is particularly poor, with only about one in ten people being reasonably 
well-informed in these areas’ (Ibid: 9, emphasis added). What constitutes being 
‘reasonably well-informed’ is not explicitly defined, however the approach adopted 
indicates that, as Chapman et al concede, knowledgability boils down to ‘recall of 
                                                        
67 As discussed above, in the 1970s and 80s many researchers (including inter alia Mike Hough and 
Julian Roberts) expressed the opinion that the lack of public knowledge about crime and justice 
completely undermined the validity of general measures of opinion. They proposed instead the use 
of specific sentencing scenarios to elicit public preferences. It is interesting that less than 20 years 
later the preferred option is to attempt to manipulate general opinion through education, rather 
than to capture it in a different, and arguably more appropriate, way.   
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key facts’ (Ibid: 15) 68.  In their experiment they claim to have been able to improve 
‘recall of key facts’ through the provision of information but, although the 
confidence of about a third of participants increased, ‘there was no clear 
relationship between improved scores on the knowledge questions and improved 
levels of confidence’ (Ibid: 35). 
Salisbury (2004) built on the previous body of research and the experimental work 
carried out by Chapman et al (2002)by providing a booklet to a sample of British 
Crime Survey respondents and conducting a follow-up interview two weeks later 
to see if their views had changed. A control group did not receive the booklet but 
still had a follow-up interview. Salisbury found that having received and at least 
glanced through the booklet increased the accuracy of people’s perception of crime 
trends, but not of criminal justice practice. However, the research concluded that 
increases in confidence could not be attributed to the impact of looking at the 
booklet or to increased awareness about crime and criminal justice69.   
More recently, Singer and Cooper (2008) sought to update and improve upon these 
experimental studies by exploring the relative effectiveness of different methods of 
providing information. Their approach to the design of the informational materials 
drew on marketing theory and sought to ‘inform, persuade and remind’ the 
recipient about key facts. Their research is a peer-reviewed70 and methodologically 
complex study which, the authors claim, demonstrates that statistically significant 
increases in the accuracy of public estimations of crime trends and certain facets of 
                                                        
68 The authors contrast public perceptions of key statistics, with the actual figures, generating 
findings such as ‘[e]ight in ten respondents thought half or less of adult male burglars were given 
custodial sentences, although the actual proportion for 1999 was 72 per cent.’ (Chapman et al, 
2002: 9). In other words to be well-informed appears to mean being able to give accurate 
estimations of criminal justice statistics. 
69 ‘increases in confidence were not restricted to only those who received the booklet [and thus] 
were not solely attributable to looking at the booklet’ (Salisbury, 2004: 11). Furthermore, ‘[t]here 
was a significant increase in the proportion feeling that the sentences handed down by the courts 
are about right (from 15% to 25%) for those who received and looked at the booklet. However, 
there was also a significant increase (from 20% to 34%) for those who did not receive the booklet’ 
(Salisbury, 2004: 12). Salisbury also found that respondents who thought that taking part in the 
BCS had made them more aware of crime and criminal justice issues were no more likely than those 
who did not feel more aware to have increased in confidence (Salisbury, 2004: 12). 
70 The Home Office operates its own peer-reviewing system, the rigour of which has been critiqued 
by Hope (2008) 
 137 
 
criminal justice practice can be achieved, at least in the short-term, through the 
delivery of a carefully designed information booklet. Crucially Singer and Cooper 
avoid committing the statistical error of failing to test the statistical significance of 
the differences between control and experimental groups71.  
The research also indicated that statistically significant increases in confidence (as 
measured by the general confidence measure from the BCS) can also be achieved 
in the short-term.  However, whilst the findings found statistically significant 
differences between the control group and the experimental group (those 
receiving the booklet), it does seem to be somewhat misleading to suggest that ‘a 
professionally designed booklet delivered through a personalised envelope or 
personal contact is a very effective way of raising public confidence in the CJS’ (Ibid: 
20, emphasis added).  
In practice the research found that the proportion of the control group who were 
confident that the CJS is effective increased 6.7 percentage points between the first 
and second interview, whilst the proportion of the experimental group who were 
confident that the CJS is effective increased by 11.4 percentage points. So the 
percentage point gain of the experimental group over the control was 4.7 
percentage points. The difference between the two groups is of sufficient 
magnitude for us to reject the null hypothesis, but it is hardly overwhelming.   
Furthermore, the increase in confidence was only statistically significantly 
different compared to the control group where the booklet was handed to the 
recipient as opposed to ‘delivered through a personalized envelope’.  
The authors also notably fail to emphasize that of those who received the booklet 
only 40% actually read all or most of it and (unlike in the earlier study by Salisbury 
(2004)) there was no analysis of whether improvements in knowledge and 
confidence were seen even in those who received but did not read the booklet. It is 
                                                        
71 In both Chapman et al (2002) and Salisbury (2004) the researchers compare the impact of an 
intervention on different groups (control plus various experimental groups) but fail to test the 
statistical significance of the differences between the changes observed in these groups. It is not 
statistically correct to claim that there is a difference between the groups unless this difference has 
been tested for significance. Thanks to Ruth Graham for making me aware of this issue (see also 
Bland, 2000).   
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therefore unclear whether it was the content of the booklet, or simply the fact of 
receiving a booklet, which produced the change in knowledge and confidence. It 
seems, then, that the authors may have been tempted to oversell the import of 
their findings, perhaps cognisant of the observation by Tonry and Green (2003: 
494) that ‘qualified claims about modest but discernible sought-after effects, 
important though they are, seldom support a sense of excitement likely to lead to 
major new initiatives or changes in policy direction’. Furthermore, although the 
study aims to provide usable evidence for local practitioners one thing which is 
entirely missing is any information on the costs associated with the design, 
production and distribution of the booklet. The reader cannot, therefore, know the 
cost of producing the relatively modest (and potentially fleeting) percentage 
increases in knowledge and confidence which the study claims.  
As well as referencing and building upon each other and upon the preceding 
analysis of the BCS, these experimental studies have each been referenced in 
subsequent research and analysis (see, for example, Whitehead and Taylor, 2003: 
124; Allen et al, 2005: 7; Duffy, Wake, Burrows and Bremner, 2007). This cross-
referencing between studies reinforces the impression of the body of knowledge 
on public confidence as cumulative and coherent. Furthermore, the implicit 
acceptance of these quasi-experimental approaches into the corpus underlines that 
a causal relationship is assumed to exist between accurate knowledge (or ‘recall’) 
of ‘facts’ about crime and criminal justice and public confidence in the criminal 
justice system (which is, implicitly both real and measurable).  
4.2.5 2000s: Politicization 
Confidence research continued towards the end of the 2000s with a further two 
high-profile reports on public confidence. The first, another report by Ipsos MORI 
(Duffy et al, 2007), was entitled Closing the Gaps: Crime and Public Perceptions. It 
featured a glowing foreword by one of the key figures in establishing the 
confidence research agenda, Professor Mike Hough: ‘This is an important report 
and Ipsos MORI is to be congratulated for producing it … I welcome the report’s 
recommendations … the report is right to emphasise the need for robust 
measurement and monitoring of perceptions of crime’ (Duffy et al, 2007).  
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What is most striking about this report is that it purports to write about a serious 
social problem, one which it alleges has significant ramifications for ‘citizens’ 
overall quality of life’ (Ibid: 11), but it is clearly aimed at meeting the strategic 
needs of a party political audience, namely the governing Labour party. So the lack 
of confidence which the British public have in their government’s ability to ‘crack 
down on crime and violence’ is described as ‘a key issue for the government 
because there is a strong correlation between trends in ratings of performance on 
crime and trends in voting intention’ (Ibid: 3).  
The politically partisan nature of the report need not be an issue, companies like 
Ipsos MORI are relied on by political parties to help plan their election strategies. 
However, this report was endorsed by a former Home Office researcher, turned 
academic, who was a key architect in establishing the public confidence agenda as 
a matter of national, not party political import. It also drew quite heavily on 
previous research, including research carried out by the Home Office, and 
explicitly located itself within the context of non-partisan government reviews 
being carried out by Louise Casey (2008) (see below) and Sir Ronnie Flanagan 
(2008). In light of this it seems unsurprising that the report, despite its party 
political orientation, attracted the attention of practitioners within criminal justice 
agencies as the latest piece of ‘evidence’ about public confidence72.  
The content of the report reprised the by now familiar refrain about the public 
being ill-informed about crime and, in particular, failing to recognise that crime 
had fallen. It also offered hope to politicians and practitioners by offering to 
‘unpick[…] what actually drives the general public’s views of crime and the 
government’s handling of it’ (Duffy et al, 2007: 11). Arguing that ‘public confidence 
and reassurance are key outcomes in their own right’ (Ibid: 59) the report 
recommended more and better measurement of public perceptions as a way of 
improving performance; more independent reviews of criminal justice system 
performance to produce data that the public would be more likely to trust; and 
                                                        
72 I base this claim on my personal experience at meetings and in conversations with individuals 
working within the criminal justice system, as well as my attendance at conferences of practitioners 
where personnel from MORI have been presenting their findings. 
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that the police should publish more, and better targeted, information about local 
issues and how the criminal justice system and its partners are working to tackle 
them.  
As already noted, and despite its clear party political purposes, the evidence 
provided by Ipsos MORI received attention within the criminal justice system. It 
was also referenced in the 2008 report published under the auspices of the Cabinet 
Office’s Crime and Communities Review and led by the high profile (and 
controversial) civil servant Louise Casey. The Casey Review (or Engaging 
Communities in Fighting Crime to give its official title) began with a typically robust 
assertion by Casey:  
‘there is a sense that the public can’t be trusted to take a view on their policing 
and Criminal Justice System. During this review I have tried to redress that 
balance by putting at its heart the voice of the public … I would urge policy 
makers, professionals, lobby groups and law makers to take note of one thing - 
the public are not daft. They know what’s wrong, they know what’s right, and 
they know what they want on crime and justice.’ (Casey, 2008: 2-3) 
Many of the recommendations made in the Casey Review were subsequently 
included in the government’s Green Paper Engaging Communities in Criminal 
Justice. These included the adoption of a ‘single confidence measure’ to monitor 
public assessments of the partnership work between the police and local 
authorities; the branding of unpaid work carried out by offenders as part of their 
sentence as ‘Community Payback’; the use of orange bibs for offenders undertaking 
such work; the recruitment and training of a body of volunteer ‘Community 
Crimefighters’; and an increasing emphasis on publicising crime data and 
sentencing outcomes at the local level.  
4.2.6 Overview 
During the 1980s researchers expressed reservations about the value of ‘general’ 
measures of public opinion which they saw as generating misleading findings due 
to poor levels of public knowledge about the ‘reality’ of crime and criminal justice. 
However, Walker and Hough (1988) made a case for general measures as 
providing an indicator of how the public feel about the criminal justice system in 
‘real life’, something which they suggested measures of opinions about what 
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should happen in specific cases could not provide. This view was reflected in 
Hough and Roberts (1998), which provided the blueprint for the development of 
research on public confidence in the criminal justice system and identified a ‘crisis 
of confidence’ in sentencing which was caused by poor levels of public knowledge 
about the reality of crime and criminal justice system. They recommended that 
more effort should be put into communicating with the public to provide them 
with an accurate appreciation of typical sentencing practice, and suggested that 
this may help to increase confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole.  
The adoption of a government target to improve public confidence in the criminal 
justice system precipitated a rapid growth in research which tended to follow the 
blueprint for confidence research set out by Hough and Roberts (1998). The 
accumulation of research into public confidence, each referencing earlier studies, 
and repeating similar ideas and findings, gives the impression of continuity and 
cumulativeness. However, the research has tended to produce repetitive findings 
and there have been a number of episodes of subtle mis- or over-interpretations 
which have given the knowledge-base a more concrete appearance than the 
available evidence appears to warrant. Most recently, Casey (2008) has claimed to 
be allowing the public a ‘voice’ within debates about how crime should be dealt 
with in their community. In the next section of this chapter I provide a more 
detailed analysis of the characteristics of the knowledge discourse. 
4.3 Deconstructing the research 
In the chronological overview provided above I have mentioned a number of 
features of the body of research on public confidence, including: conformity to a 
certain structure which is oriented to a particular practical solution and produces 
repetitive research findings; the tendency for successive studies to over or mis-
interpret certain findings such that the body of knowledge assumes a more 
continuous and cumulative appearance than the data support; and the underlying 
assumption that the phenomenon of confidence is real (that is it exists prior to 
being elicited by researchers) and that it is measurable and caused by other 
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factors. In this section I deconstruct the dominant discourse of public confidence 
established through this body of research. 
4.3.1 A hierarchy of objects 
The statements of which discourses are comprised are always about objects: 
‘things presented to thought … the occasion or the matter on which thought is 
exercised’ (O’Farrall, 2005: 79). In this section I argue that statements in the 
‘public confidence’ discourse are predicated upon a number of related objects 
placed in specific positions in relation to one another: a ‘grid of specification’ in 
Foucauldian terminology. Mapping the grid of specification within a discourse 
enables us to probe ‘the systematic ways that phenomena are rendered accessible 
to us’ (Kendall and Whickham, 1999: 28), including any hierarchical relationships 
implied between the objects which the grid contains.  
Identifying objects and their inter-relations is not simply a matter of apprehending 
the meanings attached to the different words used to make statements and the way 
these words are explicitly placed in relation to one another. A broad conceptual 
vocabulary has been used to capture and describe a range of subjectivities with 
respect to crime and the criminal justice system. Reference is made to thoughts, 
beliefs and feelings; responses, moods and sentiments; consciousness, perceptions, 
and views; concerns, complaints and attitudes; opinions, preferences and 
priorities; desires, wants and demands, to name just a selection. However, the 
vocabulary of this interiority can be intensely duplicitous, casting a veil of 
indeterminacy over many statements about what the public ‘think’, what they 
‘believe’, what they ‘feel’.  
Ambiguities and discrepancies in the way words are deployed indicate that 
maintaining clear conceptual boundaries between objects is extremely difficult in 
everyday speech and writing about the subjective. In many cases variation in the 
vocabulary used appears to be a stylistic habit, but in some reports the distinction 
made between the different words used to denote subjectivities is treated as being 




‘will be using the word belief to refer to people’s understanding of their 
environment – in this case, their criminal justice system. A belief about the 
criminal justice system, then, might refer to a view of what kinds of things were 
happening in the courts. These might form the basis of an attitude about the 
activities of the court: whether, for example, the sentences are appropriate’ 
However, even within such reports and articles, there can be slippage, as words 
which have at one point been given a specific conceptual meaning (such as ‘belief’ 
above) are subsequently deployed in a quite different sense within the same piece 
of writing. Care needs to be taken, then, when identifying the objects within public 
confidence discourse not to confuse the objects with the vocabulary used to 
describe them. Classification is not a matter of terminology, it is implicitly 
achieved.  
The imprecise and unreliable nature of the words used to describe the content of 
the subjective is demonstrated in public confidence discourse in the 
interchangeable usage of certain words, for example ‘think’ and ‘believe’, which are 
used to make statements about both facts and about more normative concerns. For 
example Roberts and Doob (1989: 494) observed a ‘very real discrepancy between 
what people think sentences to be and what, in fact, they are’. The authors use 
‘think’ here to indicate factual belief. However, in an earlier piece, the same 
authors stated that ‘policy makers, politicians, and others who wish to listen 
carefully to what members of the Canadian public really know and think about the 
sentencing of criminal offenders will find that the public’s view of sentencing is not 
simple and shallow’ (Doob and Roberts, 1988: 132). Here to ‘think’ is contrasted 
with to ‘know’, suggesting that the thinking is of a more normative or affective 
nature. Ten years later, one of the same authors, now working in a different 
partnership (Hough and Roberts, 1998) makes this same distinction between 
knowing and thinking, setting up the contrast between ‘knowledge and opinion’ 
and referring to what people ‘know and think about sentencing’ (Hough and 
Roberts, 1998: 1).  
The word ‘belief’ is also used to refer to factual judgements, for example: Hough 
and Mayhew (1985: 43) refer to ‘the accuracy of public beliefs about current 
sentencing practice’ (Ibid: 43), and Roberts and Hough (1998: 34) observe that: 
‘[t]he British public do want harsher sentences (or at least harsher than they 
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believe them to be)’. However in other statements the belief referred to is at once 
factual and normative, for example: ‘a substantial portion of Canadians believe that 
sentences are not severe enough’ (Doob and Roberts: 1988: 111) and ‘less than 10 
per cent of a national sample believed that the police were too tough’ (Hindelang, 
1974: 106).   
The same lack of clarity also appears in statements using the word ‘think’, for 
example: ‘even with criminals more likely to get jail sentences than 10 years ago, 
average sentence lengths longer and prisoner numbers at an all-time high, the 
public think sentencing is still too lenient.’ (Casey, 2008: 5). A further concept used 
as a synonym for thinking/believing is the notion of having a ‘view’. Like thoughts 
and beliefs, views can be factual, as in: ‘attempt to convey a more accurate view of 
sentencing to the public’ (Roberts and Doob, 1989: 496)); and more normative, as 
in: ‘the negative view of sentencing attributed to the public’ (Roberts and Doob, 
1989: 498) 
Use of the word ‘feel’ is perhaps even more ambiguous than think/believe/view as, 
in addition to indicating factual or normative beliefs, the notion of feeling can also 
be used to flag up a physical sensation or emotional reaction to something. When 
used to indicate a factual belief, the ‘feeling’ in question is a feeling that the facts 
are X, for example ‘respondents were asked whether they felt that “our system of 
law enforcement works to really discourage people from committing crime”’ 
(Hindelang, 1974: 105).  
As with the words think and believe, some statements using the word ‘feel’ were 
apparently factual and normative at the same time, whilst other statements more 
clearly separated views of the facts from normative feelings, for example: ‘those 
who underestimated the severity of the courts [FACTUAL BELIEF] tended in 
general to feel that court sentences were not tough enough [NORMATIVE BELIEF]’ 
(Hough et al, 1988: 208); ‘the public views crime as being more violent than it 
seems to be [FACTUAL]; sees the justice system as responding too leniently 
[FACTUAL AND NORMATIVE], and in some instances more leniently than it in fact 
does; and feels changes should be made in this system[NORMATIVE]’ (Doob and 
Roberts, 1984: 272). Further statements refer to how people ‘feel’ about or 
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because of what they know, for example ‘[t]he public feel let down’ (Casey, 2008: 
46). 
The illustrative examples given above indicate that within the confidence 
discourse (and its antecedents in more general attitudinal research) there are no 
stable objects which can be inferred purely from the use of words like ‘think’, 
‘believe’, ‘view’ or ‘feel’ . But, although the conceptual vocabulary is often 
imprecise, throughout the confidence discourse a clear (albeit mostly implicit) 
distinction is made between what people think/believe/feel/view/perceive/see to 
be ‘the facts’ of reality and what they think/believe/feel about or because of their 
understanding of those facts.  
This distinction is well illustrated in the following statement from Hough and 
Roberts (1998): ‘[t]he public are dissatisfied with sentencing practice, or what they 
perceive sentencing practice to be’ (Hough and Roberts, 1998: 2). This statement 
makes clear distinctions between three categories of object: (i) the reality of crime 
and criminal justice (‘sentencing practice’) (ii) public factual beliefs about reality 
(‘what they perceive sentencing practice to be’) and (iii) public feelings towards 
reality (‘dissatisfied’). Implicit in this statement (and indeed in many of the other 
statements included above) is that public beliefs about reality are often not the 
same as the actual ‘facts’ of reality.  
Within the confidence research literature, and a wider body of criminological 
work, the media are frequently identified as the source of public ignorance about 
crime and the criminal justice system, said to provide ‘incomplete reports’ (Walker 
and Hough, 1988: 10); and ‘a distorted picture of sentencing policy and practice’ 
(Roberts and Doob, 1989: 499) in stories which are ‘brief and provide the reader 
with little information about the case or the relevant sentencing provisions’ 
(Roberts and Doob, 1989: 500) and which fail to place individual crimes in the 
context of general crime statistics (see Pratt, 2007; Roberts et al, 2003; Roberts 
and Hough, 2002; Allen, 2004).   
Descriptions of the tone and content of media reporting objectify these 
representations, and contrast them to other representations, for example ‘statistics 
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about falling crime’ (Hough and Roberts, 1998: 8); ‘data on the actual crime 
situation’ (Van Dijk, 1978: 39); and ‘a balanced picture of crime’ (Hough and 
Mayhew, 1983: 35). The types of representations which are deemed to be 
appropriate if the public are to be ‘properly’ informed tend to be statistical and/or 
aggregating or averaging, for example the proportion of crime that is violent, the 
‘typical’ sentences received for certain crimes, or the proportion of offenders 
sentenced to prison for specific offences.    
To the three objects identified above (the reality of crime and criminal justice; 
public factual beliefs about reality and public feelings towards reality) we can now 
add representations of the facts of reality. The literature implies that such 
representations often come between the actual facts and public beliefs about those 
facts. A key characteristic of the dominant discourse of public confidence, then, is 
that it implicitly delineates and relies upon four categories of ‘object’ which are 
clearly linked in a causal schema. Representations of reality are regarded as more 
or less satisfactory attempts to reflect reality. Public beliefs about reality are seen 
as conditioned and informed by public exposure to different representations of 
reality (and sometimes also by unmediated exposure to reality). Public feelings 
about the criminal justice system are assumed to be prompted by their beliefs 
about the reality of that system. Thus, the ‘grid of specification’ which operates in 
relation to the ‘objects’ which feature in public confidence discourse is essentially 
hierarchical, with the (implicitly monolithic and accessible) reality of crime and 
criminal justice at the apex.     
In summary, within the confidence discourse, it is taken for granted that a ‘reality’ 
of crime and criminal justice and a ‘reality’ of public beliefs and feelings about 
those beliefs both exist and can be accurately represented. What concerns the 
researchers and policymakers who make confidence their business is the lack of 
alignment between ‘reality’ and beliefs about reality, which, they suggest, can be 





4.3.2 Violating the ‘things to be known’  
In order to construct the grid of specification described above, researchers have 
imposed categories and causal schema on the stuff of reality. As described, in the 
previous chapter, the Foucauldian notion of ‘procedures of intervention’ describes 
the regulation of processes for introducing new statements into a discursive field. 
This often takes place when statements are transposed from one discursive 
context into another (Hughes and Sharrock, 2007: 331). In this way, ‘[k]nowledge 
can only be a violation of the things to be known, and not a perception, a 
recognition, an identification of or with those things’ (Foucault, 1974i: 9 cited in 
O’Farrall, 2005: 67). In categorising reality in order to represent it, researchers 
follow the rules and conventions of method which regulate the statements which 
they may introduce into the ‘discursive field’ of social research. Their categories 
and frameworks intervene between the ‘things to be known’ and possible 
understandings of those things.  
Within the public confidence discourse there are two common ‘procedures of 
intervention’. Firstly, most confidence research assumes that it is acceptable to 
make statements about what people really think/feel/believe on the basis of the 
option they select as their response to a closed question from an interviewer, or on 
a questionnaire. In many senses this has come to mean that the aspect of reality 
being examined (for example ‘confidence’) has come to be defined in an 
‘operationalist’ manner whereby ‘measurement itself is used to define the 
characteristics of what is being measured’ (Williams, 1998: 13). Secondly, within 
such research, where a statistical association exists between the selection of one 
response option and the selection of another or others, it is conventional to 
represent this as indicating a real link between real phenomena, something which 
is often taken to indicate a degree of causality from one variable to another.  
These procedures of intervention can be seen at work in the following statement:  
‘Averaging the estimates of imprisonment rates for the three crimes shows the 
contrast between respondents who believe sentences are much too lenient and 
the rest of the sample. Averaged across the offences, respondents who felt 
sentences are much too lenient believed that 38 per cent of offenders were 
incarcerated. The average for those who felt sentences were a little too lenient 
was 42 per cent, and those who thought sentences were about right or too 
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tough generated an average of 47 per cent. This suggests that ignorance about 
current practice is one source of public dissatisfaction with sentencing.’ (Hough 
and Roberts, 1998: 21) 
Within this statement it is possible to discern a number of ‘violations’ of the ‘things 
to be known’: (i) knowledge about the ‘current practice’ of the criminal justice 
system is taken to be adequately represented by ‘estimates of imprisonment rates’; 
(ii) ‘public dissatisfaction with sentencing’ is understood as feeling that sentences 
are too lenient, which is defined in operationalist terms as having selected the 
option ‘much too lenient’, or ‘a little too lenient’ (Notice how those who selected 
the option of saying that sentences are ‘too tough’ have their selection lumped in 
with those who selected the option ‘about right’. The selection of the option ‘too 
tough’ indicates dissatisfaction in a direction which is commonly rendered 
invisible by the confidence agenda); (iii) the increase in the estimates of the per 
cent of offenders jailed which is observed as respondents become more satisfied is 
taken to indicate that ‘ignorance about current practice’ is a ‘source of public 
dissatisfaction with sentencing’ (emphasis added).  
A similar order of ‘violation’ can also be observed in the following statement: 
‘instrumental worries about personal safety were not, in fact, the driver of public 
confidence in policing. Feeling that one’s local community lacked cohesion, social 
trust and informal social control was much more important.’ (Jackson and 
Sunshine, 2007: 18). As with the excerpt from Hough and Roberts (1998) above, 
this statement is made on the basis of an analysis of the statistical associations 
between variables. In the statement Jackson and Sunshine do not distinguish 
between their operationalization of the concepts which they are studying 
(confidence, worries, feelings) and the phenomena (or ‘things’) themselves. As 
such they imply an identity between the measures applied and the phenomena 
studied, encouraging the reader to understand the phenomena called into being by 
their questionnaire as manifestations of ‘real’ things, or ‘social facts’. In both this 
and the previous example, the data used provide us with no way of knowing how 
the relationships inferred from the observed statistical associations would be 
reflected in what the  respondents would have said if asked to explain in their own 
words why they may or may not be confident.  
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To make this rather obvious point about the inherent limitations of quantitative 
data is not to say that the researchers are not making valid observations on the 
basis of their data (according to the ‘procedures of intervention’ accepted as 
conventional within their field as applied to the particular topic area). Rather it is 
to flag up the not insignificant point that these statements, and the analytical 
techniques upon which they are premised, are procedures of intervention which 
serve to transform the observed behaviour of individual members of the public 
within the research environment into something which is both other than what it 
actually was (the expression of an on the spot estimation, the choice of a pre-
defined response option), and also other than what it might be if the same topics 
were addressed under different conditions.  
Qualitative studies, which might provide a rather different way of understanding 
public confidence, have proved much less influential than quantitative studies in 
shaping the dominant discourse of public confidence. Quantitative studies 
dramatically outnumber qualitative studies of public confidence in the criminal 
justice system73. Where qualitative studies of public confidence have been carried 
out they have tended to explore what respondents understand by terms such as 
‘public confidence’ and ‘criminal justice system’, and what they think about when 
deciding how to answer closed survey questions74. In such research it is almost as 
if the task of defining what is meant by the rather ill-defined concept of ‘public 
confidence in the criminal justice system’ has been returned to members of the 
public, as if retrospective cognitive testing is being applied to the research 
indicators, but then the results are being used in order to ‘increase’ positive 
                                                        
73 Qualitative data is used exclusively in only three of the confidence-specific research reports 
identified (Addison, 2006; Opinion Leader Research, 2005; NOP World, 2003) and is used in 
combination with quantitative data in two of the reports (Smith, 2007; Beaufort Research, 2004). 
74 For example, Addison (2006: 28) includes a section on ‘understanding and differentiating 
relevant concepts’, Smith (2007: 14) seeks to find out ‘What factors do people think about when 
deciding how confident they are in the CJS?’, Opinion Leader Research (2005: 14) attempts ‘to 
explore how different BME groups would define the term ‘confidence’’ and Beaufort Research 
(2004: 28) asks respondents ‘what they understood by the term ‘Criminal Justice System’’. 
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performance against these indicators, rather than to refine the indicators so that 
they capture what is intended75.   
The dominance of quantitative methods in the public confidence research agenda 
may be due to policymakers favouring ‘hard’ numerical data over the ‘rich’ data 
which is usually generated by semi-structured interviews and focus groups. But I 
would argue also that researchers themselves should assume some responsibility 
for determining which methods of research are regarded as acceptable within the 
public confidence agenda, and which have thus contributed to the dominant 
discourse of public confidence.  
The public confidence research agenda also creates conditions of possibility for a 
third procedure of intervention to ensue. This procedure of intervention occurs 
when survey responses come to be understood as ‘demands’ or ‘wants’. In this way 
responses which are deliberately elicited by researchers through a survey are 
conflated with members of the public proactively saying something or making 
demands. For example, Duffy et al (2007: 16) refer to the government’s willingness 
to address ‘the priorities that come up consistently in research studies’ as ‘giving 
people what they say they want’. In a speech to the House of Lords, Baroness 
Linklater contrasted ‘the perception of many politicians and sentencers, largely 
mediated through the press, that what the public want is an ever tougher prison-
based approach’ with the findings from a research study carried out by MORI 
which suggested that ‘the public are much less retributive than is often thought to 
be the case’ (HL Debate 8th December 2004 col 903-5).  In this way research 
studies like those described above may come to be seen as definitive expressions 
of what the public ‘really’ demand or want from their government. The public 
confidence research agenda thus always has potential ‘reality effects’.  
 
                                                        
75 This is suggestive of the tendency identified by Williams (1998: 14) whereby ‘research manages 
to be both operationalist and realist at the same time, asserting both the necessity of practical 
definition and the reality of the concepts so defined!’ 
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4.3.3 ‘Capturing’ public confidence: ontological necessity or value-
judgement? 
As noted above, some researchers have cautioned against reliance on general 
opinion poll measures which fail to take into account the extent of public ignorance 
about actual sentencing trends. For example, Roberts and Doob (1989) argued that 
‘when more sophisticated survey questions are posed, the results indicate both 
greater leniency towards offenders and greater flexibility in terms of the purposes 
of sentencing … the public favour the use of incarceration to no greater degree 
than the courts currently impose’ (Roberts and Doob, 1989: 514-515). Through the 
use of ‘more sophisticated survey questions’, then, Roberts and Doob (1989) wish 
their readers to understand that they have been able to access ‘true substances’, so 
far as public opinion on sentencing is concerned, as opposed to the ‘false shadows’ 
generated by general opinion measures. 
However, Walker and Hough (1988) offered a different perspective. They argued 
that, despite their shortcomings, general measures of opinion have value as a 
measure of ‘generalized satisfaction’:  
‘If all one is trying to do is measure respondents’ cynicism about the sentencing 
of burglars, a general question… will do service. But if one wants to find out 
whether opinion and sentencing practice are in step … respondents must be 
given a lot more information about the case. … If a survey is intended to gauge 
public confidence in sentencing, there is a case for limiting details to the sort of 
information which ordinary members of the public get from newspapers, radio 
or television. To give respondents anymore is to put them in a position in which 
they will not find themselves in real life, where they form their opinions on 
sentencing. This stricture, however, obviously does not apply when the 
intention is to assess the “mechanics” of opinion formation, as in experiments 
of the kind carried out by…’(Walker and Hough, 1988: 220). 
They therefore made a distinction between generalised ‘cynicism about 
sentencing’/’public confidence’ and opinion on appropriate practice in specific 
cases, and refer to public ‘cynicism’/’confidence’ as something which exists in ‘real 
life’ and can be ‘gauged’. So, as already argued above, their view seeks to defend 
the retention of general opinion questions, despite them having been described 
elsewhere as ‘insufficiently precise’, ‘false shadows’ and ‘useless for policy’.  
This view was further developed ten years later by Hough and Roberts (1998) who 
referred to work done by Roberts and Doob (1989) and argued that: 
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‘Information … is critical to public attitudes to sentencing. As a general rule, the 
less information that people have about any specific case, the more likely they 
are to advocate a punitive response to it. This experiment [carried out by 
Roberts and Doob (1989)] demonstrated that the amount of information about 
a case is critical in determining public reaction. Unfortunately, most newspaper 
descriptions of a case provide very little information. As well, the cases chosen 
for coverage by newspapers tend to be ones that resulted in what appears to be 
a lenient sentence. Both these trends contribute to encouraging a public 
perception that the system is very lenient, and that judges are thoroughly out of 
touch with the views of the community.’ (Hough and Roberts, 1998: 2-3) 
In this quotation the approach to gauging attitudes taken by Roberts and Doob 
(1989) is referred to as an ‘experiment’ which implies something which creates 
‘unreal’ conditions.  
Here, then, we are presented with two distinctive phenomena: a general sense of 
cynicism or confidence in sentencing which pre-exists research, and sentencing 
preferences which, it is implied, are only activated by the more complex and 
specific types of survey questions which provide respondents with additional 
information. So, despite recognising that these two phenomena are simply 
different (rather than ‘true’ or ‘false’ representations of a pre-existing reality) 
Hough and Roberts still place them in an implicit hierarchy. The more hypothetical 
forms of opinion elicited through more complex and specific survey questions are 
considered to be interesting, and valid, but also less ‘real’: they exist only because 
they have been drawn out of the public in the survey context. They are of use in 
‘experiments’ examining how ‘real’ opinion is formed but they are implicitly less 
‘real’. 
Another way of looking at this issue is that the responses obtained through the 
different questioning approaches are both equally artificial, both having been 
brought into existence by the different questioning techniques. From this 
perspective, to assign these phenomena the labels of ‘true’ and ‘false’ or to say that 
they are more and less ‘real’ works to obscure the fact that both of these species of 
opinion are constructed by the research. The choice between the two is not one of 
methodological adequacy but of ontological value: it is not what does exist and how 
it can be measured that is at stake, but what can be brought into existence, 
whether it should be and what we should do about it.  
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Where the researchers’ objective was to identify whether sentencing practice was 
‘in line’ with public opinion, available evidence on public ignorance of the ‘reality’ 
of sentencing was used to justify the use of a specific, hypothetical method to 
access their ‘true’ opinion. The value judgement in this case goes something like 
this: we should find out how the public feel about sentencing by providing them 
with enough information to make an informed decision in a specific case. Where 
the researchers’ objective was to gauge levels of ‘generalized satisfaction’ towards 
sentencing the specific, hypothetical method is seen as placing respondents in an 
artificial situation, and thus as failing to provide an adequate ‘gauge’ of what they 
‘really’ think. In this case the value judgment is: we should find out how the public 
feel about sentencing by asking them if they are satisfied with it.  
The examples provided thus far have made reasonably clear (although not 
necessarily explicitly described) distinctions between different types of opinion, 
either between ‘false shadows’ and ‘true substances’, or between ‘real’ and 
artificial. However, at other times there is a tendency within the confidence 
literature to write in such a way as to render the boundaries between the concepts 
capturing specific and general opinions indistinct. For example, Hough and Moxon 
(1985) concluded that: 
‘These findings suggest that policy-makers and courts can treat with a degree of 
scepticism the claims often made by the media that public opinion demands a 
tougher line with offenders. The BCS offers no evidence to suggest widespread 
punitive attitudes amongst the public. If, as the results of the BCS suggest, 
opinion and practice are broadly in line, there is probably leeway to introduce 
more lenient or heavier sentences without losing public support. 
Support for more lenient sentences, however, would probably only be 
forthcoming if the public were better informed about current practice. If people 
believe the courts to be more lenient than they actually are, they may well feel 
that heavier sentences are called for, and may find proposals for lighter 
sentences unacceptable. Confidence in the criminal justice system might 
perhaps be improved if people had a more accurate idea of sentencing levels.’ 
(Hough and Moxon, 1985: 171) 
In the first paragraph the authors refer to specific measures of opinion which: 
provide ‘no evidence to suggest widespread punitive attitudes’; enable comparison 
to be made between ‘opinion and practice’; and suggest that ‘there is probably 
leeway to introduce more lenient or heavier sentences without losing public 
support’. They do not define what they mean by ‘punitive attitudes’, ‘opinion’ and 
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‘public support’. In the second paragraph the idea of ‘support’ is referred to in a 
more general sense, and thus becomes contingent upon the public being ‘better 
informed’, because ‘proposals for lighter sentences’ are unlikely to find favour if 
‘people believe the courts to be more lenient than they actually are’. At the end of 
the passage, the concept of confidence is introduced, but without definition: 
‘Confidence in the criminal justice system might perhaps be improved if people 
had a more accurate idea of sentencing levels’.  
The phrasing of these two paragraphs collapses the methodological and 
ontological distinctions between general and specific concepts in a most confusing 
fashion. From being the extant fact of social reality which justified the use of more 
sophisticated survey questions in order to get at the ‘true substance’ of what the 
public think about criminal justice, poor public knowledge about the reality of 
crime and criminal justice becomes the key factor used to explain an (implicitly 
‘real’) lack of public confidence in the criminal justice system. Instead of: ‘x is true 
therefore we should measure y but not z’ (a judgement about the most appropriate 
questioning technique to meet the research objectives), the discourse shifts to say 
‘z is true because of x’ (the judgement here is that we should measure z despite 
knowing x, and treat x as an explanatory variable). 
4.3.4 ‘Reality effects’: Devaluing the ontological splinters  
Recent years have seen many effective critiques of the adequacy of quantitative 
survey data as applied to the matter of public opinion (e.g. see Fishkin, 1995; 
Ackerman and Fishkin, 2004; Price and Neijens, 1997; Shamir and Shamir, 2000). 
It has been frequently suggested that mass survey data tends ‘to collect and 
disseminate opinions that may be ill-informed “non-attitudes” or “pseudo-
opinions” developed outside of any meaningful public debate’ (Price and Neijens, 
1997: 337). Famously, Pierre Bourdieu wrote that ‘Public Opinion Does Not Exist’, 
arguing that the assumptions upon which opinion polls are based (everyone has an 
opinion, all opinions are equal and there is broad agreement about the questions 
about opinion which should be asked) are so flawed that public opinion is ‘a pure 
and simple artefact’ (Bourdieu, 1979 cited by Wacquant, 2004: 7).  
 155 
 
Whilst accepting Bourdieu’s critique of the assumptions upon which polls are 
premised I would argue (with Osborne and Rose (1999)) that something called 
‘public opinion’ (or indeed ‘public confidence’) does come into existence with the 
conduct of each poll. Something with productive potential has been and is brought 
into existence by those who carry out and report such polls based on their implicit 
acceptance that mass survey data are ‘the only workable empirical rendering of 
public opinion’ (Price and Neijens, 1997: 336). By bringing public opinion in this 
form into existence survey research on general opinion can have ‘reality effects’. 
Where  survey research is promoted as the most legitimate channel for public 
expressions of confidence or disconfidence this may effectively divert attention 
from, if not devalue, alternative channels through which the public may express 
their views. Indeed, Drury (2002: 41) has written of how  
‘collectives, and crowds in particular, have historically been much maligned. A 
wealth of linguistic and conceptual resources has developed which has served 
to discredit and delegitimize the crowd’  
Crowds, including participants in mass protests, are routinely dismissed or 
pathologized, for failing to utilize existing legitimate (and less socially disruptive or 
inconvenient) mechanisms to communicate their views. 
But it is not merely that the confidence research agenda can devalue non-research 
channels through which the public may give expression to their views. It is also 
that, in its dominant form, it has actively suppressed or rejected alternative 
research-based ways of understanding how the public think and feel about crime 
and the criminal justice system. As discussed above, key texts in confidence 
research have stated that there is ‘a greater need for information on public 
attitudes … to gauge public confidence’ (Hough and Mayhew, 1985: 43) and that 
‘the only truly valid measure of opinion is a representative survey.’ (Hough and 
Roberts, 1998: 1). However, it has also been claimed that survey measurements of 
opinion are ‘organizational instruments which emphasise logicality and lucidity’ 
(Rock, 1979: 166) giving everyday ideas ‘alien meaning’ (Ibid: 163) and that 
general opinion poll style questions are ‘insufficiently precise to answer whether 
sentencing is in line with public opinion’ (Hough and Moxon, 1985: 162).  
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A number of studies have been carried out over the last 20 years which suggest 
potentially fruitful alternative methods for engaging with the public in order to 
explore their views about crime and justice. But these studies have remained very 
much at the periphery of the public confidence research agenda, apparently 
crowded out by more conventional survey-based research. 
From 1994-1996, three criminologists from Keele University carried out a detailed 
ethnographic study of ‘public concerns about, and responses to, crime’ in 
Macclesfield and its surrounds (see Girling, Loader and Sparks, 2000). The method 
which they adopted was highly sensitive to the contextual details of time and place, 
and to the apparently mundane minutiae of public discourses about crime. The 
researchers did not merely document public ‘views’ or ‘opinions’ about crime, 
rather they explored the symbolic meaning of crime in talk, with reference to 
particular places, at a particular historical juncture.  
In the book which reports their findings the researchers deliberately position their 
work as seeking to break out of the ‘self-imposed theoretical and methodological 
restrictions’ of conventional research on ‘fear of crime’ (Ibid: 1) to provide a ‘place 
sensitive sociology of public sensibilities towards crime’ (Ibid: 12). They conclude 
that research which treats ‘fear of crime’ as a ‘separate and discrete object of social 
enquiry and policy intervention’ is an ‘exhausted’ pursuit (Ibid: 170). However, 
they emphasise that this does not mean that researchers, policymakers and 
practitioners should not attend to public views, beliefs and feelings. Rather they 
argue that what is needed is for the ‘passions’ excited by crime, as well as people’s 
normative beliefs about ‘what is to be done’, to be deliberated within an effective 
public sphere (Ibid: 177).  
Girling et al anticipated resistance to their approach from administrators and 
administrative criminologists (Ibid: 3) and, just as they feared, their detailed and 
nuanced analysis has had only a rather limited impact on the dominant 
quantitative approach to researching how people think and feel about crime and 
its control in their locality. Furthermore, where their research has been referred to 
it has been misused to the extent of being absorbed and partially-neutralized. For 
example, Jackson (2004: 946) argues that Girling et al demonstrated ‘the benefits 
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of a fresh approach’ to the ‘fear of crime’. He goes on to develop a ‘fresh approach’ 
through a complex multivariate analysis of some quantitative data on public 
attitudes (see also Jackson and Sunshine, 2007 and Jackson and Bradford, 2009)76. 
Jackson’s analysis is a statistically sophisticated attempt to build upon the points 
made by Girling et al, and offers some interesting findings. But it also completely 
misses the point of Girling et al’s core argument as it relies on (and indeed 
produces more of) precisely the kind of non-deliberative ways of understanding 
public views which Girling et al reject for their tendency to leave ‘the 
(impassioned) demands of citizens undiscussed and unchallenged’ (Girling et al 
(2000: 177).  
We gain some insight into why Jackson (2004) has (ab)used the findings from 
Girling et al (2000) if we consider the conclusion he draws from his analysis:  
‘people are not “fearful” of personally being victimized as often as we think; 
rather, they are expressing their social concerns through the symbolically 
dense concept of crime. And the crime survey can be used to sensitively address 
these issues, so long as it involves sensible design and analysis, and a coherent and 
ambitious set of theoretical ideas and guidelines’ (Jackson, 2004: 963, emphasis 
added). 
In other words, although Jackson references Girling et al, he then adopts the 
default response to those who would challenge the use of quantitative methods to 
explore public responses to crime. This response is described by Girling et al as 
that of ‘pursu[ing] ever more refined empirical research, carefully introducing 
more and more definitional distinctions and categories’ (Girling et al, 2000: 14). 
The proposals advanced by Girling et al in their conclusion seem to have triggered 
a defensive response in a researcher with a strong commitment to a quantitative 
approach. 
                                                        
76 It is not my intention here to question the methodological rigour or integrity of Jon Jackson’s 
work on fear of crime and public confidence in policing. He has (in collaboration with others) been 
responsible for some extremely thought-provoking and sophisticated studies and it is to his credit 
that he references Girling et al (2000) where contemporaries working in the same area have failed 
to do so. I use Jackson’s work here however to demonstrate how it is that work which falls outwith 
the dominant quantitative paradigm for research of this kind can struggle to influence public and 
political debates, and thus to be accepted on an equal footing with more methodologically 
conventional studies.  
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The advantages of deliberative approaches have been explored in more detail by 
Green (2006; 2008), and have also been championed by Loader (2011) and (as 
referred to in chapter two above) Loader and Sparks (2010a). Green argues that 
attempts to educate the public about the facts of crime and criminal justice are of 
limited utility due to their failure to have an enduring impact on public preferences 
and opinions (Green, 2006: 131). Loader (2011: 349) describes the educational 
approach as the ‘cognitive deficit model’ and suggests that it signally fails to 
address the intense emotions which issues of crime and punishment can provoke.  
As a solution, Loader proposes the ‘redirection model’ which would seek to 
‘fashion institutions and institutional practices that mediate between public 
sensibilities and crime control policy … bringing the emotionally laced experience 
and demands of citizens in from the shadows … opening them up to the scrutiny of 
public, communicative reason’ (Ibid: 356). The purpose of the exercise would be ‘to 
strive after policy outcomes that can be said to rest on some defensible, 
deliberatively produced conception of the common good’ (Ibid: 357). Green (2006) 
provides a more detailed account of one method which might be used to achieve 
Loader’s vision for redirection. He explores the background to ‘deliberative 
polling’, how it would work and what its benefits would be, contrasting the 
‘shallow, unconsidered public opinion’ captured through polls and surveys, with 
the ‘reflective, informed public judgment’ which a deliberative poll can produce 
(Ibid: 132). The purpose, he argues, is to ‘help produce an informed, more 
defensibly invoked public will’ (Ibid: 133). 
Loader (2011) and Green (2006; 2008) make convincing arguments in favour of 
the use of deliberative methods however, in their accounts, deliberative methods 
appear dangerously exposed to the accusation that the data which they produce is 
artificial. Loader refers to the findings produced by deliberative approaches as 
‘deliberately produced’ (Loader, 2011: 357) whilst Green argues that the 
deliberative poll will provide a ‘glimpse of a hypothetical public’ (Luskin et al, 
2002: 458 cited by Green, 2006: 133) by attempting to ‘model what the public 
would think, had it a better opportunity to consider the questions at issue’ (Fishkin, 
1995: 162, emphasis in original, cited by Green, 2006: 133). He also suggests that 
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the public cannot ‘achieve public judgment unassisted’ (Green, 2006: 145). This 
potential weakness in the argument for deliberative approaches has been attacked 
by one of the key figures in establishing the public confidence research agenda, 
Mike Hough.  
In 2002, along with Alison Park form the National Centre for Social Research 
(NatCen), Mike Hough revisited a study from 1994 in which James Fishkin, the 
pioneer of ‘deliberative polling’ (see Fishkin, 1995; Fishkin et al, 2002; Ackerman 
and Fishkin, 2004) along with NatCen and Channel 4, invited 297 people to attend 
a weekend-long deliberative workshop on crime and punishment. Over the course 
of the weekend they received presentations from practitioners, academics and 
politicians, and took part in group discussions about the issues raised (Hough and 
Park, 2002: 167). In contrast to Green (2006: 149), who emphasises the 
‘democratic utility’ of the deliberative poll, Hough and Park (2002: 165) seek to 
explore how the deliberative poll can be used to ‘change public attitudes’, referring 
to it as a ‘laboratory setting for learning more about public opinion’ (Ibid: 166).  
It is clear, from the outset,that Hough and Park set out to represent deliberative 
polls as premised on primarily normative, rather than scientific aspirations, and as 
necessarily producing findings which are artificial, in contrast to the ‘real’ opinions 
elicited through polls. They are very quick to point out key criticisms of 
deliberative polls, including the fact that (unreferenced) ‘critics have suggested 
that whatever the desirability of having a well-informed and thoughtful public, 
deliberative polls are irrelevant as politicians need to take account of the reality of 
public opinion as it emerges from “snapshot” public opinion polls’ (Hough and 
Park, 2002: 166, emphasis in original). They further underline the inferior status of 
deliberative polling in their conclusion, arguing that although ‘[t]here is an obvious 
need to improve on the ways that opinion on complex topics is canvassed’ 
deliberative polls are expensive; potentially biased and do not produce 
representative results which can be generalized to the wider population (Ibid: 
181). As such:  
‘Deliberative polling will never replace the standard, representative poll as a 
measure of public opinion. However, it may serve as a very useful adjunct and 
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generate insight into community views that cannot be gleaned from the survey 
approach which carries so much weight with politicians.’ (Ibid: 182)  
The subtext in this conclusion is that surveys are cheap, free from bias, and 
produce scientifically accurate findings about ‘real’ social phenomena. Deliberative 
polls on the other hand are appropriate only if used in a supporting role. It is 
suggested that this role can only ever be a supportive role because of the 
attachment of politicians to the consumption of survey data (rather than by the 
attachment of some researchers to its production).    
4.3.5 Costs to existence 
So far in this part of the chapter I have: identified the hierarchical ‘grid of 
specification’ which is implicit in the dominant discourse of public confidence; 
described the way in which confidence research violates the phenomena which it 
purports to represent through certain ‘procedures of intervention’; argued that the 
decision about how to do confidence research is not mandated by the facts of 
reality but is rather a disguised value-judgement about how best to do research in 
this area; and suggested that the dominance of survey research has been at the 
expense of qualitative and deliberative approaches to understanding what the 
public think and feel.  
This analysis suggests some further questions, including: (i) Why this ‘grid of 
specification’? (ii) Why these ‘procedures of intervention’? (iii) Why has a value-
judgement been disguised? I shall leave aside these important questions for the 
moment (to be addressed in the next chapter) and focus on a fourth question: what 
are the ‘costs to existence’ of the public confidence research agenda?  
Burchell (1996) has argued that we should look for ‘costs to existence’ by asking: 
 ‘What sort of relationships with ourselves, others and the world does this way 
of speaking the truth presuppose, make possible and exclude? What other 
possibilities of existence are necessarily excluded, condemned, constrained?' 
(Burchell, 1996: 34) 
The dominant discourse of public confidence produced and maintained by public 
confidence research constructs confidence as a real and measurable phenomenon 
which experts are able to capture, represent and ‘know’ through the application of 
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appropriate methods. Based on what they find by using these methods, experts 
have argued that the public frequently lack confidence in the criminal justice 
system because they have not adequately grasped the facts of reality, that is to say 
they have failed to understand reality in the same way as experts. The dominant 
discourse thus also projects an understanding of the world as one where there is a 
single, knowable reality of crime and criminal justice which can also be 
represented by experts using appropriate methods.  
This dominant discourse of public confidence posits a profoundly unequal 
relationship between experts and the lay public as expert ways of knowing about 
reality are privileged over lay ways of knowing, and are effectively placed beyond 
debate. Experts are also permitted to appropriate the responses which members of 
the public make in an artificial context (the research context) and call them real 
because it is implicit in the public confidence research that such research is a 
legitimate way of making visible the authentic desires of the individual. One could, 
of course, argue that the research acts as an enabling mechanism, that it serves a 
useful social purpose in allowing people’s demands to be heard. However, one 
might also ask ‘why this mechanism?’  
Survey research of the kind generally used to explore public confidence may 
enable, but it also clearly circumscribes the manner in which members of the 
public can make their views heard. Bellah et al (2008 [1985]: 305) have observed 
that the use of quantitative polling to find out what the public think fails to open up 
a conversation with the participants, and produces summaries of ‘private opinions’ 
which can come to be seen as natural facts. In its current form as a study of private 
opinions, the dominant strain in public confidence research is always partial and 
blinkered: it can only ‘hear’ certain things and not others as it delivers ‘facts’ in the 
authorised style. To become visible to, and thus be understood and represented by, 
the survey, individuals must learn the ‘technique’ of being the kind of subject 
which the survey assumes they are. It is not that they must feel or think a certain 
way, but rather that they must learn to ‘say’ what they think or feel in a way which 
is inevitably restricted, and they must submit to have their truncated expressions 
appropriated and transformed at the researcher’s own will, or else risk invisibility.  
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So members of the public must evaluate or rate, choose or express a preference, 
estimate and, when they meet the requirements of the method in this way, their 
subjectivity may be appropriated and transformed – their selections may become 
‘demands’, their preferences ‘desires’, their evaluations ‘anger’, their estimations 
‘beliefs’. These new subjectivities can then become objects of policy: marketing, 
education and so on. In this way, as individual citizens are subjected by the 
requirements of the survey method, they are also transformed from ‘subjects of 
their own action into objects of intervention’ (Bauman and May, 2001: 169). They 
are petrified in objectification, so that we can ‘see’ what they ‘really’ 
think/feel/believe.  
The dominant discourse of public confidence found in the public confidence 
research agenda also appears to both assume and facilitate an understanding of 
individual members of the public as consumers whose feelings of confidence are 
real and measurable and should be caused by their knowledge of the (expert-
produced) facts about crime and justice. Within this discourse, experts are 
positioned as the gatekeepers to accurate knowledge about crime and the criminal 
justice system and their ways of knowing, and the representations they produce, 
are privileged above those of members of the public.  
Furthermore, in order for the government to know whether or not the public have 
confidence in the criminal justice system and what to do about it, they must 
consult experts who are able to capture the reality of confidence and identify what 
drives it through quantitative survey data. More nuanced and contingent 
qualitative data of the type obtained by engaging in conversation with members of 
the public, letting them describe what they think and feel in their own words, or 
even fostering their engagement in public deliberation about the issues produces 
interesting, but ultimately less reliable, and less accurate data.  
The existence of this dominant discourse of public confidence thus contributes to 
the construction and maintenance of a particular social reality, by promoting and 
nurturing a particular quantitative research agenda to the detriment of qualitative 
and deliberative methods. However, as described above (see section 4.3.3), this 
research agenda is premised on the misrepresentation of a value-based decision 
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about how to know as a decision which has been mandated by the facts of reality. 
The ontological splinters created by alternative methods for accessing what the 
public think and feel are thus regarded not as different ways of accessing a multi-
faceted truth, but as inferior methods which produce idealistic artefacts.  
This misrepresentation allows researchers who argue in favour of qualitative and 
deliberative approaches to be portrayed as well-meaning but unrealistic, and 
permits their recommendations to be cast as normative and unscientific. The 
ontological illusion that real social facts exist independently of the values which 
shape the character and scope of social inquiry is perpetuated.   
These, then, are the ‘costs to existence’ of the dominant public confidence research 
agenda: a prioritization of methods over values which severely restricts 
opportunities for democratic engagement and dialogue between the public and 
policymakers, and casts the public in the role of passive ill-informed individual 
consumers who are reliant upon the experts both to tell them how to know about 
crime and justice, and to relay back their real opinions to their elected 
representatives.  
This dominant discourse of public confidence can be critiqued on two levels. At the 
first or outer layer, there is the ‘violation’ which occurs through the ‘procedure of 
intervention’ which sees such survey data being (explicitly or implicitly) held up as 
evidence of the true character of a real phenomenon which pre-exists the pollsters’ 
posing of the question of the day. This problem can be critiqued as a failure of 
method, a technical failing which produces a faulty knowledge-base. At a deeper 
level one can critique the misrecognition of the order of decision upon which the 
conventional ‘procedure of intervention’ is based, by which I mean the tendency to 
regard and represent the decision as mandated by ‘the facts’ of reality, rather than 
as a value-based decision about how to know. This is a problem which is seen as 
more intractable, more inaccessible, more abstract (or indeed perhaps also as 
imaginary) however, as I argue in the remainder of this thesis, this misrecognition 
is of crucial importance to debates about the appropriate public role of 
criminology in the democratic public sphere.   
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4.4 Conclusion: from ‘costs to existence’ to ‘conditions of existence’  
In this chapter I have argued that research on public confidence in the criminal 
justice system developed on foundations which were laid during the 1980s. During 
the 1990s the previously prominent methodological debate about how to access 
‘true’ public opinion on sentencing gave way to a narrower focus on how 
misperceptions can be addressed so that general (‘real’) opinion on the criminal 
justice system will be more favourable. Researchers appeared to reason that, 
because the public generally had inaccurate perceptions of the crime problem and 
criminal justice system practice, they were unable to recognise that the system was 
operating roughly in line with the way they would want it to operate in specific 
cases.  
The problem then became one of addressing poor public knowledge so that the 
distinction between specific measures of public preferences and general measures 
of public perceptions would no longer be of relevance, i.e. not only would actual 
sentencing practice be roughly ‘in line’ with public preferences, but the public 
would know that this was the case and as a result would hold favourable attitudes 
towards the criminal justice system (i.e. say that they felt confident). In some 
sense, then, public confidence acted as a conceptual bridge between the specific 
and the general measures of attitudes and opinions which were debated in the 
1980s. Knowledge and confidence were thus always already ontologically and 
conceptually entwined.  
An expanding body of quantitative research into the ‘drivers’ of public confidence 
which has emerged since the late 1990s, has, promulgated an understanding of 
confidence as real, measurable and caused, and has obscured the value judgement 
(about how public beliefs and feelings should be researched) which underpins the 
construction and reproduction of such a reality. Furthermore it has cast a mould 
for confidence research according to which researchers already know the kinds of 
‘things’ that they are looking for, and the ‘procedures of intervention’ which they 
should apply, and collect, code and interpret data accordingly. The result has been 
that a great deal of time and resources have been spent recycling the same 
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findings, to very little practical gain. This agenda has ‘costs to existence’. It subjects 
individual citizens to the logic of its method, and potentially devalues and deflects 
attention away from other avenues through which the public may ‘speak’.  
In the next chapter I address some of the questions posed by the deconstruction of 
the dominant discourse of public confidence: (i) Why this ‘grid of specification’? (ii) 
Why these ‘procedures of intervention’? (iii) Why has a value-judgement been 
disguised? I argue that in the absence of certain ‘conditions of existence’ the 
dominant discourse of public confidence in the criminal justice system would not 
be ‘thinkable’, and that the grid of specification, procedures of intervention, and 
disguising of the value-judgment about how to do confidence research can be 
traced back to historically contingent events and ideas. I also suggest that the 
emergence of the contemporary public confidence agenda occurred in the context 
of conflict between different groups competing for power in the criminal justice 
and political fields, and that claims to know about public confidence should 





Chapter 5. The emergence of the public confidence agenda 
‘Must not power without public confidence be as precariously held as existence 
must be without a certainty of means?’ (‘Query’ in The London Chronicle for 




In 1834 Robert Peel was asked to form a government by King William IV. When 
Peel spoke of his decision to accept the King’s invitation he cited the necessity of 
his government being able to command the confidence of the public in order to be 
able to govern effectively: 
I have not taken [the decision] without deep and anxious consideration as to 
the probability that my opinions are so far in unison with those of the 
constituent body of the United Kingdom as to enable me, and those with whom 
I am about to act, and whose sentiments are in entire concurrence with my 
own, to establish such a claim upon public confidence as shall enable us to 
conduct with vigour and success the government of this country. (Robert Peel, 
The Tamworth Manifesto, in Mahon and Cardwell, 1857: 58-67 emphasis 
added) 
The British Library database of British Newspapers and Pamphlets from 1600-
1911 contains almost 25000 articles, advertisements, letters to the editor and 
transcribed speeches which deploy the phrase ‘public confidence’. With 
considerable regularity and consistency, the term is used to denote public support, 
variously manifested, for persons, actions, organisations, or some other category of 
‘thing’, from politicians to race horses, and from stocks and shares to the health 
benefits of cocoa. For example: 
‘The loss of public confidence is shown by the serious depreciation of the 
ordinary stock of the company’ (Article on ‘Welsh Finance in 1900’ in Western 
Mail (Cardiff, Wales), Monday, December 31, 1900; Issue 9859.) 
‘Confidence is not won in a day. This truth applies with special force to 
proprietary medicines. Countless preparations have been placed on the market 
during the last fifty years that have been tried and found wanting. They could 
not establish their claims. Their bid for public confidence was made under false 
pretences of merit. They were without value and they failed! Beecham’s Pills 
have been before the public for over half a century. They have grown in public 
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favour owing to their merit. Now they have a sale of over 6,000,000 boxes 
annually.’(From an advertisement for ‘Beecham’s Pills’ in The Penny Illustrated 
Paper and Illustrated Times (London, England), Saturday, March 09, 1907; pg. 
159; Issue 2389.) 
The idea of ‘public confidence’, then, has a long historical pedigree in English 
political and economic discourse. However, until fairly recently, public confidence 
remained opaque: it was invoked often enough to suggest that everyone 
understood what it meant but its substance remained elusive. It functioned as a 
rhetorical token, used to refer to something which was seen as valuable but which 
could not be directly apprehended, only inferred from the way people behaved: 
what they bought, how they voted, whether or not they protested, rioted or started 
a revolution.  
In the arena of criminal justice in England and Wales recent years have seen public 
confidence become much more than a vague rhetorical gesture in the direction of 
maintaining the support of the public. As the last chapter showed, it has come to be 
treated as an objectively real and measurable phenomenon around which 
programmes of research and action can be constructed. It has become possible and 
routine to talk about public confidence (like the cognate concept ‘fear of crime’) as 
‘an objective thing; something out there in the social world to be decoded by the 
researcher and deployed by the policymaker’ (Lee, 2007: 15). A public confidence 
agenda can be said to have emerged. 
This chapter explores this emergence, starting from the premise that the notion of 
public confidence in the criminal justice system has no existence except within 
discourse, and that its constitution is always attributable to a process of historical 
discursive development rather than a moment of discovery (Smart, 2002: 58; Lee, 
2007). Thus, the dominant contemporary form of public confidence is understood 
as being contingent upon the conditions which have given rise to its production.  
My contention is that the idea of public confidence in the criminal justice system 
has some specific ‘surfaces of emergence’, without which its contemporary form 
would be, literally, unthinkable. I also argue that particular social and political 
conditions and events in England and Wales in the second half of the twentieth 
century combined to enable a discourse of public confidence to ‘ “hook” into 
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normative ideas and common-sense notions’ (Carrabine, 2001: 269) within the 
criminal justice field.  
In the first part of the chapter I look back in time to identify the ‘surfaces of 
emergence’ for the idea of public confidence as it came to be constituted at the end 
of the 20th century. These are the things which have made the contemporary public 
confidence agenda thinkable. In the second part of the chapter I explore the recent 
history of the idea of public confidence in criminal justice through an analysis of 
media and political discourse. Tracing the shifts in the way the term has been used, 
I seek to demonstrate the extent to which claims about public confidence have 
been strategically invoked in order to exert influence within the criminal justice 
arena. In other words I argue that claims to ‘know’ about public confidence in the 
criminal justice system are intimately associated with attempts to exercise power.  
5.2 Some ‘surfaces of emergence’ for the idea of public confidence 
The previous chapter identified some key characteristics of the contemporary 
public confidence agenda. These included the positioning of members of the public 
as dependent upon experts to understand the reality of crime and justice; the 
privileging of specialized expert ways of knowing about crime and justice and the 
acceptance of survey data as the most appropriate way to understand how the 
public think and feel about these issues. In the first part of this chapter I describe 
some ‘surfaces of emergence’ for this way of understanding public confidence.  
I  suggest that the public confidence agenda is premised on the following 
‘conditions of existence’: (i) the erection of barriers between ordinary members of 
the public and the operations of the criminal justice system which make it 
necessary for them to have confidence or believe that it operates in certain ways, 
rather than witnessing this firsthand; (ii) an understanding of the criminal justice 
system as legitimately oriented towards the production of effects upon individuals 
facilitated by the existence of ‘experts’ who are able to know about and accurately 
and objectively represent the ‘reality’ of crime and justice; and (iii) a political 
climate within which the true feelings and beliefs of members of the public are 
regarded as important, and able to be accurately captured by social research.  
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I argue that the ‘surfaces of emergence’ for these conditions can be discerned in 
historical changes which have taken place in the way crime is dealt with in England 
and Wales. Over a period of some four hundred years a system of justice has 
emerged which can be differentiated from the ‘old’ penal arrangements in three 
ways which are of particular significance to the issue of public confidence: (i) 
Managed by a centralized bureaucracy and delivered by professionals, it largely 
excluded the lay public from participating in or witnessing the administration of 
punishment and placed strict limitations on opportunities for the public to 
participate in other aspects of criminal justice activity; (ii) Explicitly oriented to 
the effective delivery of instrumental ends it has increasingly come to represent 
itself as informed by the findings of scientific research and experts of various 
kinds; (iii) Funded by compulsory tax-payer contributions it operates in a society 
with universal adult suffrage where public institutions are required to be 
accountable to the public, and where managerialist regimes with quantiative 
performance indicators are used to achieve accountability. In this part of the 
analysis I describe the genesis of these changes and how they have provided 
‘surfaces of emergence’ for the idea of public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. 
5.2.1 The ‘most hidden part’77: the removal of justice from public view 
Four hundred years ago, except for serious crimes, the administration of justice in 
England was very local and closely tied in to the communities within which people 
lived out their day to day lives. Small and stable communities were able to exercise 
effective ‘surveillance’ over their members (Bauman, 1987: 42) and for most 
people offences and disputes were settled by the Court Leet under the Lord of the 
Manor (Sharpe, 1984: 25). Even when the Manorial courts went into decline, 
ordinary members of the public were still involved in or able to witness the 
process of punishment as, until the 19th century, the sentences passed regularly 
involved a significant element of public spectacle (Foucault, 1977b; Beattie, 1986). 
The pillory and the stocks remained available throughout the eighteenth century 
                                                        
77 Foucault, 1977b:9 
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and often effectively left the fate of the offender in the hands of the crowd. 
Offenders who roused particular public anger could be treated very roughly, and 
even killed, whereas those with whom the public felt sympathy may experience 
little suffering, and instead receive public support, during their period of 
‘punishment’78 (Beattie, 1986: 466; Emsley, 1987: 215).  
In London, until 1783, ‘the execution march from Newgate prison to Tyburn 
gallows lasted about two hours, to the accoutrement of tolling bells and all the 
paraphernalia of spectacle and crowd participation along the way’ (Pratt, 2002: 
16). However, the end of the execution march marked the beginning of ‘a trend 
that involves both restricting the savagery and further confining the spectacle of 
the execution’ (Pratt, 2002: 16)79.  
In England during the 19th century whipping posts, pillories, stocks and ducking 
stools all fell into disuse (Pratt, 2002: 15), branding was outlawed (Foucault, 
1977b: 10), public executions were discontinued and recourse to the death penalty 
declined dramatically (Pratt, 2002: 16). Publicly exhibited acts of punishment on 
the body thus all but disappeared in a change of ‘penal style’ (Foucault, 1977b: 7). 
Furthermore, the kind of informal sanctions which local communities had been 
accustomed to use to punish minor offenders of accepted morals or custom also 
declined (Pratt, 2002: 16). By the late 19th century ordinary members of the public 
in England were effectively neither participating in nor witnessing the 
administration of punishment which became ‘the most hidden part of the penal 
process’ (Foucault, 1977b: 9).  
                                                        
78 For example, Beattie (1986: 466) suggests that: ‘[o]n at least one occasion in London following 
the Hanoverian succession a man convicted of speaking seditious words against George I was 
rescued by the crowd and released from the pillory’, whilst Emsley recounts how in February 1765 
John Williams, a bookseller, spent his hour in the pillory being cheered by a crowd who collected 
some £200 for him (Wardroper, 1973: 48-9 cited in Emsley, 1987: 215)  
79 In part this trend can be seen as having come about as a result of people turning against some of 
the more brutal punishments which remained on the statute book, in some cases leading juries to 
acquit rather than have to submit individuals to the tortures available. For example in 1794 the 
shoemaker Thomas Hardy, a founding member of the London Corresponding Society, was acquitted 
of high treason, an offence which the jury well knew to be punishable by an execution which would 
include the criminal being disembowelled and castrated whilst still alive (Thompson, 1991: 21). 
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Over the same period of time the traditional outlets through which some members 
of the public might have involved themselves in bringing offenders to justice and 
determining their sentence were also being closed off or limited. Movements such 
as the Societies for the Reformation of Manners which sprang up in the late 
seventeenth century, only to peter out by about 1730 (see Sharpe, 1984) were at 
odds with the increasingly professionalized and standardized system of justice 
which started to emerge from the eighteenth century onwards, and which really 
gathered pace under Robert Peel at the Home Office during the 1820s (Emsley, 
1987: 222). The changes progressively reduced and circumscribed opportunities 
for the public to involve themselves in law enforcement and penal matters, and 
increasingly posed a challenge to the traditional, paternalistic, aristocratic image of 
justice based around mercy and discretion, favouring a move towards an 
‘impersonal justice in which the law was above the suspicion of dependence on any 
personal discretion’ (Emsley, 1987: 222)80.  
In line with a wider centralizing and rationalizing trend in government the 
organization and supervision of prisons increasingly became a matter for the state. 
The opening of Millbank Prison in 1816 was followed by the founding of the prison 
inspectorate in 1835, and in 1877 the Prison system was centralised under the 
Home Office establishing an expanding, hierarchically organized and increasingly 
uniform penal estate (Garland, 1990: 181). At the same time, visits into prison by 
interested members of the general public came to be viewed as inappropriate and 
were increasingly curtailed (Pratt, 2002: 55). The role formerly played in 
inspecting and exposing prison regimes by ‘pioneering individuals’ and voluntary 
organizations preaching reform increasingly passed to the state (Pratt, 2002: 123).  
                                                        
80 This trend can also be seen in the demise of the practice of ‘pleading benefit of clergy’ which 
allowed hundred of offenders each year to escape hanging for minor offences against property in 
what ‘amounted in fact to a pre-sentencing pardoning system’ which rested upon the clergyman’s 
willingness to attest to the ability of the illiterate to read, and the judge’s willingness to participate 
in the fiction (Beattie, 1986: 474). This historical anomaly, which resulted in some capital offenders 
receiving the relatively mild (for the time) punishment of branding to the thumb, was addressed in 
the mid-seventeenth century by the introduction of pardons conditional on accepting 
transportation. Once judges had a merciful alternative to execution they were less willing to permit 
a plea for ‘benefit of clergy’ (Beattie, 1986: 474-5). Judicial discretion was thus increased by the 
demise of this practice, but the clergy were no longer involved in any collusion to produce mercy. 
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Until the end of the eighteenth century prisons were ‘located in buildings which 
were essentially indistinguishable from adjacent houses’ (Brodie; Croom and 
Davies, 1999: 2 cited in Pratt, 2002: 36). During the 19th century prison started to 
be more frequently used as a penal sanction in its own right, and the enlarged 
prison facilities were removed to outlying areas of towns and cities and situated 
behind high walls, physically screening their inhabitants from common view  
(Pratt, 2002: 41-45). At the same time prisoners themselves were publicly 
exhibited less often, with moves to transport them between penal facilities in 
civilian clothing rather than prison dress, then in private railway cars, and later in 
vans (Pratt, 2002: 57).   
Meanwhile, the establishment of the professional police ‘signified a move away 
from a degree of popular control that had existed in some places over parish 
constables’ (Reiner, 2010: 65). This shift continued in the twentieth century as the 
1964 Police Act strengthened the Home Office and Chief Constables at the expense 
of local police authorities, and the shift to the Unit Beat System of patrol and 
motorised response meant that the relationship between the ‘Bobby’ and a local 
community was further loosened (Reiner, 2010: 79). 
This brief description of some changes to the organisation of criminal justice which 
occurred in England and Wales between the 17th and 20th centuries, provides some 
examples of the ways in which the public were divested of the channels through 
which they had been accustomed to be involved in, or at least to physically witness, 
the processes in place for enforcing laws and punishing wrong doers (cf. Garland, 
1990: 185). As the machinery of punishment has been progressively removed from 
public view, and as responsibility for preventing crime and apprehending 
offenders has passed to professional police, so the public have no longer been able 
to ‘see for themselves’ justice being done. They have now, to a large extent, to rely 
instead upon the information released from within the bureaucracy, and on official 
assurances that the appropriate action has been taken to apprehend individuals 
who commit crime and punish them. This gradual exclusion of the public provides 
a surface of emergence for the contemporary idea of public confidence by making 
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it necessary for members of the public to rely on the testimony of others to find out 
how the criminal justice system operates. 
5.2.2 Counting ‘rogues and masterless men’: the transformation of 
surveillance 
The need to provide a deterrent to crime has been a justification of the right to 
punish for centuries, albeit a justification which was, at least until the 19th century, 
used in support of the public exhibition of torture and death (Foucault, 1977b: 93). 
Beattie (1986: 469) notes that public corporal punishment was supposed ‘to 
discourage [the offender] and others from committing other offenses. And beyond 
that … performed the wider function of reaffirming the moral boundaries of the 
society’. Some would argue that the existence of broader correctional intentions 
towards the individual offender (as opposed to the use of their bodily suffering as a 
deterrent example) also has a long history. In the late 15th century, Edward VI 
bequeathed a former palace (Bridewell) to the city of London as ‘a workhouse for 
the poor and idle persons of the city’ (Salgādo, 1977: 189). The palace came to be 
used as both a hospital and a ‘house of correction’ for rogues and loose women 
who were sent there for ‘reformatory detention’ after receiving the punishment 
proscribed by the court. Reform was to be achieved at Bridewell by putting the 
inmates to useful work under the supervision of paid craftspeople (Salgādo, 1977: 
190).  
The 1572 Poor Law saw a system modelled on Bridewell being adopted around the 
country, with the aim of ensuring that potentially wayward youths grew up 
engaged in hard work. The law gave parishes the power to round up obvious 
vagrants and to punish those resistant to working by whipping them and 
withholding their food (Salgādo, 1977: 196-7). Further statutes permitted the 
imposition of a period in this kind of house of correction in addition to the ordinary 
punishment. With objectives which extended beyond retributive punishment and 
the deterrence of would-be criminals, Bridewell and related institutions can be, 
and have been, interpreted as prototypical correctional institutions. Their 
existence during the 15th and 16th centuries appears to demonstrate the early 
prevalence of the idea that ‘it might be possible to cure criminal instincts though a 
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healthy dose of labour discipline’ (Sharpe, 1984: 179). However, these apparently 
‘correctionalist’ practices existed in a quite different social context than later 
practices which aimed specifically to change offenders’ behaviour and it may be 
misleading to suggest that there is a straightforward continuity here. 
Bauman’s work on the emergence of modern ‘experts’ suggests an alternative 
interpretation of Bridewell and the early correctional institutions. In 16th century 
England, social and economic changes were afoot which broke up settled feudal 
communities and made increasing numbers of men and women ‘economically 
redundant, and consequently socially homeless’ (Bauman, 1987: 40). Anonymous, 
mobile and with no legitimate means of providing for their own survival these 
homeless individuals were viewed with fear and suspicion but, as they moved from 
place to place, were effectively invisible to traditional forms of surveillance carried 
out by the community. This shortfall of surveillance was to be filled by the state, a 
development which, according to Bauman, transformed the exercise of disciplinary 
power from something to be done ‘matter-of-factly’ into something ‘visible, a 
problem to be taken care of, something to be designed for, organized, managed and 
consciously attended to’ (Bauman, 1987: 42).  
As the first movement in the process of re-establishing surveillance the state 
sought to define ‘vagabondage’, and, in 1531, passed an act of parliament which 
settled on a definition which made ‘the possession of a master or a property … the 
conditions of normal non-punishable conduct’ (Ibid: 43). The solution to the state 
of vagabondage was thus identified as the restoration of authority over the 
individual. In 1569 the Privy Council ordered parish constables to carry out a 
search which identified 13,000 ‘rogues and masterless men’ roaming the country 
(Salgādo, 1977: vii). Seen in this light the early houses of correction seem to be less 
about correcting the behaviour of individuals, and more about correcting their 
condition, by putting them to work under a master. The quantification of the 
problem also reveals the desire of the state to make vagabonds, who, by virtue of 
their rootlessness, were invisible to effective community surveillance, visible in 
another way, a theme which found a most clear and brutal expression in the 
introduction of branding in 1604 (Bauman, 1987: 44).      
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The vagabondage laws represented an important juncture in the shift from 
surveillance within the community to surveillance by the state, a shift furthered by 
the widespread use of ‘enforced confinement’ (Bauman, 1987: 44) to deal with 
problematic individuals existing outside of traditional social structures. Bauman 
(1987: 45) suggests that: ‘[p]risons, workhouses, poorhouses, hospitals, mental 
asylums, were all by-products of the same powerful thrust to render the obscure 
transparent, to design conditions for redeploying the method of control-through-
surveillance once the conditions of its traditional deployment proved increasingly 
ineffective.’  
This shift introduced what Bauman (1987: 46) refers to as ‘an asymmetry of 
control’, whereby surveillance lost its previous quality of reciprocity: ‘the 
watchers’ were now to be permanently distinguished from ‘the watched’ with 
surveillance flowing only in one direction. This ‘unidirectional’ surveillance was to 
develop, according to Bauman (1987: 47), into the ‘objectivization’ of individuals 
in order that they could be categorized and thus subjected to statistical analysis. 
Furthermore, the conversion to asymmetrical surveillance tended towards the 
production of an occupational specialism: the ‘surveillor’ became a dedicated 
professional and their task more ambitious: ‘nothing less than a total reshaping of 
human behavioural patterns; an imposition of a uniform bodily rhythm upon the 
variegated inclinations of many individuals; a transformation of a collection of 
motivated subjects into a category of uniform objects’ (Bauman, 1987: 48).  
So, early houses of correction were engaged less in producing effects 
(instrumentality) than they were in being effects in themselves. However they 
were part of a regime which played a crucial role in the transformation of 
surveillance, permitting the development of new forms of expertise. Eventually 
these forms of expertise would provide knowledge to underpin a criminal justice 
system which perceived and represented itself as pursuing instrumental 
objectives, including the transformation of offenders into law-abiding citizens, 
through the application of ‘expert’ knowledge. However, that is racing ahead and I 
wish to return to some other aspects of instrumentality which existed in earlier 
centuries.    
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5.2.3 ‘I was glad to send her to the house of correction since when she hath 
been much better’81: instrumentality in penality 
Although it might not yet have had as its objective the transformation of the 
individual offender, sixteenth and seventeenth century penality did, as mentioned 
above, understand and represent itself as acting as a deterrent to criminality. 
Furthermore, for more serious offences, the courts were able to very effectively 
incapacitate offenders by passing the death penalty for a wide range of what we 
might now consider relatively minor offences. In fact, until the eighteenth century, 
as the vast majority of offenders convicted at the assizes court were guilty of 
treason or a felony, the only available sentence was death (Beattie, 1986: 450). 
However, as described above, hundreds of such convicts were able to escape the 
death sentence by pleading ‘benefit of clergy’, and receiving ‘a mere branding on 
the thumb’ (Beattie, 1986: 451). The lack of choice available to judges in capital 
cases was, by the second half of the seventeenth century, increasingly being seen 
as a problem, and attempts were being made to make a wider range of options 
available (Beattie, 1986: 450). 
The formal introduction of penal transportation to the American colonies in 1718 
provided judges with an alternative both to execution for capital offences, and to 
the branding and discharge of convicted felons who pleaded benefit of clergy 
(Beattie, 1986: 470). Transportation of convicts was already in use before this 
time, usually as a condition of pardon, and, it has been argued, was carried out in 
‘the hope and expectation that men who had lost their characters in England 
might well become productive citizens in a new society, that the harsh 
discipline of the raw society across the Atlantic would reclaim men from the 
laziness and the bad habits that it was assumed had gradually led them into 
crime in the first place. The rehabilitation of offenders was not a major 
consideration in the seventeenth century, but it was obviously recognized as a 
secondary advantage of transportation’ (Beattie, 1986: 472-3)   
This suggests the existence of a desire for offenders to be reformed by their 
punishment, albeit a desire based on ‘hope’, at best ‘expectation’. 
                                                        
81 (Moore, 1899: 33 (‘Liverpool in Charles the Second’s Time’ in William Ferguson Irvine (Ed.) 
Liverpool) cited by Sharpe, 1984: 180) 
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Whilst in use, penal transportation was viewed favourably by many as it removed 
offenders physically to another place for a significant period of time and, if they 
continued offending after their punishment was at an end, most of them were 
doing it somewhere else82. The instrumental ‘effectiveness’ of this sanction as 
regards incapacitation was, then, self-evident. However, transportation was also 
given a correctionalist spin by the House of Commons Committee on 
Transportation which, in 1784, suggested that transportation to the American 
colonies tended to ‘reclaim the Objects on which it was inflicted, and to render 
them good Citizens’ (Emsley, 1987: 218).  
There was long-standing scepticism about the potential for imprisonment to 
achieve similar objectives. In 1621 a draft bill presented to parliament expressed 
concern that prison did not make offenders less likely to cause problems upon 
their release:  
‘long imprisonment in common gaoles rendreth such offenders the more 
obdurate and desperate when they are delivered out of the gaoles, they being 
then poor, miserable, and friendless, are in a manner exposed to the like 
mischiefs, they not having means of their owne, nor place of habitation nor 
likely to gain so much credit from any honest householder to interteyn them’ 
(cited in Sharpe, 1984: 182)  
It is instructive to recall at this stage the link between economic redundancy, social 
homelessness and perceived criminality, referred to above, and also to note that 
transportation to America, and later Australia, was used both as a legally inscribed 
penal sanction, and as a way of disposing of surplus peasant populations (most 
notoriously from Ireland and the Scottish Highlands). At various stages between 
the 16th and 19th centuries (depending on geographic location) vast numbers of 
peasants found themselves surplus to the requirements of landlords and forcibly 
dispossessed of both the right of access to common land, and the right to cultivate 
land suitable for maintaining their subsistence. In becoming thus both ‘masterless’ 
and deprived of legitimate ways of obtaining the means of existence, they were 
                                                        
82 For example, in 1786 the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London petitioned the King 
about the rising tide of crime which they considered to be attributable to the end of transportation 
meaning that offenders who had served their sentence were now being released in England (at that 
time transportation to America had been ended due to the war of independence) (Emsley, 1987: 
218). The following year the first convicts departed for Botany Bay (Emsley, 1987: 203). 
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exposed to the risk of severe destitution and starvation, which may have led them 
into courses of action where they would fall foul of the criminal law. Either way, 
enforced emigration or penal transportation were available to dispose of them, 
ostensibly to improve their situation, but certainly furthering the aims of the 
landed gentry to extract maximum rent from their land, as well as assisting the 
government in populating its new overseas possessions (see for example Prebble 
(1969); Hill (1972); Thompson (1980); Hunter (2010)). 
However, during the seventeenth century, we begin to see houses of correction, as 
opposed to ‘common gaoles’, referred to as able to bring about a change in 
individuals who would then behave better on the ‘outside’. For example, during 
Charles the Second’s seventeenth century reign, a Liverpool man said of the effect 
on his tenant: ‘I was glad to send her to the house of correction since when she 
hath been much better’ (Moore, 1899: 33 cited by Sharpe, 1984: 180). Although, 
during the eighteenth century Bridewell itself was still disparagingly referred to as 
‘a nursery for thieves and prostitutes’ (Hanway, 1775: 72 cited in Emsley, 1987: 
218).  
In 1779 Parliament passed the Penitentiary Act providing for the construction of 
two penitentiaries within which inmates would be uniformed, would engage in 
hard labour during the day and would be shut in solitary confinement at night. The 
act specifically stated that these institutions should produce ‘habits of Industry’ in 
the prisoners, but also that the regime should be sufficiently harsh as to minimise 
its appeal to impoverished people (Emsley, 1987: 217-8). The institutions 
provided for were never built but the Penitentiary Act provides an example of an 
explicit attempt to produce particular effects on people through punishment: 
prisoners were to gain particular ‘habits’ during their sentence but were not to be 
so well-treated that their situation might appear enviable.  
It seems, then, that the desire for penal policy to serve a purpose has long played a 
part in English penal debates. However, changes have occurred in the way in which 
‘effectiveness’ is conceptualised and in the manner of the identification and 
justification of practices to produce effects. By the end of the eighteenth century 
the effect of penal practices upon the individual offender was increasingly a matter 
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for discussion. One reason for this might be that, following the significant 
reduction in the use of execution during the seventeenth century (Beattie, 1986: 
469), and interruptions to the use of transportation during the eighteenth, there 
were periods when many offenders guilty of felonies were no longer stopped from 
offending in England by the simple expedients of killing them, or permanently 
removing them to a far away place.  
Meanwhile, intensified anxiety about disorder and criminality amongst the 
propertied classes in eighteenth century England (developed against the backdrop 
of the French Revolution and smaller, but perhaps no less frightening, domestic 
disturbances, as well as more mundane offending such as highway robbery) 
precipitated a growing sense of the urgent need to ‘govern criminal offending’ 
(Lee, 2007: 27).  The knowledge that such offenders were simply being imprisoned 
for a period of time before being released back into contact with the law-abiding 
population is likely to have concentrated minds on how those individuals might be 
reclaimed as good citizens.  
5.2.4 ‘Homo criminalis’ and ‘the science of the state’: the coming of 
criminology 
Foucault has persuasively demonstrated the important part which the desire to 
gain a more effective and extensive level of control over citizens played in the 
construction of eighteenth century arguments for penal reform (Foucault, 1977b: 
88). He argued that classical criminological logic served to make punishment ‘an 
art of effects’ (Foucault, 1977b: 93), with those arguing for reform concerned that 
the use of public torture as punishment was not so much cruel as that it was 
ineffective.  
During the 18th century, the individuals we now know as the classical 
criminologists, inspired by Enlightenment values and informed by a body of 
knowledge known as ‘the science of police’, were already working on their 
development of ‘rational’ approaches to governing crime and punishment. In the 
British context, brothers Henry and John Fielding, and, later, Patrick Colquhoun, 
were busy developing their blueprints for policing and disciplining the lower 
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classes (Lee, 2007: 28-31). However Pratt (2002: 86-9) has argued that whereas 
references to criminals in earlier centuries had been infused with loathing and had 
focused on the need to visit harsh punishment and privations upon their persons 
and forcibly change their ‘habits’, by the end of the 19th century the language was 
starting to shift towards a rationalistic objective discourse which began to 
humanise the figure of the criminal as an individual towards whom the state has 
responsibilities.  
Whether the intentions were humanitarian or repressive, the crucial element of 
this shift was that justice was no longer a matter of punishing the offence but was 
also something which was targeted at the offender. To the ‘triangle’ of classical 
criminology - law, crime and punishment - was added the figure of the criminal: 
‘homo criminalis’ (Pasquino, 1991: 237-8). Sentences were now supposed to 
address this figure, his thoughts, instincts, drives and tendencies, and include 
measures ‘to supervise the individual, neutralize his dangerous state of mind, to 
alter his criminal tendencies and to continue even when this change has been 
achieved’ (Foucault, 1977b: 18).  
That such a shift was able to occur is, according to Foucault (1977b: 18), 
attributable to the way in which ‘scientific’ expertise inserted itself into a crack in 
the legislation and expanded over time to provide a battery of: ‘knowledges, 
techniques [and] “scientific” discourses’ upon which judgment must now be based’. 
Developments in post-revolutionary France are instructive. Legislators found that 
the tenets of strict classicism were occasionally problematic because some 
offenders could not understand the charge against them. Thus specialist expert 
witnesses entered into legal proceedings to attest to the capability of individuals.  
This approach brought to the fore the idea that there might be factors which pre-
disposed people to commit crimes (Hopkins-Burke, 2009: 24, 31-2).  The object of 
judgement was thus no longer merely the act which had been committed, but also 
the ‘soul’ of the perpetrator, creating new possibilities for juridical power:  
‘by solemnly inscribing offences in the field of objects susceptible of scientific 
knowledge, they provide the mechanisms of legal punishment with a justifiable 
 182 
 
hold not only on offences, but on individuals; not only on what they do, but also 
on what they are, will be, may be’ (Foucault, 1977b: 18).  
The ‘scientific’ discourses of ‘experts’ thus came to permeate a system of criminal 
justice which ‘functions and justifies itself only by this perpetual reference to 
something other than itself, by this unceasing reinscription in non-juridical 
systems’ (Foucault, 1977b: 22). 
Following the economic transition to capitalism and the relinquishing of notions of 
sociality rooted in the old feudal order, individuals were no longer required to live 
their lives in a certain condition (under one master, in one place), but were 
required to have certain dispositions and take (or refrain from taking) certain 
actions. Where early correctionalist moves sought to restore individual vagabonds 
to the lawful condition of having a master (see above), now correctionalism must 
have another objective: to create the right kinds of people. The increasingly 
professionalized mechanisms of surveillance identified by Bauman (see above) 
could thus be put to work to categorize and monitor individuals and to begin to 
enquire into the workings of their ‘soul’.   
The new ‘scientific’ discourse which emerged in the modern era was oriented to 
these new objectives. Foucault (1991b: 96) argues that: 
 ‘[t]he theory of the art of government was linked, from the sixteenth century, 
to the whole development of the administrative apparatuses; it was also 
connected to a set of analyses and forms of knowledge which began to develop 
in the late sixteenth century and grew in importance during the seventeenth, 
and which were essentially to do with knowledge of the state, in all its different 
elements, dimensions and factors of power, questions which were termed 
precisely “statistics”, meaning the science of the state’.  
Whilst numbers had been collected and recorded at early stages in the modern 
period, Hacking (1991) has argued that during the 19th century there occurred 
both a quantitative and a qualitative shift in the use of numbers. Quantitatively, 
between 1820 and 1840 he suggests there was a rapid expansion in the 
publication of numerical information and that an ‘avalanche of numbers ... revealed 
an astonishing regularity’ (Hacking, 1991: 187). Qualitatively there were shifts in 
the understanding, interpretation and use of these numbers: ‘where in 1800 
chance had been nothing real, at the end of the century it was something “real” 
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precisely because one had found the form of laws that were to govern chance’ 
(Hacking, 1991: 185).  
Statistical calculation was found to be applicable to the practical problems of the 
day. For example, in the early 19th century, Friendly Societies wishing to provide 
assurance protection to working people were able to calculate the level at which 
they should set their premiums, and thus: ‘[t]here arose a certain style of solving 
practical problems by the collection of data. Nobody argued for this style; they 
merely found themselves practising it’ (Hacking, 1991: 192).  
Under this shift, this taming of chance, the notion of ‘expertise’ gained a new 
meaning. In the 16th century, pamphlet writers gave advice on how law-abiding 
folk could avoid falling prey to ‘conycatchers’ (thieves and tricksters). Salgādo 
(1977: 8) quotes from one such pamphlet which claims to have been ‘Done by a 
Justice of Peace of great authoritie’ who had significant experience of examining 
the ‘villains’ in question. Clearly implicit in this latter day strap-line there is a claim 
to expertise, however in this case the claim to expertise is made based on direct 
practical experience. By the 19th century, rather than needing to have such direct 
practical experience of the phenomenon in question, experts could now quantify 
and illuminate phenomena at the level of population by way of mastery and 
application of the appropriate techniques (Foucault, 1991b: 99). In this way 
‘hitherto invisible processes and phenomena were made calculable and knowable 
and new modes of government rendered possible’ (Lee, 2007: 38).  
By the end of the 19th century scientific criminology and penology had emerged in 
Europe and North America bringing a ‘rationalization’ of penal discourse and an 
orientation towards technical methods for controlling crime. Criminology was ‘an 
expression of the Enlightenment ambition to cure social ills by the application of 
Reason’, and, according to this view, the expert was seen as an essential part of 
finding solutions to the problem of crime (Garland, 1990: 185). 
This change has been internalised in the self-representations of criminal justice 
professionals: ‘[i]nstead of being the vehicles of punitive reaction … these groups 
tend to represent themselves positively, as technicians of reform, as social work 
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professionals, or as institutional managers’ (Garland, 1990: 182-3). In the 
twentieth century, after World War Two, penal discourse increasingly focused on 
the provision of rehabilitation, assistance and therapeutic interventions for the 
offender, with a basis in psychological/psychiatric expertise (Pratt, 2002: 91-4). 
Garland suggests that ‘[i]f we nowadays expect “results” from punishing, it is in 
large part the doing of these groups and their self-descriptions’ (Garland, 1990: 
183).  
5.2.5 ‘[J]ustice tempered by understanding’: Modernist criminology in 
Britain  
In the twentieth century, the decades following the Second World War were 
decisive in establishing sites of technical criminological expertise which could be 
used to inform penal practice in England and Wales. In 1944 a report for the Home 
Office recommended that studies should be made of ‘the effectiveness of penal 
treatment, recidivism, the value of approved school training, the personality of 
offenders, the criteria used by the police in recording crime, and the efficiency of 
probation officers’ (Lodge, 1974: 14). Following on from this recommendation, the 
Home Office Research Unit was formed in 195783 and the Cambridge Institute of 
Criminology in 1959.  
Looking back on these formative years for English criminology Lord Butler recalls 
that, as Home Secretary at the time, he was attempting to ‘lay a path for an 
enlightened penal policy’ (Butler, 1974: 1). He continued: ‘[c]rime and its 
treatment seem to me to be no less suitable as a subject for study and teaching by 
the universities than a number of other social phenomena; and this is a field in 
which we particularly need the help and urge of the informed but detached public 
opinion which the universities are so well able to produce’ (Butler, 1974: 4-5). The 
                                                        
83 Lodge (1974: 11) has characterized the establishment of the Home Office Research Unit, as a 
component of the ‘inevitable…development in Great Britain of scientific criminological research’ 
which has happened as a result of ‘forces that for many years had been building up’ (Lodge, 1974: 
11). By way of illustration he refers to the establishment in 1931 of the Association for the Scientific 
Treatment of Criminals (later to become the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency) 
following work done by the Medical Research Council (Lodge, 1974: 11), and, in the same decade, 
correspondence between the penal reform campaigner Margery Fry and the Home Office on the 
need to start criminological research (Lodge, 1974: 13). 
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so-called ‘founding fathers’ of criminology who were establishing themselves in 
this period cleaved to the belief that the knowledge which they produced would 
inform improved criminal justice policies (Tonry and Green, 2003: 500).  
These changes were contiguous with the prevailing mood in government, with the 
state’s involvement in sponsoring criminological research from the late 1950s 
onwards appearing to be ‘part-and-parcel of the generally more interventionist 
state’ (Reiner, 2010: 147), and with the rehabilitative ideal being in large part a 
reflection of a high level of optimism about the potential of scientific knowledge to 
guide positive social change (Tonry and Green, 2003: 507). Furthermore, there 
appears to have been support both within government and within the legal 
profession for closer relations between the social sciences and law, in order that 
empirically-generated social scientific insights might be used to deliver ‘[j]ustice 
tempered by understanding’ (Ormrod, 1964: 331). The type of ‘understanding’ 
referred to here is quite specific: ‘understanding’ was to be generated through 
scientific research into the causes of and remedies for criminality. What has been 
described as an ‘emphatically modern’ criminological discourse is thus 
characterized by ‘its faith in instrumental reason, its vision of the technocratic 
state and its commitment to social progress and social engineering’ (Garland and 
Sparks, 2000: 8). 
Over a period of about 200 years then (although arguably set in train by conditions 
which emerged during earlier periods) a new source of authority emerged in 
relation to criminal justice: ‘[e]xpertise in the conduct of conduct – authority 
arising out of a claim to a true and positive knowledge of humans, to neutrality and 
to efficacy’ (Rose, 1993: 284). The most salient effect of this, for my purposes, is its 
tendency to exclude and devalue other forms of knowledge. As an example of this, 
in relation to the death penalty, a penal sanction which a majority of the public 
have persisted in supporting, ‘[t]he growth of penological evidence ... not only 
discredited deterrence and retribution arguments, but increasingly emphasised 
the importance of treatment and rehabilitation’ (Pratt, 2002: 29), such that in the 
1950s scientific evidence was deployed as a way of bolstering calls for the 
abolition of the death penalty (Pratt 2002: 28). This move indicated a willingness 
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to prioritise ‘scientific’, ‘rational’ knowledge over public opinion (Pratt, 2002: 32-
3), such that ‘the state was prepared to exert its own moral authority to govern in 
this area, and to place the way it punished its subjects above political interests and 
populist demands’ (Pratt, 2002: 32). Penal experts were thus united by the view 
that ‘[p]ublic opinion...was something to be wary of, not to be trusted, allowing as 
it did sentiments of anger and uncontrolled emotion to blind it to more rational 
thinking’ (Pratt, 2002: 32).  
Between the 16th and 20th centuries, then, shifts in understandings of criminal 
justice, and in ways of knowing about populations, supported the emergence of the 
notion that the criminal justice system should be oriented to the production of 
effects within those individuals subject to its discipline. An emerging set of experts 
began to make claims to be able to accurately and objectively know and represent 
the reality of crime and justice using modern scientific techniques. The type of 
knowledge about crime, criminality and justice which could be gained through 
personal experience was henceforth to be regarded as an adjunct to scientific 
knowledge, not necessarily without worth, but certainly of less general validity and 
utility.   
5.2.6  ‘At the mercy of a lawless and furious rabble’? Towards democratic 
data 
‘…every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent 
put himself under that government’ (Leveller Colonel Rainsborough cited in 
Thompson, 1980: 24)  
In 1792 the members of the newly-formed London Corresponding Society revived 
the spirit of the Levellers, agreeing that ‘every adult person, in possession of his 
reason, and not incapacitated by crimes, should have a vote for a Member of 
Parliament’ (Thompson, 1980: 19). The idea of universal suffrage was outrageous 
to many who feared it would leave them, in the words of the Reverend Christopher 
Wyvill: ‘at the mercy of a lawless and furious rabble’ (Wyville, 1804: 23 cited by 
Thompson, 1980: 27), or, as Burke preferred, the ‘swinish multitude’ (Cited in 
Thompson, 1980: 26). However, gradually the ruling classes were coming to 
believe, whether on the basis of principle or pragmatism, that governments must 
command the consent of all of the people, and the support of the majority.  
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The eventual achievement of full adult suffrage contributed to a new set of 
‘problems of collective judgement and decision making’, which, during the 20th 
century, prompted the development of new empirical methods for determining 
what the public were thinking (Price and Neijens, 1997: 339). Between the first 
and second world wars empirical sociology sought to establish a place for itself by 
providing ‘application-oriented’ research. As part of this movement ‘mass 
phenomena were made sociologically accessible by treating the individual 
statistically and objectifying him/her in a natural science mode’ (Wagner, 2001: 
23). This ‘reconceptualised society as masses who reacted to a stimulus and 
developed regular patterns of behaviour’ (Wagner, 2001: 23).    
This way of thinking was present in the work of the pioneers of the new ‘scientific’ 
opinion poll. The pioneers of opinion polling understood their work as helping to 
increase democratic participation (Price and Neijens, 1997: 336). Indeed, Samuel 
Stouffer of Harvard University Division of Social Relations, speaking at the first 
conference on Attitude and Opinion Research in 1949, described polling as an 
‘instrument of democracy’ (cited in Lee, 2007: 50). But the pollsters struggled to 
accommodate the classical understanding of public opinion as a phenomenon 
formed and expressed in the context of social interaction. Such a phenomenon was 
not compatible with their methods of data collection. Instead they began to regard 
mass survey data as ‘the only workable empirical rendering of public opinion’ 
(Price and Neijens, 1997: 336). 
The development and expansion of opinion polling offered a new way of knowing 
about and understanding what individual members of the public thought about 
different issues of the day, effectively bringing into being the notion of public 
opinion as we know it today (Osborne and Rose, 1999). Without this new way of 
knowing, and the increasingly sophisticated statistical techniques which supported 
it, the contemporary form taken by the idea of public confidence in the criminal 





5.2.7 ‘Taking crime seriously’: Left Realist Criminology  
The late 1970s saw concern amongst some criminologists that, despite its 
achievements, radical criminology was too dismissive of the experiences of crime 
amongst groups particularly prone to vulnerability and disadvantage, including 
women, ethnic minorities and the working class. Empirically, radical criminological 
theories were seen as unable to account for intra-class crime patterns which meant 
that these groups suffered disproportionate levels of victimization, whilst 
politically they were seen as having little practical support to offer mainstream 
politicians of the left seeking policies which would be both advantageous and 
attractive to their core constituency. This combination of empirical and political 
concerns inspired the left realist movement in criminology. 
Underpinning the emergence of left realism was the fresh data provided via the 
development of a new criminological innovation: the victimization survey. 
Victimization surveys first emerged in the US at a time when criminologists there 
were of a generally social democratic orientation; when it was being recognised 
that recorded crime figures indicated that a disproportionate burden of crime was 
borne by the poor and ethnic minority residents of the urban ‘ghetto’; and when 
feminist ‘victimology’ was determined to raise awareness of the hidden crimes 
suffered by women (Jones, MacLean and Young, 1986).  
The first three such surveys (carried out for the President’s Commission in the late 
1960s) inspired many subsequent surveys in the US and beyond, as well as the 
formation of a body to take forwards work on a National Crime Survey (NCS), 
which commenced in 1972. Despite some identified methodological 
shortcomings84 throughout the 1970s the new data on victimization made a 
‘substantial impact’ in academic criminological circles (Sparks, 1981: 5), providing 
as a matter of routine a ‘wealth of data ... on a range of crime-related topics’ about 
                                                        
84 The National Crime Survey surveys were, according to Sparks (1981: 6) ‘designed and 
implemented with what can only be described as indecent haste ... little more than two years was 
allowed for pretesting a new (and very expensive) research technique, in order to overcome the 
problems concerning the “reliability and accuracy” of survey findings which the President’s 
Commission had uncovered. Even the little time that was allowed for pretesting was badly used.’ 
Piloting efforts were ‘puny and inept’ and answered none of the questions which had been raised by 
the earlier surveys (Sparks, 1981: 6).  
 189 
 
which virtually nothing had been known less than a decade earlier (Sparks, 1981: 
24).  
Initially, the NCS and other victimization studies were intended mainly as a way of 
obtaining more accurate estimations of the levels of different types of crime, and 
how they impacted on different groups (Sparks, 1981: 7). In fulfilling this role they 
presented data which revealed inter alia that most crime is not reported; that 
incidents of violent victimization are generally extremely rare; that a small number 
of repeatedly-victimized individuals suffer a high impact from crime; that certain 
groups have a significantly higher level of risk of victimization than others; and, 
crucially, that criminal victimization frequently takes place within rather than 
between different social classes (Sparks, 1981).  
Revelations about the extent of intra-class crime and the scale of working class 
victimisation proved particularly problematic for radical criminologists who had 
tended to downplay or ignore these aspects of criminal behaviour (Young, 1988: 
171). In response to what they regarded as the empirical ‘exposure’ of radical 
criminology’s ‘flaws’, left realist criminologists sought to provide a ‘middle way’ 
between establishment criminology and what they termed the ‘left idealism’ of 
radical criminology. This middle way would ‘take crime seriously’, particularly its 
impact on the lived experiences of working class people, but it would also provide 
radical analysis and policy alternatives (Young, 1997: 474).  
In the first instance, then, the fresh data provided by victimization studies 
precipitated the development of the left realist approach. Later ‘second generation’ 
victimization studies moved on from simply quantifying the extent of victimization 
by including additional variables intended to gauge respondents’ assessments of 
responses to crime by the police and other criminal justice agencies. The scope of 
the victimization survey was thus expanded to ‘embrace a much greater part of the 
whole process of criminalization – namely, the pattern of victimization, the impact 
of crime, the actual police response and the public’s notions of appropriate 
penalties for various offences’ (Jones et al, 1986: 5).  
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This extended focus meant that victimization surveys were able to provide the 
kind of empirical data which was considered crucial by left realists: ‘The virtue ... of 
a crime survey is that it provides us with a more realistic mapping of the impact of 
crime and policing, and it also reminds us that we should take seriously people’s 
knowledge of crime’ (Jones et al, 1986: 201). Furthermore, left realists argued that 
‘being tough on crime must include being tough on the criminal justice system’ 
(Young, 1997: 491). Local victimization surveys were seen as a mechanism 
through which crime control interventions could be monitored, and agencies held 
to account via a regular ‘audit of people’s experiences, anxieties and problems of 
crime’ (Jones et al, 1986: 3).   
In Britain the early 1980s saw the Islington, Merseyside and Nottinghamshire 
Crime Surveys, with the last two being directly encouraged and funded by the 
Home Office (Jones et al, 1986: 4). These local surveys were rather different in 
scope to the national-scale British Crime Survey which was just getting off the 
ground in the early 1980s. The local studies carried out as part of a left realist data 
collection exercise focussed on specific urban localities, those containing the 
highest concentrations of poor and marginalized individuals (White and Haines, 
2008: 148-151).  
The surveys produced reports which would have made uncomfortable reading for 
many within the criminal justice system, particularly some senior police officers. 
For example, the Islington Crime Survey found ‘widespread public scepticism 
about the ability of the police to combat the crimes which are of the greatest public 
concern’ (Jones et al, 1986: 203). It also highlighted the fact that a significant 
proportion of the local population believed that the police acted illegally and 
unfairly towards certain groups, basing this belief, they said, on their own 
experience or the experiences of friends. The authors highlighted the potential 
impacts of such a belief, including reduced cooperation of the public with the 
police and an increasing likelihood that certain groups may be propelled towards 
delinquency (Ibid: 205). As a result, they recommended that: ‘In order to increase 
information flow it is essential that the police gain the confidence of the public’ 
(Ibid: 213).  
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In their recommendations, the authors referred to the types of police action which 
would command public support, and they contrasted senior officers’ assumptions 
about ‘what the public want’ with the ‘reality’ identified by the survey. Finally, they 
argued that there was a need to construct effective performance indicators based 
on community priorities: ‘it is paramount that the public gets value for money. For 
this reason it is necessary to develop a series of performance indicators which are 
independently audited. With this in mind the regular crime survey is a useful tool 
into which can be built the relevant indicators’ (Ibid: 211). The indicators 
suggested included ‘public satisfaction with requests for police assistance’.  
5.2.8 What the public ‘really’ want: Accountability in the managerialist 
framework 
There is, then, an explicit link here between the preeminent left realist research 
method and the development of a quantitatively-oriented, perception-focussed 
managerialist framework within criminal justice. Furthermore, in championing the 
use of local crime surveys, situating crime in relation to wider harms and social 
issues, and foregrounding the lived experiences, feelings and perceptions of 
members of the public, left realism provided a framework which was subsequently 
developed under the auspices of ‘community safety’ during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Squires, 1997). 
As Squires (1997: 8) notes: ‘the new service culture required new methods of 
discovering what the public “really wanted”’. Local crime surveys appeared to be 
one mechanism through which this could be achieved. The left realist insistence 
that the perspectives of people living with crime matter is also obliquely reflected 
in the approach to managing community safety which has subsequently been 
adopted. There is an irony in the way managerialism and community safety have 
collided: the methods of managerialism, in particular the focus on measurement, 
may have worked to undermine some of the ethos of community safety. By judging 
community safety on the basis of public perceptions measured through surveys 
much community safety work has turned towards ‘image management’ (Ibid: 15) 
and members of communities have been increasingly understood as consumers of 
community safety and criminal justice services: ‘the real “prize” at stake in the 
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consumer culture and behind the new managerialist initiatives is the rebuilding of 
public confidence and the attempted resurrection of “policing by consent”’ (Ibid: 
8).     
However, the 1980s saw a curtailment of ambition and scope in local crime 
surveys in England and Wales. The local surveys appear to have suffered the same 
fate as those in the US, where local victimization surveys tailed off in number after 
the early 1970s, almost certainly due to the existence of the massive National 
Crime Survey (Sparks, 1981: 11). The first national-scale British Crime Survey 
(BCS) was planned and carried out under the supervision of the internal Home 
Office research unit in the early 1980s.  
The first report on the BCS, Home Office Research Study (HORS) 76, published in 
1983, explicitly claimed that public reactions to their experiences and expectations 
of the criminal justice system were of vital importance to how well the system 
could operate because ‘any democratic system of law needs the consent of those 
whom it polices’ (Hough and Mayhew, 1983: 28). At this time, Home Office 
researchers, cognisant of political concern about levels of public support for 
criminal justice agencies, began to make claims about the need to be able to ‘gauge’ 
public confidence (as described in the previous chapter).  
The British model may have been influenced by developments in the US where, 
during the 1970s, social researchers started to write about how existing opinion 
poll data might be used by policymakers to shape their actions around criminal 
justice issues. The ‘Application of Victimization Survey Results’ project had the 
explicit aim of using the data from the National Crime Survey, begun in 1972 ‘to 
examine issues that have particular relevance for applications to the immediate 
needs of operational criminal justice programs’ (Garofalo, 1977: 3). Those involved 
with the program made the following claims: 
 ‘little systematic attention has been given to a growing body of public opinion 
surveys which have potential as barometers of public sentiment…the results of 
these surveys may be useful in attempts to understand the behaviour of 
Americans with regard to crime-related topics and the differential responses of 
segments of American society to aspects of the criminal justice system; further, 
knowledge of the opinions of Americans on topics related to criminal justice 
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may illuminate the public’s moods and priorities … and may also foreshadow 
impending popular pressure for legislative changes’ (Hindelang, 1974: 101) 
 ‘an understanding of the areas examined ... is important if criminal justice 
programs are to integrate public opinion into their planning process: sensitivity 
to public opinion is a key to success for any criminal justice program. Public 
attitudes about crime, then, constitute an important topic for study in modern 
criminal justice’ (Garofalo, 1977: 13) 
These claims appear to have been heeded, and to have reverberated, over the 
years, and across the Atlantic Ocean. 
At the same time as the BCS was getting established, a shift towards Neo-liberal 
modes of governing was increasing the emphasis placed on the accountability and 
efficiency of public services (O’Malley, 1999: 180) and service delivery was 
increasingly being organised along ‘New Public Management’ lines (Fielding and 
Innes, 2006: 131; Hood, 1991; Hough, 2003; Young and Matthews, 2003: 2)85. 
Garland (1996) suggests that this new managerial ethos in the criminal justice 
system has entailed a redefinition of the mission of state agencies in terms of 
'serving particular "consumers"... and being responsive to their expressed needs, 
rather than serving the more abstract, top-down notion of the public good’ 
(Garland, 1996: 456; see also Bottoms, 1995). This shift, along with NPM’s 
insistence on the use of quantitative success indicators in order to measure and 
manage performance (Hood, 1991: 4-5; Bottoms, 1995), has meant a growth in ‘the 
practice of conducting surveys of the views of consumers and the development of 
objectives and priorities which seek to respond to these' (Garland, 1996: 456). 
Hough (2003: 149) argued that the introduction of managerialist logics within the 
criminal justice system may have had the unintended consequence of reducing 
confidence in the police and the judiciary, a problem which, he argued, required 
urgent attention and more resources than were available at the time of writing. 
                                                        
85 For example, the ‘business-like’ principles of the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) can be 
observed at work in the police reforms of the early 1990s (Reiner, 2010), the requirement to seek 
‘best value’ in the provision of criminal justice services contained in The Crime and Disorder Act 
1998  (Fielding and Innes, 2006: 132), the introduction of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) for 
policing, and the pursuit of more stream-lined and efficient services which has led to the 
reorganization of the court service and the expansion of a ‘mixed economy’ of providers in the 
probation and prison services. 
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Both Left Realist criminology and the change in the management of public services, 
then, have contributed to the production of an enlarged body of knowledge about 
public perceptions of the criminal justice system, and have encouraged, if not 
required, criminal justice practitioners to gauge the adequacy of their services with 
respect to public perceptions of those services. This transformation in the delivery 
of criminal justice services has, as noted in Chapter Two and discussed in more 
detail below, happened in parallel with the intensification of political contest 
around issues of crime and criminal justice. It is not beyond the bounds of 
possibility that these trends are mutually reinforcing. Certainly they are both 
closely related to an apparent desire to increase the extent to which criminal 
justice policymaking and practice is responsive to the public, something which, as 
described in Chapter Two, is regarded by criminologists as a key cause of the 
perceived ‘punitive turn’. 
The empirical focus on how the experience of victimization impacts on the lives of 
different groups within society, the insistence on exploring what the general public 
think, feel and believe about crime and the criminal justice system, and the explicit 
attempts to bind together victimization research and performance measurement of 
the criminal justice system all seem to have proved decisive in the construction of 
the contemporary public confidence agenda.  
5.2.9 Summary  
This historical excursion has hopefully illustrated the point that, at the same time 
as the public were increasingly excluded from participating in or witnessing key 
aspects of criminal justice, a new form of ‘expert’ knowledge was also emerging 
which would come to impede the public themselves from being allowed to ‘know’ 
the ‘true’ reality of crime without expert assistance. Technical knowledge and the 
use of (ostensibly) morally neutral classifications and typologies to fit offenders to 
regimes came to displace or to disguise any moral element in punishment 
(Garland, 1990: 187). Whereas in earlier periods attempts to reform offenders 
were based on ‘hope’ and ‘expectations’, by the second part of the twentieth 
century policy was made based on a belief that the true effectiveness of penal 
sanctions could now be measured (Hacking, 1991: 187). The use of techniques of 
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probability fixed the analytical focus on statistical regularity, and excluded non-
experts from being able to ‘know’ what was ‘really’ going on. As a result ordinary 
members of the public can no longer ‘know’ but must instead ‘have confidence’ 
that the criminal justice system is effective.   
Yet at the same time the views of the public were increasingly sought out and 
captured by the growing opinion polling industry. Acceptance of the need for 
government action to be ‘in tune’ (or at least not too far out of tune) with the 
sentiments of the people meant that more than ever before organizations were 
asking the public to give an opinion on criminal justice matters. As those opinions 
were increasingly communicated to, and used by, politicians and the media so 
opinion polls came to seem the most natural and legitimate mechanisms for 
capturing public views. The existence of the opinion polling industry implied that 
the public should be asked for their opinion and that their opinions could be 
captured. Towards the end of the twentieth century a new movement in 
criminology - ‘left realism’ – appropriated and utilised some of the techniques of 
the polling industry in an attempt to build a body of criminological knowledge 
which was rooted in ordinary people’s experiences of crime. Left realists argued 
that the criminal justice system should be more accountable to the public, and the 
synergy between this call for accountability and a growing trend for the use of 
quantitative performance indicators under the New Public Management, have left 
a legacy of large-scale quantitative data and research projects providing 
information on what the public think about crime and criminal justice.    
These ‘surfaces of emergence’ made it possible for the contemporary discourse of 
public confidence in the criminal justice system to emerge, however they do not 
explain how it emerged. In the next section I explore the way in which the idea of 
public confidence became ‘hooked into’ political and media discourses of crime 
and justice, incentivising the expansion of knowledge production in this area. 
5.3 How a discourse of public confidence got its ‘hooks’ into criminal justice 
In this part of the chapter I suggest that the social and political context from the 
late 1970s onwards created a discursive opportunity, an opening, for the idea of 
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public confidence, with all its attendant historical political resonance, to insinuate 
itself into criminal justice discourse, and to take on a very specific dominant form. 
This process was neither inevitable, nor the deliberate and conscious choice of the 
actors who invoked the concept. Rather it was contingent upon the pre-existing 
resonance of confidence, the ‘surfaces of emergence’ described above, and upon 
particular conditions which arose at a particular point in time creating a specific 
set of potentialities and incentives to which some actors responded.  
I argue that the dominant discourse in public confidence research should be 
understood against the backdrop of these conditions because without them it is 
unlikely that the research would have emerged in its contemporary form. The 
conditions described are: (i) police misconduct during the 1950s and 1960s and 
tense police-community relationships in the 1970s and 1980s; (ii) political debates 
about how to alleviate over-crowding in prisons taking place against the backdrop 
of the authoritarian populism of the Thatcher government (which fuelled concern 
amongst penal modernists about the government’s failure to curb increasing 
punitiveness in rhetoric and policy); (iii) miscarriages of justice exposed during 
the late 1980s leading to the Royal Commission which shaped penal discourse 
around the time of the appointment of the new Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor, in 
1992; (iv) some high profile crime stories which unfolded in the early 1990s 
against a backdrop of intense political contest between the ailing Conservative 
government and a resurgent Labour opposition; and (v) the mid-1990s debate 
about sentencing and minimum tariffs for murderers. 
I suggest that these conditions each contributed to public confidence ‘hooking in’ 
to discourses of crime and justice, as well as having helped to shape the dominant 
discourse of public confidence. The point which I want to illustrate here is that the 
idea of public confidence in the criminal justice system was frequently invoked by 
groups competing for power and influence within the criminal justice arena, and 
that the researchers themselves, who responded to the increased opportunity to 
disseminate knowledge in this area, were not disinterested participants in the 
struggle for power and influence.  
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5.3.1 A few ‘black sheep’: police misconduct and public confidence in 
policing  
The idea of public confidence first began to be regularly invoked in relation to the 
criminal justice arena with respect to policing. The Home Secretary’s Christmas 
message to police officers in 1928 stressed the need for mutual confidence 
between the police and the public: ‘[t]he organization of the police and their 
relations with the public in this country are such that police work can be carried on 
with full efficiency only in an atmosphere of mutual confidence’ (Quoted in The 
Times, Friday, Dec 07, 1928 pg. 13). The idea that the police must retain the 
‘confidence’ of the public to ensure that they can operate effectively is compatible 
with the historical usage of the term public confidence which implicitly positions 
confidence as a prerequisite for the success of the object (be that a product, 
person, action or organisation) to which confidence attaches. Invoking confidence 
also reflects and reinforces the orthodox (or ‘cop-sided’) understanding of British 
policing as ‘policing by consent’, a rather ambiguous and idealistic notion which 
nonetheless forms a continuing part of the professional self-identity of the British 
police (Reiner, 2010: 44, 69).  
As described in chapter three, there was a quantitative increase in media coverage 
of public confidence in policing from the mid-1950s onwards.  This is not 
surprising, for as Reiner (2010: 78) has observed: ‘after 1959 policing became a 
babble of scandalous revelation, controversy, and competing agendas for reform’ 
threatening the fragile contract between police and public. By the 1950s Reiner 
suggests that there was majority acceptance of the position and legitimacy of the 
professionalized police force amongst those members of the public who were not 
routinely subjected to its coercive attentions (Reiner, 2010: 77). The 1960s saw 
changes which are regarded as having eaten into the goodwill which the police had 
built up, including increases in the autonomy of Chief Constables and changes in 
police tactics which placed increasing emphasis on crime-fighting through 
‘technology, specialization and managerial professionalism’ and shifted more 
officers into motorised response roles, thus removing them from routine public 
contact (Reiner, 2010: 79).  
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Perhaps just as damaging as the extraction of the police from a more community-
based way of operating, was the emergence of a series of scandals involving 
misconduct and criminality perpetrated by police officers. It is in this context that 
the issue of public confidence in the police first starts to be discussed in the media. 
In a 1958 letter to the Times, referring to revelations of wrongdoing by the police, 
the Conservative MP William Shepherd observed that ‘Recent events involving 
police in a number of areas have shaken public confidence’ (The Times, 
Wednesday, Mar 26, 1958, pg. 11). In 1960 the ACPO conference was head-lined 
thus: ‘Police Chiefs In Conference. Vital Need Of Public Confidence’, and the 
coverage suggested that senior police officers saw their service as being under a 
cloud (The Times, Wednesday, May 25, 1960, pg. 15). Subsequent years yielded a 
continuing trickle of stories of police abusing their positions for their own personal 
gain. For example: ‘Three PCs sent to Prison. “Public confidence is shaken” court 
told’ was how The Times, reported the imprisonment of three Welsh police officers 
for a series of offences (Tuesday, Mar 21, 1961, pg. 17). The following year four 
police officers from Birmingham City Police were jailed for carrying out a string of 
offences whilst on night shift, raising the ‘fear of a loss of public confidence’ in the 
force (The Times Friday, Jun 01, 1962, pg. 6). 
The prominence of these occurrences was such that the Royal Commission on 
Policing86, appointed in 1960, and leading to the 1964 Police Act, was explicitly 
linked to the perceived need to restore public confidence in the police. However, 
neither the Commission nor the Act appeared to stem the steady flow of cases of 
police corruption, misconduct and brutality which, if anything, became more 
prominent amidst the highly charged political atmosphere of the 1970s and 1980s.  
From the 1970s onwards, reference to public confidence in the police was most 
frequently made in the context of a long-running debate about the need for 
reforms in the way in which complaints against the police were handled. In an 
early move in this debate, then Home Secretary Robert Carr talked of the need for 
                                                        




complaints against the police to be independently reviewed so that the few ‘black 
sheep’ could be identified and ‘public confidence’ in policing restored (The Times, 
Saturday, Aug 11, 1973; pg. 2). The following year, Lord Scarman’s report into the 
Red Lion Square Disorders of June 15th 1974 called for a police complaints 
procedure which would command ‘public confidence’ (Scarman, 1975 reported in 
The Times Friday, Feb 28, 1975; pg. 4). In the 1980s police practice came under 
increasing scrutiny in relation to a number of urban riots, including the 1981 
disturbances in Brixton, upon which Lord Scarman was again requested to 
comment. He found that the breakdown in the relationship between the police and 
the community in Brixton, and the community’s loss of confidence in the police, 
had contributed to the riot (Scarman, 1981).  
In relation to confidence in the police, then, initially confidence was said to have 
been undermined by the behaviour of a minority of officers who had abused their 
position for personal gain. Later the focus shifted to the manner in which the police 
more generally were discharging their professional duties, as concerns were raised 
about the policing of urban (particularly ethnic minority) communities, and 
disturbances within those communities, and also about dubious practices in 
securing evidence to support a conviction (so-called ‘noble-cause corruption’ 
(Punch, 2009: 25)).  
In the criminal justice arena, then, the problem of ‘public confidence’ was initially 
framed in reference to the relationship between the police and the public. Public 
confidence was constructed as an essential ingredient in legitimate and effective 
policing which was threatened, initially by the conduct of a few ‘bad apples’, and 
later by failures of police tactics within altered social environments. In this context, 
the value of confidence was self-evidently instrumental. The enemies of confidence 
were the reprehensible conduct of untrustworthy individuals, and, later, 
inappropriate methods of policing which were insufficiently held in check by legal 
safeguards. However, although the idea of ‘public confidence’ was initially linked 
mainly to policing issues, during the early 1980s it came to be attached to a 
broader range of criminal justice activities. 
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5.3.2 ‘...vital to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system’: 
playing the confidence card 
When the police were under pressure due to revelations about officer corruption, 
as well as facing questions about their ability to act as any kind of check on rising 
crime, and when Royal Commissions were deliberating changes in policy and 
procedure which could have profound implications for policing, neither senior 
officers, nor the ‘rank and file’ of police officers simply sat back and took the 
criticism. The Police Federation, representing the rank and file officers, became 
increasingly politicized during this period (Reiner, 2010: 89-91), and the late 
1970s and early 1980s saw several senior police officers publicly hitting back at 
what they felt were unjustified attacks on the police which, they said, would prove 
damaging to public confidence. In their public pronouncements and protestations 
police figures were often attempting to make a case for retaining their 
independence, resisting in particular any further limitations on chief constables, or 
any moves to make the procedures for dealing with complaints against the police 
more transparent and independent.  
Perhaps the most important, and certainly the most high-profile, police 
appointment of the 1970s was Robert Mark’s tenure as Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police. Mark was not afraid to speak out on controversial topics and, 
in the most high profile policing position in England, his statements usually 
received significant media coverage. His pronouncements often enraged 
professionals working in other parts of the criminal justice system. In 1975 he was 
criticized in the New Law Journal as having made statements which were ‘clearly 
intended to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice’ (The 
Times, Thursday, Aug 21, 1975; pg. 2).  
Mark was not alone amongst senior police officers in making controversial and 
alarming public pronouncements, such as: ‘If we cannot prevent the dreadful 
increase in crime, or at least contain it, the freedom and way of life we have been 
accustomed to enjoy for so long will vanish’ (Merseyside Chief Constable Kenneth 
Oxford quoted in The Times, April 26th 1978, p.4) and ‘Crime soaks into society 
like water into a sponge’ (James Anderton, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 
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Police quoted in The Times, April 26th 1978, p.4). Whilst remarks like ‘Make thugs 
sweat in labour camps’ (James Anderton, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester 
Police quoted in The Daily Telegraph June 15th, 1979, p.7) prompted frustrated 
responses from professionals working directly with offenders. Interventions such 
as these seem unlikely to have assuaged public anxiety about rising crime, or 
contribute to a measured debate about penal affairs. In 1976, Christopher 
Andrews, then general secretary of the British Association of Social Workers 
accused police officers of making remarks directly intended to undermine 
confidence in social work professionals (The Times, Friday, May 07, 1976; pg. 5). 
What we can see in the public exchange of words between senior figures from 
different parts of the criminal justice apparatus is the way in which public 
confidence was increasingly invoked as something which was self-evidently 
necessary, and which ought not to be wilfully damaged. Media coverage of ‘law and 
order’, crime and criminal justice around the 1979 election also offers some 
examples of how different organizations were being forced to consider how to gain 
the support of the public. See for example: 
‘Probation officers must reassure and convince the courts and the public that 
they, no less than the hard-line so-called law and order lobby believed in the 
rule of law’ (Daily Telegraph, May 21st, 1979 p.9, reporting a speech by the 
President of the Association of Probation Officers) 
‘We have to face the fact that if the courts and the public are to have confidence 
in non-custodial disposals, such as supervision for the more serious offenders, 
then they have to be convinced that community-based schemes offer a real 
hope for combating delinquency and are not merely an expedient for saving 
public money’ (Leon Brittain, then Home Secretary quoted in the Daily 
Telegraph Thursday July 12th 1979, p.8) 
‘Public confidence in the administration of justice was in danger of being 
impaired unless sentences of the courts were seen to be effective, Mr Roger 
Rickard, president of the Justices’ Clerks’ Society said yesterday’ (The Times, 
17th May 1979, p. 6).  
These extracts illustrate that the idea of public confidence was no longer being 
invoked exclusively or primarily in relation to policing, but instead was considered 
to be something which should attach to the criminal justice system as a whole. The 
persons responsible for invoking the idea of public confidence in this way were 
politicians and senior practitioners working within the criminal justice system. 
Their words were subsequently transmitted to wider audiences through the 
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media, including newspapers carrying direct quotations from the texts of commons 
debates and from speeches at public events.  
The debate about how to alleviate prison overcrowding was a key criminal justice 
focal point in the early 1980s, and it is in connection with this topic that we see the 
idea of public confidence being most frequently invoked. The Conservative 
government were adamant that direct interference on their part to reduce the 
number of prisoners within the system by changing the criteria for parole 
eligibility would damage public confidence. Home Secretary William Whitelaw 
stated that public opinion favoured transparency in sentencing and that the public 
wanted offenders to serve their full term. If the public perceived that offenders 
were not doing this then their confidence in the criminal justice system would fall 
(for example see the Times, Friday, Mar 26, 1982). Crucially, Whitelaw stated that 
it was the Home Secretary’s duty to ensure that the public had confidence in the 
criminal justice system and, in pursuance of this he cited the need to maintain 
judicial independence, rejecting the idea that sentencing decisions should take any 
account of the latest figures on the prison population.  
Furthermore, in a 1982 Commons Debate on Law and Order, Whitelaw argued that 
sentencing (apart from the setting of maximums) should remain the preserve of 
the politically independent judiciary and magistracy and that this was ‘vital to 
maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system. It would be a bad day if 
that power were ever to pass to politicians’ (HC Debate, Mar 25, 1982, col. 1121). 
Whitelaw also made this point in a talk to the National Association of Prison 
Visitors, acknowledging challenging conditions in prisons but rejecting the idea of 
reducing the prison population at a time of rising crime, as this would ‘undermine 
public confidence in the criminal justice system’ (The Times, May 13th, 1982,  pg.3). 
This is the first occasion on which the specific phrase public confidence in the 
criminal justice system appears in the media (although it was first used in the 
House of Commons by Ivan Lawrence MP in 1981, in a debate about the 
introduction of the Crown Prosecution Service. HC Debate Nov 20 1981 col. 576). 
The following year the new Home Secretary Leon Brittain was reported as having 
stated that ‘public confidence in the criminal justice system required sentences 
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that reflect “society’s deep abhorrence of violent crime”’ (The Times, Wednesday, 
Oct 12, 1983; pg. 1)87. The idea that in order to command public confidence 
sentences must reflect ‘society’s deep abhorrence of violent crime’ was reprised 
two years subsequently by the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Prime 
Minister’s question time (reported in the Times, 15th March 1985, p.4). In an article 
in the Guardian later in the same year, the government’s Chief inspector of prisons 
was quoted as saying that non-violent criminals should be given shorter sentences 
in order to alleviate prison-overcrowding, adding that this would not damage 
public confidence in the criminal justice system (the Guardian, Oct 25, 1985).  
 In his 1983 speech, Brittain also directly linked public confidence to the 
effectiveness of the police and criminal justice system (The Times, Wednesday, Oct 
12, 1983; pg. 1). The following year, announcing the establishment of the Crown 
Prosecution Service, the Home Secretary described it as a development which was 
an important step to ‘increase public confidence, in the criminal justice system. 
(Reported in The Times, Saturday, Nov 17, 1984; pg. 4) 
In these examples we see how the idea of public confidence started to be utilised 
by politicians and others in defence of a range of policy positions. Whatever the 
issue under discussion public confidence could be invoked as the arbiter of what 
was, and was not, acceptable penal policy. It appeared almost as a trump card to be 
played as a way of negating the arguments put by those who expressed views 
which were in opposition to whatever it was that the government was planning to 
do or not do, or was already doing or not doing.  
It is instructive to consider this rhetorical deployment of public confidence within 
the context of an intensifying political contest which existed at the time around the 
issues and symbols of law and order. As already described in chapter two above, in 
England and Wales until the 1970s criminal justice was largely removed from the 
arena of political contest (e.g. see Garland, 1996; Downes and Morgan, 1997; Ryan, 
1999). Many observers have described how since the 1970s the issues of crime 
                                                        
87 Although, in an indication of the Conservative government’s bifurcated strategy, Brittain 
signalled that punitive sentencing for violent criminals required that less serious offenders be kept 
out of prison where possible. 
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and criminal justice in general, and penal policy in particular, have been 
increasingly politicized and subjected to the whims of a so-called ‘populist’ 
approach to policymaking (See Hallsworth, 2000; Roberts et al, 2003; Green, 2008; 
Lacey, 2007). This saw increasing attention paid to the perceived demands of a 
supposedly punitive public at the expense of ‘expert’ opinion, with allegedly 
deleterious impacts on the criminal justice system (See Feeley and Simon, 1992; 
Christie, 1993; Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001; O’Malley, 1999; Young, 1999; Bauman, 
2000; Rose, 2000; Lacey, 2007).     
Amongst the conditions said to have contributed to this shift are the widespread 
experience of anxiety and uncertainty associated with socio-economic crisis, late 
modern conditions and the experience of crime as a ‘normal social fact’ (Garland, 
1996: 446). The tensions and challenges facing Britain in the 1970s and 1980s 
included the widespread industrial unrest which produced periodic eruptions of 
conflict between striking workers and the police; the deadly threat posed by the 
terrorist activities of the IRA; and the instances of urban disorder which brought 
communities, particularly communities with large concentrations of individuals 
from ethnic minority backgrounds, into conflict with the police. The pervasive 
experience of anxiety has been cited as a contributory factor in amplifying concern 
about crime and antipathy towards offenders, and thus in prompting increasingly 
punitive rhetoric and policy in the criminal justice arena (e.g. see Bottoms, 1995; 
Garland, 1996, 2000, 2001; Bauman, 2000; Melossi, 2000; Freiberg, 2001; Roberts 
et al, 2003; Green, 2006).  
Additionally it has been suggested that increasing concern about crime arose at a 
time when doubts were increasingly being expressed about the efficacy and ethics 
of existing approaches to dealing with offenders specifically, and with social 
welfare issues more generally. These concerns were chipping away at the cultural 
foundations of the previously dominant criminal justice paradigm of penal 
welfarism and creating despair, where once there had been optimism, about the 
potential of rehabilitation (Garland, 2001).  Growing public awareness that crime 
was rising steadily, despite the substantial gains made in most people’s living 
standards during the post-war period, indicated that the causes of crime were not 
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as easily vanquished as might have been hoped. During the 1960s overcrowded 
prisons prompted both disturbances by prisoners and protests from prison 
officers, raising the profile of criminal justice issues. 
As the use of scientific monitoring of the effectiveness of various criminal justice 
interventions was coming to fruition, the available evidence was (notoriously) 
interpreted by some observers as suggesting that ‘nothing works’. This succinct 
conclusion, attributed to Martinson and colleagues (1974) is described by Pratt 
(2002: 160) as having lifted ‘the cloak of therapeutic, scientific expertise on which 
so much of the penal establishment’s prestige and status had been based’ to expose 
‘ineptitude and inefficiency, rather than the expected degree of success’. Although 
Martinson et al’s infamous analysis of the impact of correctionalism is far from 
uncontroversial (e.g. see Matthews, 2009: 357), Garland (1996: 447) has noted 
that the research carried out by the Home Office was also raising doubts about the 
effectiveness of criminal justice institutions. Scientific monitoring thus appeared to 
be unravelling ‘the whole penal welfare strategy’.  
The results of criminological research appeared, then, almost as the formal 
discursive backdrop to a more immediate sense of unfolding crisis during the same 
period, with some key tensions and difficulties coming to a head in the late 1970s. 
Ryan has suggested that an opportunity arose during the 1970s to produce a 
progressive solution to the breakdown of the post-war consensus on penal policy, 
however this opportunity was missed due to the rapid emergence of ‘authoritarian 
populism’ (cf. Hall, 1980) which accompanied the dismantling of the social 
democratic consensus and the arrival of the political trend known as ‘New Right’: 
‘penal strategy was manipulated under the broad rubric of “law and order” politics 
to secure wider political objectives during a time of economic crisis’ (Ryan, 1999: 
7). It is against this backdrop that the idea of public confidence, first used in 





5.3.3 ‘...this sorry chapter in the history of English justice’: The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice and Lord Taylor’s pledge  
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the emergence of new revelations about police 
fabrication of evidence and use of violence to extract confessions, most famously in 
the cases of the Guildford Four, Birmingham Six and Maguire Seven. These 
revelations offered new opportunities for the idea of public confidence in the 
criminal justice system to have a prominent presence in political and media 
discourse. For example: 
‘The quashing of the Guildford bombing convictions is not just an ordinary kind 
of scandal. Public unease goes far beyond the question of possible wrongdoing 
by the Surrey police. The case has undermined public confidence in the criminal 
justice system itself.’ (The Guardian, Nov 17 1989) 
A Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was announced by the Home Secretary 
Kenneth Baker on the day that the Birmingham Six convictions were quashed (14th 
March 1991). In a speech (subsequently quoted in the Times, the Guardian and the 
Independent) Baker said: 
‘The case, together with others which have occurred, raises a number of serious 
issues which must be a cause of concern to us all. It is of fundamental 
importance that the arrangements for criminal justice should secure the speedy 
conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent. When that is not 
achieved, public confidence is undermined.’ (HC Debates, Mar 14 1991, col. 
1109)  
Baker was not the only politician to invoke the idea of public confidence, as 
reported by the Independent: 
‘A sharp response to the Court of Appeal decision came from Menzies Campbell 
QC, the Liberal Democrats' legal affairs spokesman, who called for a full judicial 
inquiry into ''this sorry chapter in the history of English justice ... This grave 
miscarriage of justice has shaken public confidence in the judicial system and in 
particular in the role of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal should have a 
wider investigative role than it now has in cases where there are serious doubts 
about the evidence which has been brought before a jury,'' Mr Campbell said 
outside the chamber.’ (The Independent, Friday Mar151991, emphasis added) 
In the aftermath of the Birmingham Six verdict a cross-party campaign was 
launched by MPs to have the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane (who had presided over 
and rejected an earlier appeal by the Six) removed from his post by the Queen. At 
the time the campaign was unsuccessful as, in the face of considerable media 
criticism, the legal establishment closed ranks around Lord Lane, and he received 
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the backing of the Home Secretary and Prime Minister. However, less than a year 
later he vacated the post, a full year before his age would have meant he was 
required to retire. Lord Lane was replaced by Lord Taylor who claimed that 
restoring public confidence in the criminal justice system was his mission in his 
new role, and who, for the rest of his life, would be cast in this light in subsequent 
media discourse. For example:  
‘Lord Justice Taylor, aged 61, takes over as the most senior judge at a time 
when, as he acknowledges, he has the task, with the rest of the legal profession, 
of restoring public confidence in the criminal justice system.’ (The Times, Feb 26, 
1992 emphasis added) 
‘SIR Peter Taylor will be sworn in as Lord Chief Justice today with a pledge to 
restore public confidence in the criminal justice system in the wake of a series of 
miscarriages of justice.’ (The Guardian, Apr 27 1992 p.3 emphasis added) 
‘Peter Taylor was appointed Lord Chief Justice in 1992 to restore public 
confidence in the criminal justice system, badly dented by a series of high profile 
miscarriages of justice’ (From Lord Taylor’s obituary The Guardian, April 30 
1997, emphasis added)  
During the two years from the announcement of the Royal Commission until it 
reported, public confidence in the criminal justice system was overwhelmingly 
referred to in the context of discussions of miscarriages of justice. Senior figures 
within the criminal justice system used the term in this sense, for example: 
'I and my staff are acutely aware of the effect which miscarriages of justice have 
on the public confidence in the criminal justice system. However, it is my duty 
to make the right decision, not the expedient one.' (Open letter from Barbara 
Mills QC the Director of Public Prosecutions, defending her decision not to 
prosecute any of the police officers involved in the wrongful conviction of 
Stefan Kiszko. Published in The Guardian May 22 1992; , p. 24) 
 ‘The perceived decline of public confidence in the criminal justice system is 
another issue of concern. Highly publicised cases of miscarriage of justice 
undermine the improvements that have now been made to the integrity of our 
evidence gathering process.’ (From the annual report by the Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner Sir Peter Imbert quoted in the Guardian, Jul 30 1992; p.7) 
From 1991 until 1993, then, discourses of public confidence in criminal justice 
focussed on the adequacy of the procedures used to gather evidence and secure 
convictions and the trust invested in the professionals responsible for ensuring 
that the procedures were followed. Discourses of public confidence were not, at 





5.3.4 ‘In an attempt to rescue the position...’: Criminal justice politics get 
tough 
During the early years of the 1990s, then, the discourse of public confidence in the 
criminal justice system was almost entirely invoked in relation to the issue of 
miscarriages of justice, the associated Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, and 
the appointment of the new Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor. However, by July 1993, 
the month when the Royal Commission’s findings were due to be released, the 
political and social landscape had changed dramatically and the public confidence 
discourse had shifted. At this time the conservative government appeared 
increasingly weak in the face of a resurgent Labour party, and events which 
unfolded in the first half of 1993 only increased the pressure on the government in 
this regard.   
The killing of toddler James Bulger by two 10 year old boys in February 1993 
prompted national shock and outrage. The then Shadow Home Secretary, Tony 
Blair, reacted in a way which raised his own profile and aligned the Labour party 
with a new slogan: ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. In the aftermath 
of the Bulger case, and for the first time since polling began, Labour were regarded 
by more people than the Conservatives as having the ‘best policies for dealing with 
crime’ (ICM/The Guardian Poll, March 1993). The Bulger case is often cited as a 
watershed moment in debates about crime and justice in England and Wales (see 
for example Green, 2008). It certainly seems to have coincided with the moment at 
which Labour over took the Conservatives in the polls on crime and justice issues, 
and political rhetoric around crime and justice became substantially more hard-
line. However there were other events in 1993 which may have been much more 
significant in reshaping the political landscape, and shifting the discourse on public 
confidence. 
In June 1993 two men from a small village in Norfolk were jailed for five years in 
relation to events which had occurred on January 12th that year. The two men 
admitted kidnapping and threatening a local youth who they believed to be 
 209 
 
responsible for a spate of local burglaries. They were said to have acted when it 
became apparent that the police and criminal justice system were either unable or 
unwilling to take action to bring the perpetrators of the crimes to justice. Media 
coverage of the case throughout June linked it to a more general theme of a 
criminal justice system struggling to cope due to a combination of inadequate 
resources and unduly constrictive legislation. Headlines like ‘A Village Cheated of 
Justice’ (Daily Mail, June 17th 1993) and ‘Middle England hits back’ (The Sunday 
Times, 20th June 1993) indicate the angle taken by the media, which linked the case 
into a much broader discourse about a crisis in criminal justice, for example: 
 ‘THE five-year jail term handed down to the two Norfolk vigilantes was more 
than a rogue judge being a bit heavy-handed. It was more even than a tough 
judicial warning against people taking the law into their own hands. It was a 
desperate and no doubt instinctive attempt by the judge to hold together a 
system of justice that has now catastrophically cracked open. Yet it has merely 
exacerbated the crisis.’ (The Observer Jun 20 1993) 
In the same month the papers reported the case of a Joseph Elliott who, whilst 
'high on drink and drugs', caused criminal damage to his neighbour’s car and, 
when confronted by his neighbour, stabbed and killed him. Elliott was acquitted by 
the jury on the basis that he had acted in self defence. Conservative MPs and police 
officers railed against the decision, demanding changes in the law. The headline in 
the Guardian in July read ‘Vigilante’s stabbing prompts self-defence study; 
Conservative MPs demand changes in the law to “restore public confidence in the 
criminal justice system”’. This was the first occasion on which the phrase ‘public 
confidence in the criminal justice system’ was used in a newspaper headline. The 
article reported that:  
‘The Home Secretary is to review the way the law of self-defence works 
following the acquittal of a man who admitted stabbing his neighbour to death. 
Michael Howard faced demands from Conservative MPs for law changes 
designed, they said, to restore public confidence in the power of the criminal 
justice system to convict the guilty as well as acquit the innocent.’ (The 
Guardian, Jul 15, 1993, pg.2) 
In this article the idea of public confidence in the criminal justice system has 
drifted loose of the issue of miscarriages of justice where innocent people have 
been jailed, and is instead applied to an apparent failure of natural justice, where a 
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man attempting to protect his property from a dangerous other has been killed, 
and the law is unable to convict his killer of murder. 
So, at a time of increasing political tension, with the two main parties locked in a 
battle to be seen as the party of ‘law and order’, the idea of public confidence 
became attached to a new kind of problem with criminal justice. It stopped being 
invoked in relation to issues of police misconduct and miscarriages of justice and 
instead it began to be used in relation to the problem of criminals ‘getting away 
with it’ and law-abiding members of the public being unable to rely on the criminal 
justice system to protect them, their property, or their right to protect themselves.  
As a result, as the Times legal correspondent Frances Gibb noted at the time, the 
Royal Commission report would be delivered into a vastly altered political climate 
from that in which it had begun its work: 'public opinion on law and order, as one 
government minister put it, has "turned a cartwheel" and concern about the rights 
of the defendant in the criminal justice process is increasingly eclipsed by calls for 
tougher action on criminals'(The Times May 18 1993). The day before the Royal 
Commission was due to release its findings, the Times covered research by the 
Solicitors Journal which suggested: 
‘Most people have lost faith in the system of British justice as the best in the 
world and want an independent tribunal to investigate miscarriages of justice, 
according to a survey today. The Solicitors Journal survey of 1,000 people in 
England and Wales found that only 21 per cent agreed that the British system 
of justice was the best in the world. Some 45 per cent disagreed. There was also 
a big loss of confidence in the ability of the police to catch criminals compared 
with a decade ago, the survey showed, with backing for more officers on the 
streets.’ (The Times, Jul 5 1993)  
By the time the findings of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice were 
published on 6th July they appeared hopelessly out of step with the political 
zeitgeist. On the Sunday following the publication of the findings the Observer 
carried a substantial article devoted to presenting a police perspective on the 
recommendations: 
‘To Britain’s busiest murder squad, last week's Royal Commission report on 
criminal justice was a failure, taking the country closer to the 'doomsday 
scenario' in which the public, dismayed by the workings of the courts, loses 
faith in the rule of law. ... “You are getting people returned to the streets who 
have committed very serious offences, and the criminal law has no sanction 
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against them. Ultimately, there will be a backlash,” says Detective Chief 
Superintendent Tom Williamson, who runs east London's Area Major 
Investigation Pool (Amip). The commission, he says, “tinkers round the edges of 
the adversarial system without recommending genuine, radical reform. 
Meanwhile, public confidence in the criminal justice system is draining away.”’ 
(The Observer, Jul 11 1993, p.8) 
This article is a striking example of how the changed social and political 
environment enabled the police to obtain some control of the confidence discourse 
and redirect its focus away from the potential misconduct of their own 
organization and onto the workings of the courts.  
In August 1993 Tony Blair increased the pressure on the weak conservative 
government, seizing on polling evidence about the public’s lack of ‘confidence’ in 
various criminal justice functions. The Home Secretary Michael Howard responded 
by claiming that Labour were ‘soft on crime’ (see the Guardian, Aug 31 1993, p.2). 
In September the papers reported that Michael Howard was holding a ‘two day 
summit on how to restore public confidence in the criminal justice system’. In 
October the Guardian reported that the government would give law and order ‘top 
billing’ at their annual conference:  
‘the shattered public confidence in the criminal justice system is reflected in the 
244 resolutions tabled by constituency parties demanding action. Mr Major is 
expected to devote a third of his conference speech on Friday to the issue.  
... 
In an attempt to rescue the position, Mr Howard will ignore the 
recommendations of the two-year Royal Commission on Criminal Justice’ (The 
Guardian, Oct 2 1993, pg. 1) 
In Howard’s now infamous speech to the conference he argued: ‘Prison works. It 
ensures that we are protected from murderers, muggers and rapists - and it makes 
many who are tempted to commit crime think twice ... This may mean that more 
people will go to prison. I do not flinch from that. We shall no longer judge the 
success of our system of justice by a fall in our prison population.’ Forced to defend 
his claims against criticisms from the judiciary, the Times reported that Howard 
accused them of ‘misunderstanding his speech … and declared that putting 
offenders in prison prevented fresh crime and protected victims. Taking away 
public confidence in the criminal justice system might be an invitation to the 
vigilante he said.’ (The Times, Oct 18 1993)  
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The idea of public confidence in the criminal justice system featured prominently 
in media discourse throughout the rest of 1993 and into 1994 as the term became 
a favoured reference point in any discussion of criminal justice matters, for 
example: 
‘Mr Howard claimed that his "consistent strategy to fight crime" would restore 
public confidence in the criminal justice system’ (The Guardian, May 4 1994 
p.2) 
‘[Michael Howard] is adamant that without the tough action he announced last 
year, public confidence in the criminal justice system would have collapsed.’ 
(The Times Oct 13 1994) 
By this stage journalists had started to invoke public confidence spontaneously 
themselves, rather than quoting it directly from politicians or criminal justice 
officials. For example: 
‘The rate at which police forces caught criminals declined again last year, 
according to a The Guardian survey of detection rates across England and 
Wales. ... The findings were described last night by Tony Blair, the shadow 
home secretary, as devastating and will alarm Home Office ministers and senior 
police officers battling to restore public confidence in the criminal justice’ (The 
Guardian Jan 31 1994, p.20) 
The term public confidence in the criminal justice system, then, proved to be both 
versatile and mobile. Having been applied to a range of criminal justice issues 
(including police misconduct, miscarriages of justice, prison over-crowding, 
sentencing of offenders, attempts to reintroduce the death penalty) it migrated 
from the terminology of pollsters and the speeches and comments of politicians 
and criminal justice officials, into debates in the House of Parliament, journalistic 
turns of phrase, policy documents, and even into the summing up of cases by 
lawyers and members of the judiciary.  
As the 1990s progressed the practice of ‘playing the confidence card’ (described 
above) continued to be used. For example, the day after the publication of the 
Commission’s findings, the Bar Council chairman, John Rowe QC said the following:  
'It is vital that there is public confidence in the criminal justice system, and we 
are therefore deeply concerned that one of the Commission's major 
recommendations is to abolish automatic right of defendants to trial by jury.’ 
(Quoted in the Mail and the Times, July 7, 1993) 
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As the government appeared to stall on key recommendations from the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice, including establishing a body to review claimed 
miscarriages of justice, the Chair of the Bar Council once again intervened:  
‘"It is important that the Government does not allow this important 
recommendation of the Royal Commission to wither on the vine. Public 
confidence in the criminal justice system will be endangered if this widely 
supported and important step is further delayed."’  (Quoted in the Times, Nov 
16, 1994) 
The Law Society also invoked public confidence in order to express their resistance 
to proposed abolition of the right to silence: 
 ‘The Law Society says that the Government has “failed to recognise the reasons 
why the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was set up in 1991” namely lack 
of public confidence in the criminal justice system. “The main effect of this bill 
will be an even greater risk of miscarriages without increased convictions of 
the guilty.” A clear majority of the Royal Commission said the right to silence 
should not be abolished.’ (The Times, Jan 11, 1994) 
Meanwhile, when the idea of a free vote on the reintroduction of the death penalty 
was mooted, the Chief Constable of Humberside said capital punishment would 
‘only add to the lack of public confidence in the criminal justice system. I find 
capital punishment abhorrent and do not consider it to be a protection for police 
officers.’ (Quoted in The Guardian Feb 21, 1994 p. 4). 
However, despite these attempts to use public confidence in order to oppose 
measures considered to be detrimental to the rights of the accused, the use of the 
idea of ‘public confidence’ in a criminal justice context in reference to issues other 
than the inadequacies of the courts and the idea of offenders ‘getting away with it’ 
became increasingly rare in this period. It was in connection with the particular 
issue of sentencing, as well as with three notorious offenders, that the idea of 
public confidence in the criminal justice system was most regularly invoked in the 
latter part of the 1990s. 
5.3.5 ‘A child's screams must not be stifled...’: Minimum tariffs for murder 
A direct and explicit connection between the James Bulger case and the public 
confidence agenda did not emerge until a disagreement arose between the Home 
Secretary and the Judiciary about the minimum period which his killers should 
serve in custody before being considered eligible for release. The original tariff, set 
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by the trial judge in November 1993, was that they should serve a minimum of 
eight years. In December 1993 the Lord Chief Justice increased this to ten years. In 
July 1994 the Home Secretary Michael Howard decided that Thompson and 
Venables should serve a minimum of fifteen years. Howard’s decision, according to 
the Home Office press release, was based on ‘the judicial recommendations as well 
as all other relevant factors including the circumstances of the case, public concern 
about the case and the need to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice 
system’ (Home Office, 1994 cited by Green, 2008: 2).  
The Home Office press release on the matter was quoted verbatim or closely 
paraphrased across the media at the time, and echoed at every subsequent 
occasion upon which the matter was discussed. Thus the idea that the Home 
Secretary must take public confidence in the criminal justice system into account 
when setting minimum tariffs became a common place refrain at this time. 
However, the public confidence principle has no basis in legislation; rather it can 
be traced back to the judgment in a case from the 1980s, referred to by Lord 
Beaverbrook in a House of Lords debate from 1986: 
‘The final decision [on parole] rests with the Secretary of State. I can do no 
better than to quote the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, 
when giving judgment in the case of Findlay et al which was brought before the 
House of Lords: “Neither the Parole Board nor the judiciary can be as close or 
as sensitive to public opinion as a Minister responsible to Parliament and to the 
electorate. He has to judge the public acceptability of early release and to 
determine the policies needed to maintain public confidence in the system of 
criminal justice. This must be why Parliament saw as necessary the duality of 
the parole system: without the advice and recommendation of a body capable 
of assessing the risk of early release the Secretary of State was not to act; but, 
having received such advice and recommendation, he was to authorise early 
release only if he himself was satisfied that it was in the public interest that he 
should". It is against that background—above all, the need to pursue a policy in 
relation to parole which maintains public confidence in the criminal justice 
system—that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary is following the 
practice of his predecessor in exercising his discretion restrictively in cases 
involving the most serious offences of violence and drug trafficking.’ (Lord 
Beaverbrook, HL Debate, Nov 4, 1986, Col. 1088, emphasis added) 
Howard’s decision to extend the minimum tariff for Thompson and Venables and 
his subsequent over-ruling in 1996 by the Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
were early episodes in a long-running debate about who should set minimum 
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tariffs in cases of murder, and on what basis. The debate was only concluded when 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 outlawed politicians’ involvement in setting tariffs88. 
The debate over minimum tariffs and eligibility for consideration for parole also 
raged around the case of Myra Hindley, and inspired some particularly 
intemperate media coverage. For example, under the headline ‘A child's screams 
must not be stifled by the do-gooders; The Case for Myra Hindley Never Being 
Released’, Conservative MP David Mellor wrote:  
‘Any day now the Home Secretary has to announce a decision which, if he gets it 
wrong, will strike at the very heart of public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. The courts have insisted that every convicted murderer serving a life 
sentence should be told the minimum term he or she must serve. So Michael 
Howard is brought face to face with the issue Home Secretaries most dread - 
whether Britain's most hated woman, Myra Hindley, can ever be released. I 
hope his answer is No. I shouldn't care to be in his shoes if it isn't.’ (The Mail on 
Sunday, Jul 10 1994 p.28, emphasis added) 
Media coverage of Hindley’s attempt to have her whole life tariff overturned 
during 1996 featured repeated references to the Home Secretary’s responsibility 
to take account of the need to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. 
The dispute about minimum tariffs was one aspect of a more general rift between 
the judiciary and politicians which opened up around the time of the Royal 
Commission reporting its ill-timed findings. The idea of public confidence in the 
criminal justice system featured often in the media coverage of some very heated 
exchanges over the issue of judicial independence and sentencing from the mid-
1990s until Labour’s 1997 general election victory. For example, when judges, 
including Lord Justice Taylor, attacked government proposals to introduce 
mandatory minimum sentences, a Times editorial leapt to the defence of the Home 
Secretary: 
‘The first duty of the Home Secretary is to maintain public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. It is self-evident that public confidence in sentencing 
policy has been eroded and that Parliament must soon address the problem.’ 
(The Times, Oct 13 1995) 
                                                        
88 Interestingly, at the beginning of this long-running dispute between politicians and the judiciar,y 
Lord Woolf stated that, by courting direct conflict with the judiciary, Howard himself had 
‘undermined public confidence in the criminal justice system’ (The Guardian, 31st July 1996).  
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And, when the Bill to introduce mandatory minimums had its second reading in 
the House of Lords, the Home Office Minister Baroness Blatch was quoted as 
saying that it would ‘provide protection and reassurance for the public, and 
thereby help to improve public confidence in the criminal justice system’ (The 
Times, Jan 28, 1997). 
The early to mid 1990s have been identified as a watershed period in penal politics 
in England and Wales. Events taking place during 1993 in particular are seen as 
pivotal in establishing crime as a core election issue and consolidating a more 
punitive approach to crime. This is seen in many quarters as having underpinned 
the unprecedented rise in the prison population which followed.  
It is interesting to note the part played by the idea of ‘public confidence in the 
criminal justice system’ in providing the discursive backdrop to these 
fundamentally political shifts. During the period from 1993-1997 a particular 
understanding of public confidence became ‘hooked’ into criminal justice 
discourse. The idea of public confidence graduated from its position within the 
textual genre of political debate into much wider general use, as evidenced by its 
prominent presence in media discourse and spontaneous use by journalists 
reporting on criminal justice issues. Crucially, the particular understanding of 
public confidence which came to dominate at this time was linked mainly to issues 
of sentencing and punishment, rather than with the earlier concerns about police 
misconduct and miscarriages of justice. This shift happened as crime and justice 
(or, perhaps more accurately, ‘law and order’) became an important political 
battleground in the build up to the 1997 general election. The increasing 
determination of the Labour party to compete with the Conservatives on this issue 
marked a fairly radical departure from the stance which they had taken on the 
issue in previous decades. This shift can be better understood by considering 
changes within the criminological field which occurred during the 1980s. 
5.3.6 Summary 
In this part of the chapter I have argued that a discourse of ‘public confidence’ was 
able to hook into the wider criminal justice discourse in the first instance via 
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reactions to the emerging evidence about police corruption in the 1960s and 
1970s. Once the term became established it started to be deployed by competing 
interest groups in a way which I have termed ‘playing the confidence card’. I have 
provided some examples of how it was used to defend existing policy, to resist 
change and also to argue for the need for change.  
In the late 1980 and early 1990s revelations about police misconduct and 
miscarriages of justice led to claims that the criminal justice system was facing a 
crisis of confidence and prompted the appointment of a Royal Commission to 
address this issue. However, before the commission had reported its findings a 
number of high profile and highly symbolic criminal justice-related events 
(including incidents of vigilantism and the murder of James Bulger) had taken 
place against the backdrop of an intensification of the political rhetoric around 
crime and justice. At this point the discourse of public confidence was rapidly 
turned on its head: away from the focus on miscarriages of justice and towards the 
idea of criminals ‘getting away with it’.  
5.4 Conclusion: from ‘lay concept’ to ‘fact’? 
This chapter has argued that the contemporary discourse of public confidence in 
the criminal justice system had specific conditions of existence without which it 
would not have become thinkable. The contemporary ‘problem’ of public 
confidence in the criminal justice system could not exist unless the public had been 
progressively excluded from a professionalized system for dealing with criminal 
deviance, and had their accustomed ways of knowing about crime and justice not 
been increasingly discredited by new groups of ‘experts’, applying new ‘modern’ 
ways of knowing. Under these conditions members of the public no longer have 
direct personal access to the ‘reality’ of crime and punishment and thus must 
instead trust (or have confidence) in the ‘expert system’ (Giddens, 1990: 22) which 
assumes the role of accurately describing ‘reality’. Thus the idea of public 
confidence has always been about the ‘gap’ between between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ 
ways of knowing.  
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This gap would not matter except that the conventions, and indeed the 
practicalities, of liberal democratic societies demand that the opinions of members 
of the public must be seen to count for something when policies are made and 
enacted for and upon them. In the 20th century, mechanisms have been devised to 
measure those opinions, and these techniques have also allowed researchers (or 
‘experts’) to ‘measure’ public confidence (or so they claim).  
As I described in the previous chapter, at the same time as measuring public 
confidence researchers ‘discovered’ that a lack of public confidence in the criminal 
justice system was often statistically associated with a failure to accurately 
appraise the ‘reality’ of crime and justice (as defined by ‘experts’). From this they 
surmised that poor public knowledge was causally related to low public 
confidence.  In other words the very features of modern criminal justice which 
provided necessary surfaces of emergence for the public confidence agenda (the 
privileging of expert scientific knowledge and the exclusion of the lay public from 
knowing for themselves) are also reflected in the findings generated by confidence 
research. In this light it now seems quite unremarkable that confidence research 
has tended to produce repetitive findings about the failure of the public to 
appreciate the facts of reality in the same way as experts.  
This chapter has also described how, during the last quarter of the 20th century, 
the idea of public confidence became hooked into discourses of criminal justice as 
a result of contingent material events, specifically the struggles between political 
and professional groupings with opposing interests and values to exert their 
influence within the criminal justice field. The term public confidence has a pre-
existing historical resonance which has made it ripe for appropriation by 
politicians and criminal justice practitioners concerned to demonstrate their 
awareness of the need for the agencies, processes and policies of criminal justice to 
maintain the support of the public. However, as the above analysis has shown, the 
way in which public confidence has been used within the contested arena of 
criminal justice discourse, across multiple textual locations, and in relation to a 
range of different causes and interests, has been tokenistic: the content or 
 219 
 
definition of confidence has remained ambiguous. It has remained in the form of 
what Durkheim defined as a ‘lay concept’: 
‘lay concepts are not entirely useless to the scholar; they serve as suggestions 
and guides. They inform us of the existence, somewhere, of an aggregation of 
phenomena which, bearing the same name, must, in consequence, probably 
have certain characteristics in common. Since these concepts have always had 
some reference to phenomena, they even indicate to us at times, though 
roughly, where these phenomena are to be found. But, as they have been 
crudely formed, they quite naturally do not coincide exactly with the scientific 
concepts, which have been established for a set purpose’ (Durkheim, 1938: 37) 
In the previous chapter I provided a chronological overview and detailed 
deconstruction of the body of research on public confidence in the criminal justice 
system. I argued that this research was premised on an understanding of public 
confidence as something which is real, in the sense that it pre-exists the research 
carried out upon it, that it is measurable, and that it is caused by other factors. 
Furthermore, it is implicit within the research that the research itself merely 
accesses a pre-existing phenomenon using value-free and legitimate social 
scientific methods. Public confidence is treated, then, as a ‘fact’ 
Yet at no point in the mainstream confidence research literature has the ‘fact’ 
which is public confidence been clearly defined. Those researchers using the term 
have failed to undertake the basic work necessary to identify what public 
confidence as (either a social or a psychological) fact might be. Instead it seems as 
if the researchers have been seduced into treating a highly topical and evocative 
lay concept, a politically-charged and amorphous rhetorical token, as if it were 
something real. The error, in Durkheim’s words, is this: 
‘We are so accustomed to use these terms, and they recur so constantly in our 
conversation, that it seems unnecessary to render their meaning precise. We 
simply refer to the common notion’ (Durkheim, 1938: 37) 
Research on public confidence, as referred to above, has tended to confirm that 
members of the public believe that the criminal justice system is ‘out of touch’ with 
their views, and that for this reason they lack confidence in the system. Research 
has also suggested that the public are ignorant of the facts about crime and the 
criminal justice system, which is why they believe it to be ‘out of touch’ and why 
they lack confidence. However, as described above, this so-called ‘finding’ from the 
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confidence research may turn out to have been built in to the foundations (or 
‘surfaces of emergence’) for the dominant discourse of public confidence. In the 
next chapter I re-visit data collected during a project investigating public 
confidence in the criminal justice system (the project referred to in the 
Introduction) to explore in more depth the idea that the criminal justice system is 
‘out of touch’. What does this apparent ‘gap’ between the people and the criminal 
justice system mean to members of the public?  
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Chapter 6.  ‘Joe public’ and the ‘high falutin’ lawyers’  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Qualitative data has most often been assigned a supporting role within the public 
confidence research agenda (see chapter four above), and (perhaps as a result) has 
tended to be analysed in a fairly limited fashion. Researchers have focused on the 
ways in which members of the public understand key concepts (including 
‘confidence’ and ‘criminal justice system’), on the factors which inform their 
decision making when answering survey questions around confidence, and on 
exploring in more depth the ‘drivers’ of confidence identified through quantitative 
analysis (for example dissatisfaction with sentencing).  
Much of the analysis is descriptive, summarising what participants have said, 
rather than attempting to examine in any detail how meaning is achieved in their 
expressions, or to suggest any explanations as to why this might be so. It is 
assumed that statements made by members of the public on the subject of crime, 
justice and confidence simply are, and the role adopted by the researchers is that 
of organisers and summarisers of such statements into a more easily digestible 
format. This approach is (perhaps) understandable given that much of the 
research is (at least partially) aimed at a policymaker/practitioner audience eager 
to gain access to ‘what the public think’. However, it has also led to the production 
of a repetitive discourse on public confidence, along with a failure to reflect upon 
the moral and political meaning of doing (funded) confidence research. 
The analysis presented in this chapter reuses primary data collected for the project 
described in the Introduction. The original analysis carried out for the project 
explicitly set out to approach confidence in a way which departed from established 
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approaches in the area and, as such, it identified themes which were previously 
unexplored within the context of public confidence research89.  
The analysis for the project also reiterated some common themes from the 
dominant discourse of public confidence, including that the public have a sense 
that the criminal justice system should be (but too often is not) ‘in touch’ with their 
experiences, views and preferences. The analysis in this chapter begins from a 
close consideration of how this idea of being ‘in’ or ‘out of’ ‘touch’ is constructed in 
research participants’ discourse.  
In the first two sections of the analysis I argue that the construction of in/out of 
touch is achieved through the invoking of the notion of an ‘us’ (‘ordinary’ people) 
and a ‘them’ (‘the elite system’) and through the (often implicit) attribution to 
‘them’ of an inadequate knowledge base for making decisions about criminal 
justice policy and practice. This inadequate knowledge is characterised as 
stemming from a lack of regular proximity between elites and the reality of crime; 
by their lack of affinity with ‘ordinary’ people; and by their failure to apply 
empathy in order to understand the impact of crime on individuals affected by it. 
These short-comings are compounded by the allegedly self-interested conduct of 
elites.  
In the third section of the analysis I consider some elements of participants’ views 
which appear to be disruptive to the in/out of touch theme. These include 
participants’ levels of doubt about the reliability of their own and other ‘ordinary’ 
people’s knowledge of and opinions about crime and justice, and the 
acknowledged diversity of public experiences of and opinions on crime. Given that 
participants themselves acknowledge that they experience doubt about their own 
views, and that they are aware that other people hold views which are different 
from their own, how then can ‘they’ (‘the elites’) be expected to become more ‘in 
touch’ with ‘us’ (‘Joe public’)? 
                                                        




In the conclusion I argue that the view that the criminal justice system is ‘out of 
touch’ may reflect a perception that unequal social and economic outcomes allow 
those social groups with the ability to influence criminal justice decision-making to 
insulate themselves from exposure to crime risk, and create a cultural and spatial 
separation between them and ‘ordinary’ people which reduces their capacity to 
understand and empathise with them. Rather than being a case either of an angry 
public with clearly formed and implicitly valid demands or of an ill-informed 
public requiring an injection of cold, hard facts; perhaps what qualitative research 
into public confidence reveals is the political alienation and powerlessness which 
members of the public feel in relation to a much wider set of issues, and the degree 
to which this is seen as resulting from the self-serving habits of remote and 
privileged elites.   
6.2 Us and them 
The idea of being ‘in touch’ relies on the existence of at least two distinct groups of 
people between whom some degree of understanding is expected. Throughout the 
interviews and focus groups, participants often referred (albeit often implicitly) to 
such groups, and located themselves within groups in relation to others. Most 
often the group which they placed themselves in is a group which we might very 
loosely define as ‘ordinary people’, or what one participant called ‘Joe public’ 
(Harriet, IV390). In opposition to this group participants tended to refer to two 
other (roughly outlined) groupings: people living outside of the norm (usually 
meaning offenders) and what we might call ‘the powers that be’: people with some 
degree of control over criminal justice policy and practice. In the first part of the 
analysis I consider how respondents identify two key groups: the ‘us’ group - the 
people with whom they claim some commonality, and the ‘them’ group – the 
people who they identify as being responsible for criminal justice policy and 
practice, and as needing to be more ‘in touch’ with ‘us’.  
                                                        
90 Interview participants are indicated by the letters ‘IV’ plus a number which indicates the order in 
which the interviews took place. Focus group participants are indicated by the letters ‘FG’ plus a 
number which indicates the order in which the focus groups took place. See Chapter Three for 
demographic information about the participants. 
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6.2.1 Us: ‘it’s not just me’91  
In the interviews, participants frequently sought to indicate that they identified 
with the views of ‘most’ other people. By invoking the views of a wider community 
of opinion, participants seemed to be seeking to validate their own opinions. For 
example: 
KAREN (IV12):  I think our justice system is a fair system and we’ve got 
nothing wrong with it. I just think the punishment 
doesn’t sometimes fit the crime. And I think the 
majority of people now think that, you know.  
Here Karen (IV12) expresses an opinion on sentencing and on what the majority of 
people think. By locating her own opinion on sentencing as in line with majority 
opinion she seems to be reassuring herself (and perhaps also trying to reassure the 
author) about the validity of holding such a view. Later when I ask her explicitly 
about whether she thinks her views are ‘typical’ she replies: 
KAREN (IV12):  I would think so, yes. I would say that though, wouldn’t 
I? [laughs] Because I’m not that extreme ...   
Her laughter, and the somewhat self-effacing remark that ‘I would say that though, 
wouldn’t I?’ suggest a degree of uncertainty. This suggestion is reinforced by the 
way she seeks reassurance from being in line with ‘the majority’ or ‘not that 
extreme’.  
Throughout the interviews, the beliefs which participants expressed about the 
views held by other people seemed to play an important part in their efforts to 
legitimate their own views, for the benefit of both themselves and for the author. 
Even where participants were more certain, and more strident, in the expression 
of their opinions than Karen (IV12), they still often used the views of other people 
as a sort of rhetorical buttress erected around their own opinions and attitudes, for 
example: 
MARGARET (IV13):  Well, I think most people think this way you know, 
except the ones who do the wrong.  And they, you 
know, they don’t care, do they, you know? 
                                                        
91 Vivien (IV11)  
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BERT (IV14):   People in my situation, lots of people like me, would 
just take the attitude “what’s the point in phoning the 
police they do nothing”.  
Some participants also sought to validate their own beliefs about what other 
people think by sharing with me how they became aware of the views of others. 
For example, very early on in her interview, Angie (IV5) told me that she felt that 
people’s belief that offenders receive ‘soft’ sentences would deter many people 
from reporting crime in the first place. She said: 
ANGIE (IV5):   I feel there’s a lot of people out there who don’t trust 
the Criminal Justice System to give a fair, um, sentence.  
Later in the interview I asked her if she thought ‘a lot of people’ shared her views 
on sentencing, to which she replied ‘yes, definitely’. I then asked her where she had 
got this impression.   
ANGIE (IV5):  Oh, God, just when, if there’s been a big story on the, on 
the telly, um, and, [pause] just people who are on it, and 
friends and you.. you chat about it and you discuss it.  
Um, you know, like, “isn’t that terrible? ... look how, look 
how long they’ve getting” and “knew that would 
happen, knew they’d get let off”.  I’d tell my friends or 
family or, um, [pause] round the school, when I take the 
kids to school, and people... um, at work, yeah, things 
like that. 
Angie (IV5) here identifies her observation of opinions expressed by other people, 
both on television and in day to day conversations, as the means by which she has 
formed her own impression of what other people think. Similarly, Lorna (IV7) and 
Vivien (IV11), when asked if they thought their views were ‘typical’ replied: 
LORNA (IV7):   I think they are, I think they are reflective. I mean, 
talking to friends and talking to patients and people like 
that, I think there is quite, almost a resentment that 
people who do wrong aren’t being punished, you know. 
And it’s the people who are the victims that seem to be 
getting more punishment. And I think that is a general 
societal view I feel. 
VIVIEN (IV11):  Yes, uh huh.  I mean all the people I come into contact 
with all say more or less the same.  The people around 
me.  I mean, I’ve got two sister-in-laws, we go 
swimming about four times a week and you get to know 
all the regulars, and you talk about different things in 
the sauna or the steam room and that, and yeah, they’re 
all up in arms about this country lately, about the way 
things are going.   
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Other participants told me about conversations with other people without being 
prompted by a direct question. They then extrapolated from these conversations to 
conclude that ‘the majority’, or ‘a lot of’ people think or feel the same. An example 
of this is Brenda (IV9), who told me: 
BRENDA (IV9):  I was just talking to someone on Sunday morning and he 
said about the carry on and I said, “well did you phone 
the police?” “Ah, it’s a waste of time phoning them” he 
says “I phoned them two year ago when they were on 
the roof of the house and they never come yet.” You 
know, I think the majority of people are losing faith with 
the police and it’s because they don’t see a presence, I 
think that’s what it is. They don’t actually see the Bobby, 
walking the road. 
Brenda (IV9) here has reported what her neighbour has said and has suggested 
that his views are likely to be the views of ‘the majority of people’. Furthermore 
she has diagnosed a reason for the loss of ‘faith in police’: the lack of a visible police 
presence. This diagnosis fits with her own concern (expressed slightly earlier in 
the interview) about rarely seeing police in her area and about the closure of a 
small local police station and the centralization of local policing services in a larger, 
more distant station. Brenda (IV9) appears to offer this anecdote as supporting 
evidence, perhaps to persuade me to see her own opinions as pervasive and 
mundane.  
Like Brenda (IV9), many of the participants seemed to be keen to be seen as 
‘typical’, and therefore, perhaps one might say, as reliable mouthpieces for wider 
publics, as Niall (IV6) stated: ‘I’m just like an average member of the public’. In this 
‘typical’ guise they sometimes seemed to seek to speak on behalf of others, for 
example representing the (presumed) attitudes of ‘people in my situation’ (Bert, 
IV14); or relaying to me what others had told them, for example: ‘I know a lot of 
people, and a lot of people are saying...’ (Vivien, IV11); ‘in the factory where I work, 
um, it’s considered that..’ (Gavin, IV4). At its strongest this rhetorical device saw 
participants speaking on behalf of others, for example: ‘it’s not just me ... ... we don’t 
know where the country’s going anymore’ (Vivien, IV11, emphasis added). 
Participants seemed to perceive themselves as justified in speaking on behalf of 
others because of the voices which they encountered in their day to day lives; the 
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voices of family members, neighbours, workmates, their ‘circle of friends’ (Brenda, 
IV9) or ‘the people around me’ (Vivien, IV11). For example Bert (IV14) told me: 
BERT (IV14):   We have a community flat in the block and it[crime]’s 
the main topic of conversation, people are scared to go 
out at night. You can just pop in any time and have a 
coffee and a chat. And the main topic of conversation is 
how bad it’s become. 
Sometimes they did not need to have heard the views expressed to know what 
they would be, if only the question were put. As Niall (IV6) said: ‘most of my 
friends, I’d say if you interviewed them they’d be of the same opinion'. Even when 
challenged about whether she was aware of any views different from her own 
Vivien (IV11) seemed unconvinced: 
LIZ:   Are you aware of any other points of view about what 
the Criminal Justice System needs to do? 
VIVIEN (IV11):  Um, not really, no, no. Everybody says, that I talk to, 
there should be stiffer sentences and the sentences 
should… they shouldn’t get off early, they should do the 
sentence.   
However, having initially used the rather categorical idea of ‘everybody says’ she 
subsequently moderated her language slightly such that there was space for 
people to talk about issues other than sentencing (which became ‘the main thing’ 
mentioned), and for a minority to think differently (with only ‘most people’ rather 
than ‘everybody’ thinking the same as her):  
VIVIEN (IV11):  ... and that’s the main thing that people say about to me, 
about that. If they give them ten years, they should do 
ten years... there should be no easy rides, and that’s the 
way that most people think that I talk to.  And that’s 
about it really (emphasis added) 
Vivien (IV11)’s moderated language in this quote hints at her awareness of the 
potential existence of views which are invisible to her, as, on this occasion, she only 
speaks on behalf of the people ‘that I talk to’. Her awareness of the partiality of the 
opinions she is exposed to is also revealed when she says: ‘when you speak to 
people my age they all feel like that’ (emphasis added). She acknowledges here that 
she only really speaks on behalf of a certain age group, although within that age 
group she seems confident that views are generally pretty homogeneous and in 
tune with her own.  
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Abida (IV10) on the other hand seemed to be more open to the possibility that 
people may hold differing views to those which she normally came into contact 
with:  
ABIDA (IV10):   I probably sit and talk to certain people, and they kind 
of think the same as what I’m thinking. Um, I haven’t 
really come across somebody who thinks a bit 
differently. I mean there might be people who think 
there shouldn’t be harsher sentences and stuff, but I 
haven’t come across them, no. 
Similarly, Elsie (IV2) qualified her statements with the caveat ‘I’m just saying that 
speaking from me own personal experience, there are people that I know think 
similar’ (emphasis added). In this statement Elsie (IV2) does not make any claims 
as to how widespread her views might be in the wider population, she merely 
points out that experience has showed her that she is not alone in her views. 
Nonetheless she still utilises her knowledge of what others think as a kind of 
validation of the views she expressed in the interview, albeit in a somewhat more 
modest fashion than some of the other participants. 
A minority of participants appeared, at times, to want to distance themselves from 
‘Joe public’, suggesting that its members did not necessarily hold reliable views 
about crime and justice. However, most often participants tended to, in some way, 
seek to indicate their membership of a wider community of opinion. By doing so 
they may have been doing several things: (i) seeking to legitimate their own 
opinion to themselves and/or the author; (ii) demonstrating their awareness of the 
value of consensus; (iii) attempting to represent the views of others. But, put quite 
simply, for most participants it mattered that they were seen as representative or 
typical of a wider social group, rather than as being ‘out on a limb’. They tried to 
portray themselves as one member of an ‘us’. 
6.2.2 Them: ‘the elite system’92 
By representing themselves as holding typical views participants indicated the 
value that they placed on public opinions and consensus in the criminal justice 
                                                        
92 Bert (IV14) 
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arena. Many also delineated a group of people against which other (implicitly) 
atypical groups might be identified. One such atypical group would be offenders: 
FRED (IV1):   ...people who are going to er operate outside the 
normal, you know I mean the majority of us get along 
fine together but there’s always the odd one who won’t, 
who wants to take advantage or er … or who see an 
easy way you know of making a fast buck sort of thing 
This group, operating ‘outside the normal’, were frequently identified by 
participants as implicitly separate from the ‘ordinary’ public of which most of them 
considered themselves to be members. For example, Elsie (IV2) argued that: ‘if 
they [offenders] are named and people know what they’re doing then they 
[ordinary people] will be able to watch out for them’; whilst Niall (IV6) suggested 
that exclusion from the rights enjoyed by the non-offending public (and indeed 
exclusion from the public) should form a part of the punishment which offenders 
face:  
NIALL (IV6):   ...if you commit a crime and you’re proven to be guilty 
then for me a lot of your human rights should be gone 
until you’re reformed and then you’re put back into like 
say to the community or back into the public  
Some participants (albeit less frequently) also said things which hinted at their 
recognition of the mundanity of crime, and suggested that they recognised that the 
offender/non-offender divide is not black and white. For example, Fred (IV1) said   
‘you get the odd [unclear] perfectly normal sort of person and they step over the 
marks sometimes you know’ (Fred (IV1)). Interestingly, in their responses to the 
survey questionnaire which they completed prior to taking part in their interview 
or focus group, six of the participants had disclosed that they had been convicted of 
a motoring offence, whilst two had been convicted of non-motoring offences.  
For my purposes this idea of offenders as a separate group is of less interest than 
the other (implicitly) ‘non-ordinary’, people identified by participants as being set 
apart from ‘Joe public’. In the views expressed by many of the participants, this 
broad grouping included the obvious criminal justice system cast list of police 
officers, lawyers, and the judiciary. For some it also included politicians and 
individuals which one participant referred to as ‘do-gooders’ (Angie, IV5). In most 
of the opinions given by participants this other group was simply a shadowy but 
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powerful ‘they’, responsible for making or influencing decisions about how 
discipline and authority can be wielded, whether that be in the home, in schools, or 
by the criminal justice system. For example:  
MARGARET (IV 13):  They’ve taken the discipline out of the schools, they’ve 
taken the discipline out of the homes, and I think it’s all 
gone wrong from then. (emphasis added) 
Although the existence of this ‘they’, this other set of people, was a constant thread 
running through what participants told me, there was not a coherently formulated 
and shared conception of which individuals this ‘they’ might consist of, and of why 
they were able to exert such influence. Indeed participants had different 
understandings of the discretion available to different individuals. For example, 
some participants saw judges as being relatively unencumbered in their decision 
making: 
LORNA (IV7):  I think one of the problems in this country is that, um, 
sentences can be very much based upon the judge’s 
opinion. And sometimes there doesn’t seem to be any, 
um, I’m trying to think of the word ... parity in sentence. 
Sometimes it seems to be quite personal to that judge 
as to what sentence people receive for certain crimes. 
Whilst others saw them as being constrained: 
BRENDA (IV9):  I know they’re restricted, they must have like a list: “oh, 
aye ... he’s done this I can only give him five year”. I 
know their hands are tied. 
 
ANGIE (IV5):  I think the Criminal Justice System feels they would get, 
um, [pause] you know, like, all human rights and 
everything against them and stuff like this.  So I think 
they’re stuck in the middle, actually.  I think they’d love 
to give out tougher sentences, but then I think there’s 
the other side who’s saying, well, no, we can’t do that, 
this person has human rights. 
LIZ:   So you think there’s people in the system who would 
like to, to give those tougher sentences? 
ANGIE (IV5):  Uh-huh, yeah, I do.  
As the quotation above suggests, Angie (IV5) was less willing than some of the 
other participants to blame the criminal justice hierarchy for the undesirable 
changes she saw as having taken place. Rather, she referred to the growth of a 
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litigation culture which had disempowered authority figures from taking a robust 
common-sense approach to dealing with offenders, or misbehaving young people, 
and had reduced people’s sense of personal responsibility. 
LIZ:   How, how do you think that change has come about?  
Have you any thoughts on that? 
ANGIE (IV5):  Well, yes, I do actually.  I think it’s, um, it’s since the 
police weren’t able to give a, a swift clout round the ear-
hole when the kids were little.  Um, it’s since teachers 
stopped using the cane.  Um, it’s since there was too 
many do-gooders out there. 
LIZ:    Uh-hmm, okay, and what do you mean by do-gooder? 
ANGIE (IV5):  Well, it’s, I don’t know, it’s just that there’s so many 
people, um, who, [pause] anything that you do is wrong.  
It’s, [pause] it’s not right for a policeman, uh, to bat a 
young lad’s ears, it’s not right for a man to protect his 
home from a burglar.  He gets, he gets done if he hurts 
the burglar, um, teachers can’t throw blackboard 
rubbers at kids anymore because they’ll, they’ll get 
hauled up in court for abuse or whatever.  There’s just, 
it ... it’s crazy, absolutely crazy.  Um, people fall over a 
curb in the street and they can sue.  My mother would 
have made a fortune off me when I was little if that was 
the case, because I was never on my feet.  And it’s just 
this, just everything’s gone absolutely crazy.  You know, 
you cannot smack your kids, um.   
In her view, within the criminal justice system, the police are let down by the 
courts, and in turn the courts’ hands are tied by human rights legislation: 
ANGIE (IV5):  I think the courts’ hands are tied... because of, um, 
[pause] people who view human rights of the criminal 
more than human rights of the victims. 
LIZ:   Uh-hmm, who are these people? 
ANGIE (IV5):  I don’t know.  I wish I knew.  There’s, I mean, there’s a 
lot of politicians out there, um, who, uh, you know who I 
mean…  There was ... the one on the side of Myra 
Hindley, and, tsk, I can’t remember his name, [pause] 
but it was like, why would you want to represent 
somebody like that, for what she’s done?  Why on earth 
would you want to represent somebody like that?  Why 
would you want to fight for that person to get out of 
prison?   
... 
ANGIE (IV5):  I just do feel their hands are tied sometimes. 
LIZ:   Uh-hmm, okay, who do you hold responsible then for 
tying their hands? 
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ANGIE (IV5):  I don’t know. I just, just…  [pause] I don’t know, it’s 
just a lot of people out there.  Maybe it’s the, [pause] the 
people who don’t have any respect for any sort of 
systems and they’re the ones saying, well, no, you 
shouldn’t be putting that person away for that long.  
[pause] You know. 
LIZ:   Okay. 
ANGIE (IV5):  Human rights campaigners, I suppose. But I just think 
the focus on the human rights are on the wrong people.
       
This quotation from Angie (IV5) reveals the slightly unformed nature of her views. 
She has a sense that something is not right, but she is slightly tentative about 
providing an explanation as to why this might be. The prefixing of her statement 
about the hands of the criminal justice system being tied with the words ‘I just do 
feel’ is slightly defensive, suggesting that she is uncertain about the validity of her 
view. Then, in response to my questions about who is responsible for ‘tying the 
hands’ of criminal justice officials, she states ‘I don’t know’ several times. Even 
when she does attempt to answer the question she begins with ‘maybe...’ and then, 
after assigning blame to ‘human rights campaigners’, she says ‘I suppose’.  
I point out these details of Angie (IV5)’s expression not in order to undermine her 
account, but rather to illustrate the difficulty which the participants often 
experienced in identifying the specific individuals that they held responsible for 
the undesirable trends which they had identified in society. However, despite these 
difficulties, many accounts contained a common strand which invoked the notion 
of what Bert (IV14) referred to as an ‘elite system’ coming up with ‘crazy ideas’, 
and taking ‘no notice of what the public have to say’. The defining characteristics of 
the ‘them’ group, then, are not the exact professional positions occupied by its 
members, but rather their perceived ability to shape criminal justice policy and 
practice and their remoteness from the concerns, values and opinions of the 
‘ordinary’ people.  
6.3 Knowing about crime and justice 
In the previous section I suggested that participants in the confidence research 
showed a tendency to talk in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ when giving their opinions on 
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the criminal justice system. Most participants sought for their own views to be 
seen as representing views held by a wider ‘us’, thus (implicitly) acknowledging 
the importance of consensus and constructing a loosely defined grouping of the 
‘ordinary’ people. This grouping tended to be seen as distinct from the people able 
to exert their influence over criminal justice policy and practice, who were 
frequently constructed as remote from the concerns, values and opinions of the 
‘ordinary’ people. In this section I consider how these groups are further 
constructed through reference to their capacity to ‘know’ about, and take steps to 
address, the ‘reality’ of crime and justice.  
6.3.1 Proximity: being ‘actually in and around it’93 
Most participants suggested that ordinary people had the potential to have a much 
clearer understanding of crime than some of the professionals working within the 
criminal justice system (especially sentencers), as it is ordinary people who often 
must live in close proximity to the reality of crime. Ordinary people were thus 
referred to as ‘the people on the ground’ (Judy, FG5) and ‘the people who are 
actually in and around it’ (Niall, IV6). As Bert (IV14) argued: 
BERT (IV14):   It’s the public that are affected. Lots of people in the 
block I live in, there’s about 200 flats, all elderly, they’re 
all scared to go out at night. I never leave the house 
after 6 in the evening.  
Of all of the participants in the qualitative research, Bert (IV14)’s daily experience 
appeared to be the most badly affected by crime and anti-social behaviour. 
LIZ:   Tell me a bit about living in the area you live in ‘cause it 
sounds like that has an effect on your view. 
BERT (IV14):   It is, it’s always been a bad area in the Southside, there’s 
a great transient population of students, an enormous 
amount of students from all over the world, in addition 
with lots of refugees and would be asylum seekers, 
from Africa, some from Russia, from Chechnya, they’re 
all having an effect, forming little ghettos. A lot of them 
are causing a lot of trouble - robberies, pick pockets, 
prostitutes - it’s all happening in Southside. But the 
main problem is drugs, the only three pubs in the area 
are all well known drug dealing pubs, and drug using 
pubs, and the managers say nothing. If you say anything 
                                                        
93 Niall (IV6) 
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you’re asked to leave, if you complain about drug users 
in the gents’ toilet you’re asked to leave and threatened 
with a damn good hiding if you don’t or if you say 
anything to anybody. “We know where you live, you’d 
better keep your mouth shut” that’s a comment that 
people will hear. 
LIZ:    Is that something that’s happened to you? 
BERT (IV14):   I’ve been threatened several times, I’ve had drinks 
thrown over me because I’ve walked into one pub in 
particular, I’ve gone into the gents toilets for a genuine 
reason and somebody’s there sniffing cocaine or 
injecting something into their arms and I’ve looked 
shocked at them, because to me it always is a shock to 
see them doing it as as openly, not going into cubicles 
just doing it openly by the wash basin and its “keep 
your mouth shut or else”, if you say anything to the 
manager it’s “as long as they’re not injecting, as long as 
they’re not doing it in the bar, there’s not much I can 
say, if I said it they’d smash the bar up”. The drug 
addicts and the drug dealers are controlling the 
Southside. The Southside has always been like that, a 
hotbed of criminals. ... I know several houses in my area 
where you can buy drugs quite openly. 
Bert (IV14) told me that due to the position of his flat he was able to observe 
goings-on in the streets outside: 
BERT (IV14):   Where I live is a good vantage point. I look directly out 
of my window and see two of the pubs. Every night 
they’re fighting and rowdy and glasses being smashed, 
people fighting in the open, and people rang the police 
and they do nothing. I see a real battle outside the pub 
regular on a Friday or Saturday, ring the police “oh we’ll 
be there as quick as we can” by the time they come it’s 
all gone, it’s all over, regular, three real hell holes the 
pubs in that area. They seem to be the centre for the 
criminality and you can go in any day and buy stolen 
goods, sometimes over the bar, sometimes the bar 
managers handle it. You go in and the bar manager’s ‘oh 
do you want this do you want that’ it’s all stolen stuff 
from ships and burglaries, quite a common thing in the 
Southside as well. 
Bert (IV14)’s ‘vantage point’ ensures that he is acutely aware of criminal and anti-
social behaviour taking place in his area. It is this kind of physical proximity to this 
behaviour, which some participants suggested was the best way of ‘knowing’ about 
crime. Bert (IV14) is, as Niall (IV6) would have it, ‘actually in and around it’. By 
contrast, many of the participants suggested that the individuals who shape 
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criminal justice policy and practice do not have access to such immediate and 
compelling knowledge. That is they are not ‘in touch with reality’. 
Not all individuals working within the criminal justice system were considered to 
be ‘out of touch’. Several participants suggested that front-line staff would be in a 
better position to know about the reality of crime ‘because they deal with more 
criminals and they know more about people out there.’ (Abida (IV10)).  It was 
suggested that those at the top of the criminal justice system needed to listen more 
to these front-line staff:  
BRENDA (IV9):  I don’t think they listen, perhaps, to the people who are 
on the, um, on the front, you know, on the front line. 
By front-line Brenda (IV9) means police officers, but also teachers and social 
workers. However, Bert (IV14), who does live ‘in and around’ crime, seems more 
sceptical about whether even front-line staff, who are aware of the problems, will 
actually use their knowledge to improve the situation: 
BERT (IV14):   The police are aware of that and very little’s done about 
it. They know fine well, they know as well as I do that 
drugs are being dealt in these pubs, and used, and they 
do nothing about it at all. Never see them anywhere 
near.  
Lorna (IV7) takes a slightly different view, emphasising the necessary link between 
the public experience of crime and criminal justice system knowledge:  
LORNA (IV7):   I just feel that it’s important if somebody does commit a 
crime that you do report it, I mean, you know, in terms 
of statistics, in terms of supporting the amount of police 
that you need. If people don’t report a crime, that’s not 
going to happen, you know, because they don’t know 
how many crimes are happening if you don’t tell them 
that it’s happened, you know. How are they going to get 
more officers on the beat, um? And again, being able to 
actually target areas where problems are occurring, if 
they don’t know they’re occurring there? How are they 






6.3.2 Affinity: ‘they’re up here and we’re down there’94 
For some respondents, concerns about the criminal justice system being ‘out of 
touch’ were about more than the fact that decision-makers do not have regular 
close proximity to crime. Karen (IV12) said: 
KAREN (IV12):  I think sometimes you find some of these judges and 
that, they’re not in touch with reality, you know. They 
wouldn’t know what it’s like to live on a rough estate 
and be hounded because you’re on your own or 
vulnerable, you know. 
I interviewed Karen (IV12) at her home and my impression of the physical 
environment in her area was that it would not constitute what she referred to as ‘a 
rough estate’95. Karen (IV12) appeared to implicitly acknowledge this as, in the 
interview she did not say anything to suggest that the environment of a ‘rough 
estate’ is something which she herself had experienced recently or in the past, and 
she explicitly told me that in her daily life she rarely went to places where she felt 
she had to think about crime. In other words her own experiences did not include 
the type of reality with which she thought judges should be ‘in touch’, yet she still 
expressed concern that they were not ‘in touch’ with it. She went on to say:  
KAREN (IV12):  I still sometimes think that some of the judges are out of 
touch with reality because they’ve sort of been, um, you 
know, educated at public schools, wouldn’t know what 
it was to live on a council estate, you know. And I mean, 
I can remember once, because, you know Gazza, the 
footballer? One judge hadn’t even heard of him, you 
know. Well, you think, you know, I’m not saying that 
you could name, should name all the England players, 
I’m not saying that, you know, and what’s a 4-3-3, you 
know, team. I’m not saying that. But someone as high 
profile as that you should have heard of them, really. 
Here Karen (IV12) has expanded her implicit definition of what it means to be ‘in 
touch’ to include familiarity with shared and taken-for-granted cultural reference 
points. She also hints at a classed aspect of being ‘out of touch’: being ‘educated at 
                                                        
94 Brenda (IV9) 
95 Identifying a ‘rough estate’ is not, of course, an exact science. The area Karen lived in was 
surrounded by open countryside on the fringe of an affluent suburban area. Her house was situated 
within a cul-de-sac of large modern detached and semi-detached houses, most of which had block-
paved private driveways, garages and every lawn and garden appeared neatly tended. There were 
no visible signs of vandalism or neglect to the properties or street furniture.    
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public schools’. It is not simply that judges do not live ‘in and around’ crime, it is 
also that they lack a shared cultural experience and knowledge with ordinary 
people. 
Sentencers and other influential figures being unaware of the ‘reality’ of crime in 
people’s day to day lives, was not, it would seem, the only facet of being ‘out of 
touch’ which concerned the research participants. Some were also concerned that 
these individuals were economically and culturally removed from ‘ordinary’ 
people, something which limits their ability to connect with people whose lives are 
very different from their own. 
Lorna (IV7) also suggested that this might be the case: 
LORNA (IV7):   It goes back to this issue of ivory towers, um. And, you 
know, how much you actually mix with other social 
classes. So I suppose if you have people like judges 
they’re going to be mixing with their own social classes; 
they might live in areas where there isn’t a lot of crime, 
um. And, you know, whether they’ll actually understand 
or be involved with people at other levels is debatable I 
suppose. 
Both Karen (IV12) and Lorna (IV7) assume that judges are drawn from a particular 
social class, that they will have been privately educated, that they are able to 
purchase homes which are removed from the daily reality of crime, and that they 
will mix with people from a similar background to themselves96. As a result it is 
suggested that they may lack the capacity to understand the experiences and 
opinions of people who are ‘at other levels’. As Brenda (IV9) commented: 
BRENDA (IV9):  I think they’re up here and we’re down there and I don’t 
think they’re in contact with real life.  
6.3.3 Empathy: ‘what would they do if it was their own family?’97 
The notion that sentencers and the wider ‘powers that be’ are ‘out of touch’ also 
found expression when some participants suggested that aspects of criminal 
                                                        
96 This perception has some basis in fact. A survey by the Sutton Trust found that from a sample of 
100 high court judges 78% had attended Oxford or Cambridge University and 70% were privately 
educated. (Sutton Trust, 2009)  
97 Elsie, IV2 
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justice policy and practice seem to demonstrate a lack of empathy by key decision 
makers. For example Elsie (IV2) said:  
ELSIE (IV2):   I sometimes wonder if these judges or whoever, 
magistrates or whoever it is dishes out their sentence, I 
wonder what they would do if it was their own family 
that was affected. Would they be as lenient? I somehow 
don’t think so. ... [they] should just think about how it 
would affect them if it happened to them. 
In this case it seems to Elsie (IV2) that sentencers fail to ‘know’ how to sentence 
appropriately because they have not really empathised with those affected by the 
crime. Some participants talked about using something which we might call 
empathy (albeit without using this word) when thinking about crime and criminal 
justice. In other words empathy was a lens through which they viewed crime and 
justice and their ‘knowledge’ about crime, the views, opinions and diffuse thoughts 
which they shared with me in the interviews, were formed within the context of 
their empathy. Angie (IV5) told me: 
ANGIE (IV5):   I put myself in the place of the family who it’s been, like, 
committed to, and I think, oh, you know what, if that 
had happened to, to one of my kids, or to my husband 
or, one of my friends, and they’d just got that sentence, 
it’d be like, you know, [pause] not just that’d be 
horrible, it’d just [pause]…  You know, somebody loses 
their life and the criminal gets like six years.  
Angie (IV5) here calls upon her own situation as a mother, wife and friend in order 
to try and appreciate the impact of crime for individuals affected. Similarly, for 
Karen (IV12), her capacity for empathy is rooted in her own life experience: 
KAREN (IV12):  I think, I think when you get to a certain age you just 
realise what’s important and, you know, you know 
what a loss is like. And, you know, like you lose your 
parents and I’ve lost my husband, and [pause], and then 
to think that someone like who would, you know, stab 
my children and take them away, it ruins your whole 
life, doesn’t it, you know? 
Elsie (IV2), Angie (IV5) and Karen (IV12) are all referring to cases of quite serious 
crime, where the victim has been seriously injured or killed. However, Karen 
(IV12) also reflects upon her father’s experience of being a victim of burglary 
whilst on holiday. Whilst he was not physically threatened by this experience, 
Karen (IV12) told me that after being burgled her father was deeply upset and was 
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unwilling to go away and leave his house for any length of time. She felt that the 
fact that burglary could have this kind of impact on the victim was not necessarily 
recognised in the sentences which offenders received in such cases.  A custodial 
sentence would she thought:  
KAREN (IV12):  ... give the victim, ah, respect, in as much to say well, 
yes, we acknowledge this has been done to you and this 
is what we’re doing to go to some way to, um, show you 
that we do care. 
In other words it would show that the criminal justice system acknowledges the 
impact of the crime upon the individual victim. Karen (IV12) had heard of the 
recently introduced Victim Personal Statement98. She expressed her support for 
this innovation because she felt it made knowledge of the impact of the crime upon 
the victim available to the court. Her support for the Victim Personal Statement 
may reflect a sense that the availability of such input to the court may be conducive 
to producing a more empathetic disposition amongst sentencers, thus increasing 
their capacity to ‘know’ about crime. 
6.3.4 Motivation: ‘in it for the money’99 
Three ways of knowing, then, were seen as potentially lacking in key criminal 
justice decision-makers: knowing through daily spatial proximity to crime; 
knowing through feeling economic and cultural affinity with the people most 
affected by crime; and knowing through utilising empathy to think about crime. 
Participants also mentioned a fourth key issue around the knowledge of elites, 
which is not so much about how they know, but rather about what they do with 
what they know and why. This issue was about the perceived motives of criminal 
justice decision-makers, something which some participants saw as a corrupting 
influence because it was seen to render knowledge irrelevant. 
                                                        
98 The Victim Personal Statement (also called a Victim Impact Statement) provides victims of crime 
with the opportunity to describe how their experience has affected them in a statement which can 
be read in court. Contrary to Karen’s hopes, however, official guidance states that the content of the 
statement should not influence any sentence which is passed.                                                                                                         
See http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/victim_focus_scheme/  
99 Fred, IV1 
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Several participants made reference to legal professionals having an insidious 
influence on justice by pursuing their own professional and financial interests at 
the expense of justice: 
BERT (IV14):  Glib lawyers are the ruination of the justice system I 
think. Glib lawyers getting inflated fees for getting off 
obvious criminals ... some of them are just as bad as the 
criminals, taking vast inflated fees and then getting 
them off when they know they’re guilty. 
 
FRED (IV1):  The place is full of lawyers and barristers these days 
but they’re just in it for the money a lot of them. 
Participants suggested that lawyers did not care whether or not their client was 
guilty as long as they got paid. However, it was also suggested that the legal 
profession as a whole was able to exert more influence over criminal justice than 
elected politicians and the wider public: 
LIZ:   Do you think the criminal justice system listens to 
views like yours? 
BERT (IV14):   Not at all. Too many high falutin’ lawyers and ex-judges 
and all the rest of their own elite system. They listen to 
themselves they don’t listen to the public I think. They 
take no notice of what the public have to say or think. 
They take well politicians obviously they listen to 
politicians, but they listen to their own fraternity more 
than they listen to the public. They come up with these 
crazy ideas ... 
...   
Very occasionally. An extremely good politician but 
sadly we don’t have a majority of extremely good 
politicians. 
LIZ:   And do you think the criminal justice system then 
listens to the politicians? 
BERT (IV14):   Yes … … the politicians and their own fraternity. 
They’re such a tight knit fraternity the legal profession I 
think any law making decisions are made amongst 
themselves, with slight attention to what the politicians 
say. 
... 
LIZ:   So you’ve said that the Lawyers they’re listening to 
themselves, their own little fraternity? 
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BERT (IV14):   Their own little clubs, their own little fraternity, 
interpreting the law in the manner that suits them. 
The idea of an ‘elite system’ which has its own little ‘fraternity’ again invokes the 
idea explored above of a separate group, a ‘them’ who inhabit separate social 
circles (‘clubs’) and who are lacking in the capacity to understand the experience of 
‘ordinary’ people.  However what Bert (IV14) says here goes further than this, 
alluding not merely to a lack of capacity, but also to a lack of will to understand, 
and a preference for preserving privilege and pursuing one’s own interests. 
The charge of self-interest was also applied by participants to the way in which 
statistics are used by politicians and criminal justice agencies. For example, Lorna 
(IV7) said:  
LORNA (IV7):   At the end of the day you can always change statistics to 
suit, you know, to say exactly what you want them to 
say. Um, people move goalposts; you know, the 
government will move goalposts so that they will 
actually determine one thing. But if that doesn’t suit 
they can change it, so that it actually meets another 
criteria [sic]. And that’s with any branch of society. So I 
think statistics themselves, it’s too easy to corrupt 
them. So I wouldn’t necessarily believe statistics I don’t 
think. 
This scepticism about the neutrality of statistics is also clear in the following focus 
group exchange: 
MALCOLM (FG2): If the Government want you to concentrate on knife 
crime they will come up with the statistics that says 
there has been a dramatic erm percentage change in the 
number of knife crimes that took place. … The SATs for 
instance this year being totally, totally corrupt because 
of a marking problem or a payment problem for 
marking and so on. So somebody’s done something.  But 
what they’re saying is there’s been a 1% change, an 
increase in reading abilities of 11 year olds or 
something like that.  1% - what was that the figure of? 
ERIC (FG2):  It’s just another lie 
ROSEMARY (FG2): Ahuh. 
MALCOLM (FG2): [Laughing] It’s how the information is portrayed to the 
public. 
ERIC (FG2):  It’s all spin, it’s got nothing to do with facts. 
ROSEMARY (FG2): It is. It’s all spin.  
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The police, sometimes seen as more trusted than other parts of the criminal justice 
system, are also under suspicion in this regard: 
NIALL (IV6): ... when um when the actual police give their statements 
about their figures and stuff I sometimes feel they’re 
sort of doctored to cover over the cracks and basically 
make things look a bit more rosier than what they what 
they are, you know trying to meet targets and stuff like 
that where people just want the truth basically.  
ROSEMARY (FG2):  It’s the Chief Constable … he produces figures to suit 
himself, he’s going to do this, that and the other.  It’s all 
just you know like any Chief Constable, he just wants to 
make himself feel important.  Just like the Prime 
Minister or anybody in authority. 
These comments suggest that respondents did not have a great deal of trust in 
authority figures, be they judges, politicians or chief constables, to pursue the 
public interest before their own.  For example, Mavis (FG1) argued that ‘politicians 
will do anything that it takes to keep the constituent happy’. This statement could 
be interpreted in a positive sense, as meaning that politicians try their best to 
serve the people who have elected them. However, the tone and context of Mavis 
(FG1)’s comment suggest that, in her view, such a stance by politicians is not 
something to be admired. Keeping constituents ‘happy’ was also referred to as 
‘pacifying’ them, a word which suggests manipulative rather than benevolent 
intentions. 
Being ‘political’ appeared to be interpreted by many of the participants as 
behaving in a self-interested and calculating, rather than a democratic or authentic, 
manner. Perhaps unsurprisingly then the participants did not seem to see ‘politics’ 
as a way in which ‘the people on the ground’ could have their views heard on crime 
and justice issues.  For example, Anne (FG5) said ‘the chief constables are sort of all 
political now as well ... because of their own ambitions’ (Anne, FG5). The dubious 
motives ascribed to criminal justice elites by the participants were seen as further 
corrupting their already inadequate ways of knowing about the experiences, 
concerns, values and experiences of ‘us’, the ‘ordinary’ people.  
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6.4 Difficulties with getting ‘in touch’ 
In the two previous sections I have presented what participants said as a relatively 
harmonious discourse within which people are divided into an ‘us’ (ordinary 
people) and a ‘them’ (the ‘powers that be’) and short-comings in the knowledge 
and actions of ‘them’ are attributed to their lack of proximity to the ‘reality’ of 
crime; their economic and cultural distance from ‘ordinary’ people; their failure to 
utilise empathy as a way of knowing and the dubious motivations for their actions. 
But of course the data from the interviews and focus groups also contained some 
notes which were at odds with this discourse. Participants did not give coherent, 
unambiguous, non-contradictory accounts of themselves. Nor did they always 
seem to think that, as ‘ordinary’ members of the public, they, or others, necessarily 
had access to a privileged level of knowledge about crime. Furthermore they were 
aware of both the diversity of public views and the inherent difficulties in 
accessing such views.  In this section I explore these issues and reflect upon what 
they might mean to the analysis I have presented above.  
6.4.1 Doubt: ‘I could be right, I could be wrong’100 
Participants oscillated between certainty and apparent self-doubt in the 
expression of their opinions. It would be easy to ignore the indications of self-
doubt, and indeed when doing the kind of organising and summarising style of 
research which I referred to in the Introduction to this chapter, the temptation 
may well be to do so, and to focus on the use of clear opinion statements. However 
consider the following view expressed by Harriet (IV3): 
HARRIET (IV3):  ... in those days I’m sure there was far less chance of 
being molested or assaulted, um, compared with today 
.. unless it’s just that the media.. er.. we have much more 
access to the media so we’ll hear about all the nasty bits 
much more. I’m sure everything did go on just the same 
years ago. 
In this short extract Harriet (IV3) goes from being ‘sure’ that one thing is the case, 
to being ‘sure’ that the opposite it the case, in the space of 55 words. Her view, 
                                                        
100 Karen (IV12) 
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then, is worked out in the process of speaking. You can almost hear the cogs 
turning as she pauses, and then says ‘unless it’s just that the media’ and then 
pauses again, ‘er’, then she finishes more quickly and with renewed confidence ‘we 
have much more access to the media so we’ll hear about all the nasty bits much 
more’, reaching a conclusion which directly contradicts her initial position.  
In the above example Harriet (IV3) has talked herself out of her previously 
expressed opinion, revealing her willingness to revise her own view in the light of 
more information and also (albeit implicitly) acknowledging the rather contingent 
and unstable nature of her own expressed views. Whilst many statements made by 
the participants in the interviews and focus groups did suggest that they, in Louise 
Casey’s recent words ‘know what they want on crime and justice’ (Casey, 2008: 3), 
there were also many (perhaps many more) statements which contained 
indications of the shifting and situated nature of their opinions, their willingness to 
be persuaded to hold other views, and their sense of some of the shortcomings of 
their own knowledge about crime. 
As Lorna (IV7) says, when referring to the information which is available in the 
media: 
LORNA (IV7):  ... you’ve got to have a little bit of, you know, treat 
things with a little bit of a pinch of salt occasionally. But 
it’s very difficult to find out what the truth of the matter 
is, because you don’t have access to finding out what 
the truth is.'  
Lorna (IV7)’s sense of the inadequacies of media-communicated information about 
crime and justice was shared by many of the other participants, for example: 
JUNE (IV8):   Bearing in mind that all I’ve got to go on is, er, 
television, newspapers, documentaries, things like that. 
BRENDA (IV9):  ... it’s only what I read in the papers, and I know you 
shouldn’t believe everything you read but...  
KAREN (IV12):  I mean I only know from what I read in the paper and 
the media. And they’re going to sort of highlight the 
sensational.  
In these statements the use of the words ‘only’ and ‘all’ indicate the participants’ 
sense that there exist some other methods of accessing ‘truth’, to which they are 
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not party and which it might be preferable for them to use. One of these is the 
experience of close daily proximity to crime discussed in the previous section. 
However, participants also acknowledged that there may be some less immediate 
but no less valid sources of information which it would be useful to consult. For 
example, Niall (IV6) said: 
NIALL (IV6):   I would like to see some stats to see how many reoffend 
‘cause I’ve watched programmes and stuff and they 
seem to, as soon as they get out they’re always gonna 
reoffend, it’s just gonna be a matter of time so... 
Here Niall (IV6) alludes to a potential tension between what ‘seems’ to be the case, 
based on the TV programmes he has watched, and the ‘stats’ which will, it is 
implied, reveal the truth of the matter. Karen (IV12) also referred to this tension: 
KAREN (IV12):  I don’t know enough about it. You know, probably all 
behind the scenes you’ve probably got good people sort 
of… But then probably again, [pause] because it’s not 
maybe high profile maybe enough, it’s not being funded 
adequately, I don’t know, you know, because all of these 
resources take money.  
LIZ:    When you say it’s not high profile do you mean, um, … 
KAREN (IV12):  Um, you don’t know, you don’t know really what’s going 
on behind the scenes. You only know what you read in 
the paper, don’t you? 
But it was not just their lack of access to reliable information which concerned 
participants. They also expressed uncertainty about how their own personal 
perspective might be affecting their views. For example, Abida (IV10) speculated 
about why she held the view that crime was getting worse: 
ABIDA (IV10):  ... perhaps when we were younger, I mean maybe we 
didn’t know as much about crime; maybe that’s what it 
is. Um, but we just never used to… Just when we were a 
bit younger, say, I never used to hear as much crime. Or 
maybe I wasn’t that interested in crime, I don’t know. 
But it is just now maybe I’m interested.  
She concludes that it might just be that as she has got older she has become more 
interested in crime, and thus more aware. 
Meanwhile, Karen (IV12) identified going to observe proceedings in court as a 
possible way for her to get better information about the criminal justice system, 
but worried that ‘I probably won’t understand what’s going on and probably nine 
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times out of ten it would be boring because you’ve got certain procedures.’ She 
went on to express an opinion which she then immediately qualified: 
KAREN (IV12):  ... sometimes I think an eye for an eye. I don’t mean in 
the form of taking them away but, um, but a life 
custodial sentence is what is appropriate, and maybe it 
might stop people. You’ve got to give it a try, haven’t 
you, because nothing seems to be working at the 
moment, does it? You know, um, I could be right I could 
be wrong.  
If we chose to ignore key aspects of this statement in order to extract a clear and 
unambiguous opinion statement we could just say that Karen (IV12) favours a 
whole life tariff for convicted killers. However what this excerpt also clearly shows 
is the level of doubt which Karen (IV12) has about the opinion she expresses. 
Firstly she indicates that the opinion she expresses is a temporary thing: 
‘sometimes I think’. Then she makes an implicit rhetorical appeal to her 
interviewer to validate her own view: ‘nothing seems to be working at the 
moment, does it?’ Finally she acknowledges that she ‘could be wrong’.  
Participants’ awareness of the contingent, situated and temporary nature of 
expressed opinions is also well-illustrated by the following excerpt:  
HARRIET (IV3): ... I said in a moment of despair the other day about how 
in the sort of Arab countries, you know, for people that 
steal they chop off their fingers. Well [laughs] me friend 
says “you can’t do that!” and I said “well no I know you 
can’t but..” [laughs] but maybe that just highlighted the 
sort of, er, the extreme feelings I had at the time. 
LIZ:  Was that any particular thing that had provoked you to 
say that? 
HARRIET (IV3):   I can’t remember, I can’t remember what we were 
talking about. It probably was something that we’d read 
in the paper [pause] oh it was to do with a dog [laughs] 
that’s terrible isn’t it I think more of animals than I do 
about people well.. ... I was reading about this guy who 
had killed his dog with a screwdriver, it was in the 
paper, we were talking about that, and, I’ll not tell you 
where I would push the screwdriver [laughs]. ... so I was 
in a heightened state because, I mean, that was.. he’d 
obviously got mental health problems or something you 
know, ... I mean I appreciate that but it was absolutely 
horrendous the suffering of this dog and I do, I do get 
quite angry when I hear about cruelty to animals. I’m.. 
probably because I’m an animal lover um ... so maybe 
my feelings were heightened. And then we just started 
talking about, you know, the way crime is, sometimes in 
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this country. And I think I said, “you know they should 
do what they do in Arabia, chop their hands off”.  
LIZ:    But you didn’t really mean it? 
HARRIET (IV3):  No [Laughs] I’m sure I didn’t no no no it was dreadful 
really but you do say things on the spur of the moment. 
Here Harriet (IV3) describes the ephemeral nature of opinions expressed on the 
basis of strong emotions. Her love of animals and her horror at the cruelty inflicted 
on a dog by its owner led her to make a statement which had appalled her friend 
and which she subsequently acknowledged to have been said ‘on the spur of the 
moment’ based upon her ‘heightened’ emotion.  
A small minority of participants also questioned the reliability of other members of 
‘Joe public’s’ opinions, occasionally appearing to position themselves outside of 
this group altogether. For example, Mavis (FG1) argued, in focus group one, that: 
‘people definitely think that they are less safe on the streets than in reality’, 
something which the other participants in that group, after some discussion, 
appeared to concur with. Whilst in focus group five, Mavis (FG1) bemoaned the 
insidious influence of the ‘hang em and flog em brigade’. Gavin (IV4), meanwhile, 
said that he often heard people argue that the criminal justice system should 
reintroduce severe corporal punishments, something which he argued against: 
GAVIN (IV4):  Well, I think, you have to work out what is a good and 
not so good idea.  Um, a lot of people would instantly 
jump to, um, more severe punishments than what is 
appropriate, go back to the old times and have people 
whipped and cut people’s hands  off, and things like 
that ... I think that is harsh, it’s  extreme. We see that in 
other countries.  And, other countries, yes, they have 
harsh punishments like that, but they also have less, 
um, structure. 
LIZ:   So, I mean, do you come across people who have those 
harsher views than you? 
GAVIN (IV4):  Absolutely, you hear them all the time, everywhere, 
yeah.   
LIZ:   Okay, is that any particular people who have that view 
often? 
GAVIN (IV4):  Um, it tends to be people who have had crimes 
committed against them, or their families, things like 
that.  Um, or, obviously, the stigma with, um, [pause] 
sort of where a child or a family are injured, um, things 
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like that; that tends to make people more aggressive 
than ... a motoring offence.   
LIZ:   Mm-hm, okay, and why, why do you not share the views 
about bringing back those particularly harsh 
punishments. 
GAVIN (IV4):  Because, I think, that’s, um, times of old, I think, you 
know, times move on, times change, I think, people are 
changing.  It comes with evolution, it comes with, um, 
[pause] new times, new ages, new technologies. 
6.4.2 Diversity: ‘I know a lot of people would disagree’101 
Despite their concern that the criminal justice system needed to be more ‘in touch’ 
with the views of the public, many of the participants were also cognisant that, in 
light of the heterogeneous character of public views, this might be difficult to 
achieve. As noted above, older participants recognised that their views may be 
typical only of their own age group, thus implicitly acknowledging that younger 
people may hold different views from their own, as Fred (IV1) said: ‘I’m almost 93 
you see so you’re getting a really old man’s views’. Fred (IV1) said he thought his 
views were typical of ‘the older generation’, something which he differentiated 
from ‘generations growing up now that know nothing about war’. He suggested 
that his generation’s experiences during the second world war had ‘moved’ them: 
‘we were quite prepared to settle down when we came back, all we wanted was a 
decent home … we were quite happy to obey the law.’ 
The impact of life experiences and also upbringing on opinions about crime and 
justice was also acknowledged by Harriet (IV3), who said:  
HARRIET (IV3):  Well I suppose I’m from the old school and being 
brought up to sort of an eye for an eye sort of syndrome 
right ... I know a lot of people would disagree but it’s 
what I think anyway.  
Here Harriet (IV3) explicitly acknowledges that ‘a lot of people would disagree’, 
indicating her awareness that views on crime and justice are diverse and affected 
by a person’s personal background. 
                                                        
101 Harriet (IV3) 
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Other participants recognised that people living in different places may have 
different experiences of the crime problem which might shape their views:  
JUNE (IV8):   ... if you talk to the people who live down Astonside and 
Grandbury and hear about their problems, up here we 
have nothing to complain about 
JULIAN (FG1):   I mean there are certain spots where it is slightly 
different but I think in general we are very lucky where 
we live. It’s not like other cities - Astonside, Wrighton, 
Everfield. 
Lorna (IV7) suggested that these different experiences of crime in different areas 
create difficulties in terms of the fair allocation of resources: 
LORNA (IV7):   It comes down to budgeting at the end of the day, and 
what’s most appropriate. And I think you’re going to 
police areas where you know there are higher crime 
populations. But that doesn’t really help people who are 
in the low crime populations who are still experiencing 
problems, you know. Because they think well, we’ve 
moved to a nice area and we’re being penalised because 
we don’t get the support because we’ve moved to a nice 
area, you know. Whereas if you’re in a Council estate 
and I know that sounds, you know, prejudiced. But if 
you’re in a Council estate where there are a lot of 
problems, you would expect that you’re going to have a 
higher police presence. Which is obvious, but it’s not 
helping everybody as well, do you see what I mean? 
The examples above illustrate that participants sensed that having a criminal 
justice system which is literally ‘in touch’ with ‘ordinary’ people, as in aware of 
their needs and demands, is always going to be challenging in a society where 
people have diverse experiences and views. As Fred (IV1) commented:  
FRED (IV1):   You probably wouldn’t agree with a set of laws that I 
drew up. And so it goes on. It’s a very very difficult 
problem but all you can hope to do is strike a happy 
medium that satisfies most people. 
Fred (IV1) recognised the difficulty of the criminal justice system being ‘in touch’ 
with what he referred to as ‘the mass majority’ which he felt should influence the 
level of punishment: 
FRED (IV1):   This mass that I’m talking about they don’t write to 
newspapers, and when they go down to the pub and 
talk at night and have a drink they’ll say “oh that’s fixed 
it” and that’s it you see. They’ll walk away. It’s a very 
difficult matter to get the opinion of them.  
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Fred (IV1) feared that instead of the views of this silent ‘hard core... the main body 
of the people’ being heard, instead it was ‘the wilder outer elements of society... the 
outer circle’ which would be influential. He professed himself uncertain as to how 
this could be addressed any differently than under the current system of 
representative democracy. He said: 
FRED (IV1):   How? How can I get it across? I mean my views are well 
known, the views of my friends are well known, you 
know. But, er, when we vote I suppose we vote for the 
candidate which is going to fulfil our views. I cannat see 
how else you can do it you see. It’s no good going round 
asking individuals and that sort of thing. 
... 
When do you get the chance to speak to your MP? You 
don’t. You can write to him. You’ll probably get a nice 
civil note back from his secretary, you know. 
   ... 
I don’t know if public meetings are the answer 
either...who goes to public meetings? 
Although he notes the limited opportunities available to the ‘mass majority’ to 
make their views heard, Fred (IV1) seems sceptical as to whether increasing this 
opportunity through the mechanism of ‘public meetings’ would actually improve 
matters in this regard. A similar point was also made by Harriet (IV3) when I asked 
her if she thought that the criminal justice system listened to views like hers: 
HARRIET (IV3):  I don’t really know, I don’t know, I would hope they do, 
I would hope they do, um I mean there has, to my 
knowledge anyway, until I read.. I can’t even remember 
how I got in touch with you, how I got involved there 
must have been something? 
LIZ:    I sent you a questionnaire 
HARRIET (IV3):  Oh was that what it right ... but I can’t up to this point in 
time think of any forum where, apart from screaming 
and shouting from the rafters when I was working - I 
used to bawl into the copshop [laughs] and they would 
say “are you sure you’re a social worker?” I’d say “yes, 
yes - look at this” holding on to a twelve year old’s 
scruff of the neck [laughs] no but no I didn’t think there 
was any such forum to be heard you know with the 
criminal justice, I mean people, you know, Oh we’re 
wonderful at moaning aren’t we I mean sort of [noise to 
indicate moaning on] [laughs] and not sort of doing 
anything about it, is this one of the traits of being 
English? I don’t know. But I really haven’t really 
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thought about it, honestly. So that’s.. I’m at fault there 
aren’t I? 
Here Harriet (IV3) makes a joke about the English being ‘wonderful at moaning’, 
nonetheless when I ask her if she would like her views to be listened to she replied: 
HARRIET (IV3):  Um … yes yes… um … whether it would do any good I 
don’t know. I mean it is such a big organisation isn’t it? 
Massive. I mean it is it is good that they’re speaking to 
each other, all these little bits of it um I mean 
communication’s a wonderful thing but yes I think they 
should be able to hear and if your research is gonna 
help towards that well that’s all to the good.  
Again though she seems quite unclear about how this might be achieved, other 
than by giving her views to me. Elsie (IV2) suggested that views on criminal justice 
were only likely to be heard if ‘there was quite a few of us together’. She did have 
an idea as to how the system might be made more in touch, suggesting: 
ELSIE (IV2):   I think there’d have to be some kind of a committee, the 
word’s not committee that I’m thinking of, there’d have 
to be some kind of a gathering and it would take a lot of 
doing I think and you’d have to listen to everybody’s 
point of view in this group. If you took more than one 
group then it would depend on comparing notes with 
the groups as to how they would if you had enough to 
er um do something about it then they might listen but 
after that I can’t see.  
But as she says ‘it would take a lot of doing’, and it is hard for her to really imagine 
how such a committee might translate into influence. When I asked Angie (IV5) 
who she would ask to make the changes which she had told me she thought were 
necessary to make the criminal justice system more satisfactory she said: 
ANGIE (IV5):  Oh, God, [pause] well, it would have to be the Prime 
Minister, I suppose, wouldn’t it?  [pause] But how do 
you get in touch with him?  [chuckles] [pause]  And 
then it’d be the politicians. 
As noted above, most of the participants did not see the existing political process 
as a way in which their views could be heard, and many of them expressed a 
distrust of politicians and the idea of politics.  When I asked the participants in 
focus group five who central government listens to Anne (FG5) suggested, to 
laughter, that they only listen ‘to each other’. Steve (FG5) then suggested that ‘they 
let the media dictate what’s important’, to which Anne (FG5) added: 
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ANNE (FG5):   Well there’s a big thing about knife crime now, but 
that’s actually been ongoing for about 8 or 9 or 10 
years, but again because the media have pushed it to 
the fore, all the chief constables have jumped on the 
band wagon. I think it is the media as well, they have a 
knee jerk reaction to whatever is popular at the 
moment.  
The idea of a ‘knee-jerk reaction’ seemed to resonate with Judy (FG5) who added 
that when Michael Howard was Home Secretary he had reformed Probation 
services in a way without ‘rhyme or reason’ in order to placate the ‘hang’em and 
flog ‘em brigade’. She added:  
JUDY (FG5):   He had his own opinions and his own agenda. Politics 
shouldn’t come into this, they should actually listen to 
the people on the ground. The people are very unhappy 
in this country.  
Similarly, in focus group three, Ursula (FG3) referred to politicians ‘all they’re 
interested in is getting in and having their own self importance but they don’t 
actually do anything for the country’. 
In the face of the diversity, and potential unreliability of public perceptions and 
opinions, as well as the untrustworthy nature of politicians, Gavin (IV4) proposes a 
different approach entirely: 
GAVIN (IV4):   I think, it’s a case of, um, what works and what doesn’t 
work, what makes more of a deterrent, what makes a 
course of action?  I think, there needs to be a constant 
look out of, a monitoring of what works and what 
doesn’t work, when things start to break down is it 
because of the individual, is it because the kind of crime 
or is it because of the punishment? 
The idea that some kind of monitoring of ‘what works’ should be used to help 
shape policy was expressed by several other participants, including Karen (IV12): 
LIZ:  Okay. So, when they’re making these changes, um, who 
should they listen to in determining what they, how 
they change it? 
KAREN (IV12):  Well, I think someone who has more of a grasp than I 
do, obviously... There should be more statistics to say 
maybe this is an idea, you know. To see, like everyone 
who has committed a knife crime, you know ... 
demographically ... Because I think age, the younger you 
get, I think you tend to be a bit more violent because 
you’ve got a bit more, few more hormones raging 
round. Um, you know, and do that, and the court, and 
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how long they were sentenced and if they repeat, and 
you hear on the news that all, they come out, I don’t 
know how many percent repeat, but it, it’s quite a high 
percentage. So obviously, nothing’s been done. So, 
you’ve got to say well, we’ve got this, and this is a fact. 
Now, if we put him in jail for another four years and 
help him, will he re-offend? Because it will be worth 
keeping him in there rather than him going in and out 
like a yo-yo, you know. So, that is, they, they need to 
look at the statistical data, you know, facts not, not… 
And, and listen to people as well but I think they should, 
the facts would speak for themselves because [pause] 
they’re non-negotiable, really 
... 
And so maybe, I think that’s what should do, I think 
they should look at the statistical ... data and see what’s 
happening 
The idea that the doubts and diversity which seem to be inherent aspects of public 
views on crime and justice should be dealt with by discounting those views in 
favour of a scientific, factual, statistical monitoring of ‘what works’ might be music 
to the ears of some criminologists and criminal justice professionals, however this 
idea formed only a small aspect of a discourse which was far more concerned 
about the inadequate ways of knowing and dubious motivations of criminal justice 
elites. Though they might, at times, recognise the frequently contingent and 
temporary nature of their own opinions, and though they might find it difficult to 
imagine a way in which their diversity could be captured and heard, the 
participants were still eager to give voice to their views, and many expressed their 
hope that by taking part in the research those voices would be heard.     
6.5 Conclusion: an alternative reading of public confidence data  
Data from a piece of research carried out under the auspices of the public 
confidence agenda reveal the extent to which members of the public are cognisant 
of and value the need for policy to reflect the ‘will of the people’. The data also 
reveal public frustration that this is not the case, and that professional elites who 
are ‘out of touch’ with reality are making policy without duly consulting the people. 
The data suggest that these elites are seen as frequently being culturally, 
economically and spatially distant from ordinary members of the public, and that 
both their ways of knowing and their motives are viewed with suspicion.  
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The remedy which is most frequently proposed for low public confidence is the 
provision of information and public education, but such an approach ignores 
apparently extensive public mistrust of their potential ‘educators’, and their belief 
that these elites often seek to manipulate them for their own ends. This mistrust 
appears to stem from public appraisals of the extent to which elites are culturally, 
economically and spatially removed from ‘ordinary’ people. The perceived ability 
of elites to insulate themselves from the impact of crime, and their perceived 
inability (or unwillingness) to empathise with crime victims, makes their 
knowledge-base suspect in the eyes of the public. Interestingly, this suspicion 
appears almost like a mirror to the expert’s frustration with what they perceive as 
inadequate public knowledge about the ‘reality’ of crime.  
The analysis suggests that much of the public’s mistrust of criminal justice elites 
may stem from their perceptions of social and economic divisions, and from a 
sense of alienation from democratic institutions. Existing research into public 
confidence may have exacerbated this situation by locating the key to confidence 
in educating and informing members of the public, thus increasing the extent to 
which the criminal justice system ‘markets’ itself, circulating materials which 
members of the public perceive as manipulative.  In effect the dominant discourse 
of confidence has rendered it a private problem, a matter of individuals holding 
misconceptions, rather than understanding that it may be a public issue, located in 
the structural matter of the relationship between elites and ‘ordinary’ people.  
In the next and final chapter of this thesis I bring together this analysis of public 
discourses on confidence with the analysis of the dominant discourse of the 
confidence agenda from Chapter Four, and the analysis of the emergence of the 
public confidence agenda in Chapter Five, and consider them in light of the recent 
literature dealing with the notion of a public criminology. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
‘no topic in the social sciences is its own automatic justification. Rather it is up 
to us to establish its relevance and interest – its little contribution to the self-
understandings of our time and perhaps to the democratic deliberation of 
questions that trouble and vex us’ (Girling et al, 2000: 2) 
 
7.1 Starting point: ‘A troubling situation’ 
At the start of this thesis I set out some questions about what I saw as a ‘troubling 
situation’. Why is a concept as poorly defined as public confidence apparently so 
central to criminal justice and penal policy? Why are some criminologists engaging 
with the concept of public confidence (and similar concepts) in a relatively 
uncritical fashion? What are the linkages between the increasing prominence of 
the notion of ‘public confidence’ and apparent increases in punitiveness? What 
does all this mean for criminology, criminal justice and confidence?  
In pursuit of answers to these questions I embarked on an investigation of the 
public confidence ‘agenda’, exploring the way the idea of ‘public confidence in the 
criminal justice system’ had been constructed in discourse, and identifying its 
conditions of existence as an object for research. I was interested in addressing the 
questions which Flyvbjerg (2001) has proposed as the basis for phronetic social 
scientific inquiry (see Chapter Three): Where are we going? Is this desirable? 
Why/why not? Who gains and who loses? By which mechanisms of power?   
In the process of conducting this investigation I realised that what really interested 
me was the more general issue of criminology’s role within the democratic public 
sphere. This topic has attracted increasing attention from academic criminologists 
in recent years however, upon reviewing the available literature I found that it did 
not contain a satisfactory way of dealing with the plurality of criminological 
knowledges and the role played by values in their production (See Chapter Two). 
My objectives for the thesis thus expanded to include that of identifying more 
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fruitful ways of thinking about the public role of criminology than were already 
available. In this context the public confidence research and policy agenda has 
functioned as an illuminating case study.  
In this final chapter of the thesis I use the findings from the public confidence case 
study to discuss the much wider issue of criminology’s public role. I begin by 
summarising the key findings from my analysis of the public confidence agenda. I 
then provide some additional analysis by reading my analysis of the public 
confidence agenda against the review of the public criminology literature and its 
roots in the wider literature mapping the criminal justice landscape. I argue that 
criminology’s wider struggles for recognition and influence can be seen condensed 
within the public confidence research, and that the public confidence agenda can 
be seen as having a double epistemic objective: firstly to provide epistemic 
knowledge about public confidence and secondly to promote a vision of 
criminology as episteme.  
I go on to suggest that the epistemic pretensions of the dominant discourse of 
public confidence can be understood as an attempt to dominate the knowledge 
arena, using episteme as a ‘mechanism of power’. In the face of this dominance 
strategy the ontological splinters generated by alternative (qualitative and 
deliberative) approaches to understanding how the public think/feel have not 
been able to mount any effective resistance. This is because they themselves 
remain wedded to epistemology as a legitimising technique, and thus remain 
exposed to the claims from the dominant discourse of public confidence that they 
can only provide unrepresentative, partial or artificial data. By taking the 
epistemological bait the ontological splinters cannot mount any effective 
resistance to the dominant discourse. I then argue that the literature dealing with 
criminology’s public role falls into a similar trap by acknowledging criminological 
pluralism but failing to deal with the tendency of some forms of knowledge to 
dominate others, and ignoring the role played by values in the production of 
criminological knowledge. 
I then propose a way forwards. I argue that Loader and Sparks’s (2010a) notion of 
democratic underlabouring, which requires an orientation towards service and 
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humility on the part of criminologists, is a useful starting point. But I suggest that 
to become truly democratic these underlabourers need to do a number of things, 
including: (i) resist the de-humanizing effect of making episteme a ‘higher 
authority’, even if this is for strategic reasons; (ii) accept that all empirical (or 
primary) criminology is techne; (iii) recognise and acknowledge that reality is not a 
fait accompli, facts are expressions of values, and the role of values in the 
production of facts is and should be accessible to deliberation; (iv) own their 
values and take responsibility for their ontological wakes; (v) avoid pathological 
argument by making their knowledge producing activities more accessible to 
democratic deliberation and dialogue; (vi) be reflexive and theorise. 
In the concluding part of the chapter I argue that there is a case for examining 
whether criminology should continue to exist as a separate field of inquiry. I 
suggest that this discussion should take place as part of a more general debate 
about the future of the social sciences. It is crucial that discussion about 
criminology’s public role should begin by considering the contribution which 
criminological knowledge can make to sustaining democratic ideals. Thus perhaps 
what is needed is a political philosophy of social science in order to prevent social 
scientific knowledge from superceding the perceived need for political philosophy. 
7.2 The public confidence agenda and criminology’s public role 
7.2.1 Summary of key findings 
In Chapter Two I argued that recent years have seen criminologists expressing 
concerns about four features of the criminal justice landscape: (i) the increasingly 
‘punitive’ character of criminal justice policy, which has been widely interpreted as 
signalling (ii) policymakers’ disregard of evidence produced by criminologists in 
favour of pursuing popularity amongst the wider public, who are seen as (iii) 
having a poor level of knowledge and understanding of the ‘facts’ of crime and 
justice, a shortcoming, which is seen as at least partially attributable to (iv) the 
impoverished media discourse on crime and justice.  
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Recognition of some or all of these four features of the criminal justice ‘landscape’ 
has encouraged some criminologists to reflect more explicitly upon the nature and 
achievements of their field. But to understand the criminal justice landscape in 
these terms - that is to say as punitive, ineffective, irrational, populist, and be-
devilled by public ignorance of the ‘truth’ - is already to imply a particular sense of 
what criminology’s public role should or could be. We might summarise this role 
as: (i) informing policy so that irrational, ineffective, punitive policies are not 
enacted; and (ii) educating the public so that policymakers are able to enact 
humane and evidence-based policy without fear of public opprobrium. In other 
words the foundations of ‘public criminology’ were already laid down by the way 
some criminologists conceptualised, interpreted and described the criminal justice 
landscape. 
The burgeoning literature discussing criminology’s public role has tended to deal 
with the inherently plural, value-dependent and contested character of 
criminological knowledge in one of three ways: (i) deplore it; (ii) downplay or 
ignore it; or (iii) acknowledge it then set it aside. In Chapter Two I suggested that 
where the role of values is denied, downplayed or ducked, and where some 
criminologists are content to produce one-dimensional knowledge, the end-users 
of criminological research, whether they are policymakers, journalists, or indeed 
members of the public, are likely to be exposed to only segments of a much larger 
criminological whole. The diverse truths which the criminological enterprise is 
capable of producing are thus effectively obscured, the role of values remains 
invisible, and, on the uneven playing field of a public sphere distorted by vested 
interests, certain kinds of knowledge come to dominate: a certain ‘politics of truth’ 
is secured. I concluded that if criminologists are serious about reflecting on the 
appropriate public role for their work then they must find some way of broaching 
the question of values. 
In Chapter Four I described and deconstructed an expanding body of research into 
the ‘drivers’ of public confidence which has emerged since the late 1990s, 
influenced by more general attitudinal research from the 1980s. Over time this 
body of research has constituted a dominant discourse of public confidence in the 
 259 
 
criminal justice system as a real and measurable subjective state or attitude which 
is caused by the cognitive state of knowing (or failing to know) the ‘facts’ about 
crime and the criminal justice system.  
The dominant discourse has also tended to obscure the value judgement (about 
how public beliefs and feelings should be researched) which underpins the 
construction and reproduction of this understanding of confidence. In line with 
this dominant discourse, researchers already know the kinds of ‘things’ that they 
are looking for, and the ‘procedures of intervention’ which they should apply, and 
they collect, code and interpret data accordingly. The result has been a succession 
of research projects producing similar findings, to very little practical gain. This 
agenda has ‘costs to existence’: it subjects individual citizens to the logic of its 
method, forcing them to engage with that method in order to become ‘visible’ and 
potentially devalues and deflects attention away from other avenues through 
which the public may ‘speak’.  
In Chapter Five I identified the conditions which provided the discursive surfaces 
onto which the idea of public confidence in its dominant contemporary form could 
emerge. These surfaces include: (i) the modernization of approaches to crime and 
justice (which increased the physical distance between ordinary people and the 
institutions of justice); (ii) the expansion and development of statistical techniques 
for accessing ‘reality’; (iii) the introduction of universal adult suffrage attended by 
the development of mechanisms which purported to measure the popularity of 
different policy; (iv) the Left Realist movement in criminology (which advocated 
increased attentiveness to the experiences and perceptions of ordinary members 
of the public through the use of victimization surveys); and (v) the imposition of 
‘New Public Management’ rationales on the public sector, which forced 
organizations to be increasingly attentive to the satisfaction of their ‘customers’.  
These developments combined to make public confidence in its dominant 
contemporary form ‘thinkable’ and ‘doable’, however they did not cause the 
contemporary public confidence agenda to emerge. Rather, a discourse of public 
confidence became ‘hooked into’ the criminal justice discourse, first via reactions 
to the emerging evidence about police corruption in the 1960s and 1970s and 
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subsequently, once the term became established, as a valuable rhetorical token, 
deployed by groups competing for influence in an increasingly heated political 
contest around law and order (a practice I termed ‘playing the confidence card’). 
Through its repeated use the term migrated easily between different textual 
genres (opinion polls, speeches and comments by politicians and senior 
practitioners, parliamentary debates, journalists’ reports, Home Office and 
academic research) and was moulded to the needs and issues of the day. 
In the late 1980 and early 1990s revelations about miscarriages of justice led to 
claims that the criminal justice system was facing a crisis of confidence and 
prompted the appointment of a Royal Commission to address this issue. However 
before the commission had reported its findings a number of high profile and 
highly symbolic criminal justice-related events (including incidents of vigilantism 
and the murder of James Bulger) had taken place against the backdrop of an 
intensification of the political rhetoric around crime and justice. At this point, the 
discourse of public confidence was rapidly turned on its head, away from the focus 
on miscarriages of justice and towards the idea of criminals ‘getting away with it’, 
and the need for the criminal justice system to ‘get tough’. The confidence research 
which emerged in England and Wales from the late 1990s onwards appears to 
have accepted the ‘lay concept’ of public confidence at face value, and has not done 
the necessary preparatory work to render it accessible as a real ‘thing’ (either a 
psychological or a social ‘fact’).  
From the analysis in Chapters Four and Five I concluded that the idea of public 
confidence has always been about the distance which opened up in the modern era 
between between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ ways of knowing about crime and justice. 
Latterly, as newly applied research techniques allowed researchers to ‘measure’ 
public confidence (or so they claimed) those same researchers ‘discovered’ that 
low confidence was statistically associated with a failure to accurately appraise the 
‘reality’ of crime and justice in the terms defined by the experts. From this they 
surmised that poor public knowledge was causally related to low public 
confidence.  In other words the features of modernity (the privileging of expert 
scientific knowledge and the exclusion of the lay public from seeing for 
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themselves) were clearly implicated in the emergence of the dominant discourse of 
public confidence. In this light it seems quite unremarkable that the findings from 
mainstream confidence research have tended to produce repetitive findings about 
poor public knowledge.  
In Chapter Six I argued that data from interviews and focus groups with members 
of the public suggests that much of the public’s mistrust of criminal justice elites 
may stem from their perceptions of social and economic divisions, and from a 
sense of alienation from democratic institutions. I suggested that the dominant 
public confidence agenda may have exacerbated this situation by encouraging 
attempts to educate and inform members of the public about the ‘facts’ of crime 
and justice, thus increasing the extent to which the criminal justice system 
‘markets’ itself, circulating materials which members of the public perceive as 
manipulative. The data suggest that rather than being (as the dominant discourse 
appears to suggest) a private problem, a matter of individuals holding 
misconceptions, public confidence may be better understood as a public issue, 
located in the structural matter of the relationship between elites and ‘ordinary’ 
people.  
7.2.2 The two-fold epistemic aspirations of public confidence research  
Garland (1990: 187) has noted that as the public were increasingly excluded from 
the administration of justice by processes of scientific rationalization and 
bureaucratization that they became more ‘susceptible to misinformation’:  
Sensational headlines, emotive political appeals, or particularly heinous cases 
may lead to outbreaks of popular emotion which lack the counterweight of 
extensive knowledge and moral commitment. In such circumstances, the public 
is still capable of acting upon penal institutions by means of political pressure, 
and it may do so to bad effect. (Ibid: 187) 
He further noted that the professionalization of the administration of punishment 
was not accompanied by sufficient effort to educate the public, thus creating the 
situation where the liberal, educated, professionals were in a state of perpetual 
exasperation with the punitive public and its irrational demands (Ibid: 187-8).  
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This thesis has demonstrated how some of these liberal, educated, professionals 
have translated their exasperation into action in the form of the creation of bodies 
of knowledge which focus on: providing explanations for the obstacles 
encountered on the criminal justice landscape; proposing strategies by which 
criminology can better negotiate these obstacles; producing empirical data on 
attitudes which can be used to manipulate those attitudes. Whilst these bodies of 
knowledge may be presented as intellectual enterprises of a rather different 
character from one another, there are thematic threads (and often overlaps of 
personnel) which link them together.  
Empirical research into public confidence in the criminal justice system, though it 
may appear crude compared to the landscape literature and reflections upon 
criminology’s public role, nonetheless can be read as a logical outworking of the 
themes which run through these more scholarly areas of inquiry. A historical study 
of the emergence of the contemporary public confidence agenda in research 
suggests that it can be best understood as having been predicated on the 
conditions of penal and criminological modernity and animated by a desire to 
preserve these same conditions. In particular, it can be linked to an ‘emphatically 
modern’ understanding of the potential of criminology characterized by ‘its faith in 
instrumental reason, its vision of the technocratic state and its commitment to 
social progress and social engineering’ (Garland and Sparks, 2000: 8).  
Criminologists wedded to this modernist framework felt particularly aggrieved 
that the useful scientific knowledge which they knew criminologists could produce 
was being ignored in favour of a more populist approach. These concerns have 
apparently structured the very composition of an area of empirical inquiry which 
presents itself as a value-free exercise in capturing and explaining a pre-existing, 
real ‘thing’. The case study analysis illustrates how the construction of research 
problems is contingent upon specific historical conditions, and how power 
struggles can both frame a research agenda and make it appear politically and 
socially pertinent.  
The establishment of a body of research-based knowledge about ‘public confidence 
in the criminal justice system’ breathed the oxygen of scientific integrity into what 
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had previously functioned in political rhetoric as a fairly empty rhetorical token. 
Henceforth, due to the existence of a growing ‘scientific’ body of knowledge about 
the factors contributing to public confidence, it would be more difficult for just 
anyone to deploy this token. The rhetorical token thus became an object for 
research and policy as researchers consciously adopted it as such, and began 
producing a relevant body of knowledge which could then be used to inform 
political discussion about ‘what the public wants’ and to prod criminal justice 
agencies into devising communications strategies to impart relevant facts about 
crime and justice to the ignorant public.  
A crucial and telling moment as criminologists and other researchers set about 
bringing into existence the dominant body of knowledge which has shaped the 
object public confidence was the moment at which a value-based decision (about 
how to do research on what the public think and feel about the criminal justice 
system) was described as if it were ontologically mandated. The misrecognition of 
the nature of this decision helped to construct public confidence as a natural 
phenomenon and a real object for research. It contributed to a holding-apart of the 
facts about public confidence from the values which had brought the concept, in 
that particular form, into existence, and failed to acknowledge that its existence 
was predicated on particular historical and social conditions.  
In this omission the public confidence research agenda accepted these conditions 
as given, that is to say as natural and beyond critique. But, what is of more interest 
about this moment, is that it testifies to the public role which criminologists had 
already implicitly assumed, seeing themselves as custodians of ‘truth’, helping to 
shape policymaker and practitioner understandings of what criminological 
knowledge is, where it comes from and how it should be regarded. By breathing 
scientific integrity into the idea of public confidence, and defining it as real, 
criminologists and other researchers reduced a question about values to a matter 
of method: which method was most appropriate to capture and accurately 
represent the ‘real’ phenomenon of public confidence.   
It seems clear that confidence research is predicated upon ‘epistemic’ aspirations 
(see discussion of Flyvbjerg (2001) in Chapter Three): seeking or claiming to 
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provide ‘scientific’ knowledge (which is to say knowledge which is objective, 
universal and context-independent) about public confidence. This epistemic 
knowledge is constructed as having instrumental value: knowing the truth about 
what ‘drives’ public confidence is seen as key to identifying practical confidence-
building interventions. The public confidence agenda thus has a further epistemic 
aspiration: to govern lay epistemologies by bringing public knowledge and ways of 
knowing into line with those preferred by experts.  
As such the public confidence research agenda is both research which aims to have 
a public role and research which promotes a particular understanding of the public 
role of expertise (as the provider of value-free ‘facts’ which, by implication, should 
structure and inform opinion formation amongst members of the public). This dual 
epistemic role makes the public confidence agenda a particularly interesting case 
study for thinking about criminology’s public role because it illustrates how 
criminologists’ own interests (retaining influence and status for expertise) have 
become intertwined with the development of a substantial body of research 
knowledge, which masquerades as value-free.  
However, data from interview and focus groups discussions with members of the 
public indicate that shadowy criminal justice elites and ‘do-gooders’ are seen as 
culturally, economically and spatially distant from ordinary members of the public, 
and that both their ways of knowing and their motives are viewed with suspicion. 
Existing research into public confidence may have exacerbated this situation by 
locating the key to confidence in educating and informing members of the public 
and thus increasing the extent to which the criminal justice system ‘markets’ itself, 
circulating materials which members of the public perceive as manipulative.  In 
effect the dominant discourse of confidence has rendered it a private problem, a 
matter of individuals holding misconceptions, rather than understanding that it 
could also be read as a public issue, located in the structural matter of the 
relationship between elites and ‘ordinary’ people.  
So, not only does the dominant discourse of public confidence reflect the interests 
and self-understandings of modernist criminologists, it also appears blind to the 
public perception of a democratic deficit rooted in the perceived mismatch 
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between lay and expert epistemological frameworks, and the unequal socio-
economic positions which experts enjoy compared to ‘ordinary’ folk.    
7.2.3 Epistemic pretensions as ‘mechanism of power’  
As noted in Chapter Two, in a highly contested ‘marketplace of ideas’, some 
criminologists seem to feel that in order for them to be able to attract potential 
consumers to make use of their wares the criminological field as a whole should 
not draw attention to the diverse and contradictory nature of its stores of 
knowledge. According to this account, criminologists cleave to their epistemic 
aspirations because they fear a loss of influence if their scientific image becomes 
tarnished. This suggests that effects of power are tacitly understood to be achieved 
through making claims to objective truth.  
Power is thus exercised through statements aligned with the ‘ontological illusion’ 
of truth as the accurate representation of an objective reality: objective scientific 
facts are viewed as the currency of legitimacy in a world oriented to the epistemic. 
Yet clinging to epistemic aspirations for instrumental ends amounts to a tacit 
acceptance that no single truth exists, and subordinates any intrinsic value which 
the idea of a criminological ‘truth’ may possess to the value which it has as a 
strategic rhetorical resource. Brandishing epistemic credentials thus seems more 
like a deliberate attempt to dominate the knowledge arena. Seen in this light, the 
good ship modernist criminology appears to be listing at a rather precarious angle.  
Thinking back to the questions which make up the basis for a phronetic inquiry (as 
listed in Chapter Three these are Where are we going? Is this desirable? Why/why 
not? Who gains and who loses? By which mechanisms of power?) we can suggest 
that the mechanism of power at work, glueing in place the dominant survey-based 
approach to eliciting public preferences, opinions and feedback, is the epistemic 
illusion which implies that there must be one single authentic set of preferences 
and opinions, and that the purpose of social research is to use the most 
appropriate method to accurately capture that already existing reality. This 
illusion, as described above, is reinforced through the misrepresentation of value-
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based decisions about how to produce facts as ontologically mandated necessities, 
a manoeuvre which subordinates values to the requirements of methods.  
In the face of the use of epistemic pretensions as a mechanism of power arguments 
for using deliberative methods to gain a more nuanced and reflective 
understanding of public preferences on criminal justice have struggled to gain a 
foothold. Part of the reason for this appears to be that the proponents of 
deliberative approaches cannot resist the lure of the epistemic in their accounts of 
why deliberative methods are preferable. Although the deliberative approach 
offers a more democratically appealing vision of method, and operates with a 
much fuller account of the potential and appropriate role of subjects as political 
agents, under this model reality, represented according to authorized techniques, 
remains at the apex in a hierarchy of objects, and the existence of objective, value-
free facts is not challenged.  Thus deliberative methods are proposed as a way of 
capturing opinions which are a truer reflection of what people really think, once 
they are exposed to (expert-authorised) ‘facts’ and encouraged to engage in 
‘rational’ discussion and reflection. They are also implied to have the potential to 
increase public confidence (that measurable, malleable phenomenon), because 
sustained engagement with the true ‘facts’ through deliberation is ‘known’ to be a 
stimulus to confidence.   
Additionally, proponents of deliberative methods cannot offer a convincing 
account as to how these methods will gain legitimacy in the face of the dominance 
of more traditional survey methods. This failure means that the advocates of 
deliberative methods will always struggle to make a case for their style of research 
to be used more widely under actually existing social and political conditions. 
Why? Because by presenting itself as a novel social scientific method which can be 
practically applied within existing social and political conditions it superimposes a 
discussion of method over the more important discussion about the merits and 
demerits of the substantial social transformation which would be required for 
deliberative methods to gain legitimacy and traction (in the face of the dominance 
of the alternate reality produced by established quantitative methods). Neither the 
circumstances of production for expert-produced facts nor the basic organization 
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of society are up for discussion. The model thus places arbitrary limits around 
what is to be deliberated. Values are thus, once more, subordinated to methods 
and the dominance of the epistemic illusion is maintained102. 
The answer to the phronetic question ‘Where are we going?’, then, appears to be 
‘nowhere’. The confidence agenda has incentivised the production of a predictable 
and repetitive knowledge base with little apparent public benefit, and with 
significant ‘costs to existence’. It is clearly not desirable that criminological efforts 
have been directed in this manner.  
In terms of ‘Who benefits?’, the dominant ‘cognitive deficit model’ of public 
confidence research (see Chapter Four) benefits politicians and the compliant 
experts who have profited through their contribution to the production of a 
predictable and repetitive knowledge base. The (futile) championing of 
deliberative methods, meanwhile, provides an outlet for criminologists who are 
uncomfortable both with the apparently illiberal and punitive turn in recent penal 
policy and with the charge that opposing it is anti-democratic and elitist. Proposing 
the use of deliberative methods for eliciting public preferences allows them to 
refute the latter charge whilst simultaneously upholding a more moderate vision of 
the privilege of expertise. Deliberative measures are, anyway, extremely unlikely 
to be adopted on a large scale without significant change to the political system. In 
both cases the loss is to the public who, whilst subject-ed by the dominant 
cognitive deficit model experience the ‘costs to existence’ outlined in Chapter Four, 
and for whom deliberative methods offer scant hope of change.  
The situation illustrated through the analysis of the public confidence agenda, 
then, militates against the notion of phronesis. Both the dominant cognitive deficit 
model and the ontological splinter created by deliberative methods tend to 
reinforce the notion that the facts of crime and justice can be known in a value-
free, context-independent manner, with members of the public being implicitly 
                                                        
102 This tendency to stick to the epistemic is present in Habermas’s own insistence that people 
generally exhibit a natural tendency towards conversing with a view to consensus, an insistence 
which he used to provide an empirical grounding for his argument for the adoption of discourse 
ethics. It is a shame, in my view, that he felt obliged to cast the veil of science over the value-based 
nature of his proposals.  
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dependent on expert representations to access that reality. They also imply that 
the facts about ‘what the public think’ about crime and justice can similarly be 
known in a value-free fashion.  
The lack of meaningful challenge to the use of epistemic pretensions as a 
mechanism of power is also, as discussed in Chapter Two, present in existing 
discussions about the public role of criminology. Proposals for a public 
criminology, or for criminology as democratic underlabouring, have tended to 
avoid dealing with the issues of criminological pluralism, and the value-based 
nature of criminological facts. However, as I argued in Chapter Three, reflexivity in 
social research should extend to a consideration of what different types of factual 
claims, and the values and assumptions underpinning the investigations which 
allow these claims to be made, imply about, and may do to, the nature of social 
reality. The very methods of social scientific research, then, ought to be subject to   
critique on the basis of values. In the next part of this chapter I argue that this 
principle should be at the core of a criminology which embraces democracy. I also 
propose some principles and procedures through which this can be achieved.  
7.3 After Episteme: Proposals for a democratic criminology  
In this part of my thesis I use the theoretical and empirical points raised above to 
sketch out some proposals for a new way of thinking about criminology’s public 
role. But before I get stuck into this I want to address or, perhaps more specifically, 
to cut off at the pass, the common criticism levelled at any attempt to outline what 
can appear as a radical departure from extant approaches to a particular topic. 
This criticism tends to be organised around the usefully ambiguous notion of 
plausibility, and takes the form of challenging those who critique the way things 
are to outline ‘realistic’ alternative arrangements (whatever realistic may be). Stan 
Cohen (1992: 111) captures the essence of this technique for deflecting critique 
extremely well:  
‘When the establishment demands “alternatives” before contemplating any 
changes, it knows in advance that it can already lay down the framework for 
the discussion. The conservative aims remain taken for granted ... and only the 
means are debated. The demand for alternatives, then, has a conserving effect. 
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Real oppositional values because of their nature must be long-term and 
uncertain. So when opponents are presented with the choice of specifying 
alternatives, they find it difficult to avoid coming close to the prevailing order in 
what they suggest (reform) or emphasizing completely different values and 
thereby being defined away as irresponsible or unrealistic.’ (Cohen, 1992: 111)   
At the risk of being ‘defined away’, then, I am going to make some suggestions 
which may, at first, seem unrealistic. These suggestions are intended to sketch out 
an idea of how criminologists can deal with the plurality of knowledges produced 
by their field without resorting to misrepresenting value-based decisions as 
ontologically mandated and  invoking the notion of a value-free, objective 
criminological truth in order to gain strategic advantage and dominate other forms 
of knowledge. 
I should state at the outset that, like Loader and Sparks (2010a), it is not my 
intention to tell other criminologists what they should or should not do. Rather I 
want to advance for consideration what I think is a potentially more fruitful way of 
thinking about criminology’s public role, one which addresses the failure within 
the existing literature in this area to deal adequately with the issue of extant 
criminological pluralism in the face of the reality of power. I begin by revisiting the 
proposals advanced by the authors of the book which I consider to have made the 
most comprehensive and illuminating contribution to the recent debates about 
criminology’s public role: Loader and Sparks’ (2010a) Public Criminology? In what 
follows I will outline a way in which the rather skeletal idea of criminology as 
democratic underlabouring outlined by Loader and Sparks might have more flesh 
put upon its bones.   
7.3.1 Recovering the democratic under-labourer 
The wisdom of using the rather unwieldy term ‘democratic underlabouring’ has 
been questioned by some of Loader and Sparks’s critics, but I am not particularly 
interested in the eloquence (or otherwise) of  the terminology. Rather I am 
interested in the stuff of democratic underlabouring. These are the bones upon 
which I propose to place some flesh. The backbone of democratic underlabouring 
is composed of two laudable attitudes in any social scientist: service and humility. 
However, where Loader and Sparks’s vision runs into trouble is, as argued in 
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Chapter Two, in their lack of engagement with the seriously truncated version of 
democracy which exists under current political realities.  
When one considers extant political realities, the question ‘labouring under 
whom?’ springs to mind.  A key difficulty is that the value-holding, choice-making 
public, to whom one might assume Loader and Sparks intend that criminologists, 
who are humble in the face of democracy, should show due deference, is 
chronically elusive and, for the most part, its members play only a very limited and 
infrequent role in the political arena. How, then, can the notion of democratic 
underlabouring be brought to life under these conditions? How can criminologists 
be humbly at the public’s service?  
My proposals for a democratic criminology begin from the premise that the first, 
and most important, sense in which criminologists can become more humble is by 
avoiding perpetuating the illusion that the facts they produce are objective, value-
free, context-independent truths. I will explain. 
Zygmunt Bauman has argued that when modernity is prosecuted diligently human 
behaviour can be instrumentalized to the extent that ‘any aim may be pursued 
with efficiency and vigour, with or without ideological dedication or moral 
approval on the part of the pursuers’ (Bauman, 1989a: 93 cited by Tester, 2004: 
124). This can lead to the ‘uncoupling of human being from humanity’ as 
bureaucratic procedures create inhuman social relationships and individuals listen 
not to their consciences, but to ‘the higher authority of the superior’ Tester (2004: 
125). One ‘higher authority’ which is at the core of modernist criminology is the 
illusion of the value-free truth, of criminology as epistemic.  
When criminologists purport to be practicing social research as episteme they 
subordinate values to method, creating a ‘higher authority’ and absenting 
themselves as humans from the activities which they carry out in the service of this 
authority. They become Gouldner’s (1970: 13) ‘moral cretins’:  
‘To limit judgment solely to “autonomous” technical criteria is in effect not only 
to allow but to require men to be moral cretins in their technical roles. It is to 




7.3.2 Empirical criminology as Techne 
Empirical criminological knowledge and indeed, as I argued in Chapter Three, all 
empirical social scientific knowledge (which is to say knowledge of the things 
which are in the world gained through some application of sensory experience of 
that world), is socially produced. As such, empirical criminological work seems to 
be best understood, in line with Flyvbjerg’s argument (see Chapter Three), as 
Techne: the production of knowledge in pursuit of a particular goal, according to 
particular rules of practice, with both goal and rules premised upon particular 
values. 
However, as I have outlined above, some criminologists have tended to claim or 
imply that their work is epistemic, which is to say a universal, context-
independent, value-free method for accessing the truth. This epistemic image can 
be used to enable certain forms of knowledge to dominate others. The 
misrecognition of a value-based decision as ontologically mandated can also be 
understood, then, as a misrecognition of techne (a ‘pragmatic, variable, context-
dependent’ form of knowledge which can be critiqued on the basis of values) as 
episteme (a ‘universal, invariable, context-independent’ form of knowledge which 
is implicitly immune from value-based critique on the basis that it objectively 
represents what is real). If we accept that this is a mistake, and redefine 
empirically-oriented criminological work as techne then we open up a space in 
which phronesis (a value-rational critique) can operate. 
By acknowledging their empirical, evidence gathering role as an exercise in techne 
rather than episteme, and by acknowledging the role of values in structuring 
techne, criminologists would open up a space for phronetic value-rational 
deliberation about their topics and methods. Method would thus be put in the 
service of values and phronesis would precede and overlay techne. Rather than 
values being a matter for discussion and debate only after the production of facts, 
when reality can appear as a fait accompli, this approach would ensure that the 
role that values play prior to the production of facts is acknowledged and owned.   
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This distinction is analogous to the difference between what the public 
understanding of science (PUS) literature calls ‘downstream’ and ‘upstream’ 
consultation (Wynne, 2006: 72 cited by Loader and Sparks, 2010a: 53). However, I 
am not suggesting here that there should be actual public deliberation about the 
content, focus and methods of every criminological investigation (clearly this 
would quickly become unworkable). Rather I propose that for criminological work 
to qualify as truly democratic underlabouring (in the sense of it being about service 
and humility) it should openly acknowledge that its content, focus and methods 
are suitable for deliberation on the basis of values, and that there is no single pre-
existing reality which dictates what criminological research should be, and what it 
should do. In other words, acknowledging that empirical criminological work is 
techne not episteme, opens up a much larger space within which criminologists can 
theoretically be held democratically accountable for the kinds of truth which they 
produce (or do not produce). 
Perhaps, then, as Matthews has noted of Burawoy’s four-fold division of 
sociological labour: ‘It is precisely the inability to join up … different aspects of 
social enquiry that lies at the heart of the problem’ (Matthews, 2009: 342). When 
Loader and Sparks (2010a) proposed that criminological knowledge production 
could be compartmentalized into primary, institutional-critical and normative 
variants they settled on a line of argument which legitimised approaches to 
criminology which did not join up ‘different aspects of social inquiry’. And when 
these different approaches are not joined up this leaves the door open for some 
criminologists to deny or hide the values upon which their evidence-gathering and 
analysis is premised, and to gain advantage in the competitive knowledge market-
place by assuming an epistemic image. In other words if these different modes of 
criminological knowledge production are understood as being legitimately discrete 
activities then this creates conditions which are hostile to Loader and Sparks’s call 
for criminologists to respect and engage with diverse criminological approaches.  
7.3.3 Owning our values: ‘a basic professional obligation’  
In contrast to the division of labour proposed by Loader and Sparks (2010a) I have 
suggested that empirical (or ‘primary’) criminological work should be understood 
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as techne, opening up space for phronesis and requiring criminologists to recognise 
and own the importance of values in constructing their objects and methods of 
research, and to be willing publicly to defend these values. This entails accepting 
that facts are never just facts; they are also expressions of values and assumptions 
about the nature of reality which should always be explicit and open to critique, 
never accepted as given. As criminologists embark upon empirical and theoretical 
inquiries they either actively make value choices about what to study and how, or 
they passively accept the choices made by someone else (Mills, 2000 [1959]). Thus 
all criminologists, one way or another, choose a paradigm and, as Pepinsky notes, 
reason may play only a limited role in this choice: ‘reason cannot dictate whether a 
criminologist chooses to learn within a paradigm of war or a paradigm of 
peacemaking’ (Pepinsky, 1991: 301). The recognition of the role played by values 
is the very essence of being critical in research, and is, or should be, a ‘basic 
professional obligation’ (Loader and Sparks, 2010a: 141) for all social researchers.  
The economist E F Schumacher argued of his own discipline that it was ‘a “derived” 
science which accepts instructions from... meta-economics. As the instructions are 
changed, so changes the content of economics’ (Schumacher, 1993 [1973]: 36). He 
suggested that modern economics has a strong tendency to value means above 
ends, an attitude which ‘destroys man’s freedom and power to choose the ends he 
really favours’ (Schumacher, 1993 [1973]: 36). This criticism could equally apply 
to any of the social sciences: changes in the instructions received from the meta-
level (that is to say the level of values and of ends), will inevitably change the 
content of the discipline, its focus, its methods, its findings. Truth, then, turns out 
to be a function of the ends which are pursued through techne, whether or not 
these are explicitly acknowledged and debated.   
Value choices about how to represent reality, that is to say about what kind of 
evidence to produce in order to facilitate knowing, have social and political 
consequences. Bourdieu has written that: ‘[w]e underestimate the properly 
political power to change social life by changing the representation of social life’ 
(Bourdieu, 1977 cited by Wacquant, 2004: 3). Such is the potential power of social 
scientists, including criminologists, which is why, as I also argued in Chapter Three, 
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they each have an ethical responsibility to consider the potential consequences of 
the ontological ripples which they create.  
Some criminologists appear to wish to escape this responsibility by pleading for 
(or implicitly assuming) the existence of a single knowable reality which precedes 
their representations of it, thus rendering their representations accessible to 
critique only on the basis of how accurately they represent that knowable reality, 
rather than the ethical acceptability of their choice about how to represent reality 
(which is also a choice about how not to represent reality, as well as about which 
aspect of reality to represent). To avoid taking responsibility for the realities we 
produce, to deny the role played by values in what we do, is to place the activities 
which comprise social science outside of the realm of things which can be 
deliberated. This seems to me to be profoundly anti-democratic.   
My argument is not intended to deny the ability of criminologists to produce 
worthwhile evidence. Rather it is intended to highlight that such evidence should 
not be mistaken for reality. Social scientists should offer evidence, indeed that is 
what social scientists do, but no one type of evidence alone is enough, and all 
evidence is premised on value-based decisions. A democratic criminology would 
acknowledge the ethical responsibilities which this implies. Perhaps, then, in the 
context of a far from ideal democratic public sphere, the democratic under-
labourer must also become the phronetic under-labourer: aware of and 
comfortable with the values which animate her work, and committed to publicly 
defending them, whilst using those methods and pursuing those ends which are 
compatible with those values103.          
7.3.4 ‘Social science as public philosophy’: An argument for democratic 
dialogue 
As I have already argued, it seems quite futile to deplore, denounce, deny or 
downplay the inherent pluralism of criminological knowledge. But neither is it 
particularly helpful merely to acknowledge it by accepting that argumentation is 
                                                        
103 Such self-awareness would also involve following Melossi’s advice (2008: 252) to ask oneself: 
‘What is the connection between the sociological discourse I am producing about social control and 
deviance, and the society in which I live today?’ 
 275 
 
good, making, as Loader and Sparks (2010) do ‘an argument in favour of 
argumentation’, or following Barak’s (1988) prescription for a ‘newsmaking 
criminology’ which simply brings oppositional knowledge discourses into the 
public sphere. It seems clear from the literature and from the public confidence 
case study that, when diversity and disagreement are accompanied by dominance 
achieved through the strategic (albeit often implicit) deployment of the illusion of 
an objective, value-free truth then argumentation becomes pathological. I am not 
arguing against argumentation. In the face of knowledge diversity, conflict 
between knowledges is inevitable. The question is whether we can find more 
constructive ways of responding to such conflict.  
My contention is that, faced with this inevitable conflict, rather than being drawn 
into debating only the outer layers of research (its findings, the adequacy of its 
methods, the reasonableness of its epistemological assumptions), criminologists 
with a responsible and self-reflective attitude towards their public role (which is to 
say the phronetic under-labourers described above) should want to get at the 
differences which really matter. That is to say they should want to drill down to the 
roots of disagreement, to reach (or at least try to reach) agreement about the 
points of disagreement, to identify the point at which argumentation becomes 
futile and shrill, where what political philosopher Alasdair Macintyre calls 
‘conceptual incommensurability’ is reached and ‘the invocation of one premise 
against another becomes a matter of pure assertion and counter-assertion’ 
(Macintyre, 1985: 8).  
This is not an exercise in interminable navel gazing, it is a responsible, (and, 
potentially, consensual and collaborative) search for the point at which agreement 
is no longer possible in order to recognize why agreement is not possible. This 
approach should facilitate a much clearer recognition of the differences (in values 
and basic assumptions) between pieces of research, and, crucially, should enable 
external audiences to understand how and why criminological work is so varied, as 
well as to adjudicate, on the basis of values, between different approaches to 
knowing about crime.  
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Only once the question of values has been considered should we return to the 
epistemic-style questions about whether the evidence proffered justifies the 
conclusions drawn by the researchers, whether they have followed the rules of 
method accepted in their field, whether the reporting of their findings is clear, 
coherent and non-contradictory. This approach would recognise that where the 
initial phronetic critique has drilled down to a serious and irreconcilable difference 
about the values upon which the research is premised, internal technical matters 
of method become somewhat irrelevant, and to engage in sustained debate at this 
level will merely be ‘academic’, will likely become ‘shrill’ (MacIntyre, 1985) and 
will ultimately detract from what could be a much more powerful critique on the 
basis of values. 
Although Loader and Sparks (2010a) use a quotation right at the beginning of their 
book which emphasises the importance of ‘dialogue’ between the experts and the 
public they do not follow through on this early promise to provide a convincing 
account of how real democratic dialogue can be nurtured. They leave the question 
hanging: dialogue about what? The quotation which Loader and Sparks use is from 
Bellah et al (2008 [1985]) whose work, if Loader and Sparks had followed up on 
their introductory quotation, does provide some clear pointers about the matters 
upon which social scientists should engage in dialogue with the wider public.  
Bellah et al (2008 [1985]: 301) argue that all social scientific endeavour, whether 
or not it acknowledges this, emerges from assumptions about what constitutes ‘the 
good’ on an individual and a societal level. These assumptions have deep cultural 
roots and, crucially they are always open to challenge. Bellah et al propose ‘[s]ocial 
science as public philosophy’, an approach which would ‘make the philosophical 
conversation concerning these matters its own’. Because Loader and Sparks 
(2010a) do not engage in further discussion of Bellah et al’s proposals they neglect 
to reflect upon the high importance which Bellah et al attach to discussions of 
values, or to acknowledge their claim that social research simultaneously employs 
analysis and moral reasoning (Bellah et al, 2008 [1985]: 303). But, as I have 
outlined above, these issues are crucial if the notion of democratic underlabouring 
as service and humility, is to be brought to life in a meaningful way. 
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Flyvbjerg identifies Bellah et al (2008 [1985]) as a good example of phronetic 
research in action. The goal of such research, Flyvbjerg argues, is ‘to produce input 
to the ongoing social dialogue and praxis in a society, rather than to generate 
ultimate, unequivocally verified knowledge’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 139). By rejecting 
the ‘higher authority’ of episteme, owning up to their values, and taking 
responsibility for their ontological wakes, criminologists will be in a much stronger 
position to be phronetic in their outlook, and thus to nurture real democratic 
dialogue about crime and criminal justice and produce the ‘better politics’ which 
Loader and Sparks (2010a) seek.  
If we return for a moment to the dominant discourse of public confidence and its 
‘costs to existence’ we may have cause to wonder whether this research, couched 
in epistemic language with the will to dominance which that implies, really has any 
valuable contribution to make to such a ‘better politics’. C. Wright Mills argued that 
the social scientist should seek  
‘to combat all those forces which are destroying genuine publics and creating a 
mass society – or put as a positive goal his aim is to help build and to 
strengthen self-cultivating publics’ (Mills, 2000 [1959]: 186)  
However, identifying tendencies in society and social science which ran contrary to 
Mills’s hope, Bellah et al argued that the Americans they spoke to during their 
research lacked a vocabulary and conceptual framework to talk coherently about 
their involvement in social life and groups, and about social connectedness. They 
suggested that this lack of vocabulary could itself weaken these bonds. They 
argued that the problem was reproduced within a sociology which had become 
utilitarian, individualistic and problem-solving (2008 [1985] cited by Seidman, 
2004: 111).  
As I argued in Chapter Four, those researchers who treat public confidence in the 
criminal justice system as a real object which is measurable, malleable, and caused 
by other external and measurable objects, construct subjects as individual 
consumers of public services, circumscribe their subjective potential and the 
legitimate avenues for its expression and thus appear to contribute to a damaging 
‘suppression of … connectedness’ (Lawler, 2008: 149). Meanwhile, in Chapter Five 
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and above I have suggested that the dominant discourse of public confidence 
reflects the interests and outlook of modernist criminologists and thus is blind to 
the possibility that these very things, as well as the apparent socio-economic 
divides with which they are perceived to correlate, may well be what underpins 
the public’s perception that there is a democratic deficit in the way criminal justice 
is pursued. By circumscribing opportunities for its subjects to express their views, 
by remaining blind to the possibility that expert ways of knowing may be 
mistrusted, and by undermining the case for using deliberative methods to 
understand how the public think and feel about crime and justice, the dominant 
discourse of public confidence thus simply seems to reproduce the conditions 
which it favours at the expense of offering a true democratic engagement. 
7.3.5 Unleashing the democratic potential of social constructionism  
Holdaway and Rock (1998: 7) have argued that, in the wake of a storm of 
theorising by a ‘fortunate generation’ of criminologists, criminological theorising 
has been in decline, coming to be seen as a private matter involving disputes 
which, if publicly aired, are unhelpful or unproductive. I fear that the contribution 
of this thesis may be regarded by some as veering towards the latter but, 
nonetheless, on the basis of the matters which I have explored, I can come to no 
other conclusion than that at the current moment more theorising (which must 
include reflection upon the conditions of existence for criminological knowledge) 
is what is needed.  
It should therefore be a matter of concern that, as Holdaway and Rock (1998: 10) 
also maintain, theory has ‘become subterranean in the work of the many 
criminologists who are simply too pressed, too preoccupied with the empirical, too 
dependent on funding agencies uninterested in speculation, or too jaded to 
conduct their theorising publicly and as a main pursuit’ (Holdaway and Rock, 
1998: 10). Without theorising, I concur with Holdaway and Rock (1998: 181-2) 
‘criminology fades into an over-evaluated nothingness, speaking the language of 




A theory-blind criminology is an anti-democratic techne masquerading as episteme, 
operating in blissful denial about the ‘costs to existence’ of knowing in one way, 
rather than another, and thus placing the production of knowledge, and the 
different ends towards which it can be oriented outside of the realms of public 
deliberation. Under such conditions the dominance of episteme operates, there can 
be no constructive debate about criminology’s public role and criminology cannot 
be considered democratic. Criminologists who are committed to pursuing their 
work democratically must be prepared to reflect theoretically and thus to do at 
least some institutional-critical and normative work, in addition to primary 
empirical work (or techne). 
Insisting that criminologists theorize in order to drill down to identify the 
differences in the values and basic assumptions which underpin their work may 
mean letting certain criminological ‘separatists’ go their own ways if they will not, 
or cannot, own their values and basic assumptions. For example, the proper place 
for the narrow concerns of ‘crime science’ may well be (as its proponents appear to 
wish) outside of the criminological stable, where they can be subjected to 
appropriate critique. Of course ‘crime science’ is a (deliberately?) provocative 
name, and official descriptions of the content of this new ‘discipline’ appear to 
signal aggressive intentions towards traditionally criminological territory. It is 
unsurprising, then, that Matthews (2009: 359) has argued that we should deplore 
‘the proliferation of poorly conceived one-sided criminologies that make little or 
no contribution to progressive social reforms’ (Matthews, 2009: 359).  
However, in order to effectively resist crime science it is, I believe, necessary to 
also challenge Matthews’s complete rejection of what he calls ‘idealist’ social 
constructionism. This he says:  
‘assumes that anything can be socially constructed as if by exercise of collective 
wishful thinking, and that our capabilities and susceptibilities are themselves 
voluntaristically constructed. From this perspective concepts of oppression, 
exploitation or abuse are incomprehensible because the damage involved is 
only seen to exist in the mind of the beholder(s)’ (Matthews, 2009: 346).  
This belief he takes to be incompatible with critical criminology, which aims to 
‘assess the practical adequacy or objectivity of different social constructions and 
 280 
 
this task assumes a degree of objectivity of the social phenomenon in question’ 
(Ibid: 346). He goes on to state that ‘recognizing the socially constructed nature of 
crime does not make it discursively revisable’ (Ibid: 346). 
Matthews’s (2009) understanding of what ‘idealist’ social constructionism entails 
diverges from my own (as outlined in Chapter Three). For me he constructs a 
straw man, and misrepresents its capacity to recognise some (usefully) emotive 
categories of human behaviour ‘oppression, exploitation and abuse’. As I argued in 
Chapter Three, the strong critical edge of social constructionism is that it renders 
all representations contingent and examines their ‘costs to existence’. This does 
not necessarily have to mean that it does away with them, or denies their inter-
subjective significance. The critical anti-representationalism which I outlined in 
Chapter Three argued instead for an ethical approach to socially constructed 
objects which would ask ‘what must the world be like to make this reality 
possible?’. Clearly such an approach would be well able to accommodate ideas 
such as ‘oppression, exploitation and abuse’ if it saw that there was ethical and 
practical value in retaining and using them to help structure our ways of knowing.  
The important thing, then, is to recognise that, although reality cannot be known 
outside of discourse and our knowledge of reality is socially constructed through 
our inter-subjectively shared resources which can themselves have ‘reality effects’, 
nonetheless we can deliberate (with each other and with the wider public) about 
the value of different ways of representing, constructing and knowing reality. 
Indeed, my contention throughout this thesis has been that we should subject our 
ways of knowing to deliberation on the basis of values. Furthermore, perhaps a 
criminology which is more confident in the values which inform its work will be 
better placed to challenge crime science’s one-dimensional way of knowing and its 
dismissal of criminology as a failing science104 and to demonstrate the broader 
social value of a range of different ways of knowing about crime. 
                                                        
104 See for example Clarke, 2004. See also the website of the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science 
(http://www.ucl.ac.uk/jdi/) which describes its purpose as setting out a ‘new scientific approach to 
crime’ which contrasts with traditional approaches to crime by being ‘an evidence-based, problem-
solving approach that embraces empirical research. Adopting the scientific method, crime scientists 
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7.4 Breaking eggs?: Can criminology survive in a post-epistemic age? 
I started this thesis from the position that dominance must be challenged, as 
Foucault counselled, by exposing the contingent nature of ideas and their 
relationships with power. I hope I have outlined a way in which this critique can be 
usefully extended beyond the accusatory through a consensual use of 
intersubjectively shared resources to search for the point at which disagreements 
arise – the point of conceptual incommensurability. This process is not a miracle 
cure to what some regard as criminology’s Achilles’ heel: the plurality of its 
methods, evidence and conclusions. Rather, by attempting to track down and agree 
on the points upon which they disagree perhaps some criminologists may change 
their minds and find a way to agree. Still more may continue to disagree, but with a 
clearer sense of why they disagree, having made more explicit the assumptions and 
values which they hold and which inform the knowledge which they produce so 
that these can be subject to public scrutiny and criminology can properly consider 
itself democratic. 
It is highly probable that following the approach I have described above may lead 
to the conclusion that criminology no longer works as a meaningful descriptor for 
any recognisably distinctive activity. Some may suggest that this point has already 
been reached, and that the primary function of the word ‘criminology’ is as a brand 
name, signposting potential consumers towards a sub-set of knowledge workers 
who often share little more than an interest in ‘crime’.  However, although the 
subtitle for this final section poses the question of whether criminology can 
survive in the kind of post-epistemic phronetic future this chapter has imagined, I 
don’t think this question is mine to answer.  
For I have been conscious whilst writing this thesis that I am writing about a field 
of which I have never truly felt a part. Although I have presented at criminological 
conferences and exchanged ideas with people who carry out their academic work 
under the banner of criminology I have never worked or studied in an institution 
                                                                                                                                                                  
collect data on crime, generate hypotheses about crime patterns and trends, and build testable 
models to explain observed findings’. 
 282 
 
which has a department of criminology, or received any formal instruction in 
criminological thought. This of course, I have in common with many other 
individuals whose work deals with issues of crime and its control, but that is not to 
say that this is a trivial or irrelevant point. It is highly likely to have bearing on my 
sense that there is ‘no necessity’ in criminology, a sense which I suspect shines out 
like a beacon from this text. 
My suspicion is that we are, in any case, a long way from a phronetic future, and 
that the idea of criminology, (that is the idea that ‘crime’ is such a unique, real, and 
important social phenomenon that it deserves its very own -ology) will retain its 
power in the context of a future which looks likely to bring increasing economic 
polarization and social unrest at the societal level, and insecurity and fear for the 
individuals affected. Perhaps the better question, then, rather than ‘can 
criminology survive?’ - an epistemic question which is always unanswerable in the 
present - is ‘should criminology survive?’ - a phronetic question for which many 
answers are possible, and upon which every criminologist no doubt has his or her 
own, ultimately value-based, opinion.  
In my own view, criminology cannot sensibly debate its future in isolation from 
debates happening about the future of the social sciences more generally. It is 
unhelpful for criminologists to become fixated upon the survival of ‘criminology’, 
at the expense of the survival of what the best examples of the kind of knowledge 
produced under its colours can achieve. What seems to be needed is a political 
philosophy of the social sciences, in order to prevent social scientific knowledge 
from superseding the perceived need for there to be ongoing dialogue about how 
we should live together, which includes the basis upon which we should make 
claims to know about each other and about ourselves. What is, I believe, most 
important is that future discussion about criminology’s public role begins from a 
consideration of the contribution which our value-based processes of 
criminological knowledge production, in all their manifest forms, are making and 
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Appendix 1 – Interview Schedule 
SECTION 1: OBJECTS 
Why do we need a criminal justice system? 
Why is that important to you in your day to day life? What should the CJS be doing to 
achieve those aims? What is it about ---- which you think would help the criminal 
justice system ----? What do you mean by ----? Do you think the CJS is doing this? Is 
there anything that you think the CJS is doing well? 
SECTION 2: CONDITIONS 
What sort of information do you use to find out about what the CJS is 
doing?   Why is that convincing? Is there any information about the 
criminal justice system which you don’t use? Why not? How does your own 
personal experience in your local area and day to day life affect your view 
of the criminal justice system? Is crime something you think about often?  
SECTION 3: BEHAVIOUR 
How do your views about the criminal justice system affect the way you behave? 
In the survey you were asked whether or not you would contact the police in certain 
specific scenarios. I would like to go back and talk about some of these scenarios in a 
bit more detail. 
Would you call the police in that situation? OK so why might you not call the police? 
What else might you do? Is that a situation where you think people should be calling 
the police? Would you like to be able to call the police in that situation? 
SECTION 4: BEING LISTENED TO 
Do you think that your views about the CJS are quite typical? 
What gives you that impression? What other points of view are you aware 
of? Do you think the CJS listens to views like yours? Who does the system 




Appendix 2 – Focus Group Schedule 
SECTION 1: OBJECTS 
Why do we need a criminal justice system? 
What should its main aims be? Why are these things important? What should the 
CJS be doing to achieve those aims? What is it about ---- which you think would 
help the criminal justice system ----? What do you mean by ----? Do you think the 
CJS is doing this? Is there anything that you think the CJS is doing well? 
SECTION 2: CONDITIONS 
What sort of information do you use to find out about what the CJS is 
doing? 
Why is that convincing? Is there any information about the criminal justice 
system which you receive but don’t use? Why not? How does your own 
personal experience in your local area and day to day life affect your view 
of the criminal justice system? Is crime something you think about often? 
SECTION 3: BEHAVIOUR How do your views about the criminal justice system 
affect the way you behave? In the survey you were asked whether or not you 
would contact the police in certain specific scenarios. I would like to go back and 
talk about some of these scenarios in a bit more detail. How many people would 
definitely call the police in that situation? OK so why might you not call the 
police? What else might you do? Is that a situation where you think people should 
be calling the police? Would you like to be able to call the police in that situation? 
SECTION 4: BEING LISTENED TO 
Do you think that the criminal justice system listens to views like 
yours?    
What gives you that impression? Who does the system listen to? Who 
should the system listen to? How can the system listen better? Do you 
think your views are typical? What other points of view are you aware of? 
 
